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POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION AS INSTITUTIONAL 
DISINTEGRATION: EXPLAINING THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
RECESSION
K. Z. POZNANSKI
The most important aspect o f the so-called transition from a communist economy is that 
each reforming country has immediately entered into massive recession. Only a systemic de­
terioration could cause such a negative econom ic turn. State agency was at the core o f the 
communist-type system and the role o f the state remained central during the transition as well.
It was the weakening o f the state in the process of its own reforming— or reinventing— that was 
responsible for the growing econom ic pains of the late communism. Further decline in the state’s 
ability a n d /or willingness to manage economic affairs forced Eastern European economies into 
an even deeper distress. The greater the damage to the state capabilities, the more severe the 
recession, as comparison o f Poland and Russia amply reveals. In contrast, where the state, while 
being reformed itself, remained firmly in charge, as in China, converting the communist system 
into the capitalist one has been recession-free.
There are many different conceptualizations o f post-communist transition, 
but it can be said that most of them are open to question. In fact, the com ­
monest way o f looking at the transition process is possibly the most inadequate. 
The historic transition in Eastern Europe (broadly defined to include the Euro­
pean parts o f the former Soviet Union) is generally viewed as a positive process 
o f institution-building—-that is, o f bringing back competitive markets and private 
property. However, this conceptualization has not served the post-communist re­
formers well when making policy choices, though admittedly there are other, less 
benign reasons for such choices. These errors are in large part responsible for the 
initial establishment o f some rather unstable, half-reformed economic systems, and 
these negative systemic outcomes have in turn led to the disappointments of the 
early stages of transition. In particular, they can be blamed for the unprecedented 
region-wide recession, which has shaved off about one quarter o f the national prod­
uct o f Eastern Europe.
I take a contradictory view: transition, if viewed properly, should be seen 
as an open-ended process that may assume a positive institution-building form; 
however, transition may also turn into a negative institution-degrading process.
We should not think about the transition exclusively in terms o f a replacement of 
communism by capitalism; this immediately creates positive images o f change be­
cause we tend to associate capitalism with efficiency and progress and communism 
with waste and regression. There is nothing wrong with this image if taken as a 
general proposition, but to succeed with a specific analysis, instead o f focusing on
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markets and property (the two categories used to define the differences between 
communism and capitalism), one should look at this systemic process in terms of 
what is happening to the two other institutions found in both o f these systems: 
state agency and civic order (i.e. society).
From this alternative perspective, transition cannot be judged as anything but 
a largely negative development, for it has simultaneously caused a major weakening 
o f both the state and society. States have become more autonomous or alienated 
by allowing the private interests of their officials to override public interests not 
only in growth, stability, and equity but also in safety. At the same time, societies 
have turned from civic to selfish drives, making effective operation o f the state 
much more problematic. Transition has been a negative— regressive— process, not 
only due to this state/society degradation but primarily because some degrated 
markets and property have only just been able to emerge. While these economies are 
moving towards capitalism, markets are plagued by undue political influence, excess 
speculation, breaches o f contracts, etc. In addition, property, while increasingly in 
private hands, has initially become grossly undefined and generally insecure.
I find this state-society approach superior to the one centred on markets and 
property, since markets and property can function only if embedded in a healthy 
state-society setting. Sound markets and property require extensive competition 
and stable ownership, which only come with effective state regulation o f business 
dealings and an effective enforcement of property rights. Perhaps even more impor­
tant for the soundness o f markets and ownership is that society accepts competitive 
outcomes— possible loss and reward diversity— and displays respect for property as 
well. Thus, when state and/or society deteriorates, the foundations o f private mar­
kets are fractured as well— which is exactly what has happened to the economic 
systems in transition countries.
Those who take the view o f transition as a move from communism to capi­
talism cannot usually reconcile their positive position on systemic change with the 
striking fact that at the time o f this systemic change all the economies o f the region 
have gone into unprecedented recession. As a general rule, the presence o f this re­
cession is denied or downplayed on the grounds that much of the decline in output 
is overstated by imprecise statistics; the latter suffered from manipulations by the 
planners under communism and are now unable to capture the qualitative change 
brought by transition. Typical explanations o f the recession are hard to square with 
the economic realities o f the transition, but, quite surprisingly, this line o f reasoning 
usually goes unchallenged. Only when the alternative view—which concentrates on 
changes in state and society— is adopted can one reasonably address some o f the 
discomforting aspects o f economic performance in transition economies.
Taking this position, I argue that no single factor other than the parallel 
collapse of state and society, combined with the reappearance of deformed markets 
and unstable property, can explain the recessions that have erupted in transition 
countries. Nothing other than an institutional implosion can account for a recession
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as massive as the one that has ravaged post-communist Eastern Europe. This is far 
worse than any modern recession, including the Great Depression in the 1930s. This 
well-remembered episode in the capitalist past can be also linked to an institutional 
break-up, though of visibly less severity; this explains why the Great Depression 
was less damaging (though not on all accounts, since investment, in general, has 
suffered less during the post-communist transition).
The transition process has not been uniform in the region, and there are cer­
tainly major differences in both the conduct o f reforms and the pattern o f recessions 
in the respective countries. While all states in Eastern Europe have entered their 
own crises, some important differences in the exact mechanisms of these respective 
crises are apparent. It can be demonstrated that, depending on the nature o f the 
state crisis, the severity o f respective recessions also differs. The countries where 
systemic change has been more radical have seen their economies deteriorate more 
than those with a more measured or conservative approach. Moreover, whenever 
the systemic process has been more chaotic, the economic results have been worse 
than in those cases where reforms have proceeded in a rather systemic way. Con­
sequently, the worst cases o f recession have been in those economies where reforms 
have been the most radical in speed and chaotic in fashion.
The relatively limited crisis o f the state can be linked to radical changes in 
the name o f creating a “minimum state” , conducted in a rather organized way by 
a still-coherent state. This has undoubtedly been the case in Poland, where the 
(crafted in a liberal fashion) “shock therapy” programme was intended to achieve 
exactly this. Poland is for this reason the country least damaged by recession. 
Hungary seems to fall into the same category, for the reformers here acted with 
a similar minimum-state vision in mind, though Hungarian measures have been, 
at least initially, more conservative. The significantly worse, nearly catastrophic 
recession which has hit Russia and Ukraine can in turn be linked to the much more 
radical and, at the same time, chaotic changes which have taken place while the 
state has virtually collapsed due to the evaporation o f its authority.
In order to succeed without a massive recession— i.e. to cut recession down 
to a manageable size or to avoid it altogether— transition economies did not need 
a sudden weakening o f the state, as actually occurred, but careful reform o f it. 
There was nothing unusual about a powerful state under communism, because all 
modern economies are characterized by powerful states, and as markets expand so 
do states. Rather, what was, if one could use this term, “non-modern” about the 
communist state was its peculiar type of behaviour with respect to other economic 
agents: both enterprises and households. The communist state was not doing 
the right type o f things, and these had to be changed in the course o f transition 
while keeping the state— in part because o f the needs o f the pro-market reforms 
themselves— very powerful in order to provide a largely different set o f services 
required for the market to operate properly.
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Instead o f taking the view of the early reformers— i.e. that transition entails 
a substitution o f states by markets— the process should be viewed as a parallel 
restructuring of both states and markets. After the collapse o f communism as a 
political system, a different, though not necessarily lesser, state was needed, and 
different, not necessarily more, markets were required. Transition entails a restruc­
turing o f states into agencies which are to be compatible not with the hegemonic 
party— as its superior— but with a market. It is not that markets had to be in­
vented, since they already existed under communism, but rather that they have had 
to be further articulated. In short, transition involves moving from the existing, 
largely informal, and defective markets with low payoffs, to formal and effective 
markets where rewards are generous and diversified.
Opening remarks: false conceptualizations and fictionalization of reality
It is truly amazing what has recently happened to the general attitude within 
that group of professional economists involved in the study o f East European 
economies. With the departure o f communism, the profession’s evaluation o f the 
regional economic situation has completely changed from a very negative assess­
ment about both the economic system and the related economic performance to a 
very positive evaluation o f both. The communist state-run system was typically 
blamed for a confusing form o f decision-making and for what was perceived to be an 
increasingly disappointing regional economic performance; the latter was frequently 
described as economic stagnation. Then, with all former communist countries mov­
ing into transition, the region suddenly started receiving a favourable evaluation 
for its reformed institutions and for an economic performance it had apparently 
started to produce.
Communism was correctly criticized for running an inefficient and, in some 
ways, irrational system; however, even with all these imperfections, it delivered 
some measure o f economic growth right up to its last days. If official statistics are 
to be trusted, the economies grew everywhere (except for Hungary, which spent the 
last ten years of communism with an overall flat level of national production. Poland 
is another special case, since it was the only communist country in the region that 
registered a serious economic crisis under communism, though this happened some 
time before the end o f the system (during 1979-1982). Later, Poland’s economy 
expanded year by year at a respectable rate, though the quality of production—  
due to limited imports— was at the same time falling visibly. The same technical 
(qualitative) deterioration was taking place elsewhere in Eastern Europe, meaning 
that real economic growth was less than suggested by production figures alone.
This regional growth slowed considerably just before the post-1989 transi­
tions officially started; however, this cannot be blamed on communism, since these
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slowdowns took place during an interim phase. In some places, like Poland, major 
reforms had taken place shortly before the 1989 transfer of power from the commu­
nist party, and many o f these changes— often quite bold (e.g. reduction in farming 
subsidies and price supports)— had a disturbing effect on production. Bulgaria suf­
fered economic slowdown before 1989, largely due to adverse developments in its 
agriculture (in part due to migration by members o f the Turkish minority, mostly 
engaged in farming). The sharpest pre-1989 downturn took place in Romania, 
which was not due to reforms, as in Poland, but rather to disarray in the state 
administration.
Even if the above statistical observation was incorrect and the late communist 
economy, as some argue, was suffering from a region-wide recession in disguise, this 
does not impact my main point. Even with the performance as bad as some would 
suggest, the regional economy after 1989, when post-communist changes were ini­
tiated, took a negative turn which was far worse than the one attributed to late 
communism. It is doubtful that any o f these critics would go as far as to claim that 
post-Soviet Russia has suffered less than Brezhnev’s or Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. 
But while the early post-communist performance looks like a catastrophe— again, 
even this interim period is ignored— there is very little, or no talk among main­
stream economists about the emerging replacement— i.e. some form o f capitalism—  
as being equally or possibly even more irrational than the communist system used 
to be.
To understand this attitude it is necessary to examine the dominant view on 
the transition from communism— that is, the view shared as much by the post­
communist reformers as by the broad public. From this perspective, the process 
o f undoing communism is viewed narrowly as a process o f remaking a complex 
system of institutions. Importantly, this process is defined as a straightforward 
substitution o f (communist) states by (capitalist) markets, which itself is assumed 
to ensure systemic improvement. Accordingly, the progress o f transition is mea­
sured in terms o f shrinking states and expanding markets, particularly the spread 
of private property and the decline in state holdings. When reformers indeed en­
gage in the replacement o f states with markets, o f course there cannot be any lack 
o f measurable evidence that transition is a success.
When transition is defined in such purely positive terms— as a sort o f “salva­
tion” , or final solution to various systemic problems from the more or less distant 
past— it easily becomes incomprehensible that switching from presumed-inferior 
states to assumed-superior markets may produce the opposite. In addition, when 
some major economic distress comes along, such as the massive post-1989 reces­
sion which has accompanied the transition from the start, there is a tendency to 
dismiss it as an illusion linked to the very nature o f transition. Alternatively, it is 
admitted that it is a real economic phenomenon but one which is not directly linked 
to the actual policy choices o f the post-communist reformers. Instead, this negative
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outcome is blamed by mainstream economic opinion on the initial conditions, left 
as an inescapable legacy o f the now-defunct communist system.
Reality o f recession. Using official national accounts, one finds that even 
the luckiest countries o f all, such as Hungary and Poland, suffered an initial loss 
o f their total production— close to twenty percent continuously in three and two 
years respectively. Others, such as the Czech Republic, saw their national income 
go down by almost twenty-five percent three years in a row, and in Bulgaria and 
Romania the total incomes fell by close to thirty percent for four and five years 
respectively. When transition started in East Germany, the loss was even worse, 
totalling as much as thirty-five percent in a single year, and when the former Soviet 
Union initiated its reforms, its cumulative output losses often reached fifty percent 
(e.g. Russia and Ukraine), or sometimes turned out as high as sixty percent (e.g. 
in the post-Soviet Lithuania).
Although, I will concede, that there are serious measurement problems with 
national accounts, these problems are not impossible to overcome. Furthermore, 
importantly, when some other more reliable indicators are applied, there cannot be 
any doubt that the recessions have been very real— and undeniably very bad. If one 
prefers not to look at official national income figures, there are some physical data 
on production that undeniably show a sudden downturn, such as in agriculture (e.g. 
in Hungary, where real— corrected for inflation— output was down by 50 percent 
as late as in 1997) or in certain heavy industries (e.g. coal-mining in Poland, where 
output fell by 40 percent through 1993). A parallel decline in pollution can only 
be attributed to this fall in production (given that environmental laws did not 
instantly become stricter or more enforceable nor could anybody have managed so 
quickly to put anti-pollution measures into place.
Sharp demographic deterioration is another, possibly even more trustworthy 
piece of evidence indicating the enormous depth o f the post-communist recessions. 
For instance, the officially reported shortening o f lifespans cannot be blamed on 
statistical inadequacies, as there cannot be any serious incentive for people to over­
report death. The reports on lifespan shortening are quite alarming, particularly 
in Russia, where the average span among males, after making some gains late in 
the eighties, showed a decline o f five to six years (bringing it to the level typical of 
the most impoverished countries). Statistics on fertility losses, which are also hard 
to doubt, provide further proof that transition entailed a demographic crisis, and 
thus itself cannot be treated as anything else but crisis.
Even those who accept the recessions as real often refuse to address the 
issue o f recession itself on the basis that it has been quickly made irrelevant by 
the subsequent recoveries, which are presumably spreading to all corners o f the 
region. This view is fuelled by the fact that many have already recovered from 
the recession and show strong production growth and healthy budgets that are 
often admirable by European standards. One o f these economies is the Polish, in 
which recession lasted for a little less than two years, and in which annual rates of
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national product growth have since been in excess o f five percent. Other countries 
have shown healthy, steady recovery as well, such as Slovenia and, somewhat slower, 
Slovakia. Poland is most often mentioned in these positive accounts, because there 
is a tendency to view Poland as the country which, from the start o f transition, has 
paved the way for the region.
Some other recoveries have already managed to move from one recession to 
another, in particular Bulgaria in 1996-97, where a ten-percent decline in national 
product was reported; not only Romania in 1996 but also the Czech Republic in 
1997 showed respective declines, and in Hungary in 1995, only minimal growth 
was experienced. Importantly, in many critical cases, like the populous countries 
o f Russia and Ukraine, recessions have not yet been arrested, though they started 
almost seven years ago. In the case o f Russia, with an already suffering economy, 
it was lucky to delay further decline for two years; Russia took another major hit 
in the mid-1998 downturn, highlighted by a remarkable fall of the ruble by one 
third and a huge run on dollars. While the currency and prices have stabilized, it 
is expected that the national product of Russia will again show a negative rate for 
the whole of 1999.
Incomplete explanations. With the attitude o f denial within the economic 
profession regarding the post-communist recessions comes a widespread lack of 
interest in studying the phenomenon. Very little has been produced by economists 
in terms o f theoretical accounts, and most o f what has been done is o f doubtful 
value. Furthermore, statistical analyses— attempts to test theoretical arguments—  
are also very few and quite inadequate. Of all the countries in transition— and 
suffering related recession— only Poland has received some kind of decent coverage 
and debate (e.g. Berg and Sachs 1992; Poznanski 1993). The Russian case of 
recession, on the other hand, despite its most striking nature, has not been studied 
with much intensity at all.
There has also been no effort made to place this region-wide downturn in a 
comparative perspective, save for the occasional references to the Great Depression. 
The latter has been the case analyzed most often, with the analysis itself having 
a profound impact on the discipline o f economics. There is presumably something 
to learn about the post-communist catastrophe from the lessons o f the Great De­
pression, but no such lessons have been sought out. This is mainly because the few 
comparisons attempted have largely been approached with an intention to prove 
that there is actually no common features between the two to talk about.
When recession is not denied or ignored, there is a tendency to provide im­
plausible explanations which seek to detach the collapse o f production from the 
course o f transition— i.e. to blame the reforms themselves. Even though in most 
economies o f the communist system there was some growth (albeit with the help 
o f subsidies) until their end, there is a tendency among the mainstream analysts to 
blame the post-communist catastrophe on the communist past. In its final phase, 
the communist system was greatly distorted, although not enough to cause a re­
Acta Oeconomica 50, 1999
8 K. Z. POZNANSKI: TRANSITION AS INSTITUTIONAL DISINTEGRATION
cession o f its own; it is still, however, said that the communist system left regional 
economies so heavily distorted that once these countries entered the transition pro­
cess they pay for these distortions with production decline, higher inflation, and 
growing unemployment. The mistakes made by the post-communist reformers were 
assumed to have the effect of making the downturn in economic performance much 
more pronounced.
In reality, however, the regional catastrophe is not a fatal, or unavoidable, 
event but a consequence o f severe mistakes made by the reformers in large degree 
due to a misconception about the nature o f transition. Seen as something which 
could be substituted by markets, states needed some critical reform— instead they 
were allowed to deteriorate. Since the state was still the essential element o f the 
overall system at the end o f the communist period— i.e. the opening o f transition—  
by damaging the state’s capacity, the overall system was damaged as well. The 
state could neither fulfil its proprietary functions towards the outgoing public sector 
companies nor could it properly conduct the reforms needed by the emerging private 
sector. This state crisis, universally found in the region and always quite extensive, 
is the principal reason for the economic catastrophe.
Initially, when transition economies were taking their first steps in systemic 
reform, there was some doubt about the role o f the state in provoking economic 
downturn. This was because the production decline seemed to be temporary and 
thus possibly accidental. But the continuous extension o f economic troubles— most 
strikingly manifested in Russia’s recent slip from a terrible recession (which ap­
peared to have been arrested) to another uncontrolled fall— has forced economists 
to rethink the role o f state. There is, however, a tendency to treat Russia as a 
separate case o f transition and, consequently, there is a reluctance to consider the 
state as an important explanatory variable. While society is increasingly seen as 
partly responsible for Russia’s economic perplexity— for the same reason of pre­
sumed incompatibility— there is a reluctance to extend this view to other parts of 
Eastern Europe.
Conventional argument: recession by conversion of imbalances
From the start o f deliberations on post-communist transition, liberal thinking 
managed to set quickly both the agenda and the approach for this historic process. 
This was quite understandable, because the communist system’s ideological source, 
Marxism, had lost much o f its remaining appeal with the collapse o f communism. 
The demise o f communism also elevated its major opponents, who happened to be 
liberal thinkers. This is not to mention the obvious fact that turning to liberal 
thought for help during the transition seemed only natural, since the transition 
process has been aimed at strengthening both markets and property, which liberals 
concentrate upon.
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Liberal controversy. Although the transition issue seems to have been “hi­
jacked” by liberal thinkers, this does not mean that the deliberations have lacked 
controversy. On the contrary, a lively debate has emerged between two currents of 
liberal thinking: the neo-classical and the evolutionary. The former is the main­
stream tradition, in which the focus is on the rational individual as the basic unit of 
analysis and on equilibrium as a desirable state. The latter also takes the individual 
as the basic unit o f analysis but does not assume the individual to be rational, and 
its focus is on disequilibrium. Importantly, while neo-classical economists consider 
institutions as given or irrelevant, evolutionists take institutions as a core o f their 
economic analysis.
Table 1
Major theoretical approaches to post-communist transition
Building
elements
Liberal approaches Statist approach
Neoclassical Evolutionary
Origins
(communist
collapse)
Total fragmentation 
o f the system 
(imperfect state)
Partial fragmentation 
o f the system 
(imperfect state and market)
Bureaucratic 
paralysis 
(imperfect state)
Transition
(Post­
communist
reforms)
Autom atic return 
o f markets 
(linear systemic 
progress)
Past-dependent 
reconfiguration 
(open-ended change)
Reform o f state 
agency (free 
policy option)
Destination
(final
system)
Complete markets 
operated by advanced 
capitalist economies
Unique types o f sytems Genuine developmental 
state (governing 
o f markets)
These two approaches differ greatly in their account of transition, beginning 
with the critical question of initial conditions faced by reformers ( Table 1 ). Briefly 
speaking, the neo-classical view presents the starting point as the one in which the 
former communist system, with its apparent irrationalities, has left a desperate 
economy in ruins. What is left is a non-existent— also called “destroyed” (Bal- 
cerowicz 1995)— market with a once overpowering state in a condition of chaos. By 
the evolutionary account, these economies entered transition with weak, albeit not 
defunct, economies that are strong enough to demonstrate some growth anyway. 
The state is viewed as a pale version o f the original, while many elements of the 
market, though mostly in an imperfect form, are already in place.
Another difference between these two views (for the third, less-articulated 
position on transition, which I call “statism” , see, for instance, Amsden et al. 1994) 
refers to the conceptualizations o f the reform— or change— processes themselves.
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For neoclassical economists this process entails an almost automatic “return” of 
markets— with “good” prices— to fill the void created by the “withdrawal” o f the 
state. The process is fuelled by natural human propensities, such as an interest 
in profits, a will to prosper, or desire to save for the future. For evolutionists, 
transition is a protracted process where states are not substituted by markets; 
instead, both are subject to reforms, with the state and market complementing 
each other.
The other important difference refers to the respective views on the final sys­
temic outcomes o f transition. In the neo-classical version of liberalism, it is assumed 
that reformers have a relatively free choice with regard to the ultimate system. This 
choice is limited only in the sense that some normal, working versions o f the ex­
isting markets found in advanced capitalist economies are in the pool (including 
the once-abandoned early forms of highly competitive— i.e. free o f monopolistic 
practices— markets before welfare state capitalism arrived: see Balcerowicz 1995). 
In the evolutionary view, reformers are constrained by the communist legacy and 
thus some novel forms o f capitalism are likely to appear (even highly deficient ones).
The neo-classical view has become the leading liberal platform, defining both 
the style o f transition analysis as well as its overall tone and spirit. It is true 
that numerous attempts have been made by neo-classical economists to admit the 
presence o f transition, but in most cases they only call it a statistical illusion caused 
mainly by the fact that a decline under transition is apparently more detectable 
than a growth o f production. As the argument goes, during transition production 
declines only in the state sector (which is assumed to report its figures more or 
less accurately. The private sector in which there is growth, however, tends to 
“underreport” , partly due to a defect of statistical services but also, and most 
commonly, due to its tendency to operate in an undercover way (mainly for the 
purpose o f tax evasion). This is not a very convincing point, however, since at 
the outset, when recession emerged, the state sector was dominant and the private 
sector was negligible.
Admittedly, there is also a group o f neo-classical economists which admits 
the reality o f recession and seeks an explanation for its emergence; by and large, 
however, these are self-serving arguments with questionable intellectual— or theo­
retical— value. It is not only surprising that this catastrophic event, unheard of 
in modern history, is given very little attention, but equally intriguing is the fact 
that of the few attempts made, many are totally wrong, while many others are at 
best impressionistic. This remark refers also to the most prominent line o f thinking 
that has developed mostly among the radical reformers— namely, the advocates of 
so-called “shock therapy” (i.e. the combination o f a rapid deregulation o f prices, 
harsh deflationary measures, and a commitment to fast privatization).
Conversion theory. The line o f thinking about the sources of recession which 
has gained most prominence in this light has been what I prefer to call “conver­
sion theory” . Crafted in the neo-classical tradition, this concept presents recession
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as a product o f hidden imbalances left over by the communist system and thus 
it is treated as an inevitable phenomenon (e.g. Berg and Sachs 1992, and Berg 
1993). These macroeconomic imbalances involve: repressed inflation, which results 
in shortages; hidden unemployment, or jobs performed by workers with negative 
marginal productivity; and unnecessary production. All o f these conditions are 
related to specific state regulations (i.e. price— fixing, employment plan-targets de­
signed to assure full employment, and free credit for inventories to prevent deficits—  
see Sachs 1993).
The core o f the argument is built around the notion o f unwanted production, 
understood as a kind o f production that could only exist under state planning. Most 
common is the position that, under the state planning, there were many goods 
produced for which there was no real demand— i.e. the demand came from the 
state rather than from consumers (this production has been called “pure socialist 
production” by Balcerowicz (1995), or “unwanted production” by Winiecki 1991). 
In another version, this excess production is linked to the apparent over-building of 
the industry, linked to planners’ obsession with heavy manufacturing (Aslund 1995). 
(In the Russian context an argument is made that, in fact, the entire economy was 
over-built during the late communist era due to a temporary windfall gain from 
oil/gas exports, see Gaidar 1997.)
Recession is inevitable, since transition by definition entails deregulation, or 
the withdrawal o f the state from performing co-ordinating functions; as a result, 
once-hidden imbalances somehow have to be revealed— i.e. forced out into the open. 
Hidden inflation thus becomes open so that prices begin to rise until aggregate sup­
ply and demand eventually balance out. Disguised unemployment becomes visible 
as well, for excess labour is laid off and unnecessary production is terminated as 
well; as a consequence of this overall output goes down. Typical signs o f economic 
recession appear along the way— such as inflation, unemployment, and produc­
tion decline— though they are greatly misleading as they actually mask generally 
positive economic changes.
This form o f general recession is unconventional for it does not represent any 
real cost to society; in other words, it is a cost-free economic recession. Conversion 
actually leads to a change not in the size o f the overall costs themselves but in the 
form in which they are manifested in statistical sources. The difficulties related 
to hidden inflation— i.e. the search for goods by producers and consumers— are 
replaced by the equally burdensome inconvenience of rising prices. Unproductive 
employment now becomes clearly redundant with no negative impact on the pro­
duction level at all. Meanwhile, the elimination o f unwanted production for which 
there was no consumer— as opposed to state— demand cannot cause any loss in 
value, or aggregate welfare, either.
The conversion o f hidden imbalances into open ones is advantageous, since 
now economic imbalances are at least properly signalled. More importantly, such 
conversion leads to easy, if not to say instant, recovery (Balcerowicz 1995). Since
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prices and wages now set themselves, it improves the economic signals perceived by 
agents and makes their choices more rational. At the same time, by being plunged 
into the competitive game, economic players— i.e. enterprises— find themselves with 
additional resources at their disposal. These resources come from defunct, surplus 
production and can be more usefully re-deployed in considerable quantities. This 
is due to the fact that only desired production is allowed and under equilibrium 
conditions there are stronger incentives to use them solely for productive purposes.
Recovery from a fictitious recession can only be fictitious, so that the con­
ventional economic language of recession/recovery becomes even more awkward. 
Conversion entails more in the way o f normalization— i.e. the transformation o f an 
unhealthy economy characterized by distorted signals— i.e. prices— into a healthy 
one where the signals are correct (for more, see a quantitative study by Lipowski 
1996). Once these economic signals have finally become truly reliable indicators 
(reflecting conditions o f supply and demand), agents start acting rationally and the 
general equilibrium condition can eventually be achieved as well.
Given the nature o f the post-communist (also called “transformational” , see 
Kornai 1994) recession/recovery, deregulation should proceed as fast as possible, 
since it shortens the whole cycle of production downturn and production upturn. 
Due to the no-cost nature o f recession, there is no gain whatsoever from extending 
hidden imbalances by allowing the state to stay around. Besides, as has just been 
said, an automatic recovery from a fictitious downturn in production is assured once 
the conversion process is complete. From this perspective, conversion theory has 
been quite useful in the hands o f those supporting radical transition on other— i.e. 
economic or political— grounds.
Some researchers have attempted to prove that recessions, though inescapable, 
tend to be weaker in economies that adopt radical measures. Leaving aside East 
Germany, which for reasons of apparent non-comparability may be excluded from 
our analysis, Poland has been treated by these economists as an exemplary economy. 
It is said that the radical programme introduced by that country, referred to as 
“shock therapy” , resulted in the most superficial and briefest recession recorded 
in any o f the transition countries. The Czech economy— in which, many argue, a 
fairly similar programme was introduced— also apparently experienced a relatively 
weak recession in relation to the region as a whole.
Factual problems. It cannot be denied that both the Czech and Polish gov­
ernments adopted programmes that, at least by some standards, were more radical 
than those introduced by many other states. However, when we add East Germany 
to our equation, their attempts pale by comparison with the ultra-radical approach 
of the latter. Following the logic o f the conversion theory, one would expect East 
Germany to have made an even better showing. Instead, however, East Germany 
suffered a much worse recession: the fall in production experienced by this state, al­
though occurring over a much briefer time period than elsewhere, was at least twice 
as sharp as that registered in the other two countries (keeping in mind that, unlike
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any other transition economy, for very peculiar reasons, East Germany adopted a 
policy o f sharp currency appreciation that greatly added to its economic recession).
Russia’s particularly poor results are regarded as a product o f that country’s 
gradual approach to reform, and are more precisely attributed to the abandon­
ment o f its original radical programme. The other under-performing economies—  
Bulgaria and Romania— are put in the same gradualist category. Registering the 
longest lasting and sharpest fall in output of all the states in question, Russia does 
fall far behind, say, Poland, but by certain measurements it trails another radi­
cal reformer: East Germany. East Germany experienced the worst recession of 
all the transition states in the sense that it recorded the sharpest fall in output 
over the shortest period of time (its above-thirty-percent decline took place in just 
one year). While the Bulgarian and Romanian recessions have lasted longer than 
the East German recession, the aggregate fall in production recorded in these two 
countries is close to that o f the region’s seemingly most radical state— i.e. East 
Germany.
Many studies carried out to support the arguments o f conversion theory have 
excluded not only East Germany but also China. This is also for reasons of ap­
parent non-comparability (though China, as a. former state-run economy under­
going transition, is undeniably, at least in this sense, comparable). If China is 
included, however, even more confusion is created, since one is now dealing with a 
post-communist economy which has passed through a period o f transition without 
suffering the effects o f recession. On the contrary, it grew very fast with no inter­
ruption, with very limited inflation and, at least until recently, with insignificant 
unemployment. This would suggest that, contrary to conversion theory, it is not 
true that post-communist transition has inevitably led to deep recession. It also 
challenges the claims of conversion theory with regard to the virtues of radicalism, 
for China has avoided recession by pursuing, as I will further demonstrate, gradual 
change (for a similar account, see Naughton 1995).
These reservations cannot be easily dismissed, since the typical arguments 
about China’s incomparability do not make sense unless we understand by incom­
parability that China is so different that its approach— though it has shown itself 
to be very successful— is not applicable under East European conditions. But even 
the latter is not so obvious, and this refers to all o f the main points which suggest 
that China can be excluded from a comparative framework. For example, many 
economists stress the obvious fact that China is politically unique in that the com ­
munist party has retained its monopoly on power. It is apparently for this reason 
that the country has been able to pursue a slower— more gradual— trajectory of 
reforms. But, of course, this conclusion directly contradicts the tenets o f conver­
sion theory, according to which gradualism in transition cannot lead to economic 
success.
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Several economic arguments with regard to China’s incomparability have 
been forwarded as well, one often-raised point being that the more rural nature 
o f the Chinese economy has made it easier to achieve production gains whilst lim­
iting systemic change. This may be true, but a number o f other economies, namely 
Albania’s, have not necessarily achieved a more industrial profile than in China 
but have somehow not been excluded from comparative studies. If it is true that 
farming is more suitable for transition reforms, then in countries other than China 
agriculture should show a better performance than industry, and farming should 
possibly achieve growth, with industry going into temporary decline. But, unlike in 
China, East European economies have seen their agriculture suffer a major decline, 
often worse than their industry.
Besides, and most importantly, the arguments for the exclusion o f China fail 
to address the only relevant factor— namely, the extent o f pre-reform economic im­
balances. In terms o f conversion theory, the only economic factor that counts is 
the presence o f hidden imbalances, for only these imbalances can cause a reces­
sion. To claim that conversion theory does not apply ts China, one would have 
to demonstrate that, unlike communist Eastern Europe, China was free of hidden 
imbalances. Yet this could not have been the case because, due to its similar statist 
nature, China’s economy under communism had to suffer from hidden imbalances. 
In fact, there are reasons to believe that China at the outset o f reform was more 
distorted than most o f its East European counterparts; this, of course, makes China 
an even more legitimate case for comparative study.
To sum up, conversion theory presents recessions as the inevitable products 
o f the communist legacy (i.e. hidden imbalances) o f the transition states. These are 
recessions only in name since they entail no real cost to society and are effectively 
dealt with by policies o f radical deregulation which, by nature, entail rapid systemic 
change. The conventional theory that blames recession on these legacies can at 
best only partly explain recessions, for the actual decline exceeds what could be 
reasonably attributed to correcting such hidden imbalances. Finally and most 
importantly, this argument is powerless when explaining the recession-free case of 
China’s transition, which happens to be (as will be demonstrated later on) gradual, 
not radical as in the recession-ridden economies.
Institutional explanation: central role of state agency
While largely missing the point, conversion theory continues to rule the day, 
both in academic studies and in casual discussions. This is, in part, because it 
satisfies the widespread need to further the “persecution” o f communism, which has 
largely gone from economic reality but not entirely from collective memory. It also 
meets another need: to escape the possible responsibility for the various failings of
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the post-communist period (given that what came after communism was expected 
to quickly cure the economy). But there are other, no less important, reasons for 
the theory’s durability: namely, that it has never been rigorously tested, except 
for few rather superficial quantitative examinations (limited, as already said, to a 
narrow group of countries, basically Poland, where many o f the specific arguments 
on this sort of “recession by conversion” were originally formulated).
Methodological problems. The conversion theory o f recession does not offer 
a satisfactory account o f post-socialist recessions, largely because o f its inadequate 
methodological foundations. These foundations are largely borrowed from the neo­
classical paradigm, which is scarcely capable o f addressing the kind o f complex 
processes which are characteristic o f post-socialist transitions. Thus, while conver­
sion theory defines the initial conditions o f recession— i.e. the communist legacy 
o f the past— only in terms o f internal disequilibria, other, and probably more im­
portant, unrelated deficiencies were present. I am talking about various forms of 
dysfunctional, often almost institutionalized, behaviour that existed at the end of 
communism— namely, a disrespect for law or a negative attitude to state authority.
Furthermore, conversion theory, in keeping with its neo-classical logical foun­
dations, defines the post-communist transition as essentially a form o f deregulation 
or change in the mechanisms o f coordination. In other words, it focuses on proce­
dures through which the prices o f products and productive factors— such as labour 
and capital— are set. Such thinking in terms o f the quality o f prices, and how 
signals— i.e. prices— are established, is as characteristic of neo-classical economics, 
as is its tendency to ignore property rights. By overlooking property-related as­
pects, conversion theory disregards an immensely important potential cause o f 
recession— namely, changes in the ownership structure. Any change in this area 
must affect the motivations o f actors and, thus, economic performance (when the 
state is mentioned in such an approach it is not in its property function but in its 
role as coordinator).
To bring these missing elements into proper focus, an alternative explana­
tory model is developed below; this is a model which, building on certain elements 
of conversion theory, employs the tools o f institutional economics, where property 
rights are seen as a central economic category. Neo-institutional theory (e.g. North 
1990) could certainly provide a suitable framework for such an excursion, for it 
offers major insights into how institutions work. Of even greater help, however, is 
evolutionary economics, especially when one considers its more dynamic outlook—  
that is, its interest not only in explaining how institutions function, but also in 
analyzing how institutions are shaped and reshaped. Furthermore, the evolution­
ary approach, unlike neo-institutional economics, pays attention to values that 
drive human actions and thus defines the quality of ownership structure and other 
relevant institutions (see, for example, Schumpeter 1962).
From the perspective o f the evolutionary approach, there is only one logical 
thesis regarding the cause o f recession: downturns as dramatic as those registered
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in the majority o f transition economies could only have had their roots in some sort 
o f systemic crisis. In this context, such an explanation departs from neoclassical 
conversion theory, which in its interpretation of recession does not refer to any kind 
of systemic crisis at all (except in claiming that indecisive reforms— and resultant 
systemic debacles— may make inevitable recessions worse). If anything, the conver­
sion argument presumes that transition represents a systemic improvement, namely 
in the form o f a shift from an inherently inferior state to a superior market-directed 
economy; it is this which helps to trigger an illusive recession.
If we are to go beyond the confines of non-institutional conversion theory 
and include institutions in our analysis, the only reasonable way to proceed is 
to come up with an accurate definition o f the actual systemic make-up of post­
socialist economies at the time when they embarked on the path of transition. The 
answer is simple: from the moment they began to open up all these economies, 
in addition to suffering from hidden imbalances as conversion theory claims, they 
have been characterized by the omnipresence o f the state. Indeed, at this juncture, 
the state (except in the case o f the two partly reformed economies, Hungary and 
Poland) is almost entirely responsible for determining the economic system, acting 
as the coordinating mechanism and the principal owner of capital. (Combinations 
of various types o f these two elements constitute an economic system, as stated 
by German institutionalists from the so-called “order school” , and more recently 
restated by Kornai 1992.)
State crisis. Keeping in mind this simple fact that the state was the core o f the 
late communist system, the only important source o f systemic crisis at the time—  
and thus o f recession— would have been that the state went too far in abandoning 
its role o f performing its two basic functions. To put it another way, the sources 
o f economic crisis lay in a crisis o f the state, and its disintegration can only be 
attributed to a too radical effort by reformers to remake it. Certainly this sudden 
economic downturn could not have been because o f a market crisis, for the market 
was only just emerging at the time. Even if such market elements were ridden by 
crisis, the weight carried by the market was too small at this stage for that crisis to 
have had a great impact. In fact, the crisis o f the state as a core institution helped 
to wreck the emerging markets, for markets cannot effectively operate without 
effective states.
The arrival o f recession and its depth are thus related both to the moment 
when— due to radical measures— the state lost too much o f its capacity and to the 
depth o f such a loss o f efficiency, both in terms of ability to pursue policies and 
adequacy (or, rather, inadequacy) of such policies. The same theoretical reasoning 
could be applied to the pre-1989 downturn in economic performance, since the 
state was already losing some of its effectiveness in the late stage of communism. 
By making this point, my alternative recession theory departs further from the 
conversion argument, which considers the state’s withdrawal from economic affairs 
as a positive element. Generally speaking, with its conviction that the state is a
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threat to markets and thus dispensable, conversion theory does not speak about 
state over-withdrawal as a theoretical possibility.
Claims that the post-communist withdrawal of the state might have been ex­
cessive may strike the reader as “counter-intuitive, given that the state had been the 
cause of the problems affecting the economies in question while under communism. 
Theoretically speaking, however, even the undeniably inefficient state o f commu­
nism could have been further undermined, so that some transition economies could 
initially have ended up simply with a less efficient version o f the old system (which, 
undeniably, had taken greatly diversified forms— Poznanski 1996). But even those 
countries that immediately abandoned the traditional system could have adopted 
a system— which one could call capitalist— that would not, at least initially, have 
been more effective than the previous one. There is no reason to assume that even 
the worst kind of capitalist regime must always be seen as superior to any type of 
communist order, even the most effective such regime.
The above hypothesis on the over-withdrawal o f the state might also appear 
to be inconsistent with evolutionary economics, upon which this theory claims to 
be based. To be sure, supporters o f evolutionary theory are highly suspicious o f the 
state and in favour o f markets, which might be interpreted as a theoretical argument 
in favour o f quickly dispensing with the state. The above hypothesis, however, is 
concerned with the ways in which the state provides room for markets. In actuality, 
this is the only aspect of evolutionary theory which deals with the issue o f optimal 
transition strategies. Behind it lies a warning given by evolutionary economists 
against so-called “constructivism” , or radical state-directed systemic change.
If taken seriously, the anti-constructivist argument o f evolutionary economists 
leads to only one conclusion— namely, that the state, as one o f the principal ele­
ments making up the system at the starting point, should be allowed to withdraw 
at a slow pace. One should not think that the concern o f evolutionary theory is 
with the dangers o f collectivism and that this applies only to attempts to dispense 
with the market in wholesale fashion and not to a wholesale removal o f any other 
system, including the state-socialist model. As much as a market-dominated system 
is desirable, it is only a state-based system which agents are used to. Therefore, if 
the state is quickly ejected from that system, agents will no longer be capable of 
making rational decisions.
Comparative approach: typology of state over-withdrawals
A true challenge is to develop our argument in a way that would best ex­
plain why actual recessions registered by statistics have varied in the extent of 
their damaging effects, depending on the economy in question. Given the general 
understanding of recessions presented in this study, it would follow that cross-
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regional variations would have to be explained by referring to the different forms of 
state-crisis that have appeared. As is the case with conversion theory, the simple 
distinction between radical and gradual pathways is not very useful here. A mod­
ified, or different typology is needed: namely, one that stresses not only pace (i.e. 
speed) o f transition but also the extent to which transition is organized.
In conversion theory, a gradual approach is often seen as being inconsequential 
(that is, a process which lacks both focus and credible commitment from the state). 
This is precisely why, as the theory claims, gradualism will make post-communist 
recession worse than the hidden imbalances which, inherited from communism, 
are virtually inevitable. Theoretically speaking, however, it is perfectly possible 
for a gradual process o f transition to proceed in a coherent— organized— fashion. 
Moreover, a radical transition towards a market-type economy does not always have 
to be organized and it may proceed just as far, or just as easily, in a completely 
disorganized way.
Table 2
Typology o f state over-withdrawals
Level o f radicalism 
(and political 
circumstances)
Character o f the process
Organized Disorganized
Less radical Ideological shift Corruption
(political continuity) Poland, Hungary Bulgaria, Romania
More radical Unification/disunification Collapse
(political East Germany (Czechoslovakia) Russia, Ukraine
discontinuity)
There is a fundamental dividing line between those transition models in which 
the process o f institutional change is organized and those in which it is disorganized 
(i.e. chaotic). The term “organized” should not be equated with some fully state- 
controlled process, since self-organization in the absence of the state is theoretically 
possible as well. The post-communist transition, however, only follows an organized 
path if the state remains firmly— but not completely— in control. This is because, 
in an economy initially based on the state, a process o f transition— even towards a 
market-based economy— cannot proceed in an organized fashion on its own. By the 
same token, transition becomes chaotic when the state loses control over systemic 
change and events proceed on their own accord.
Given this basic distinction, the over-withdrawal of the state can take two ob­
vious systemic forms: organized over-withdrawal and disorganized over-withdrawal. 
In the former case, the state, without losing its coherence— i.e. its ability to con­
trol the process o f transition— engages in excessive self-limitation (or withdrawal). 
O f course, the fact that the state is still quite capable makes such an attempt at
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limiting state involvement more effective. In the latter— chaotic— case, the state 
over-withdraws due to an unintended loss o f coherence— i.e. because o f an unin­
tended self-destruction that also forces state capacity below a reasonable level, as 
dictated by the needs o f transition. To repeat: self-withdrawal and self-destruction 
are the two basic ways in which the state can over-withdraw and thus they also 
represent the two alternative causes o f early recession (see Table 2).
To further develop this categorization o f transition pathways, an over-with- 
drawal through self-limitation can take two different forms, one of which may be 
called ideological. One clear example o f such an approach is Poland in 1990, when 
the former anti-communist opposition established its first reform government under 
Mazowiecki; Hungary also had a. former-opposition government. Various motives 
lay behind this path, including the desire o f the still-coherent, state in some of 
the countries in question to ensure that the collapse o f the communist polity was 
made irreversible. Another motive was to avoid a third-way version o f transition, 
in which powerful unions co-operated with an activist, or populist, state. Besides, 
reformers— in line with the views o f classical (and also evolutionary) thinkers— 
regarded the agency o f the state in its minimalist form to be the best means of 
supporting the economy.
Belonging to a second, separate sub-category o f over-withdrawal through self­
limitation is transition through reunification, as occurred in East Germany. Here, 
the much more restricted, though perfectly coherent state apparatus o f West Ger­
many was imposed on an East German economy accustomed to a more activist, 
if not overgrown, state system. Despite its greater efficiency, faced with the enor­
mously complex problems o f transition the West German state was not capable 
of instantly ensuring proper interventions by the state. An alternative strategy 
involving a more gradual type of reunification, especially in the economic sphere, 
was dismissed; this alternative would have enabled the state to withdraw in a less 
drastic, and probably more organized fashion.
The Czech case can be viewed as combination of the above two types (though 
there are reasons to regard this case as coming closer to the East German one). 
There is evidence that Czech reformers tried in a number o f ways to follow the 
Polish model, or even to outdo it (at least in rhetoric) by taking even bolder steps 
than Poland did; by taking more aggressive steps, however, the Czech economy 
has come closer to the East German case. Analogies between the two countries go 
even further. The eventual break-up, or disunification, o f Czechoslovakia led to an 
inevitable downsizing of the state apparatus in both the Czech and Slovak parts; 
this resembled what happened in East Germany due to its own reconfiguration— i.e. 
the reunification o f the country.
Over-withdrawal through self-destruction can also take two forms. One in­
volves the dissolution o f the state by means o f corruption, as occurred in Bul­
garia and Romania. State attributes are seized by individuals— usually officials—  
pursuing their personal interests through illegal means or taking advantage o f exist­
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ing legal loopholes; they might also adopt a criminal path (quite visible, for instance, 
in Bulgaria, where many former secret police members ended up as influential fig­
ures with easy access to the state). Because they trade political influence within 
the state apparatus for material rewards that benefit them, no truly coherent state 
policy exists. Although the state here appears on the surface to be as large— and 
therefore as influential— as it was before transition, in actuality the state largely 
becomes a hollow structure, which it certainly was under late communist rule.
In another case o f self-destructive over-withdrawal, the state is undermined 
through the virtual, though not complete, collapse of its apparatus as an indepen­
dent agency. Russia serves as a good example here, but so do many other former 
Soviet republics, such as Ukraine. The focus o f power in Russia has largely moved 
away from the state to non-state agents, with those in public position having little 
to trade with state clients. In this sense it differs from self-destruction through 
corrosive corruption (where, as indicated, officials still have enough influence to 
trade it for personal advantage). Another equally important difference is that in 
Russia the means o f violence upon which states base their authority are taken over 
by external forces— e.g. criminal gangs, renegade military units, and self-protected 
business figures.
To sum up, to the extent to which post-communist recessions in Eastern Eu­
rope are real, they can be attributed to a serious systemic decline related to an 
underlying crisis o f the state. Since these state crises stem largely from excessive 
limitations on the state’s economic role, in this special sense all the recession­
ary cases in question may be defined as involving radical-type transitions. The 
over-withdrawal o f the state with regard to both its coordinating and ownership 
functions has taken on a different form in different economies. Nevertheless, all of 
them, as a group, differ from the case of China, the only country where— as will 
be shown— the state has not undergone any crisis during the entire course o f its 
transition towards capitalism. This, presumably, can explain why China has been 
the only former communist economy that has experienced strong economic growth 
rather than a strong recession.
Actual transition experience: specifying principal pathways
The differences between the four types (models) o f early radical transition in 
the recession-ridden economies can be better understood by looking at what actual 
changes took place in the systems of the respective countries. To gain the fullest 
possible insight, we need to examine these states not only at the level o f internal 
deregulation, as conversion theory does, but also with regard to the opening of 
trade (i.e. liberalization) and the privatization o f state assets. These factors will all 
be analyzed below (albeit in an abbreviated fashion due to lack o f space). What I
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offer below is rather a “road map” for further comparative economic research into 
the causes of post-communist recession in the region.
Internal deregulation. A good illustration of the radical nature o f internal 
deregulation in all the recession-affected economies has been the reduction in the 
once notorious state subsidization (well captured in Kornai’s concept o f communist 
economies as soft-budgeted “shortage economies” ). In all o f these cases, the extent 
of subsidy reduction during the early post-communist reforms was very high, at 
least in the sense that enterprises did not have enough time to make proper ad­
justments without making cuts in production. The actual mechanisms employed to 
reduce state assistance differed considerably from country to country, with major 
differences closely following the four major types o f state over-withdrawal discussed 
above.
De-subsidization was initially most drastic in East Germany, where all sub­
sidies were cut to state-owned enterprises waiting to be privatized. In addition, all 
enterprises undergoing privatization, or waiting to be privatized, found themselves 
cut off from bank credits, which caused an even deeper liquidity crisis. This was 
because banks were also “shut off” as part o f the unification process. The East 
German banking system was demobilized, with the aim of later splitting it up and 
placing it under the control o f the two leading West German banks. Some time was 
spent on integrating East German operations into West Germany’s existing bank­
ing structure. No fresh credits were issued in the meantime, though the balance 
sheets o f the incorporated banks were restructured (mostly in order to facilitate 
the privatization o f enterprises).
In Poland, direct subsidies were drastically reduced, though mostly for con­
ceptual (i.e. ideological) reasons— that is, mainly in order to balance the state 
budget (thus reflecting the leading priority o f deflating the economy through a 
number o f severe measures applied at once; Poznanski 1993). Ending subsidies was 
expected not only to reduce pressure on the budget but also to force greater finan­
cial discipline on state enterprises. This latter priority was aided directly by the 
commonly shared view that the source o f the communist debacle was represented 
by so-called “soft-budget constraints” ; thus, by getting rid o f this condition there 
would be a rapid demise o f the state apparatus, rather than a reduction in the size 
of budgetary transfers combined with a change in the formula for subsidization (for 
a summary, see Poznanski 1998).
De-subsidization was combined with state-imposed restraints on credit in 
Poland, a move triggered by almost the same motives as those behind the cuts 
in budgetary assistance. Due to the concern to keep the money supply down and 
harden budget constraints, quantitative state limits on issuing credits were simulta­
neously imposed with state-formulated interest rate targets. This restrictive strat­
egy further worsened the liquidity position o f enterprises already suffering from a 
reduced flow o f their own, internal financing (coming from the profits). Default 
on inter-firm payments by some economically weaker— or less reliable— firms has
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made the situation for some firms even worse, with the state apparatus unprepared 
to solve this debacle quickly by implementing creative financial measures.
In the corrupt model o f over-withdrawal, as in Bulgaria, the role o f subsidies 
was also significantly diminished— not so much in terms o f the amount of money 
spent as in the effectiveness o f such subsidies. While budgetary spending directed 
to companies continued, corrupt state officials did not in every case assign money 
to those businesses in greatest financial need. Furthermore, there was no means- 
testing structure in place and no interest in developing such tests. The amount of 
money allocated was mainly based on personal calculations of possible gains from 
directing funds to the receivers willing to provide kickbacks. A considerable amount 
o f the cash allocated now ended up in private pockets rather than being spent on 
enterprise restructuring.
Although credits continued to be issued, they also fell into corrupt hands. The 
practice o f extending credit to associates for personal gain— in exchange for a share 
of the value of a given loan— wrecked the banking system. At any rate, banks, which 
were virtually unable to distinguish between legitimate and dishonest requests for 
financing, withdrew from competitive allocations to close-client operations within 
the holding framework, leaving many enterprises in the cold. While Poland has been 
capable o f eventually improving its financial condition, Bulgaria has failed to cure 
its banking system. The latter continues to be weakened by corrupt practices—  
this factor itself has been largely responsible for Bulgaria’s renewed recession of 
1996-1997.
Russia also radically reduced its subsidies, but for its own reasons, reflecting 
the overall nature o f its adopted path o f state withdrawal. In this case, the near 
collapse o f the state has inflicted excessive damage on tax collection, with the largest 
sources o f tax revenue, such as the raw material/energy giants, exerting sufficient 
influence to avoid having to pay the bulk of their outstanding taxes. In addition, a 
large proportion o f revenue due to the state is diverted to private accounts under a 
system in which apparently one-third or even half o f the budgetary allocations are 
not properly accounted for. This loss o f revenue has produced a huge budgetary 
shortfall which has paralysed subsidization (to the extent that there have been 
insufficient resources even to pay public employees’ wages on time).
The Russian banking system has been unable to provide any relief to the 
struggling companies, since its initial interests have been centred elsewhere. In 
large part, Russian banks have emerged as a vehicle through which revenue siphoned 
off from enterprises has been directed to other ventures, often towards the acqui­
sition o f heavily under-priced state assets or speculation in commodity markets. 
Given Russia’s high-risk environment, the investments o f banks have been centred 
on state-backed commercial securities issued to repair budgetary imbalances. The 
latter have often yielded enormous rates, thus providing an additional opportunity
Acta Oeconomica 50, 1999
K. Z. POZNANSKI: TRANSITION AS INSTITUTIONAL DISINTEGRATION 23
for banks to aggressively siphon off—via the state— financial resources from tax- 
paying enterprises.
Trade liberalization. The most extreme case o f removing an economy’s pro­
tection shield from foreign competition occurred in East Germany, where, during 
the process of reunification, the lower tariffs employed by West Germany in its trade 
with the European Union were introduced into the East German economy. East 
Germany, one should add, also experienced a drastic appreciation o f its currency 
after adopting the unrealistically high rate o f conversion from the East German 
mark to the West German mark. In this latter move, as earlier indicated, East 
Germany radically departed from the practice o f other transition economies, where 
national currencies were sharply devalued in the early stages (with the choice of 
a superficially favourable conversion rate for the East German currency driven by 
the political concerns o f Kohl and contrary to the opinions o f major West German 
financial figures).
In Poland, foreign trade liberalization also took place in an organized fash­
ion, though more for conceptual reasons than anything else and mainly out o f the 
conviction that the opening up o f trade would increase competitive pressure on do­
mestic producers. It was expected that with this change, deficit-making companies 
would be eliminated and downward pressure on prices— and inflation— would ma­
terialize as well. Liberalization o f the external sector was executed mostly through 
sharp, unilateral tariff reductions which reached extremely low levels for a coun­
try at Poland’s stage o f development. Accompanying this act o f de-protection was 
the decision to abolish the state’s trade monopoly without providing any com ­
pensation in the form o f quantitative restrictions (contingents) common in market 
economies— at least in those economies at comparable levels of development.
The Czech approach was also quite radical, though not in terms o f custom 
tariffs, which were kept at a high level with additional “import charges” also being 
imposed. What further exposed the Czech economy to foreign competition was its 
policy o f holding its exchange rate at a fixed level despite an initially sharp rise in 
inflation. This policy was intended to stabilize the economy, but it also lowered the 
cost o f imports and led to steady current account deficits. The door was opened 
even wider for imports when tariff concessions began to be offered on a frequent 
basis to direct foreign investors, mostly attracted by sales o f state property. This 
latter factor continued to fuel the appreciation of the currency even after the Czech 
government, faced with imminent crisis, decided in 1997 to execute a one-time 
sharp devaluation.
No less severe has been the impact of the corrosion o f customs systems in 
those countries which took the disorganized route, such as Bulgaria, Romania, 
and, possibly even more so, Russia and Ukraine, where the state began to issue 
preferential licenses for duty-free imports. Many of these privileges were provided 
to influential state-related organizations but also to some newly established private 
entities in the hands of well-connected former officials. At the same time, powerful
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criminal organizations have been able either to bribe customs officers by putting 
them on their payrolls or simply to intimidate them through threats o f force. The 
number o f cases in which customs documents have been falsified or goods simply 
smuggled across borders has greatly increased.
Capital divestment. While different on many accounts, all privatization ap­
proaches may also be regarded as radical, mainly in the sense that whatever their 
particular form they have caused an initial suspension or dilution o f the prop­
erty structure. For this reason, privatization in particular countries has invariably 
caused a loss o f interest— or ability— among managers in fully mobilizing capital 
resources. It should be kept in mind that in the world o f rational expectations, 
such a weakening o f property rights is possible even without any practical steps—  
actual asset transfers— being initiated. If credible, a mere declaration o f the state’s 
intention to fundamentally alter the property structure, even without giving any 
proper details, can have the same effect as the state taking actual concrete steps in 
this direction (Poznanski 1996).
The privatization process in East Germany appears to have been the most 
radical— though a relatively disciplined case— with a newly created state agency—  
set up by the West German government— taking over the property o f all enter­
prises. For the duration o f privatization procedures, the existing management was 
suspended and the agency took over all decision-making authority. This itself dam­
aged production, magnified by the fact that insiders— managers and workers— were 
almost completely excluded from the acquisition o f enterprise assets (while most of 
the households lost their apartments through parallel re-privatization that returned 
property mainly to former West German owners). This was a case of almost com ­
plete expropriation designed to benefit West Germany. Moreover, this process was 
subsidized, since the agency ended up with sales revenues well below its operational 
costs (including various subsidies to buyers).
The Czech case is in many ways similar to that of East Germany: very radical 
and greatly detrimental to the motivation o f managers and workers. As in East Ger­
many, the state immediately reclaimed ownership o f all enterprises and prevented 
insiders from gaining any preferential treatment in asset acquisitions. Rather than 
organizing sales, however, the Czech state decided to distribute capital to all adult 
citizens free o f charge and to allow citizens to freely chose where to allocate their 
vouchers. This represented a completely experimental and unprecedented (at least 
on such a scale) scheme, although it was executed in a very rigorous way. While the 
state engaged in distribution, the operations of enterprises were largely brought to 
a halt. Afterwards, when the scheme was completed, with assets widely distributed, 
managers did not feel much pressure to return to economizing on capital resources.
The Russian approach was also radical, as it was initially based on the Czech 
model o f “democratic capitalism” , though it envisioned that the purchase o f ad­
ditional assets by managers/workers would be allowed. The Russian programme 
offered state enterprises a choice among a few privatization options, one o f them
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being a partial buy-out by the insiders. Unlike the Czech programme, however, 
Russia’s privatization was executed in a disorganized fashion, for the state began 
to disintegrate and various interest groups took over. Distribution to all citizens 
was prevented by insiders using inflated money and credit issued by phony banks 
to purchase extra assets above their voucher allocation. All this was done with­
out proper attention being paid to legal aspects, and as a result a very unstable 
property structure emerged.
Poland’s privatization process was also radical although, unlike in the above 
cases, this was mostly due to the rhetoric employed by the state and not so much 
because o f its actions. The state could not agree on any specific model o f priva­
tization, though it declared its stiff opposition to the labour-managed version of 
capitalism and thus precluded any form of mass distribution of assets to citizens. 
Still, it declared its intention to complete the process within a few years, mainly 
through a British-style sales o f assets. Given the boldness o f other steps (e.g. 
de-subsidization, trade liberalization), these fast-paced plans for the divestment 
o f public assets sounded credible. This was enough to cause a rapid and virtual 
suspension o f already greatly destabilized property rights, to which— predictably—  
enterprises responded negatively (Poznanski 1993).
Hungary comes close to Poland, since its privatization has also been based 
mostly on sales, though it has been even less favourable to the idea o f voucher 
privatization than Poland (Poland initiated a limited programme o f the Czech-type 
in 1996). Like Poland, Hungary started at a relatively slow pace and, similarly, 
the state’s decision to quickly divest affected all Hungarian companies, not just 
those actually targeted for sales. In fact, many of them were already engaging in 
ownership changes during the last years o f communism, taking advantage o f laws 
that allowed for cross-ownership among state-owned companies. This process of 
recombination o f property accelerated during the early stage of transition, helping 
to reduce additional risks but also taking a lot of the manager’s energy away from 
production itself.
To sum up, severe post-communist recessions are a result o f the state radically 
and simultaneously withdrawing from performing many o f its basic functions. One 
such radical act o f withdrawal involved de-subsidization, which left many state- 
owned enterprises on the brink o f bankruptcy before they developed resistance to 
market shocks. The opening up o f foreign trade, while pursued in many different 
ways, was also pursued in a radical fashion, exposing enterprises to excessive threats 
from imports and causing an erosion of their profits. By embarking on unusually 
rapid and often mostly experimental privatization schemes (e.g. the never-before­
tried “voucher” programme in the Czech case), states reduced the motivation of 
enterprises to meet their challenges.
Acta Oeconomica 50, 1999
26 K. Z. POZNANSKI: TRANSITION AS INSTITUTIONAL DISINTEGRATION
Recession severity and subsequent recovery: extending the centred argument
If the above-discussed theoretical model provides, as it seems to, a plausible 
explanation for post-1989 recessions, it should also be capable of explaining the 
recoveries that have followed in many of the cases analyzed. What demonstra­
bly went wrong would have to be rectified for the particular economies to turn 
around— hence, again, the central role of the state is assumed in explaining success 
in arresting recession. And, logically, this success is to be related to the type of 
transition model— or pathway— embarked upon by a given economy. Presumably, 
depending on the type o f state over-withdrawal, countries would find it easier or 
harder to enter recovery, and they would make their recovery sustainable or, con­
versely, fail to keep it alive. Accordingly, depending on how a country entered 
into recession, it would take different changes in a state’s behaviour for recovery to 
materialize.
Given the logic o f my main argument, the only good explanation for recovery 
is the return o f the state, i.e. the resumption o f the role expected of it at a given 
stage o f transition. In the countries in question this change in the state’s behaviour 
has not involved a return to the literal pre-transition role o f the state during the 
communist era. O f course, it is not that a return to a state with all its omnipotent 
and political features is necessary, for this is not what has been required for recovery 
to begin. Nor has such a literal return been possible, since in the new, greatly 
changed conditions o f these countries there is no longer any room for such an 
omnipotent state with a rigid political structure. A return of the stronger state has 
been indispensable, but at the same time the return o f a different, reformed state 
that is compatible with the expanding markets.
The state which has returned in these countries is rather different from the 
one that withdrew at the outset o f the transition, mainly because two parallel 
processes have taken place during the reforms. On the one hand, by giving up 
some o f its prerogatives, the state has created the room necessary for markets to 
operate successfully. On the other hand, the state itself has become subject to 
change; this is an aspect o f post-communist reforms which is not fully appreciated, 
particularly by those who view transition simply as a substitution of states with 
markets. In reality, at the same time as its powers are diminished in some areas, 
the state is empowering itself to a new role in regulating markets (e.g. moving from 
interest rate control to open market operations, or giving up price controls in favour 
o f aggregate demand management).
Major cases. The return o f the state proved easiest to achieve in East Ger­
many, which would also explain why its economy was the first to recover, after only 
about a year-long decline in production. In this case, the return o f the state was 
easy because an effective state apparatus, that o f West Germany, was already in 
place. It took a relatively short time for this apparatus to re-equip itself for the task 
o f restarting the East German economy. Such a return did not require any major
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reorganization of the state, save for the creation o f an agency for privatization. In 
other agencies, adding personnel and sending personnel to East German offices— a 
massive operation in itself— was sufficient to handle the additional tasks related to 
East Germany. All this was helped administratively by the fact that West Germany 
had had, for a long time, various contingency plans— including special laws— in case 
o f eventual reunification with East Germany.
The most visible manifestation o f the return o f the state in East Germany 
was a rapid increase in the level of subsidization channelled from West Germany 
to the new lands. The degree of subsidization and the related burden on the 
budget— and, o f course, on taxpayers— is certainly the right indicator o f the size 
o f a state as an economic agent. In this case, a sharp increase in the role o f the 
state was made possible because the state was able to introduce additional taxes 
(called “solidarity taxes” ) with relative ease. West German taxpayers agreed to 
make a small additional contribution after receiving a promise that it would be 
short-lived, but the burden has in fact turned out to be longer than anticipated at 
first. The resulting increase in subsidization for East Germany has been so massive 
that Germany has recently turned from being one o f the region’s fiscally tightest 
into one o f the most generous.
In Poland, where retreat was, as started earlier, mainly an ideological step, 
another ideological change, although not one concerned with a major rebuilding of 
the state apparatus, was needed for the state to return. The ultra-liberal ideol­
ogy adopted in that country had rather shallow roots and did not greatly restrict 
the movements of the elite. Here, the problem was not that the authors o f shock 
therapy changed their minds, (which, in fact, they did not). Rather, it was their 
relatively rapid replacement at consecutive elections that made the real difference. 
The political process brought in forces generally opposed to overtly radical mea­
sures, most notably parties whose roots lay in the pre-transition era. Interestingly, 
since being forced into opposition, the authors of shock-t.herapy have not been 
muted their advocacy o f radical measures.
The return of the state has involved most complications in those countries 
where the state was seriously undermined— such as in Russia, where corrupt struc­
tures are today even more pervasive than elsewhere and are even overwhelming the 
remnants o f the state agency. Under these circumstances, the return o f state has 
taken the form of powerful criminal elements trying to penetrate state structures. 
The last presidential election has been seen by some observers as proof that these 
criminal, or semi-legal, elements decided to try to gain control over the state in 
order to protect their vast, largely illegal interests. The very unpopular incumbent 
president Yeltsin entered the elections with meagre support only to be revived by 
massive help from a group o f oligarchs channelling money for his campaign through 
their banks.
For this very reason— namely, the appearance o f illegitimate influence by 
oligarchs— the state has had serious problems in firmly asserting its legitimacy
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among a majority o f voters. Among the mistrusting elements are scores who con­
sider themselves losers and who continue to look for leadership that can ensure 
that the burdens o f transition are distributed more evenly. There are numerous 
parties which strongly oppose the type of market emerging in Russia— i.e. that in 
which commercial laws are weak and property rights are not enforced. Their pro­
grammes call for an overhaul and even a possible reversal o f pro-market reforms. 
If these forces gain the upper hand, one should expect fierce resistance from well- 
entrenched criminal interests. Only when this political conflict has been resolved 
can the Russian state be rebuilt, an event which should also usher in a long-delayed 
recovery.
The Polish example. Poland is often offered as an example of the advantages 
o f a radical programme that, despite an eventual slowdown in reforms, has produced 
the best results in the region. However, careful analysis o f the actual course of 
reforms reveals that the true cause of recovery has not been the cumulative impact 
o f radical measures. The initial “shock therapy” , engineered by Balcerowicz’s team, 
had a sharply negative effect on production, and it was precisely the restrictions 
on original policies that allowed the economy to turn around. Poland is thus a 
good illustration of my model, which claims that state over-withdrawal— as well as 
the radical reforms that led to a sudden decline in state’s capabilities— are to be 
blamed for the initial recession and that a return of the state, in a largely changed 
form, is to be credited with restoring positive growth.
There can be little doubt that not long after Poland’s first post-communist 
government elaborated its first radical measures, many of them were already being 
slowed down or reversed by the team of Balcerowicz itself. Some members o f the 
government bitterly complained about this relaxation in radical reform, but in the 
face of a drastic fall in production clinging to the moral or rhetorical high ground 
was impractical. Importantly, as a sign o f relaxation, considerable deficits were 
allowed to accumulate early in the first round o f reforms after the production o f a 
very high budget surplus; this was seen as one o f the highest priorities. Fortunately, 
non-inflationary methods o f financing deficits were found by turning to the country’s 
still-state-owned banks and, accordingly, increasing the state debt.
The same government, with its roots in the anti-communist opposition, also 
made the decision not to relax Poland’s remaining price controls on certain major 
goods, particularly energy. The state also retained control over certain goods which 
figured heavily in household budgets, i.e. rents and electricity, in order to protect 
low-income groups, including pensioners. When the prices for other goods, now 
liberalized, became stable, the state made periodical adjustments regarding the 
maximum levels set for the controlled prices. While these state price corrections 
became one o f the major sources o f inflation, accounting for one-third to a half o f 
the total increase as late as 1994-95, they also prevented the overall level o f prices 
from spiralling out o f control.
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In addition, the initially endorsed policy o f keeping the economy as wide open 
as possible was quickly modified. As early as the second year o f the transition tariffs 
were, on average, tripled. This brought them back to a relatively high level. In 
certain sectors, protectionism reached prohibitive levels— such as in car production, 
where total payments (tariffs, taxes, import surcharges, etc.) reached half the value 
o f the imported goods. These protectionist measures had a strongly positive impact 
on the car sector, which quickly showed a recovery, itself a great stimulant for the 
whole of manufacturing. Quantitative barriers were introduced as well (though 
on a very limited scale) mainly in the agricultural sector. These were represented 
by a small though critical peasant party with origins in the communist era. These 
restrictions greatly limited the inflow of competitive foodstuffs and— combined with 
price supports— helped in reviving farming production.
It also became clear, quite early on, that the government would be unable to 
proceed with rapid privatization given that very few state-owned companies were 
sold in the first two years. The procedures chosen for divestment— i.e. private 
offers— proved very costly and time-consuming. Meanwhile, other methods which 
could be implemented more quickly, such as distributing assets free o f charge, failed 
to obtain the necessary parliamentary support. To support public tenders the road 
was opened for leveraged buyouts by enterprise collectives. The costs o f these were 
to be paid in multi-year instalments, but these applied mostly to smaller enti­
ties. This stabilized property rights and, with greater assurances o f personal gain, 
managers— and workers— turned from asset stripping and ordinary waste to efforts 
aimed at maximizing the capital value of their companies, thus further helping the 
economy to recover.
Non-recessionary transition: retaining a coherent growth-oriented state
O f all the factual challenges to the conversion theory, the most important, as 
earlier indicated, seems to be that it fails to explain why China has avoided reces­
sion. If it is really impossible to exclude China from the sample then we should ask 
ourselves how it is that, despite its initial imbalances, China has been able to pro­
duce strong— and well-balanced— growth. To answer this question one would have 
to modify the conversion theory or seek an alternative theoretical model, general 
enough to encompass this important case as well. The theoretical challenge here is 
thus to explain what form o f deregulation allows precisely a non-recessionary— even 
expansionary— pathway to be assumed by a transition economy.
In determining which approach to reforms matters, it is best to examine 
policies adopted in economies showing the greatest contrast in performance; this 
makes China not the least suitable but the most appropriate case to work with. 
When this comparative approach is taken, there can be no doubt that what most
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differentiates China’s transition from East Europe’s is not so much its economic 
structure or political differences but their respective policies. China emerges from 
such a comparison as almost the opposite to the radical set o f reforms executed in 
Eastern Europe— it is the only case (save, possibly, for Vietnam) where a gradual 
approach to reforms has been tried. If this is so, there indeed cannot be any other 
factor but policy differences to account for the contrast in the economic performance 
o f China and Eastern Europe—meaning that conversion, even if unavoidable, does 
not have to produce recession if gradual steps are taken.
The contrast between China and the rest begins with the general philosophy 
o f conducting reforms. It is important to note that, unlike in Eastern Europe, 
the government o f China has never produced specific programmes for reforms, nor 
has it outlined a fixed timetable for various elements o f reform. Instead, China’s 
government has engaged in a casual process where reform steps have been initiated 
in response to the pressing needs o f the day. In this way, China has not wasted its 
energy by pushing through programmes that fit an end-model as outlined by the 
reformers; thus it can focus on solutions that will immediately benefit its economy. 
Also, by leaving its reform process unscheduled, the Chinese government has made 
it easier for itself to reverse any steps which prove to be premature or ill-directed. 
This is because programmes that are not well-defined do not have to be implemented 
according to a deadline and at all costs by politicians who are involved in a reform 
process.
The other difference in philosophy refers to the concern by reformers with 
regard to the social implications o f their programme. In contrast to Eastern Europe, 
the Chinese government has decided to reform the economy while keeping a social 
compact intact. In particular, it has chosen to ensure that industrial workers will 
continue to receive their privileges and that the socially excluded will be protected 
from falling into poverty. For this reason, China has given priority to economic 
growth rather than to reforms, making sure that reforms are pursued only if they 
allow the economy to keep expanding. Consequently, reforms have had to be kept 
in check, while in Eastern Europe governments chose to give preference to reforms, 
trying to legitimize themselves on the ground that they are the most eager to change 
the system. Economic growth was given less attention and, if necessary, sacrificed 
for reforms, and with this the inherited social compact was revoked and higher 
human costs permitted as well.
These differences in general approach are reflected in the differences between 
all important aspects o f actual reform programmes, including price liberalization 
and macroeconomic stabilization, o f which freeing o f prices is a part. Without 
exception, the economies o f the former Soviet bloc, with varying degrees o f hesi­
tation, engaged in the immediate removal o f state controls on the prices of most 
goods. This approach exposed hidden levels o f inflation and produced higher in­
flationary expectations which took prices levels beyond simple conversion. China, 
in contrast, adopted a dual-price system for similar goods, allowing the share of
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supplies— subject to demand/supply price setting— to increase at a slow but steady 
pace. When it found it appropriate, the state would re-impose price controls to pre­
vent the appearance o f monopolistic practices and/or wild speculation that might, 
have pushed inflation beyond acceptable levels. This explains why China has been 
able to liberalize its prices without causing excessive inflation.
Unlike other transition economies, China prepared its economy for price 
deregulation ahead o f time by investing heavily— via the public budget— in bot­
tleneck sectors (Naughton 1995). In Hungary and Poland, where investment was 
seriously decentralized by bringing banks into the financing process, such bottle­
necks were tackled more successfully than in other late-communist Eastern Euro­
pean economies. This practice o f China’s government has continued alongside the 
process o f freeing prices so that the state has retained an active role in investment. 
The supply-side of price reform has been further aided by the fact that, unlike 
elsewhere, the Chinese economy has grown rapidly and continuously throughout 
the transition, thus generating enough resources for a smooth relaxation o f supply 
constraints.
In Eastern Europe, reformers decided to deal with excess demand— and forced 
savings— by letting prices increase, but in the process they almost wiped out house­
hold deposits. The region entered into transition with depleted private savings and 
a greatly reduced propensity to save (with inflation itself being one o f the reasons 
behind this). Apart from China., no economy has seen a major absorption o f the ex­
cess money supply— inflationary overhang— by shifting income from consumption 
to savings. China has not utilized privatization (nor bond issues) for this purpose, 
but Eastern Europe has not raised much government income through sales o f assets 
to its citizens either. China, however, has dramatically increased personal savings 
through a combination o f coercion and incentives— which explains why inflation 
has been low in China despite the considerable deficits maintained by the state.
Former members o f the Soviet bloc quickly revealed the existence o f repressed 
unemployment by eliminating their state assistance to industry and at the same 
time suddenly exposing enterprises to increased competition. Unemployment im­
mediately soared in these economies, as in East Germany, where, if those forced 
into early retirement, are included, the rate o f unemployment immediately rose to 
about 40 percent, with West German subsidies going not into job  creation but 
mostly into welfare payments. In Poland, with a similar lack o f concern for jobs, 
actual unemployment— with early pensions and increased “hidden” unemployment 
in farming— went up to 30 percent. China has avoided high unemployment in part 
by protecting its public sector industries and actually allowing them to grow, and 
as a result scores o f jobs have been created during the reform (with no special 
incentives for companies themselves to cut jobs).
To sum up, the transition in China has assumed a different path from that 
seen in the other former communist countries, with an active state removing con­
trols at a measured pace. This measured withdrawal strategy in China has been
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combined with the application o f various complementary state measures— such as 
regulations— that have helped to mitigate hidden imbalances. Such an approach 
has allowed China not only to spread its conversion more evenly over time but also 
to resolve some o f the hidden imbalances without ever releasing them into open. 
This strategy, together with other factors, explains why the Chinese economy, alone 
among the transition countries, has been able to sustain positive growth. This in 
itself has been an important factor in helping it to defuse hidden imbalances in a 
smooth fashion without forcing them fully into the open.
Concluding remarks: recession and recovery explained
The principal lesson from this analysis is that an effective state agency is 
indispensable for any successful transition away from communism. This is due to 
the simple fact that, at the outset, what these economies have had in terms of 
an organizing principle is the state, as the coordinator o f decisions and the owner 
o f the means o f production— both combined in one powerful agency. That this 
obvious fact has been ignored by the reformers is a truly remarkable example of 
miscalculation (or, if one takes a less benign position, o f the irresponsibility o f the 
post-communist elite). To avoid wrecking the economic system and thus preventing 
an early slide into recession, the state must slowly relinquish these two functions. 
By the same token, the phasing-in o f market forces also has to proceed slowly.
The additional reason for assuring an effective state during the transition 
process is equally obvious, for it is the state that has to execute the measures 
needed for the transition process to proceed successfully. If the task for the state 
was to eliminate the state than the just-mentioned need for an effective state would 
have obviously been immaterial. This is not the case, because no economic system 
can dispense with the state, and consequently transition cannot mean that the 
state is reduced to a bare minimum. Instead, a reform o f the state is needed. This 
makes the role o f the state as a reformer— the agent o f transition— particularly 
problematic, since while reforming the system the state has to reform itself as well.
While all transition economies that suffered from early recessions did so for 
the same general reason— a crisis o f the state— the particular forms o f this crisis 
differed from country to country. There is a direct correlation between the various 
forms o f state crises in these countries and the intensity of recession that occurred. 
Specifically, recession has been less drastic in countries where the state initially 
over-withdrew in an organized fashion, without losing its capability to manage the 
economy, than in countries in which similarly radical reforms were executed in a 
disorganized fashion. At the same time, for any pair of economies belonging to an 
organized or chaotic variant respectively, the country where the general approach
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to reforms has been less radical has performed better than the one with a more 
radical range of measures.
The countries o f the ideological model (Hungary and Poland), that is, where 
the state’s capacity was generally damaged less— given that the reforms were rela­
tively muted and conducted in an organized way— are also those where recession was 
the shallowest of all. At the other end of the spectrum are the economies in which 
more radical measures were executed in a chaotic fashion (the “collapse” model, 
exemplified by Russia and Ukraine which, respectively, had the worst economic 
performances o f all, if measured in terms o f cumulative losses). My analysis thus 
does not disagree with the conventional perception with respect to which countries 
have been less scarred by recession and which have been hurt more. It is different, 
because it finds Hungary and Poland not to be the most radical reformers but the 
most cautious ones, while categorizing Russia and Ukraine as the most radical. In 
addition, it finds the latter also to be the ones that allowed their reforms to run off 
course, which, for example, caused the Russian and Ukrainian economies to suffer 
so much more.
At the same time, the most successful recoveries have taken place in those 
countries where the return o f the state has been easiest. Countries whose state 
capacity was initially less damaged did relatively better. Poland, for example, 
where the state over-withdrew for conceptual (or ideological) reasons but retained 
its basic cohesion during the entire process, was in a favourable position to assume 
recovery. For the state to regain its resolve in Poland, a shift in attitude— and 
personnel— was necessary, and it took reshuffling at the governmental level (the 
removal o f Balcerowicz’s team) to bring this change about. On the other extreme 
one finds Russia and Ukraine: here, the state immediately fell into disarray and 
the process o f rebuilding the state was more problematic. In fact, this process has 
not yet been completed, which explains quite clearly why no economic recovery has 
occurred in either country yet.
Not surprisingly, when we look at the countries in which there was an orga­
nized state over-withdrawal, those with more restrained reforms, including Hungary 
and Poland, have been less economically damaged than those in which steps were 
of a more radical nature, as in East Germany (and initially in Czechoslovakia, and 
later after country’s disunification, in the Czech Republic). East German reforms 
have been more radical not only because those in charge wanted to accomplish more 
change but also because, in this case, the state which was executing reforms had 
greater capabilities. In the East German case, the over-withdrawal o f the state was 
executed by the coherent West German state apparatus, which was perfectly ready 
to embark on truly radical measures (leading some analysts to call this model an 
“instant transition” ).
It is the presence o f a well-tuned West German state that allowed for quick 
substitution o f the damaged East German state, which, in turn, produced the 
fastest recovery o f all the countries in Eastern Europe. While the East German
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recession was much deeper than in Hungary and Poland, it was also much shorter 
than elsewhere. In Poland it took twice as long for the economy to recover, and 
in Hungary twice as much time as in Poland was needed to accomplish the same; 
but while slower, their recoveries have proved to be much more successful. While 
Poland has already exceeded its pre-crisis production level, and Hungary is close 
to reaching this point, East Germany is far away from undoing its recession. While 
East Germany has on occasions slowed down, the other two countries have shown 
relatively uninterrupted production growth. It thus appears, quite paradoxically, 
that Hungary and Poland have been more successful in restoring their respective 
state to an appropriate status.
Similarly, Bulgaria and Romania, with less aggressive reforms, have per­
formed better than the exceptionally radical Russia and Ukraine, also in the cate­
gory o f disorganized withdrawal. On the one hand, Bulgaria and Romania engaged 
in chaotic reforms that wrecked their respective economic systems, but the state in 
both countries has not completely lost its cohesiveness. While all these four states 
have been submerged in corruption, in Russia and Ukraine the states— infusing 
themselves with corruption— have virtually disintegrated. Left without much state 
control, reforms in Russia and Ukraine have assumed a radical and, quite obviously, 
chaotic character. Given this difference in state capabilities, and a related degree 
of disorganization, it is not surprising that production losses in the corrupt model 
of Bulgaria and Romania have been only half o f those experienced by Russia and 
Ukraine, which represent the collapse model.
Turning to the recovery, it is also clear that with a less-damaged state Bulgaria 
and Romania have been able to restore economic growth before Russia and Ukraine. 
In the former, the state, under proper political leadership, could still have been 
mobilized for launching policies that would benefit the national economy, while 
fulfilling the private needs o f the officials involved. However, due to the extent 
o f official corruption, mastering a robust recovery has proved to be an onerous 
task. Instead, both Bulgaria and Romania have seen their recoveries suspended. 
They have recently entered into a second recession, though not as damaging as the 
first one. Russia and Ukraine, with no effective apparatus to speak of, have failed 
to end their initial production downturn— and just recently, in the eighth year of 
transition, they experienced a further decline.
These conclusions are derived from a broad comparative analysis which in­
cludes the experiences o f economies such as East Germany and China, both o f which 
are usually overlooked by students o f transition (with the notable exception o f ana­
lysts working on China’s economy). These two examples are in many ways different 
from other cases o f transition and thus possibly cannot be replicated. It cannot, 
however, be denied that they belong to the general sample o f the once-communist 
economies engaged in transition. Thus, these two should not be excluded, and the 
very contrast in question is exactly what makes these two countries particularly
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instructive, at least in terms o f positive rather than normative (prescriptive) work 
on post-communist transitions.
The case o f China is particularly telling, for its economy, while starting from 
more or less the same initial conditions, is (possibly next to Vietnam’s) the only 
one that has managed to completely escape recession; in fact, it has experienced 
unremitting and rapid expansion. Any theory o f post-communist recession has to be 
able to explain this sharp contrast between recession-ridden and growth-oriented 
pathways o f transition from communism. While this proves that there exists a 
certain path o f transition which can steer an economy away from early recession, 
the question is: what factors account for this road to capitalism? The principal 
feature o f such a path requires that the state remains robust while, at the same 
time, it uses its authority to carefully execute its own eventual reconfiguration into 
a market-friendly agency.
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A NEBBISH PRESENCE: 
UNDERVALUED CONTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM TO IPE
A. LEANDER1
Sociological institutionalism is unequally present in International Political Econom y (IPE) 
and even when it is used little explicit attention is given to it. It is as if it were not there. 
This article argues that this nebbish presence is regrettable. Explicit attention to sociological 
institutionalism could further the theoretical and empirical development o f IPE. Theoretically, 
sociological institutionalism offers concepts for linking up different social spheres and for thinking 
about the vertical and horizontal levels o f governance. Empirically, sociological institutionalism 
advances the understanding o f phenomena at the heart o f IPE such as states and firms. It provides 
frameworks for understanding o f the normative and social settings o f economic practices. It also 
offers ways o f moving towards an understanding of firms as social and political actors.
In the 50th anniversary issue o f International Organization, the editors state 
that International Political Economy (IPE) has been little touched by the construc­
tivist turn in International Relations (Katzenstein, Keohane et al. 1998: 675). This 
study will argue that this assessment is misleading. Even if its presence continues 
to be timid, and often grossly undervalued, sociological institutionalism occupies a 
growing space in IPE and raises issues and makes claims which are consonant with 
those made by “constructivists” in IR. This study argues that much stands to be 
gained from making this presence more visible and assertive.
Institutionalism is pervasive in contemporary IPE. Economic/rational choice 
institutionalism has become central to mainstream research in IPE; regime theory 
(Keohane 1984), European integration (Moravcsik 1998), trade policies (Rogowski 
1989) and foreign investment (Dunning 1988) are some of the subjects that have 
been studied with the help o f economic institutionalism. Similarly historical in­
stitutionalism is referred to in the discussion o f the state (Halliday 1987; Krasner 
1988; Hobson 1997). In contrast, with few notable exception,2 sociological in­
stitutionalism is rarely explicitly discussed except as it relates to other forms of 
institutionalism.
The neglect o f sociological institutionalism in IPE is regrettable. However, 
innovative IPE may be compared to international relations and international eco-
'Special thanks to Tanja Boerzel, Béla Greskovits, Stefano Guzzini, Mihály Laki, Jennifer 
Milliken and Ronen Palan for commenting extensively on an early version of this study which 
was written as part o f the book project Global political economy: contemporary approaches edited 
by Ronen Palan (London: Routhledge: forthcoming).
2See the work o f John G. Ruggie (1982; 1998) which relies heavily on Karl Polányi.
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nomics, frustration is growing among IPE scholars with the apparent incapacity of 
the discipline to accumulate and develop (e.g. Hobson 1997; Keohane 1997). Mean­
while IPE is chastised by outsiders for its lack o f theoretical rigour and adequate 
theoretical frameworks. IPE scholars are said to overstate their points ( Wade 1996), 
to be simplistic in their interpretation of globalization (Esping-Anderson 1996; Hu­
ber and Stephens 1998), and to focus exclusively on globalization to the detriment 
o f other (possibly more important) factors o f change (Andrews and Willett 1997). 
Unfortunately, theoretical rigour is often equated with economic approaches and 
the importance o f preserving IPE as a “space of openness” (Helleiner 1994), rather 
than turning it into a Procrustean discipline (Strange 1998), are brushed aside.
In this context I would argue that sociological institutionalism offers IPE an 
excellent opportunity to develop without compromising either its interdisciplinarity 
or its theoretical openness. I develop this argument in three steps. The first section 
introduces sociological institutionalism and shows how it can deal with two central 
theoretical problems in IPE: the relationship between different spheres o f social life 
and the conceptualization o f diverging spatial levels— global, national, local and 
international. The following two sections illustrate the contribution o f sociological 
institutionalism to two specific issues: respectively, the changing nature o f states 
and o f firms.
Sociological institutionalism: assumptions, concepts and frameworks 
for the study of IPE
Sociological approaches to economics, also called economic sociology (Swed- 
berg, Himmelstrand et al. 1987), centre on the social embeddedness o f economic ac­
tivity. The term “embeddedness” derives from Polânyi (1957) who, contrary to the 
economic (objectivist) tradition, argued that market relations are by no means nat­
ural or present in all societies, but rather remain contingent on the social context. 
The vast majority o f present work in this tradition draws on neo-institutionalist 
perspectives— hence the label sociological institutionalism.
The core o f neo-institutionalism consists o f an interest in how institutions 
shape, and in turn are shaped by, different social spheres, including the econ­
omy ( Immergut 1998: 25). Beyond this, the different strands o f the various neo- 
institutionalisms provide sharply diverging answers to fundamental questions such 
as: how institutions are to be studied, what counts as an institution, and what 
the relationship is between institutions and their environment and institutions and 
actor behaviour. In answering these questions, it is common to distinguish three 
traditions o f neo-institutionalist thought: economic or rational choice, symbolic or 
sociological, and historical (Hirsch, Michaels et al. 1990; Powell and DiMaggio 
1991; Hall and Taylor 1996). The focus of the first group is on individual choices
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according to set preferences and is often the target o f explicit criticisms by the sec­
ond and the third groups who contest its ahistorical, utilitarian materialist, and/or 
individualist bias.
Sociological institutionalism has more in common with historical institution­
alism— often synonymous with historical sociology— than with rational choice in­
stitutionalism.3 The first two work in an essentially neo-Weberian tradition. They 
are interested in path dependence, organizational bias and rules which structure 
the context o f decisions. Compared with historical institutionalism, however, so­
ciological institutionalism places a greater emphasis on non-materialist aspects of 
institutions, viewed not only as socially, but also intersubjectively constructed. Its 
research on these intersubjective meanings focuses specifically, but not exclusively, 
on the common sense o f the day, on shared understandings and practices which 
inform human action in society. Consequently, “institutions” in sociological insti­
tutionalism include world-views, cognitive maps, codes o f behaviour, discourses, 
symbols, or mental frames. This raises question about how institutions develop 
and change, and how they shape, for instance, identities, interests, behaviour, firms 
strategies, systems o f production, states, or politits.4 Contrary to the individual­
ism o f choice theoretical approaches, in sociological institutionalism social reality 
is seen as logically and empirically prior to behaviour: it provides reasons for ac­
tion, as opposed to constraints or causes; it defines identities and hence actors’ 
interests (Ruggie 1998: 22). As opposed to materialist approaches, sociological 
institutionalism stresses that behaviour, identities and interests emerge through 
shared understandings o f social reality and are not mere epi-phenomena o f some 
underlying material reality. They play a part in shaping this reality.
Theorising political economy in IPE: conceptualising the relation between social 
spheres
Scholars in IPE, whose basic assumption is that economic relations cannot be 
analysed independently o f the political setting, should be naturally inclined to use 
approaches which stress social embeddedness. After all, the ideal o f the “perfect 
market” is the product o f institutions, and when markets are not perfect, they 
display power relations. Indeed the market is an institution o f political power.
3However, there can be very fruitful interchanges between sociological and rational choice 
institutionalism as illustrated by the collaboration between Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman 
(Coleman and Bourdieu 1991) in connection with the concepts o f social and symbolic capital.
4 This wide definition o f institutions is vulnerable to the critique that the concept has been 
rendered vacuous by the expansion o f its meaning to include almost everything ( Pontusson  1995: 
125). Institutionalists reply that since the definition o f an institution is part o f the issue to be 
studied there can be no prior definition o f the term (Immergut 1998).
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Economics is therefore about politics, and politics is more than some struggle in 
the government apparatus.
In other words, since its inception IPE has been confronted by the issue of 
how to relate different social spheres to each other. More specifically, it has dealt 
with how to avoid the Scylla o f “over-embedding” the economy by seeing it as 
only socially/politically determined, and the Charybdis of “under-embedding” it 
by downplaying the influence o f social institutions on economic relations. More­
over, it is precisely here that sociological institutionalism has something to offer. 
Studying how the economy is tied to other social spheres is at the heart of socio­
logical institutionalism. This, in fact, is the essence o f embeddedness (Swedberg, 
Himmelstrand et al. 1987: 178).
Bourdieu’s influential theory o f social fields might serve as a good illustration.5 
Bourdieu’s starting point is the understanding o f social power and stratification. 
His ambition is to develop “a general theory o f the economy o f symbolic goods and 
its relation to the material economy” (Brubaker 1985: 87). He argues that social 
practices form a unity. Even practices, such as lifestyles, music and food tastes—  
which are usually considered devoid o f direct material purpose— are “economic” in 
that they are part o f the strategy of capital accumulation in a broad sense. In a 
Weberian vein, Bourdieu insists that not only (material) capital is a determinant 
o f power relations but so too is capital based on symbolic (social and cultural) 
resources. Concretely, this leads him to study rules governing different spheres of 
social life and the resulting “strategies” for accumulating different forms o f capital 
(economic, social and cultural); these are partly and imperfectly transferable from 
one “field” o f social life to another.
Fields are defined by Bourdieu as a set o f (normal, habitual, routine) practices 
which, in turn, can be understood on the basis o f a set o f socially and historically 
informed and shared dispositions— Bourdieu calls these the “habitus” . These dis­
positions translate past experiences into schemes of perception, thought and action; 
in turn, these suggest the individual behaviour which would conform to the usual 
practices in the field (Bourdieu 1980: 91). Fields are interlinked, and individuals 
are part o f several fields at any given time.
By looking at the “habitus” and the practices in different fields, Bourdieu 
explains diverse strategies o f capital accumulation which then allow him to paint 
a rich picture o f social stratification and power relations well beyond classical We­
berian limits. Similarly, these strategies are not conceived in terms o f calculated 
interdependent decisions, but as behaviour positively sanctioned within the prac­
tices o f a field and internalised by the individual: it is strategy “without strategic 
calculation” .
5 For an application o f Bourdieu to the study o f  power in international relations, exemplified 
by a study o f the second gulf war, see (Guzzini 1994: Chap. 11 in particular).
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Rather than providing a theory in the sense o f a set o f casual propositions 
which specify the conditions under which certain links occur, Bourdieu (again a 
heir o f Weber) offers a conceptual framework for identifying the links between 
different social spheres and for studying them empirically. He does not believe in 
the possibility of a more general theory. According to him, there is no a priori 
given hierarchy among different forms o f capital. Their relative value differs from 
field to field and from society to society.
The relationship between different forms o f capital is therefore to be de­
termined empirically. Thus, in Distinctions (1979), Bourdieu provides a detailed 
description o f the relationship between economic, social, and cultural capital in 
different fields o f French society and shows how they fit together to form a so­
cial hierarchy. In Homo Academicus (1984, dealing with the university system) 
and State Nobility (1989, dealing with the state elite) he shows how, within sin­
gle fields, the relative value o f different forms of capital have changed and how 
actors, as a consequence, have adopted their strategies. This open-ended view on 
embeddedness is very useful for IPE scholars. It allows for a contextual approach 
to embeddedness which seems particularly important since IPE purports to study 
political economic realities spanning over a great number of contexts.
Theorising the “international" in IPE: vertical and horizontal levels o f governance
Sociological institutionalism also grapples with a second key theoretical issue 
for IPE: the link between different “levels” o f the global political economy and 
the artificial dichotomy between the state and the global (Palan and Gills 1994). 
The “ two level games” solution (Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson et al. 1993) is 
clearly not satisfactory for IPE. Its focus on the relations between policy-makers 
and their different constituents leaves no room to structural forces. Moreover, since 
the theory looks at the international and the local separately (or vice versa it can 
account only for international phenomena; not for “global” ones. Needless to say, 
the two level games theory does not provide any convincing way of accounting for 
the (sub- or supra-national) regional level.
Sociological institutionalism can provide useful insights into the debate, main­
ly through the (French) regulation school and (American) studies o f governance. 
Both have conceptualized governance in a way that makes it possible to understand 
the complex relationship between the respective transnational (or global), state and 
regional levels in shaping the regulation o f the economy.6 The shared aim o f scholars
6Palan (1999) rightly points out that not all regulationists fit the following account. Some 
scholars have simply adopted a realist conception o f the international and hence have failed to 
properly integrate the global into their accounts, let alone theorize how this integration could be 
accomplished.
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from both traditions is to develop an understanding o f the economy in terms of 
the “rules o f the game” as set by the social institutions which govern economic 
life. It is worth pointing out that both schools o f thought are part o f sociological 
institutionalism because o f a shared “constructivist” view of social institutions. 
Both are increasingly focusing on discursive practices, the construction o f identities 
and o f interests in the economic spheres (Boyer  1990). Similarly, the interest in 
linking the local and the global does not stem from abstract theoretical concerns, 
but from the obvious fact that the economic sectors, sub-sectors, regional clusters 
or production networks operate at different levels concomitantly. This has left 
scholars with no choice but to integrate “global” and “local” in their study of 
regulation /  governance.
The result is not a general theory, but frameworks of analysis for the study of 
the global and the local. Indeed, the link between the global and the local is neither 
uniform nor unidirectional. The different levels are “articulated” with each other: 
they influence each other but continue to display a certain independence. Moreover, 
the weight o f different levels of governance/regulation varies between sectors, sub­
sectors, production-networks and countries (Mytelka and al 1985; Hollingsworth 
1998). One illustration can be found in Lynn Krieger Mytelka’s (1988; 1993) studies 
of the changing regulation o f international production and the effects o f this on 
different industries. She has analysed how changes in the textile industry, which 
are largely global in nature, have impacted upon individual countries and their 
policies, and where differences in national institutions have played a considerable 
role.
These frameworks make the integration o f different spatial levels an inevitable 
part o f the analysis, avoiding the pitfall of an artificial separation o f the national 
and global realms, and also not making the mistake o f pretending that the regional 
and national levels are o f no consequence.
The changing nature of the state 
and the globalisation of legitimate economic practices
Sociological institutionalism is central to the move in IPE away from sterile 
questions about “the end o f the nation state” and towards more fruitful ones about 
the ways in which globalization is changing political practices.7 I will make this
7The debate about globalization and the role of the state today is in fact very rich. Notwith­
standing the critics, “globalization” research does not purport to show that econom ic integration 
is leading towards the disappearance o f the state, increased equality among countries and a conver­
gence o f prices in national markets ( Hirst and Thompson 1996; Wade 1996; Huber and Stephens 
1998; Weiss 1998). Even those IPE scholars most frequently quoted as defending such absurd 
claims ( Cerny 1988; Strange 1996) actually argue that the nation-state is not about to disappear,
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point with reference to two research tracks o f sociological institutionalism which 
are directly overlapping with IPE.
Sociological institutionalism focuses on the embeddedness o f human action. 
Applied to IPE, it looks at the social embeddedness o f the global political economy. 
The global political economy, in turn, is viewed not simply as a system o f more or 
less well-governed and efficient markets, but as something which consists o f a num­
ber o f overlapping sets o f practices that rely on a certain self-understanding and 
distribute different forms o f capital among social actors, hence empowering some 
over others.8 Applied to the central relationship between the state and the global 
political economy, concrete research programmes in this tradition therefore have at 
least two aspects. First, they focus on shared or taken-for-granted understandings 
o f the nature o f the global political economy. Here, sociological institutionalism fol­
lows lines similar to those which investigate the so-called “Washington consensus” 
in IPE. Second, they examine the practices o f those groups o f actors empowered 
(i.e. legitimated) by such shared understandings. At this point sociological institu­
tionalism overlaps with the literature on “epistemic communities” in IPE.
Research Track 1. The normative setting o f  economic practices: exploring the 
Washington consensus
The “Washington consensus” is a shorthand for the conventional wisdom 
about the most efficient government action in the present global political economy. 
IPE scholars are increasingly aware that this kind o f shared “common wisdom” is 
o f crucial importance. Constructivist scholars have convincingly argued that the 
impact o f common wisdom cannot be reduced to the constraints posed by the insti­
tutions that embody it. Rather facts (e.g. about the global economy) and interests 
(e.g. defining the strategies o f states) are themselves intersubjectively constructed. 
Consequently, one strand o f IPE research centres on the extent to which changes in 
the ideas about what is feasible and sound have shaped “globalization” and state 
strategies. A few examples will illustrate the point.
To begin with, there is considerable research on the ideological and organ­
isational origins o f such transnational consensuses. This is important for under­
standing why change in normative settings takes place, as well as to clarify who 
benefits and loses. In contrast to much of the work in the constructivist tradition, 
explanations deriving from sociological institutionalism usually venture beyond the 
realm o f discursive constructions into the economic and social structures. This is 
no doubt the reason why they have been smoothly integrated in IPE.
but is changing in nature, that there is growing inequality among states, and that there is no 
reason to believe that prices will somehow converge.
8For a very clear general statement o f this point see Bourdieu (1997).
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The work o f Evans (1997) and Dezalay and Garth (1998) reflects this strat­
egy. Dezalay and Garth explain the emergence o f the “Washington consensus” in 
terms o f the construction o f economics as a neutral, technocratic, mathematical 
science where “it takes a model to kill a model” . They explore the interests and 
the strategies o f economists who have managed to carve out for themselves a niche 
that secures jobs, funding and status. The shift to neo-classical economics grounded 
in econometrics is understood as one such possible niche in a context which has 
been predominantly Keynesian and largely “verbal” . Dezealay and Garth show 
how this niche was carved out and developed within US academia through a re­
liance on media, links to business-life as well as through the control o f academic 
institutions. Similarly, Evans (1997) explains the Washington consensus by the 
parallel development o f neo-liberal economics, neo-utilitarian state theories, and 
“civil-society” -centred theories o f politics. An unsophisticated neo-utilitarian state 
theory, combined with the focus on the new civil society, has complemented the 
neo-liberal turn in economics, serving to de-legitimize more generally state inter­
vention in the economy and politics at the state level. As Evans underlines, these 
theories often move towards self-fulfilling prophecies as they tend to result in an 
exclusive focus on state failures and to deprive the bureaucracy o f its economic and 
social status.
Both accounts move beyond the focus on academic debates to underscore that 
the impact o f these ideas can be explained only by reference to their place in a wider 
context. Dezalay and Garth (1998) place these shifts in the broader context o f the 
changing nature o f the economy— i.e. the globalization of finance and production—  
and the related increase in the political strength o f the Washington institutions (i.e. 
the IMF and the World Bank). These changes have made>private business, with an 
interest in models for reducing uncertainty as well as in further deregulation and 
state withdrawal, more influential both in academic life and in politics.9 They also 
point out that the replacement o f Keynesianism with, liberalism as the dominant 
view within the Bretton Woods institutions themselves has been greater because 
the conditionality and reports o f these institutions were immediately reflected by 
private markets. Likewise, Evans sees the immediate, though possibly not long­
term, interest o f international economic actors (e.g. MNCs and financial market 
operators) in supporting further deregulation and liberalization as a fundamental 
reason for the establishment o f the Washington consensus.10 In fact, he suggests 
that the possible limits to state decline stem from the risk that if this decline goes 
too far then the stable, predictable, law-abiding environment which is essential
9See Bourdieu and Waquant (1998) for an elaboration o f  the im portance o f US foundations in 
spreading the ideas. They fund both “scientific" and NGO work on issues which are conceived 
according to the prevailing understanding o f social and econom ic sciences
10On this theme, see also Fligatein (1997)
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for business will disappear and business consequently will cease to support further 
liberalization, deregulation and state withdrawal.
Once established, the Washington consensus informs both the identification 
o f problems and their solutions. This shift to a “market civilization” legitimises a 
set o f practices whose ideological effect has been a central theme of Gramscian IPE 
( Gill 1995) and was also a focal point of the late Susan Strange (1990). The Wash­
ington consensus constrains policies directly through the pressure o f international 
and national financial markets, central banks, credit rating agencies, or condition­
ality. There seems to be what Gill refers to as a “new constitutionalism” . That 
is, the explicit or implicit conditionality imposed by international actors regulates 
and constrains politics in much the same way as national constitutions (Gill 1997: 
215).11 The consensus, however, is not only felt as a constraint, for it alters the 
way actors conceive o f their interests, what is feasible, what is a problem and what 
is not. Hirschman has repeatedly pointed out the significance of underlying under­
standings for the policies adopted, and the implications in terms of incapacity to 
solve problems (see Hirschman 1967, on inflation in Chile) or o f even thinking about 
solutions (see Hirschman 1981 on the debilitating effect o f dependency theory). It 
is increasingly common in IPE to explain policy-choices partly in this way— i.e. 
with reference to the changing world views o f actors. Thus, the repatriation o f US 
trained economists with different world views has been used to explain fundamental 
shifts in policy orientation such as the opening up o f the Swedish financial markets 
(Korpi 1992) or the closing o f the Korean Central Planning Board (Weiss 1998).
By the same token, changes in the dominant understanding o f the relationship 
between the state and the economy affect who is a legitimate political actor and 
what legitimate politics are about. This leads us straight onto the second research 
track where sociological institutionalism has been of consequence for IPE.
Research Track 2. The social setting o f economic practices: exploring the diffusion 
o f politics
Shared world views empower actors “in the know” and disempowers others. 
In examing this process empirically, sociological institutionalism joins IPE scholars 
concerned with the bearers o f ideas, their organisation and institutional setting. In 
the case o f the establishment o f the Washington consensus, the two groups which 
have been most studied are those o f policy-makers and private actors respectively, 
who pushed for the turn to neo-liberalism and who have acquired increasing political 
influence as a result o f it. In studying the first group, sociological institutionalism
11 O f course, the significance o f  this pressure may be exaggerated by governments who wish to 
use it to legitimate and push through otherwise unpopular policies (Hirst and Thomson  1995).
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clearly overlaps with IPE scholars’ interest in “epistemic communities” and the 
role of norms in policy-making. In working on the second, it overlaps with IPE 
studies o f the “diffusion o f power” and the increasing importance of private, often 
corporate, actors in politics.
First, in the shift to a new dominant understanding o f the role o f the state in 
the economy, the focus o f much recent research has been on policy-makers, or more 
precisely the networks o f experts and policy-makers usually referred to as “epistemic 
communities” in IPE (Haas 1992). The question here becomes which networks of 
policy-makers carry a particular set o f ideas and how they manage to impose these 
in a given situation. Such studies invite investigation o f policy-making practices 
and, in particular, o f the role that norms play. In returning to these issues IPE 
scholars ( Trentmann 1998) have thus joined IR scholars more generally (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998) and have moved closer to sociological institutionalism.
Sociological institutionalism has contributed to this literature by demonstrat­
ing the way ideas are “imported” and adjusted within national fields o f economics 
and the economy.12 Consonant with a sociological approach, the analysis does 
not de-link the analysis o f ideas from the social groups who share them. Lebaron 
(1997a), for example, analyses the “field” of professional economists in France in 
the 1990s, showing the role imported ideas, funds, and positions in the international 
scientific community play in the field of French economics and in the “strategies” 
o f French economists. In particular, he emphasizes the importance o f an interna­
tional status for those French economists who are not well linked up with national 
networks— that is, those who do not come from the Parisian faculties and lack 
prominent positions on editorial boards and other scientific institutions, and who 
need to establish themselves from the outside. Further, he shows the weight of 
international ideas and institutions in his study o f the reform of the legal status of 
the French Central Bank (in 1993) aimed at making the bank more independent 
o f government. Here “new constitutionalism” was central. A key impetus for the 
reform came from the Maastricht treaty. But beyond this, the pressure o f inter­
national markets and the changing reference points o f central actors who “only 
place themselves on the transnational level” (Lebaron 1997b: 89) played a central 
role. Similarly, in her study o f the ruling elite o f Brazil, Loureiro (1998) shows 
how foreign education is fundamental both in constituting identities and networks 
and as a symbolic resource for imposing politics (for a similar study in the French 
context, see Lezuech 1998). Finally, it merits underlining that the integration of 
the international consensus can also be negative as in the cases where the policy 
expert networks are defined in opposition to the dominant consensus, as is often 
the case with Islamic economic strategies.
12These fields are still largely national because o f the central role played by the nation-state in 
the past and the present in funding, organizing and regulating academic production.
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As these examples illustrate, sociological institutionalism is closely related 
to, and in effect overlaps with the concerns in IR and IPE about policy-making 
networks and tends to study them much in the same manner. In fact, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to separate work in IPE and in sociological institutionalism on 
this topic.
The same goes for the study o f the second group o f actors which has been 
empowered by neo-liberalism: the private actors. Indeed, as Strange repeatedly 
insisted (including in her last piece, see Strange 1998), it would be a serious mistake 
not to account for the increasing role non-state actors play in politics. In part, 
this role is adopted simply by virtue o f the changes that are taking place in the 
international economy. As pointed out by numerous IPE authors, including Strange 
(1996: Part II), private actors such as accountants, credit rating agencies, banks, 
or for that matter, organized crime or drug dealers, play an increasing role in 
determining politics. They do not have a popular mandate for such powers, yet 
the changes in the way that the international economy is operating has made them 
extremely influential. For example, Sinclair (1994) shows how credit rating agencies 
dominate private and corporate policies simply because o f the enormous importance 
o f their evaluations. The aspect of this privatization, or diffusion o f power— which 
sociological institutionalism is best equipped to deal with— is how it is accepted 
and legitimated.
Indeed, in parallel with the structural shift which has conferred de facto 
new political roles on private actors, the privatization of policy-making (which is 
increasingly placing politics either in the grey zone between the private and the 
public sphere or purely in the private sphere) has taken place. What is new about 
this privatization is the legitimacy and official sanctioning of private policy-making. 
Sociological institutionalists have been concerned with the way in which this has 
developed.
Two examples can illustrate this point. First, sociological institutionalists 
have examined the emergence and increasing importance o f private regulatory 
institutions— that is, institutions in which public policy-making and the setting 
o f rules is mandated to the private actors involved. PIGs (private interest gov­
ernment), or more respectfully SROs (Self Regulating Organizations), play an in­
creasing role in a number o f economic sectors (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Boyer 
and Hollingsworth 1997). In a study o f the emergence and increasing dominance o f 
SROs o f financial markets, Coleman (1994) stresses the importance o f the changing 
perceptions o f what is legitimate regulation. In particular he underlines the signif­
icant difference between the UK tradition, where state interference continues to be 
considered as illegitimate, and the US where “a (state) shotgun behind the door” 
considered necessary. In looking at the spread of the “Anglo-Saxon” model 
of finance, he stresses the importance o f international market pressures and the 
changing consensus among policy-makers. He further underlines the significance of 
national traditions for the concrete ways the model is copied and implemented.
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Second, sociological institutionalism draws attention to the emergence (or ex­
istence) o f governance practices consisting o f a mixture o f public and private actors. 
Again, conceptions o f legitimacy have evolved and play a crucial role in the success 
o f such forms o f governance. Thus, in their study o f economic policy-making in 
Russia, Sabel and Prokop (1996) stress the importance o f the flexible, decentralized 
and private sector oriented policy-making, usually associated with post-fordist or 
flexible production forms. They argue that this is crucial both for creating com ­
petitiveness and because this is the policy both national and foreign firms consider 
legitimate. Similarly, in exploring the role of “deliberative associations” 13 in Cen­
tral Eastern Europe, Stark and Bruszt (1998) underline the importance that these 
institutions be recognized as existing forms o f economic activity and as legitimate 
sites o f policy-making.
To sum up, this section has shown how sociological institutionalism has con­
tributed to one specific aspect o f the debate about the evolving role of the state 
in IPE: the role shifts in world views (e.g. the establishment o f the Washington 
consensus) have played in bringing about changing roles for the state. The overall 
contention is that sociological institutionalism can provide important insights for 
understanding exactly how, and if politics is “uncaging” from the nation-state in 
different contexts (Mann 1993) and what, if any, o f the traditional “functions” of 
the state are disappearing and becoming illegitimate in the process (Ferge 1999).
A less economic understanding of firms
Although themes consonant with sociological institutionalism have already 
been addressed in the discussion o f political (state) phenomena in IPE, economic 
actors (such as the firm) are still understood primarily through the lenses o f eco­
nomic institutionalist in IPE. Yet, as the remainder o f this article will argue, this 
neglect leads to an unduly restrictive understanding of the power relationships in­
volving firms at the heart of IPE.
In a world where production is increasingly organized in global “webs” over 
which states at best have imperfect control, firm motivations and behaviour are 
o f fundamental importance (Reich 1992). Firms play a central role in determin­
ing crucial political questions concerning jobs, income redistribution, taxes, welfare 
provisions, research and development, and environmental policies. Therefore, un­
derstanding the firm is a central part of any analysis that purports to ask political 
questions about the economy (Stopford and Strange 1991, Strange 1970; 1991; 
1995).
13These institutions are deliberative because they involve negotiations; and they are associations 
because they refer to networks between the array o f public and private actors concerned with any 
one issue.
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That said, IPE scholars have chosen, on the whole, to examine firms through 
the lenses o f economic approaches and particularly institutional economic approach­
es. The approaches to the firm and the behaviour of multinationals most commonly 
referred to in IPE, centre on oligopolistic market conditions, market imperfections 
and strategic behaviour ( Gilpin 1975; Kindleberger 1979), on neo-institutionalism 
(Dunning 1988) and on product cycle arguments ( Casson 1987). As argued by 
Sally, approaches which regard firm behaviour as originating from its embeddedness 
in a social and political context have largely been ignored (1994).
The adoption o f an economic approach leads to a concentration on questions 
of efficiency. These questions are no doubt important but they tend to downplay 
the distributional, political and social aspects both of firm strategies and of their 
consequences. Also, they tend to misread the actual behaviour o f firms, seeing it in 
strictly economic terms; this is a shortcoming particularly relevant for a discipline 
like IPE which started with the purpose o f overcoming exactly such a bias.
Sociological institutionalists reject both the traditional economic view where 
firm behaviour is analyzed solely as a response to external market conditions, and 
institutional economic analysis where transaction costs are determinant. Instead, 
sociological institutionalism stresses the social construction of firm identity and 
behaviour. Firms are viewed primarily as social institutions. Firm strategies and 
structures are shaped by the internal social context of the firm: the behaviour o f a 
firm is a consequence o f its history, traditions, culture and internal power relations 
(e.g. personal rivalry, competition among divisions). Moreover, sociological insti­
tutionalists link their analysis o f the firm as an institution with the environment 
in which the firm is embedded. This environment must be considered in terms o f 
social, political, and cultural relations— and not only in terms o f markets and eco­
nomic factors, as neo-classical economics and rational choice institutionalism would 
have it. As a result sociological institutionalism is better than conventional eco­
nomic analysis in dealing with questions such as: why do firms behave differently in 
similar contexts? Why do some firms adapt well to changing circumstances while 
others do not? Why do different firms have different structures and strategies in 
different, contexts, and what are the distributional consequences o f firm behaviour?
In his critique o f transactions costs economics, Granovetter (1992) provides a 
succinct statement o f the difference between sociological and economic institution­
alist approaches. Williamson (1975; 1985) contends that the transaction costs (i.e. 
the costs due to the combination o f bounded rationality, uncertainty, opportunism, 
and small numbers) involved in any transaction explain whether the transaction will 
take place through markets, hierarchies or networks. In his critique, Granovetter 
points out that Williamson overstates the uncertainty o f most market transactions 
by ignoring the role o f social relations and networks in which they are embedded 
and, conversely, overstates the smoothness of transactions within firms (hierarchies) 
by understating the problems o f transparency and uncertainty in a bureaucratic in­
stitution. In some cases the importance o f social ties for regulating exchange is
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obvious— as, for example, in sectors dominated by family firms, minority groups 
or migrant workers (Ben-Porath 1980). However, Granovetter contends that social 
ties are important in a more general way. This is because they also shape economic 
activity in sectors where market relations guide firm behaviour and structure, pre­
cisely for the reason that they are at the origin o f the shape that these firms and 
their market relations take (Granovetter 1990).
This kind o f sociological analysis has been applied extensively to subjects 
o f direct relevance to IPE. First, sociological institutionalists have employed their 
analysis o f firms to explain broader political changes. Neil Fligstein (1991), for 
instance, explains the diversification strategies o f large American firms by inves­
tigating power-holders (i.e. management and shareholders) and their capacity to 
impose their views. Mintz and Schwartz (1990) explain the increasing influence of 
finance and insurance companies over firm strategies in terms of the changing cor­
porate cultures. Finally, Charles Sabel (1995) argues that the evolving discursive 
practices determine whether middle-level management will resist or adopt flexi­
ble production strategies. This is in turn essential for understanding the extent to 
which there will be an overall shift to new flexible, post-fordist forms o f production.
Second, sociological institutionalism has been used to analyse how (changes 
in) the relationship between context and firms influence power relations in soci­
ety. Thus, Boltanski (1981) shows the importance o f the Cold War, a coalition of 
conservative politicians and the business elite for shifting management practices in 
France. He focuses on alterations in the world view o f the French business elite 
and its impact on their business strategies. He argues that they have brought 
about a reorganization o f the economy (and of the elite). Likewise, comparative 
work has underlined the importance of differences in socio-political contexts in 
shaping firm structures and strategy; these in turn, are directly linked to distri­
butional issues in society. An excellent example is the work by Hamilton and 
Biggart on organizational forms in the Asian economies (Orrú, Biggart Woolsey 
et al. 1991; Hamilton and Woolsey Biggart 1992). They show the importance 
o f cultural factors— including a shared Confucian culture— in shaping similarities, 
and the significance o f different histories, state interventions and political events in 
explaining differences in the overall structure o f the private business sector and the 
strategies o f firms. The relations between different social groups are correspond­
ingly different. There is a wealth o f excellent studies, focusing on the same issue 
in various countries (see, for example, Bugra 1991; Sadowski 1991; Bahout 1994; 
Szelényi, Eyal et al. 1996).
IPE scholars have occasionally made use of sociological institutionalism. Work 
on foreign direct investment and the strategies of MNCs sometimes turns to it. Sally 
(1992) used a sociological institutional approach to study the behaviour o f French 
and German multinationals in the chemical industry. He departs from sectoral 
policies and state/business relations as a basis for understanding the business cul­
ture in the two countries and, consequently, firm behaviour (see also Tavis 1988).
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Similarly, the approach has been used for studying the role o f state institutions 
and policies in shaping firm structures and behaviour (Katzenstein and Tsujinaka 
1992; Whitley 1998).
On the whole, however, the sociological institutionalist literature on firms has 
been ignored. This is regrettable since sociological institutionalism could be used 
to break the trend which is making firm studies in IPE a branch o f business studies; 
in other words, it could help those who try to use the study of firms to understand 
the international political economy.
Conclusion
To sum up, sociological institutionalism could play the same role in IPE as 
constructivism does in IR. Both raise similar issues concerning the importance of 
intersubjective meaning in the construction o f identities, politics, and the econ­
omy. However, unlike constructivism in IR, sociological institutionalism has not 
yet received the recognition it deserves. In IR constructivism has been noisy and 
visible; a self-proclaimed “constructivist school” has triggered a new seminal dis­
cipline debate (between “constructivists and rationalists” ) and this in turn has led 
to theoretical renewal and to the development o f a whole range o f new empirical 
research agendas. In contrast, as has been shown, sociological institutionalism is 
moving into IPE in a slow and selective way. In many areas, here exemplified by 
the study o f firms, sociological institutionalism has developed outside o f the IPE 
debate. In other areas, where sociological institutionalism has influenced IPE very 
strongly (as in the debate around the state), sociological institutionalists have not 
proclaimed their specific contributions and the value o f their presence. They have 
been absorbed, but remain invisible and undervalued. The argument being put 
here is that, by providing a higher profile to sociological institutionalism, it would 
be possible for IPE scholars to move forwards both theoretically and empirically.
An obvious question following from this centres upon what explains the dif­
ference between IR and IPE: why is constructivism so assertive in IR while its kin in 
IPE so nebbish? The easy answer would be that IPE is more focused on economic 
phenomena and actors, and that the theoretical tool kit o f economic approaches is 
best suited for the study o f these. However, as underlined above, this is simply not 
true. A more interesting way to answer the question would be to apply sociological 
institutionalism reflexively to the field of IPE and to clarify why the strategies of 
IPE scholars have so far been constructed in a way which has largely excluded this 
kind o f approach. Indeed, a further virtue o f making sociological institutionalism 
an explicit part of IPE would be that it paves the way for a treatment o f reflexive 
issues, such as this one, and for attempts to make serious (and critical) sense o f the 
future directions taken by our discipline.
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THE END OF POST-SOCIALISM: 
THE STRUCTURE AND EFFICIENCY OF THE OWNERSHIP OF 
HUNGARIAN LARGE COMPANIES IN 1997
A. CSITE-I. KOVÄCH
On the basis o f the analysis o f the structure o f large com pany ownership, through owner­
ship, efficiency and the transformation models, the authors consider that the econom ic transfor­
mation has been com pleted in this segment and the period o f post-socialism has ended. There 
are no arguments or reasons regarding that post-socialism can be further used as an indicator of 
the period, either with the surviving presence o f the socialist economic model or with the iden­
tification o f the explosion and transition o f socialist economy into market economy. None o f the 
elements o f the socialist econom ic model are characteristic o f the economic environment o f  the 
large companies in the nineties, however significant the companies’ “state” past (that they were 
transformed from state companies) or ownership structure (state/local self-government, foreign 
and home entrepreneurs, etc.) is in influencing the operations o f the given companies.
According to the latest works on Hungarian privatisation and large company 
reorganisation, (Szalai 1997; Voszka 1997a; Csite and Kovach 1998; Totli 1998; 
Vedres 1997) the theories and models originating from the restructuring o f the 
post-socialist market economy— i.e. at the beginning o f privatisation— are either 
unverifiable in the light o f actual details, or are only in part valid. Not one em­
pirical research into the model o f political capitalism or nomenclature bourgeoisie 
(Hankiss 1989; Sztaniszkis 1991) can be proven. It is true that most managers of 
the largest companies held management positions in the eighties; hence Erzsebet 
Szalai’s prognosis was largely true in that researchers only partly accept respective 
theories on technocrats’ ability to survive and their potential power, managerial 
theoreticians (Szelényi, Eyal and Townsley 1996; Szelényi, Szelényi and Kovach 
1995; Bôrôcz 1995; Borocz and Rôna-Tas 1995; Rona-Tas 1994), managers be­
coming owners, diffuse ownership and managers disposal o f power— and then only 
those theories concerned with the period after privatisation and the intensive pe­
riod o f company transformation (1993-97). Éva Voszka’s extraordinarily thorough 
monograph unequivocally proves that it was not characteristic that managers of 
the largest socialist companies did not receive property. (Voszka 1997b). Accord­
ing to data prepared on the economic elite, only 1.9 percent more managers were in 
possession o f their own firms in 1997 than in 1993; and thus arguments relating to 
managers becoming owners are less relevant. It is also true that a mere 12.8 percent 
o f the people interviewed in 1993 and 21.8 percent in 1997, disposed o f a greater 
than 50 percent share in some kind o f venture; however, this can be explained by
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the appearance o f a Hungarian owner-manager layer who became proprietors in 
the nineties (Csite and Kovách 1998). According to Lengyel and Bartha (1997) 
there was no dominant group among the most important economic players (banks, 
corporations, political elite) which particularly controlled the others (Csite and 
Kovách 1998). Contrary to theories on diffuse ownership conditions, Kolosi and 
Sági successfully presented the large company group who had the real ownership. 
(Kolosi and Sági 1997). According to István János Tóth “the largest achievement 
o f the Hungarian privatisation was that it helped put the rights o f company own­
ership into the hands o f ‘ real owners’ ” . (Tóth 1998, p. 611) In T óth ’s study, 
from which this quote is taken, the author analysed data from large companies 
between 1995 and 1996; this study brings into question the universal application of 
the David Stark model o f recombined large company ownership to the transformed 
Hungarian economy. On the basis o f Eva Voszka’s book and the results o f our re­
search, recombined large company ownership is not verifiable (Voszka 1997a, Csite 
and Kovách 1998). According to the analysis o f the structure of large company 
ownership, by 1996 individual ownership had become common. At the same time, 
according to the type o f ownership and its structure (multinational, self-founded 
or arising from privatisation, and majority state— local self-government owned) the 
Hungarian economy is multisectoral (Csite and Kovách 1998).
The relevant general binding models and theories concerning the ownership 
structure and owners o f Hungarian companies were constructed before the period 
of intensive privatisation; and thus now, after privatisation, it is worthwhile re­
examining the real composition o f ownership. In this study, carried out in 1997 af­
ter the privatisation o f the larger enterprises, to supplement data that was collected 
on the economic elite and using the data collected about the large companies, there 
is an analysis o f the ownership structure of one segment of the Hungarian econ­
omy. The sampling and the sample size have provided the opportunity to present 
representative data on the large company ownership structure, and perhaps serve 
to give decisive arguments to the debates on this. The data methods have enabled 
us to find answers to the exciting question o f how efficiency effects the ownership 
type and the process o f privatisation; furthermore, perhaps the judgement o f the 
transformations o f the nineties can contribute to a joint analysis o f ownership and 
efficiency. We think that, on the basis o f our data, a large part can be described as 
typical organisational features o f the large segment o f companies in the Hungarian 
economy. Given this, an opinion o f the characteristic post-socialist economy, or 
rather the restructured market economy, can be formed.
Literature on the economics of transition describes the nineties in terms of 
post-socialist transformations, and asks whether characteristics remain which were 
features o f the socialist economy; or, have the processes o f privatisation, economic 
liberalisation and market economy transformation totally removed such features 
from the Hungarian economy, in our case from the management o f large compa­
nies? In our view, the usage o f “post-socialism” as an indicator o f the period
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is no longer valid. For verification o f this a difficult task lies ahead as, in real­
ity, post-socialism never really found its theoretician. Transition or backwardness 
are synonyms o f post-socialism and we did not have knowledge o f a theoretical 
analysis which could analyse post-socialism, as a system. In our interpretation, 
post-socialism is a transitional period in which the socialist economic elements 
of organisation and operation appear, and if it is not possible to demonstrate this 
then we cannot talk about post-socialist economy or post-socialist transition. When 
János Kornai analysed the growth of the Hungarian macro-political economy, he 
found a relationship between post-socialism and the surviving elements (goulash 
post-socialism, prosperous state, grandialism, premature prosperous state) of the 
socialist political model (Kornai 1995/6). To describe the social economy as a 
system we use Kornai’s model, given that it is the most widely accepted (Kornai 
1993). Kornai described the social economy as being over-centralised, as having ac­
celerated growth and an imbalance o f prices, as a system of state ownership and the 
Party state. We believe, and try to prove in this study, that none o f the elements 
o f the socialist economic model are characteristic o f the economic environment of 
large companies in the nineties. However, what is significant is the extent to which 
the companies’ “state” past (i.e. they were transformed from state companies) and 
character o f the ownership structure (State/local self-government, foreign and home 
entrepreneurs etc.) have in influencing the operations of those companies.
Ownership structure and character
Two-thirds of the corporations were unequivocally privatised by 1997; the for­
merly dominant state/local self-government ownership retained 16.6 percent o f the 
firms; a further 16.9 percent were mostly owned by cross holding and subsidiaries. 
Foreign and worker-director ownerships obtained a majority share in nearly half o f 
the large companies; at that time the owner-manager group had a majority share 
in 11.1 percent o f the firms ( Table 1).
The majority o f the largest firms remained the property o f the state/local 
self-governments, which included 60.2 percent o f large company assets and 66.4 
percent o f the total number o f employees. With regard to the companies’ total 
income the largest amount accrued to the private sector (55.3 percent). Between 
1993 and 1997 the private sector became dominant in the large company sector of 
the Hungarian economy; however, the conditions o f management theories for diffuse 
ownership are not verifiable; that is, this dominance is only conditionally true1 for 
those large companies which can be described as cross holdings— these account for
1 At the same time, we had to note that the questionnaire did not contain questions referring to 
firms in possession o f the companies— however, we are aware o f the leading managers properties 
outside o f the companies.
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16.6 percent o f the total number of large companies. Our data strengthens I. J. 
Toth ’ findings on the fast growth o f private ownership after 1993 (Toth 1998); in 
the case o f large companies, the state (like the local self-governments) had a larger 
interest than in the total Hungarian company ownership structure.
Table 1
Types of companies on the basis of dominant ownership2 ( N=SJ,9)
Percent Number o f cases
Foreign ownership 23.3 128
State/local self-government ownership 16.6 91
Cross holding/subsidiary 16.9 93
Small shareholder/cooperative type ownership 8.2 45
Worker-director ownership 23.9 131
Owner-manager ownership 11.1 61
The role o f the change o f regime and privatisation in the large company 
segment shows that one-fifth o f the firms were established before 1990, whereas all
2The variables o f ownership type with regard to the data on the company ownership structure 
were defined according to the following:
Foreign owner: a com pany where more than fifty percent is owned by a foreign com pany or 
a private individual or, where there is no owner with a greater than fifty percent share and the 
largest share o f the com pany is in the hands o f a foreign company or private individual;
State/local self-government: a com pany where more than fifty percent is owned by the state 
or a local self-government or, where there is no owner with a greater than fifty percent share and 
the largest share of the com pany is in the hands o f the state or a local self-government.
Cross holding/subsidiary ownership: a com pany where more than fifty percent is owned by 
another com pany or, where there is no owner with a greater than fifty percent share and the 
largest share o f the com pany is in the hands o f another company.
Small shareholder/cooperative ownership: a company where more than fifty percent is owned 
by a Hungarian private individual (who is neither a worker nor director at the com pany) or, where 
there is no owner with a greater than fifty percent share, where the largest share o f the com pany 
is in the hands o f a Hungarian private individual.
W orker-director ownership: a com pany where more than fifty percent is owned by the workers, 
managers a n d /or directors o f the com pany or, where there is no owner with a greater than fifty 
percent share, where the largest share of the com pany is in the hands o f the workers, managers 
and /or the directors o f the company.
Owner-manager ownership: a company where more than fifty percent is owned by the leading 
manager o f  the company or, where there is no owner with a greater than fifty percent share, where 
the largest share o f the com pany is in the hands o f  the leading manager o f  the company.
There were only a few companies which were dominantly owned by a bank and these firms 
have thus been placed in the cross holding/subsidiary ownership group. 85.4 percent o f the 
companies were in ownership groups where the owners disposed o f a more than fifty percent 
share; the remaining 14.6 percent o f the companies were placed into groups according to the 
largest ownership share.
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the others came into existence by total transformation, privatisation or they were 
newly formed. (Tables 2 and 3)
Table 2
The year of the company’s foundation (N=582)
Year of foundation percent
before 1988 8.6
1988 2.4
1989 11.7
1990 14.1
1991 17.0
1992 17.5
1993 12.7
1994 7.6
1995 3.8
1996 3.1
unknown 1.7
Table 3
The present firms preceding venture (N—582)
Preceding venture percent
Newly-founded firm 37.1
Firm which previously operated as a different business organisation 50.2
Firm which previously operated as part o f a different business organisation 10.5
Unknown 2.2
More than sixty percent o f the larger firms were established between 1990 
and 1994. According to this, the intensive privatisation of the Horn government 
reorganised the ownership structure of already existing firms: only 14.5 percent of 
the large companies were founded after 1994. In the privatisation o f those firms 
which were in existence in 1988, the directors and workers obtained the largest 
share o f the companies ( Table 4)\ in a quarter of the firms the majority owner was 
the state or local self-government.
Foreign ownership took over fewer o f the formerly socialist firms than in 
the whole segment o f large companies. The arrival of multinationals in Hungary 
took two forms: firstly, greenfield developments and secondly, entities participating 
in the privatisation o f those firms previously under state ownership; in this second
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case it was rather that they incorporated property originating from the state into 
newly-founded firms. ( Table 5)
Table 4
The distribution in 1997 of the type of company ownership of firms 
existing in 1988 (percent)
Foreign ownership 12.7
State/local self-government 26.7
Cross holding/subsidiary ownership 15.2
Small shareholder/cooperative type ownership 7.3 
W orker-director ownership 33.9
Owner-manager ownership 4.2
Table 5
Ownership types and the company’s preceding venture (percentage) (N=5Jt0)
New firm Formerly operated 
as a different 
business 
organisation
Formerly operated 
as part o f a 
different business 
organisation
Foreign ownership 54.8 32.3 12.9
State/local self-government ownership 13.2 75.8 11.0
Cross holding/subsidiary ownership 31.5 51.7 16.9
Small shareholder/cooperative type
ownership 45.5 47.7 6.8
W orker-director ownership 28.2 63.4 8.4
Owner-manager ownership 68.9 24.6 6.6
N 207 274 59
The privatisation and transformation o f large companies was not the deciding 
factor in the process o f management gaining ownership— i.e. the other “managerism 
theorem” . Éva Voszka did not find, within the 49 highlighted socialist large com ­
panies, the process o f managers becoming owners within their own company to be 
typical; data collected about the 1997 economic elite indicate the same pattern as 
that found by her. The leading managers and the lower managers did not become 
dominant in the large companies. Manager ownership o f more than a 50 percent 
share was only found in those firms where the owner and the leading manager was 
the same person. However, the proportion of these companies was less than 8 per­
cent o f the total number o f large companies (Table 6); in nearly half o f the large 
companies there was no management ownership. ( Table 7)
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Table 6
The proportion of leading management ownership in each ownership type (percent)
0
percent
0.1-20
percent
20-50
percent
50-99
percent
100
percent
Foreign ownership 78.9 18.8 2.3 - -
S tate/local self-government ownership 93.4 6.6 - - -
Share-holding/subsidiary ownership 67.7 24.7 7.5 - -
Small shareholder/cooperative type ownership 53.3 26.7 20.0 - -
Worker-director ownership 25.2 47.3 27.5 - -
Owner-manager ownership - - - 45.9 54.1
N 306 127 55 28 33
Table 7
The proportion of management ownership ( company managers and other managers) 
in each ownership type (percent)
0
percent
0.1-20
percent
20-50
percent
50-99
percent
100
percent
Foreign ownership 75.8 19.5 4.7 - -
State/local self-government ownership 91.2 7.7 1.1 - -
Share-holding/subsidiary ownership 64.5 22.6 12.9 - —
Small shareholder/cooperative type ownership 48.9 20.0 13.3 17.8 —
Worker-director ownership 13.0 15.3 22.9 48.9 -
Owner-manager ownership - - - 37.7 62.3
N 279 82 55 95 38
The proportion o f management ownership— except for firms under owner- 
manager ownership— was only high where, under privatisation, other employees, 
apart from the managers, became owners; and, according to our taped interviews, 
private ownership means corporative ownership (i.e. collective workers and leaders 
ownership domination), and small shareholder/cooperative type companies. (Here 
too, and most importantly, a few firms operating in the cooperative form were T.S. 
or Â.F.É.SZ.). The company management only obtained 6 percent of the large 
company ownership. The significant joint ownership by leading and lower managers 
accounted for ten percent o f the firms. (Eva Voszka and I. J. Toth pay attention 
to the managers who did not receive personal property but instead gained state 
Property through the medium of their firms. In out questionnaire we also asked 
about this; hence the above data were not only collected on personal property of
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managers in this category but on the property of their own firms.) According to the 
data in Tables 8 -10, the managers became the majority owners o f large companies 
by founding new firms in which there was little or no state ownership.
Table 8
The proportion of leading manager ownership based on the company’s 
previous type o f venture (percent, of the total sampling)
0
percent
0.1-20
percent
20-50
percent
50-99
percent
100
percent
New firm 19.9 6.7 3.8 4.4 4.2
State firm 27.3 11.5 3.5 0.9 0.5
L td ./stock  company 5.3 1.8 0.7 0.2 0.5
Cooperative 0.9 1.8 0.4 0.7 -
Other 2.4 1.3 0.5 - 0.7
N (percent) 306 127 49 34 33
(55.7) (23.1) (8.9) (6.2) (6.0)
Table 9
The proportion o f manager (leading company and other managers) ownership 
based on the company’s previous type of venture (percent of the total sampling)
0
percent
0.1-20
percent
20-50
percent
50-99
percent
100
percent
New firm 18.2 4.9 2.6 6.4 6.9
State firm 24.8 6.9 5.5 5.1 1.5
L td ./stock  com pany 4.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.9
Cooperative 0.9 1.3 0.4 1.3 -
Other 2.2 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.9
N (percent) 279 82 55 77 56
(50.8) (14.9) (10.0) (14.0) (10.2)
With regard to large companies— and stressing the defining character or pri­
vate ownership— the question is: how well the origin of private ownership is linked 
to the David Stark “recombined ownership” theorem? (Stark 1992; Bruszt and 
Stark 1996) I. J. Toth— who has been quoted several times— believes that cross 
holding ownership was, at that time, not only characteristic o f state owned firms, 
but also of privately owned firms. He stressed that the probability o f ownership 
being cross holding was linearly proportional to the size of the company. We hold
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Table 10
The proportion o f non-leading and other manager ownership based 
on the company’s previous type of venture (percent o f the total sampling)
0
percent
0.1-20
percent
20-50
percent
50-99
percent
100
percent
New firm 27.7 4.9 2.6 3.5 0.4
State firm 29.7 6.0 4.6 3.1 0.4
L td./stock  company 5.8 0.7 1.5 0.4 0.2
Cooperative 2.6 0.7 0.5 - -
Other 3.6 0.7 0.4 - 0.2
N (percent) 381 72 52 38 6
(69.4) (13.1) (9.5) (6.9) (1.1)
the view that 16.9 percent o f the large companies are dominant among cross hold­
ings. Considering this, it is possible to restrengthen the fact that the recombined 
ownership was not exclusively an indicator of the nature o f the Hungarian econ­
omy. Each joint ownership type was more common than the cross holding company 
( Tables 11 and 12), from which it can be concluded that 7.8 percent o f the large 
companies were owned by one owner.
Table 11
The different types of joint company-ownership 
(The percentage of the total firms questioned)
Foreign State Subsidiary Small
shareh.
Employee Owner-
manager
Foreign -
State 4.6 -
Subsidiary 8.2 7.8 -
Small shareholders 4.4 2.7 5.8 -
Worker 10.2 11.7 14.9 7.8 -
Owner-manager 9.3 8.6 13.2 9.3 30.2 -
The percentage o f the 
ownership share o f the firm 33.0 29.9 31.9 14.9 42.1 44.3
It is mainly the foreign and state owners who exclude other owners from hav­
ing a share o f their companies and, contrary to the recombined ownership theorem, 
the foreign, the worker-director and owner-manager types are more active in joint 
ownership than the state majority owned companies. With regard to the vari­
able analysis o f the joining o f the different ownership groups ( Table 13), the state
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Table 12
The proportion of companies according to the ownership share of the given owner
0
percent
0.1-20
percent
20-50
percent
50-99
percent
100
percent
Foreign ownership 67.0 3.1 7.5 8.9 13.5
State/local self-government ownership 70.1 8.2 5.1 4.4 12.2
Cross holding/subsidiary ownership 68.1 9.1 8.8 8.2 5.8
Small shareholder/cooperative type ownership 85.1 6.0 4.5 3.9 0.5
Worker-director ownership 58.1 13.3 11.8 13.5 3.3
Owner-manager ownership 55.7 23.2 10.2 4.9 6.0
and foreign ownership are the least open, if compared with the other ownership 
types; the owner-manager and the small shareholder/cooperative type ownerships 
generally join together with other ownership types.
Table 13
The relationship between different ownership groups (correlation coefficient) 
(N =549; in brackets, the significance level)
foreign
owner­
ship
state/local
self-
government
ownership
cross
holding/
subsid­
iaries
small share­
holders/ 
cooperative 
type ownership
worker-
director
owner­
ship
owner-
manager
owner­
ship
Foreign ownership - - - - - -
State/local self-govern­
ment ownership
-0 .2 7 2
(0.000)
- - - - -
Share holding/subsid­
iary type ownership
-0 .2 4 8
(0.000)
-0 .2 1 8
(0.000)
- - - -
Small -0 .1 4 7 -0 .1 4 6 -0 .1 0 0 — - -
Shareholder/cooper­
ative ownership (0.001) (0.001) (0.019)
Worker-director
ownership
-0 .3 2 6
(0.000)
-0 .2 3 7
(0.000)
-0 .191
(0.000)
-0 .0 9 9
(0.021)
- -
Owner-manager
ownership
-0 .2 6 6
(0.000)
-0 .2 5 8
(0.000)
-0 .1 8 7
(0.000)
-0 .012
(0.621)
-0 .0 3 9
(0.356)
-
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With regard to the situation in 1997, 38.7 percent o f large companies were 
newly-founded and two-thirds o f the firms were brought into existence by the pri­
vatisation o f previously existing firms. It was possible that the newly-founded 
company received state or cooperative property but there is no exact information 
on this. 43 percent o f large companies had previously been state companies ( Ta­
ble H ) .
Table 14
The type o f the company’s previous venture (percent) N=566
New firm 38.7
State company 43.8
Ltd., stock company 8.7 
Cooperative 3.7
Other 5.1
In the literature on privatisation (Szelenyi, Eyal and Townsley 1996; Borocz 
1995; Borocz and Rona-Tas 1995; Stark 1994; Bruszt and Stark 1996; Grabher and 
Stark 1996; 1997; Toth 1998; Voszka 1996; 1997a) the most controversial issues 
are those o f the breakdown o f  state assets in recombined ownership form and the 
continued operation o f state majority-owned companies. According to the data o f 
1997 on the firms which had a predecessor company, most came into being through 
transformation and only 27.7 percent were established through separation from a 
predecessor company. ( Table 15)
Table 15
How the preceding firm came into being
Transformation Separation
State com pany 81.0 19.0
L td ./stock  company 83.0 17.0
Cooperative 81.0 19.0
Other 93.0 7.0
According to the theorem on recombined ownership (Stark 1994), in the 
model o f Hungarian privatisation, the privatisation o f the parent company hap­
pened through smaller firms which were linked to the parent company in various 
ways. In earlier parts o f this study, we showed the frequency of the unification 
of cross holdings and other ownership types, stressing that the validity is limited 
and conditional. In the distribution o f former state owned companies, according
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to the present ownership type and the mode o f transformation ( Table 16),  similar 
conclusions can be drawn.
Table 16
The distribution of the 239 former state companies 
according to their present ownership type
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Total Transformed Separated
Foreign ownership 16.7 70.0 30.0
State/local self-government ownership 28.0 85.0 15.0
Share-holding/subsidiary ownership 15.5 70.0 30.0
Small shareholder/cooperative type ownership 5.9 85.0 15.0
Worker-director ownership 31.0 89.0 11.0
Owner-manager ownership 2.9 57.0 43.0
The foundation o f firms through separation from other business organisations—  
which in our interpretation is a precondition for recombined ownership— it was 
precisely those companies which remained under the control o f the state and those 
which became worker-director ownership types from the previous organisation (and 
which were also in the smallest proportion) to which the recombined ownership 
theorem can be most easily applied in the Stark model. In the case of large com ­
panies, those which came into being through transformation can be excluded from 
the recombined ownership model. Principally, most o f the firms which came into 
existence through separation were dominant under the owner-manager ownership; 
these had ownership shares in other companies belonging to the sample; at the 
same time, the owner-manager ownership firms had the smallest income ( Table 17) 
and had obtained very little state property.
Large companies which come into being through transformation generally 
have a larger number o f employees and a greater income than those formed due to 
separation from another company. Stark (1994) and later Bruszt and Stark (1996) 
held that the recombined ownership form was valid for the company property nexus 
and for privatisation o f the 200 largest companies; however, the 1993 data sample, 
with regard to the method o f formation o f new firms, the number o f employees and 
income, showed similarities to that of 1997 ( Tables 18 and 19). Moreover, according 
to the latter, the larger companies generally came into being through transformation 
and not through separation. Thus the model o f recombined ownership does not 
explain the differences in the sample.
Cross holding, as the dominant ownership type (discounting those firms which 
were the smallest) in the large company segment o f the economy, is where the role 
o f the recombined ownership is most conceivable. More intensive privatisation def­
initely does not result in the intensive growth o f the firms o f the larger ownership
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Table 17
Ownership type and income (percent)
0-200 200-500 500 mill.— 1-10 above
mill. mill. 1 bill. bill. 10 bill.
HUF HUF HUF HUF HUF
Foreign ownership 21.4 16.2 19.5 27.4 53.3
State/local self-government ownership 12.5 17.5 13.3 19.1 26.7
Share-holding/subsidiary ownership 14.3 15.6 14.2 21.0 16.7
Small shareholder/cooperative
type ownership 12.5 11.7 8.8 5.7 3.3
Employee ownership 21.4 24.7 28.3 22.3 -
Owner-manager ownership 17.9 14.3 15.9 4.5 -
N (100 percent) 56 154 113 157 30
Table 18
1996 income and the firms ’s former venture (column percent) (N=515)
0-200
mill.
HUF
200-500
mill.
HUF
500 m ill -  
1 bill. 
HUF
1-10
bill.
HUF
above 
10 bill. 
HUF
New firm 53.4 39.7 40.0 31.5 34.5
Firm formed through 39.7 46.8 46.4 58.0 65.5
transformation 6.9 13.5 13.6 10.5 -
Firm formed through separation 
N (100 percent)
58 156 110 162 29
Table 19
Number o f employees on 1 January 1997 and the firm ’s former venture (percent)
less 21-50 51-100 101-500 501-1000 more
than 20 people people people people than 1000
New firm 74.1 64.2 35.8 17.9 14.6 21.6
Firm formed through 22.2 30.5 47.4 66.3 78.0 73.0
transformation 3.7 5.3 16.8 15.8 7.3 5.4
Firm formed through
separation 81 95 95 35.3 41 37
N (100 percent)
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network: 80 percent o f those firms which had an annual income o f more than 10 
billion HUF, in the state/local self government and foreign ownership company 
sector, were the least open to cross holding. At the same time, it is true that 
the cross holding/subsidiary ownership form was found among the largest firms. 
Cross holding as a dominant ownership form was characteristic o f the small, most 
importantly, commercial food processing industry and construction industry firms, 
respectively. For these firms the income and the number o f employees were growing 
at a faster rate than those firms which came into being through transformation.
In connection with recombined ownership, the ownership role of the banks 
is another issue. This was minimal in 1997. Less than 5 percent o f the large 
companies were owned by banks. This could be a consequence o f the privatisation 
of banks (and thus the retained investments), and o f foreign capital which was not 
very interested in investing in the sphere o f manufacturing companies. ( Wachtel 
1997; Fogarassy 1996)
The structure o f the large companies’ owners and ownership managerialism 
(e.g. diffuse ownership, managers individual ownership) and the presence o f recom­
bined ownership has not been dominant or characteristic of Hungarian privatisation.
Ownership and efficiency
The economic growth o f companies under examination between 1993 and 
1997, calculated on the basis o f 1996 prices and with regard to the number of 
employees, shows a fairly changed picture. The unequivocal decrease in the number 
o f employees between 1993 and 1998 ( Table 20) slowed down between 1993 and 
1997, and the number o f employees grew in 30 percent of the firms ( Table 21)] 
income shows the same tendency.
Table 20
The number of employees of companies on the 1 January o f the given year
Number o f employees 1988 1993 1997
0 -  20 people 9.4 16.1 15.1
21 -  50 people 4.1 16.5 17.7
51 -  100 people 4.9 12.5 17.7
101 -  500 people 33.2 36.6 35.2
501 -  1000 people 18.9 9.1 7.7
more than 1000 people 29.5 9.3 6.7
N 244 497 549
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Table 21
The change in the number o f employees
percent
1988-1993
percent
1993-1997
Significant decrease ( —50 percent) 28.6 13.0
Moderate decrease ( —10 percent <  x  <  —50 percent) 43.2 36.0
Stagnant (—10 percent <  x  < 0  percent) 13.3 21.2
M oderate increase (0 percent <  x  <  +50  percent) 6.2 13.8
Singnificant increase (+50  percent < x) 8.7 16.0
N 241 486
The growth o f the number o f employees and the income in the foreign dom­
inated firms was unequivocal; the firms which remained under state ownership 
increased their income but the number o f their employees radically decreased. The 
ownership group which was the most stagnant includes the small shareholder and 
cooperative type firms. Those firms whose data shows mostly decreases were those 
which were owned by the workers and directors. The owner-manager ownership did 
not show growth in income, but the number o f employees grew quickly. ( Tables 22 
and 23)
Table 22
The change in the number o f employees 1993-1997 and the ownership type 
(column percent) (N —468)
foreign state share
holding
small
shareh.
worker owner-
manag.
Significant decrease ( —50 percent) 
Moderate decrease
8.9 13.4 21.9 25.0 9.7 7.7
( — 10 percent <  x  <  —50 percent) 29.5 50.0 42.5 25.0 42.5 17.3
Stagnant ( — 10 percent <  x  < 0  percent) 
Moderate increase
17.9 26.8 13.7 13.9 27.4 15.4
(0 percent <  x  <  +50  percent) 17.0 7.3 11.0 16.7 13.3 1.2
Singnificant increase (+ 5 0  percent <  x ) 26.8 2.4 11.0 19.4 7.1 38.5
N 112 82 73 36 113 52
From the analysis o f the above it is obvious that between 1993 and 1997 
the economic growth o f the companies which belonged to each ownership type was 
characteristically different.
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Table 23
The quintiles of income and the ownership type (percent) (N=510)
Foreign State Share
holding
Small
shareh.
Worker Owner-
manag.
Lowest quintile 18.6 20.7 15.1 22.2 24.8 31.6
2nd 12.7 18.4 22.1 33.3 17.9 24.6
3rd 16.1 13.8 16.3 17.8 23.9 29.8
4th 23.7 23.0 22.1 15.6 15.4 14.0
Highest quintile 28.8 24.1 24.4 11.1 17.9 -
N 118 87 86 45 117 57
In the sample which represents the large company’s population in 1997, there 
were significant changes in the operations system. We evaluated changes with 
the following linear regressional elements ( Table 25):  (a) The changes in income 
between 1 January 1993 and 1997; (b) The changes in the number o f employees 
between 1 January 1993 and 1997; (c) The changes in the company’s assets between 
1 January 1993 and 1997.
We used the following five groups of variables:
—  The age o f the firm in 1997
—  Was it a state company?
—  The previous state o f the firm (reference being to newly-founded compa­
nies): Did it come into being through transformation or separation?
—  Type o f ownership
—  Which branch o f industry does the company belong to?
We thought it probable, as a hypothesis, that in each ownership type the 
transformations between companies were significantly different, after the separation 
o f the branches o f influence between 1993 and 1997. We designated as a reference 
group the newly-founded, dominantly foreign owned service companies.
a) Income
The model that we made to explain the changes in income between 1993 and 
1996, in the light o f the results, does not work. As well as the very low value of 
R  squared (0.02), none o f the illustrative variables had any significant influence on 
the income trend.
b) Employment
The variables in the model in part explain the changes in the number of 
employees o f a company between 1993 and 1997 (R  squared=0.15). The number 
o f employees in companies that came into being through transformation, in state 
or worker-manager ownership and trading companies, differs from the reference 
group. The difference represents a decrease in employment after 1993, a decrease 
of the weight o f the former state companies in the large company population (in
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particular due to the redundancies in the durable state companies), and a decrease 
in worker-manager. ownership companies.
c) Company assets
The coefficients that show changes in company assets reinforce the consider­
able evidence that there was a loss o f assets in the former state companies. The 
illustrative power o f the model is the same as for the model which was constructed 
for the purpose o f evaluating the changes in employment (R squared=15). The 
increase in the volume o f assets o f companies formed through separation and the 
private owner-manager owned firms surpassed that o f the reference group. We con­
cluded from our data that the increase or decrease o f a company’s assets was closely 
connected to the company’s director ownership— that is to say, the larger the part 
of the company under the ownership of the directors, the greater the probability 
that the assets o f the firm grew during the mid-nineties.
In the mid-nineties the already visible trend in the large companies contin­
ued: the (former) state companies suffered considerable losses of their assets and, 
in connection with this, the number o f employees also fell considerably. In the 
large company population the weight of privately established and manager-director 
owned firms grew. For these respective types, the number of their employees kept 
pace with, and their assets surpassed those o f firms which were established by for­
eign investors. However, the history and ownership structure o f the firms were not 
affected by the income-formation.
Company efficiency
We measured the operation efficiency of companies in 1996-97 using a five- 
model linear regression: (a) the profit made in 1996 compared to one unit o f the 
assets; (b) the income made in 1996 compared to one unit of the assets; (c) the 
income made in 1996 per employee; (d) the profit in 1996 per employee; (e) the 
profit per one unit o f income in 1996. The question we put forward was designed to 
find out if there was any difference in efficiency according to the different methods 
of formation at the beginning o f the nineties; furthermore, if so, then was there any 
connection with the character o f Hungarian post-socialist economy?
a) profit per assets
Besides the 16 percent R squared, the durable companies under state own­
ership and the companies formed through transformation differ considerably from 
the reference group, and they show lower efficiency. These firms have compara­
tively large assets and low profits and, most importantly, it may be supposed this 
includes companies which have not been privatised due to the low adaptability to 
the market; it also includes durable state firms in which the state owner does not 
Judge profitability according to the performance o f the management. According to
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our suppositions, these firms must be those where the siphoning o f the profits has 
not been stemmed and that is why the value o f the workable assets is still falling.
b) income made per unit o f the assets
Besides the weak illustrative power of the model (R squared=0.13) this shows 
that the way in which the firm came into being divides the population o f the 
Hungarian companies. From this point of view, in 1996 the owner-manager and 
the employee owned firms were efficient in their respective fields: they could produce 
significant income with relatively low company assets.
c) income per employee
The relatively high illustrative power of the model (R squared=0.20) shows 
that state owners were still dividing the large companies: the serious employment 
cutbacks in the state owned and employee-manager owned firms were to no purpose 
as the income per employee was still less than average.
d) profit per employee
O f our models, this has the greatest illustrative power, R squared=0.23; on 
the basis of the beta coefficient compared to the efficiency of the newly founded 
foreign owned firms, that o f the other types of firms is low. Mostly it is the small 
shareholders and the owner-manager owned firms which come close to the efficiency 
o f the newly founded foreign owned companies, and it is the state owned firms that 
are left behind.
e) profit per income
The illustrative power o f the model is small, /?.=0.07, and it is worth pay­
ing attention to the fact that, apart from the worker-manager owned firms, the 
efficiency o f all the other company groups is considerably lower than that o f the 
newly founded foreign owned companies; and this is not affected by the fact that 
the company was formerly state owned or not.
In the evaluation o f efficiency, in terms o f the different viewpoints, the owner­
ship structure and the company’s past would appear to have a significant role in the 
present population o f Hungarian large companies. The company’s “state” past is 
a disadvantage from the point o f view o f capital and work efficiency: the efficiency 
o f the former state firms is lower than that of the newly founded ones. Ownership 
structure is also influenced by the operation efficiency o f firms: the capital and 
work efficiency o f the state and local self-government companies are less than for 
the others; the capital efficiency o f the worker-manager and the Hungarian owner- 
manager owned firms is better than that o f the foreign owned ones, but the work 
efficiency is not; those companies which own other companies, characteristically 
cross holdings, are the same as the state companies while the dominantly small 
shareholder owned companies (characteristically either firms on the stock exchange 
of cooperative firms) are the same as the foreign owned ones in terms o f efficiency.
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Management
In our earlier study (Csite and Kovách 1998), we came to the conclusion that 
the directors o f the large companies can be divided distinctly into four groups: 
owner-managers, clientele, technocrats, and posted foreign employees. From expe­
rience, there is a close relationship between the different types of economic directors 
and this can be characterized by social statistics, and the company’s efficiency and 
ownership structure. The latter can be seen as the decisive function o f managerial 
culture (o f which many elements are not particularly well-known in the case o f the 
multinationals) in the formation o f the competitive viability o f the market econ­
omy and management participation. This, according to our research, was one of 
the important defining factors o f the growth model of Hungarian large companies 
(as is highlighted in the professional literature by Kerekes, Rondinelli and Vastag 
1995; Hoványi 1995).
The 1997 economic elite group which obtained owner-manager property was 
the youngest elite group. The average age o f the members of this group was under 
fifty, the highest proportion of which being under forty. The qualifications held 
by members o f this group are lower than that o f the other three groups, given 
that nearly forty percent did not have university degrees. We can characterise 
the culture capital structure o f these groups by those who have a university degree 
(mostly technical degrees) and by the high proportion of English language speakers. 
Two-thirds of the group work at privately founded companies as owner-directors. 
Most o f these companies were founded between 1988 and 1993, but slightly more 
than two-fifths of them were not privately founded— instead they were established 
through privatisation. More than half o f the owner-managers made their earnings 
from the private economy, even in the eighties. This proportional number is the 
highest in this group, which indicates that the members o f the 1997 elite can be 
clearly differentiated from those in the other four groups; ten percent o f them, 
even in the eighties, followed the “socialist’s course” of developing a middle class 
status: that is, they tried to increase their own wealth and develop and follow the 
until then, “bourgeois” lifestyle by abusing the opportunities offered by the regime. 
Besides the owner-manager companies this group is found in a larger proportion in 
the cooperative and cross holding firms.
The other group of the 1997 economic elite is the “powerful clientele” who, in 
their companies, because o f the dominant state and local self-government property, 
were able to connect many branches with the elite fraction. The latter, according 
to Iván Szelényi, represent the new politocration. The main characteristic o f the 
members o f the clientele group is that most of them do not have any share in a 
firm. More than half of the companies between 1991 and 1993, a quarter o f them 
after 1994 and more than a quarter of them after 1993, gained an elite position. 
A quarter o f the members, who are over fifty years old, joined the economic elite
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between 1988 and 1993, and they retained this position in 1997. The members of 
this group have the highest level of qualifications.
The main characteristic of the group o f technocrats is that they obtained 
shares during privatisation, and the largest proportion o f them in cross holding and 
worker-manager owned firms. It was not usual that the managers were not able to 
privatise their companies alone; instead, they did this by drawing in employees and 
other managers or foreign investors. By choosing the privatisation technique, they 
succeeded in keeping their position o f authority or they became directors. Due to 
the impossibility of individual privatisation, the directors of the companies divided 
the respective owner and company directors’ duties. In our interpretation these 
remained characteristic o f corporatives, because in ownership and management de­
cisions many elements (e.g. ownership partners, validity company employees inter­
ests, state bureaucracy) had to be taken into consideration which did not result in 
an increase in competitiveness. It can be emphasised that the group o f technocrats 
played a leading role in the company’s economic strategy, whose structure most 
closely resembles those companies which remained under state control. Most o f the 
technocrats gained their present leading positions between 1988 and 1993: that is 
to say, not in the wave o f privatisations following 1993; rather, at the time of the 
change o f regime in the “privatisation” at the beginning o f the nineties.
The directors o f the dominantly foreign owed firms account for less than a 
quarter of the economic elite, and they are clearly separable from characteristic 
social statistics. This is the next elite fraction, after the owner-manager group: 
they are mainly in their forties and their qualifications and foreign language skills 
are o f the same high standard as that o f the clientele group. Nearly fifty percent 
of their number were born in Budapest and they are from highly qualified families. 
However, their ownership shares are lower than those o f the other groups. In their 
companies they hardly have any shares and according to the taped interviews they 
want to obtain ownership in the coming years.
The transformation model of large companies
In the large company segment o f the Hungarian economy, in the nineties there 
were four typical methods for the formation o f market economy competitiveness 
according to ownership, efficiency and management composition (i.e. redistributive, 
corporative, owner-manager and multinational). The transformation models of 
the companies differ from each other according to their level of participation in 
privatisation. Considering large company ownership, apart from the state and local 
self-government firms, in 1997 the private ownership was unequivocal and decisive; 
this was a result o f the breakdown o f state property. Private ownership exists at 
different levels: from that o f multinational and owner-manager private ownership
Acta Oeconomica 50, 1999
A. CSITE -I. KOVÂCH: THE END OF POST-SOCIALISM 77
to corporative private ownership, of which the proportion of the latter is much 
more significant than can be found in literature 011 privatisation. It can be seen 
that, after the reduction o f the socialist type of redistribution and the liberalisation 
of economic policy, the role of the state in the large company sector, according to 
the ownership type, can be differentiated, (occasionally significantly). However, 
the direction o f the state policy directly controls only the majority state/local self 
government owned companies and the effect o f state policy is not greater in the 
large company economy than in the developed market economy. The liberalisation 
o f economic policy brought about market competition in 1997. At that time the 
state maintained the market competitiveness of strategic large companies (or those 
who did not wish to lose their assets) by state subvention and other allowances. 
According to Éva Voszka the highlighted large companies received greater state 
support in the mid-nineties. (Voszka 1997a)
The market competitiveness of each type of transformation goes together 
with the characteristic managerial nature. The interest, capital and socialisation 
o f a company’s management are decisive— at the time of the company’s necessary 
reorganisation— for market competitiveness. According to our interviews, manage­
ment in all types of companies are preparing for special “internal” privatisation. 
After the privatisation o f state property it was only possible to obtain private 
property from other private property (apart from the 15-16 percent state/local 
self-government large company sector). From the point of view of the development 
models, the endeavours o f the management to become owners are decisive.
The redistributive model
The state and local self-government agreed to play the dominant ownership 
role in the transformation/development. This state and local government agree­
ment could have been for many reasons: the significance of a firm’s strategy, prepa­
rations for privatisation by defining asset amortisation, other political views (e.g. 
preservation o f workplaces) and lobbying interests. The view o f the redistributive 
development model is not efficiency, but rather the preservation o f company com ­
petitiveness at the cost o f state/local self-government intervention. Efficiency, of 
course, is not contrary to the model of state development, but those companies 
which belong here were not left to go bankrupt even if t.heir ventures were not 
particularly successful. The state/local self-government as an owner, after the lib­
eralisation of economic policy, had limited development funds which it used along­
side direct subvention (e.g. in the case of the Postbank); there were also indirect 
allowances to maintain the company’s competitiveness. The most general form of 
indirect subvention were state orders, the maintaining o f positions o f monopoly 
using political instruments, the lax control and extortion o f budget payments (per­
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haps by the remittal o f these), and customs and export allowances. The state 
development model really maintained each element in the former redistribution, 
by which it wished to bring each company or company group into a competitive 
position in the circumstances o f the market economy. Due to falls in company as­
sets and the worst efficiency index between the large companies, the state’s direct 
interventions are likely to continue. Management itself had little opportunity to 
obtain property within its own company; however, it is possible that the wish of 
the directors to obtain a share o f the company was behind the continuous fall in 
the value o f company assets and the negative efficiency indexes. Managers mostly 
depended on political connections rather than real economic achievements. It is not 
accidental that the proportion of people who were already managers in the eighties 
is largest among the directors o f those companies which belong to the redistribu­
tive development model. The lobbying techniques o f those company directors who 
belong to the political clientele were the same as those applied during the eighties. 
During the earlier socialisation, the large company managers accumulated skills, 
knowledge and connections which are still effective in the nineties.
The corporative model
During privatisation, companies were formed from state firms which— due 
mainly to the ownership structure and the consequences o f the company mar­
ket transformation influence— can best be described as corporativisation. The 
common characteristics o f the worker-director, cross holding, and small share­
holder/cooperative ownership types, which came under analysis earlier in this study, 
are that the company is, for the most part, under private ownership, but the owner­
ship and disposal rights are divided between more owners o f the ownership groups. 
Thus we have to pay attention to the conflicting interests o f directors, in whose 
hands lie the disposal power when decisions are made on efficiency and market 
competitiveness. The management o f the company, because o f earlier practices 
and ownership corporativisation, has two different challenges when making deci­
sions on those affairs affecting market competitiveness. One is the completion o f 
changes in market orientation, structure, work organisation and management; the 
other is that, because o f worker ownership and political preferences (workplace), 
balanced decisions have to be made. Probably the results o f the decision-making is 
that while there is high capital efficiency, the work efficiency does not grow accord­
ingly in the companies o f the corporative model. Also, in the corporative model, 
and according to the research, the number o f employees was continuously falling, 
but because the workers were also the owners it was not possible to carry out 
radical work organisational changes. The worker-director share was high in those 
companies which preserved the former state work organisation and strategies. The
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cross holdings, where the ownership rights were unclear and the leading managers 
did not have ownership interest, had a similar efficiency to the state sector. The 
small shareholder/cooperative ownership companies, in which the ownership right 
had been divided the most effectively, resulted in the management influence being 
relatively high and they belonged to the most efficient companies. The state had 
only indirect political instruments with which to influence the corporative model. 
In the case o f the majority ownership o f worker-directors, the managers had ex­
perience, connections and lobbying capacity. This explains why they were able to 
obtain those state allowances and subventions which the companies belonging to 
the state model continuously receive.
The owner-manager model
The owner-manager model is, as a matter o f fact, not a model o f transfor­
mation because usually it is characteristic o f those firms which have been newly 
founded. However, it is possible that one source o f assets was from those which 
were under state ownership, but the state assets were introduced into the com­
pany as private property. Although these firms started with a “clean page” , they 
became large marketable companies in such a way that direct and indirect state 
aid was at its lowest, and they did not have the benefit o f the multinational firms’ 
capital power, market or work organisation experience. The model characterises 
dominant private ownership. This implies unambiguous ownership conditions, the 
consequence of which is clean structures o f power. The consequences o f strategic 
decisions, made on the basis o f the gains o f the market economy, is that this model 
has not only the best efficiency indicators but also the fastest growth, mainly in 
those branches (services) where the invested capital return and the accumulation 
of profit is fast. The state economic policy uses only indirect instruments in the lax 
enforcement o f the black market economy control, in connection with the owner- 
manager model. Probably it was the lack o f resources and a liberalised economic 
policy which used different instruments (in the formation of market competition 
for the companies) which were developed according to each different model. In the 
redistributive development model state subvention is regular, gives favourable loans 
and handle late budget payments in a lax manner, in the case o f the corporative 
model it is dependent on the lobbying capacity and also the loose control o f the 
presence (black job-market, tax, N.I. contributions) o f the black market economy. 
These could have been part o f a hidden state economic policy at that time.
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The multinational model
Nearly one quarter of large companies are under the ownership of the multina­
tional firms. The development model is unambiguous: the multinationals brought 
companies into being which cater to a relatively safe market; they follow such mod­
els that have been rested and formed in the market economy area; they started 
with an optimal number of employees and plant size; and the state o f the Hun­
garian employment market and the state economic policy insures, by way of five 
year tax and other allowances, international competitiveness. The management has 
hardly any share in the company which, for one reason, is because the ownership 
and disposal rights are clearly and effectively separated. The other reason is, due 
to the fact that the management has no ownership share, that it is not interested 
in profit and efficiency through ownership. According to the taped interviews, the 
managers o f the multinationals have the highest social capital o f all the managers 
o f other large companies; and in the next few years they will try to obtain a larger 
share in their companies.
Table 24
The transformation models of large companies
Redistributive Corporative Company Multinational
State control Direct control Indirect market Market indirect Indirect market
Redisti'ibution
characteristic
State subvention, 
the lax control 
o f budget 
payments
Individual state 
subvention, lax 
control o f budget 
payments and 
black market
The lax control 
o f the black 
market
Tax, settlement 
and excise 
allowances
Ownership
characteristic
State/local
self-government
Corporative Private owner Private owner
Capital
efficiency
Weak Strong Strong Moderate
Assets Decrease Decrease Feist growth Stable
Work
efficiency
Weak Medium Medium Strong
Number of 
workers
Decreasing Decreasing Growing Stable
Management Profit
orientated
Profit and 
ownership 
orientated
Profit
orientated
Ownership 
and profit 
orientated
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Table 25
The linear regression coefficients
Changes in 
incom e 
1993/96 
(n .b .l.“ )
Changes in 
employ­
ment 
1993-97
Changes in 
assets 
1993/97 
(n .b .l.“ )
The 1996 
profit per 
unit asset 
(n .b .l.“ )
The 1996 
incom e per 
unit asset 
(n .b .l.“ )
The income 
in 1996 
per worker 
(n .b .l.“ )
The profit 
in 1996 
per worker 
(n .b .l.“ )
The profit 
per unit in­
com e in 1996 
(n .b .l.“ )
Age o f  firm -0 .0 0 1 -0 .013* -0 .0 0 8 -0 .0 1 7 * -0 .0 1 6 * -0 .0 2 1 * -0 .030*** -0 .0 0 7
Former state com pany -0 .1 9 1 -0 .1 6 3 -0.550*** -0 .1 9 5 -0 .0 7 4 -0 .4 3 3 * -0 .5 4 4 * -0 .1 9 9
Firms precedents 
new firm (ref.) 
formation by 
transformation -0 .0 5 6 -0 .486*** -0 .0 3 7 -0 .893*** -0.747*** -0 .4 3 8 * -0 .6 6 1 * -0 .2 4 2
formation by 
separation 0.246 -0 .1 6 6 0.423* -0 .5 2 2 -0 .2 0 4 -0 .5 3 4 * -0 .9 3 2 ** -0 .3 8 4
Ownership type 
foreign (ref.) 
state -0 .2 1 1 -0 .408* -0 .313* -1.079*** -0 .1 5 0 -0 .717** -1 .474*** -0 .559*
cross holding -0 .2 8 7 -0 .2 4 4 -0 .324* -0 .472* 0.395* -0 .0 1 3 -1 .013*** -0 .791**
small shareholder -0 .3 2 6 0.098 -0 .0 6 0 -0 .2 1 5 0.601* -0 .0 9 2 -0 .6 8 2 ** -0 .582*
worker-manager -0 .0 2 2 -0 .242* 0.051 0.024 0.574** -0 .430* -0 .8 2 0 ** -0 .3 5 4
owner-manager 0.101 0.251 0.484* 0.017 0.707** 0.028 -0 .5 9 5 ** -0 .6 6 6 *
*p  <  0,1; **p <  0.01; ***p <  0.001 
“ n.b.l. =  natural base logarithm
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Table 25 (continued)
The linear regression coefficients
>
Changes in Changes in Changes in The 1996 The 1996 The income The profit T he profit
incom e employ­ assets profit per incom e per in 1996 in 1996 per unit in­
1993/96 ment 1993/97 unit asset unit asset per worker per worker com e in 1996
(n .b .l.“ ) 1993-97 (n .b .l.“ ) (n .b .l.“ ) (n .b .l.“ ) (n .b .l.“ ) (n .b.l.*) (n .b .l.“ )
Branch 
Service (ref.) 
manufacturing
industry
construction
-0 .0 2 1 -0 .2 6 6 * -0 .410** -0 .1 2 0 0.042 0.030 -0 .3 6 0 -0 .0 2 7
industry -0 .0 6 4 -0 .3 1 1 * -0 .3 0 4 * -0 .0 1 3 0.525“ 0.763*** 0.055 -0 .3 3 4
trade 0.161 -0 .493** -0 .3 0 7 -0 .3 5 4 0.352 -0 .0 1 4 -0 .991** -0 .6 3 1 *
Constant 0.742’ ** 1.926*** 1.040*** 1.283*** 1.385*** 2.686*** 2.798*** 2.261**
R  squared 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.23 0.07
F 0.91 6.98*** 5.71*** 5.55*** 5.74*** 10.04*** 9.18*** -0 .2 4 9
N 427 476 400 365 476 509 376 375
*p <  0.1; **p <  0.01; ***p <  0.001
an.b.l. =  natural base logarithm
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The end of post-socialism
On the basis o f the analysis o f the structure o f large company ownership, 
through ownership, efficiency and the transformation models, we see that the eco­
nomic transformation has been completed in this segment and that the period of 
post-socialism has ended. There are no arguments or reasons which justify post­
socialism being used as an indicator of the period. In other words, the surviving 
presence o f the socialist economic model or the identification o f the explosion and 
transition o f the socialist economy into the market economy are not valid factors 
for identifying post-socialism.
From the elements (i.e. over centralisation, accelerated growth, imbalance o f 
prices, state ownership and the party state) o f Kornai’s model of social economy, the 
party state, the state ownership, the imbalance o f prices and the accelerated growth 
have disappeared, while the degree of economic centralisation is greater in many 
national economies where the market economy is entirely taken for granted. The 
differences between the efficiency o f large companies can be brought into connection 
with the transformation o f the company— i.e. from state companies or originating 
from elsewhere— but the conditions for diffuse ownership have unequivocally been 
terminated and private ownership has become dominant. Decisions about economic 
policy and the regulations with regard to transformation change according to the 
model. Hence, it is not possible to talk about the self-regulating mechanism o f the 
market but, in this case, state intervention intended as development policy and not 
in the sense o f restricting the operations o f the market. According to our analysis, 
the different regulations with respect to the transformation model for large state 
companies, and the state’s agreement to take a supporting role during a period o f 
a lack o f resources and liberalisation o f economic policy, can be viewed as different 
forms o f hidden development support.
From the four models o f transformation, three (redistributive, multinational, 
owner-manager) are market transformations. In the case o f the models o f multi­
nationals and owner-managers the structure o f ownership and the nature o f the 
structure (which are in connection with efficiency) show the market economy or­
ganisation. The state and local self-government ownership as a redistributive model 
and the owners’ redistributive role is not contrary to the market economy aspira­
tions o f these companies. The role o f the state/local self-government helps those 
companies which the decision-makers deem to be worthy o f survival. From the 
Point o f view o f the transformation of the market economy, the transformation 
° f  the corporative model is the most problematic, because in this case the market 
strategic decisions are interconnected with other views (e.g. ownership group, work­
ers interest). According to the taped interviews, those companies which belong to 
this model instigated changes, through which the disposal power and the market 
managerial system quickly showed similarities with the three other transformation 
models. In the worker-director owned companies, the proportion o f the manager’s
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share grows quickly; this was originally higher than that o f the workers anyway, 
and here in the example o f those firms where the managerial share was more than 
fifty percent, the possibilities o f the workers interests, or other ownership groups’ 
interest, and o f the division o f disposing power interest were quickly terminated. 
Those managements which became majority owners mercilessly completed the nec­
essary steps for market competitiveness— for example, through a larger proportion 
of redundancies. This, in cases where workers had large shares, was either carefully 
carried out or in some cases not at all. The quiet, second part o f privatisation 
which is happening at the present will, in a few years, terminate the characteristics 
o f the corporative model; with this the transformation of the market economy of 
the large company segment will finish. There seems to be nothing that can obstruct 
the second wave o f privatisation; the post-socialist period is over, at least in the 
large company segment o f the Hungarian economy.
Appendix— the data basis used in the analysis
The analysed data in the study originated from a data survey completed 
between 1 February and 15 March 1997. The 1993 data survey resulted from 
the “Social Stratification in Eastern Europe” research programme, led by Iván 
Szelényi and supported by the OTKA. The 1997 data surveys were led by Iván 
Szelényi and Imre Kovách; the latter compiled the questionnaire by adapting the 
1993 questionnaire. The aim o f the survey was to obtain representative data on the 
leading management o f Hungarian companies with the highest incomes (director 
general, managing director, directors etc.) For this we chose companies with a 
larger than 200 million HUF income from the 1996 Hoppenstedt-Bonnier company 
register and later gained a randomly picked survey sample o f a thousand elements. 
(Only companies from Budapest or county towns appear in the survey sample.) Of 
the planned 1000 interviews 582 took place; the others either refused to answer the 
questionnaire or we were not able to make an appointment to answer it.
Approximately 80 percent o f the questions on the questionnaire referred to 
the activities, life-styles, family backgrounds and political leanings o f the company 
directors. The other parts o f the questionnaire endeavoured to obtain information 
connected to the ownership structure, the history, the product structure and the 
marketing o f the companies. In sixteen cases, answers were refused for this second 
section o f questions. Thus in total we were able to obtain information about 566 
companies.
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The distribution o f some basic variables o f the participating companies in the 
data basis:
Branches (percent)
manufacturing industry 29.7
construction industry 10.2
commerce 23.0
service 25.4
other 11.7
Number of employees 1 January 1997 (percent)
up to 20 people 15.1
21 — 50 people 17.7
51 -  100 people 17.7
101 -  500 people 35.2
501 -  1000 people 7.7
more than 1000 people 6.7
The 1996 income (percent)
less than 20 mill. HUF 11.0
200 -  500 mill. HUF 30.1
500 mill. -  1 bill. HUF 21.7
1 bill. -  10 bill. HUF 31.4
Over 10 bill. HUF 5.7
Former state company (percent) 43.8
New firm (percent) 37.1
Firm form ed through transformation 50.2 
Firm form ed through separation 10.5
Company assets on 1 January 1997 (percent)
less than 50 mill. HUF 20.2
50 -  200 mill. HUF 28.7
200 -  500 mill. HUF 22.0
500 mill. -  1 bill. HUF 13.1
more than 1 bill. HUF 16.0
1996 profitability (percent)
loss-making 10.8
broke even 3.5
profitable 69.3
unknown 16.4
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WWFl97_2-economic branch of more than 10 people
Observed N Expected N Residual
1.00 167 184.3 -1 7 .3
2.00 54 69.3 -1 5 .3
3.00 107 120.3 -1 3 .3
4.00 137 78.9 58.1
5.00 50 62.2 -1 2 .2
Total 515
Test statistics
W W FI97.2  
Chi Square 51.691
df 4.000
Asymp. Sig. 0.000
a 0 cells (0.0 percent) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected 
cell frequency is 62.2. 
Chi-Squareo.95(4) =  9.48— this value o f the table is less than the given value 
o f chi-square, so we discount the zero hypothesis which says the two divisions are 
equal. 
Branch industry o f the respective firms from I. J. T oth ’s works.
C hem ical and pharm aceutical industry
T extile industry
E ngineering industry
P aper and printing
F ood -processing
C onstruction
W holesale and retail trade 
Total
Observed N Expected N Residue
18 15.1 2.9
20 33.1 -13 .1
51 41.9 9.1
17 20.6 -3 .6
28 32.0 -4 .0
59 56.2 2.8
133 127.2 -5 .8
326
Test statistics
respective firms 
branch o f  industry 
Chi Square 9.239
d f  6.000
Asym p. Sig. 0.161
as 0 cells have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell fre­
quency is 15.1.
Chi-Squareo.95(6 ) =  12.59. This value o f  the table is larger than the given 
value o f chi-square, so we accept the zero hypothesis that the two divisions are 
equal.
From the W W -EM 97: I. J. Toth, the chosen number o f  categories o f  popu­
lations. Our sample upwardly distorts only the manufacturing industry, the food 
processing industry and the trading firms.
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Observed N Expected N Residual
1.00 58 59.5 -1 .5
2.00 58 135.4 -7 7 .4
3.00 117 94.5 22.5
4.00 82 25.5 56.5
Total 315
Test statistics
W W -EM 97
Chi Square 174.729
df 3.000
Asymp. Sig 0.000
as 0 cells have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell fre­
quency is 25.5. 
Chi-Squareo.95(3 ) =  7.81. This value o f the table is less than the given value 
o f chi-square, so we discount the zero hypothesis that the two divisions are equal.
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WHAT IS LEFT OF “REFORM ECONOMICS” ?
L. ANTAL
In the seventies and eighties the so-called “reform economics” became surprisingly popular 
in certain countries o f  Eastern Europe, in Russia and later in China. The key issue, raised by 
reform economists coping with the increasing troubles o f socialist economy was: “How could 
a more effective, more liberal econom ic system be created with substantially larger role o f the 
market and private ownership without breaking up the framework o f the monolithic political and 
centrally planned econom ic systems?” This limited way o f thinking was inevitable: in this period 
even the most radical economists did not believe that socialist system would com e to an end in 
the foreseeable future.
Reform economics has frequently been criticised. No doubt, it has never been a theoretical 
school, has not been in possession o f peculiar paradigms. Its main representatives did not belong 
to a com mon scientific workshop. Some critics deemed reform economics an irrational vision or 
wishful thinking because existing socialism was an incurable system. Reform efforts could result 
at most in the prolongation o f the old system’s agony.
Notwithstanding these critical remarks reform programs have had considerable effect on 
econom ic practice, especially in Hungary. The introduced Hungarian reform was really ambiguous 
because o f its ideological limits yet this limited reform at once ceased the shortage on the market 
and led to moderate welfare.
Ten years after the Soviet Union falling to pieces reform economics, similarly to kremlinol- 
ogy, lost its relevance. It was replaced by transition economics. Nevertheless, as to the author, 
former reform attempts nowadays contribute to successful Hungarian transition.
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Instead of a precise definition
The only comprehensive work attempting to describe the abstract politico- 
economical model and the dynamics o f the socialist economic-social-political system 
distinguishes between the transition to the socialist system, the classic socialist sys­
tem, its reformed version, and finally, the stage o f market economy transformation. 
(Kornai 1992) (The author does not deal with this latter.) It considers reforms to 
be a change— distinguishing them from the frequent technical adjustment (in the 
terminology o f the day, “perfection” ) o f the system on the one hand, and from the 
Profound change o f the system, the “revolution” , on the other. “Revolution” goes 
beyond the framework o f the given socio-economic system and the changes are deep 
and at least medium-radical.
As far as the depth o f change is concerned, Kornai refers to a set o f notions 
which are also manageable for practical purposes. Accordingly, the most basic fac­
tor is the political sphere or, simplified, the monolithic political structure (and its 
dissolution). Therefore the deepest changes are those that take place in, or start 
from this sphere. The second level o f depth is the dominance o f state property.
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The third one, which is also partly a consequence o f the first, is the predominance 
of bureaucratic co-ordination. Moving towards the phenomenon level, the fourth 
group includes such deeper and general system-specific features as paternalism, soft 
budgetary constraint and weak price sensitivity. Finally, the fifth level comprises a 
group o f superficial phenomena which are relatively easy to change (e.g. by modi­
fying plan indicators or restructuring) but do not warrant in-depth and irreversible 
transformation. (Forced growth is considered to be one o f these; this could be 
“dropped” within the framework o f traditional planning economy, although the 
propensity remains.)
Given these, Kornai (1992) considers “all changes which modify at least one 
fundamental feature in at least one o f blocks 1, 2 or 3. (these are the deeper system- 
specific features) without shifting the system outside of the socialist family o f sys­
tems” as reforms. I believe this is an acceptable approach and it confirms the 
opinion I have maintained to the present day: namely, that there was a reform in 
Hungary at the end o f the 60’s1 (similarly to Czechoslovakia, though unfortunately 
for only a year); this cannot be said o f the changes in Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, 
Romania or East Germany although they are often referred to as reforms.
On this basis, reform economics could be considered to be the broad intellec­
tual trend which actually surfaced in the mid-50’s (after Stalin’s death) in a number 
o f Eastern European countries. In fact, the movement for economic reform even 
became fashionable and perhaps predominant from time to time, the aim being to 
reform the traditional planned economy. I emphasize: the aim was to reform and 
not to exceed, nor replace the planned economy with a capitalist market economy .2
'T h e  elimination o f the mandatory planning system (as a comprehensive system) proved to be 
a really relevant and later irreversible change, even if its effects were far from those assumed by 
many. (This is true in both directions: assumptions o f  those in favour o f reform have also failed 
to come true; they— including me— had hoped that the narrowed econom ic reform would be the 
battering ram which would generate much more penetrating changes involving also the political 
sphere, thus initiating an organic development process. Neither had those views in opposition to 
reforms proved true that this change would lead to econom ic anarchy. Béla Csikós Nagy once 
remarked sarcastically: “ It is not impossible that shoe factories would still produce shoes if they 
received no specific instruction to do so.” )
2 In the second half o f the 80’s, many experts in Hungary also considered a t ransition to a market 
economy when they openly talked about restricted reforms. Several elements o f  later Hungarian 
reforms may be regarded as anticipating a later transformation (e.g. the establishment o f a two- 
tiered banking system, tax reform). Such a change in thinking occurred as a consequence o f the 
limitation o f the soft dictatorship and the widespread recognition that the operating econom ic 
system had simply becom e unfeasible. The pragmatism which became traditional to the country 
gave enough leeway for those engaged in economics (experts, administration managers, and even 
some politicians) to realise that the system o f  central planning was not functioning in practice 
and the only thing that remained important was to maintain appearances.
It was a strange experience that, in 1984, we were assigned by Ferenc Havasi, Secretary of the 
Central Com mittee (o f the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) to elaborate a reform proposal 
under the leadership o f Rezső Nyers and Tamás Nagy. The draft docum ent was prepared and 
reviewed by the secretary of the Party in charge o f econom ic policy. In the small meeting preceding
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This intellectual trend was diverse and extended to several countries, even 
to those where reform eventually could not gain a foothold. The tides and ebbs 
o f reform waves by and large coincided in the whole o f the region. The players 
in them, however, were far from thinking along the same lines. The only thing 
they had in common was the realisation that the existing economic system (both 
in the 50’s and in the 60’s and at the end o f the 70’s, to refer only to the typical 
periods o f Hungarian reform waves) had serious weaknesses; these simply could 
not be solved within the framework, and based on the logic o f the traditional 
(and later, the half-reformed) system o f a planned economy. (The solution within 
the logic o f the system was simply a transformation o f planning priorities and 
requirements, and decision-making competence. Based on these, the plan tasks or 
participating organisations which reacted to the troubles recognised all this, but 
within the boundaries o f an all-permeating consciousness— i.e. central decision­
making competence.) A common trait to writings conceived on this level was that 
they started from a deep (at least deeper than allowed by the “etiquette” o f the 
time) critical analysis o f the operating system and proposals were largely aimed 
at the increased broadening o f the influence o f market mechanisms (in Hungary, 
in the 80’s, this even concerned the capital market) but without questioning the 
basic logic o f the political set-up and the dominance o f the community— i.e. state 
and co-operative property. (Proposed changes, therefore, in terms o f the definition 
above, were aimed at blocks 3 and 4.)
This study makes no attempt to present all the many intellectual trends 
related to reform. The first wave of this thinking process include people like the 
Pole W. Brus, the Slovak Ota Sik, the Soviet Lisichkin, Petrakov, Libermann, and 
among Hungarians, György Péter, János Kornai and István Varga (who headed the 
committee which elaborated a reform concept in 1957).3
Later on, the number o f participants in the reform debate expanded to in­
clude such personalities as: Tibor Liska, Tamás Bauer, Károly Attila Soós, Márton
the official debate, Ferenc Havasi said: “In the first twenty pages— I have underlined on purpose— 
the expressions and synonyms market and capital market appear at least 30 times. Do not forget 
that I will have to sell this in the Political Committee to Comrade Gáspár and others. Put in 
there at least something Marxist, let us say the harmony o f production forces and production 
relations. Or is even that not true any more?” he asked meekly.
In my experience, however, this was not the situation during earlier reform waves. W hether 
because during the 60 ’s and 70’ they still believed in the harmonisation o f plans and the market as a 
superior system, or because they thought that the restrictions on reforms could not be surmounted 
in a predictable period o f  time (and so it is useless to contemplate it) the m ajority indeed meant 
reforms when they talked about them. Some o f  the early great reformers still pamper this illusion. 
[See e.g. the “ third way” o f Sik (1985) and Nove (1983).]
3In terms o f Hungary, this concept is included in a collection o f texts edited by László Szamuely 
(1986); the collection includes an analytic study by the author.
An evaluation o f  reform concepts— and reformer types— is provided in an article by Kornai 
(1986). An overview o f international reform literature is found in Kornai (1992).
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Tardos, Rezső Nyers, János Mátyás Kovács, Sándor Kopátsy and András Hegedűs. 
These economists looked at the issue o f self-management and later the role of large 
enterprise management. Much later, in relation to financial reform issues, Lajos 
Bokros, György Surányi and László Asztalos appeared as significant figures. The 
organisation system was analysed by Tamás Sárközy and István Csillag, and in 
addition to them László Lengyel and myself. All the above-mentioned individuals 
were recurring participants in the reform debates and analyses conceived under the 
heading of reform. (This list is o f course far from complete. It is simply impossible 
and perhaps pointless to list all writings on the topic o f reform— they would fill a 
library.)
The majority o f those listed have to my knowledge worked for shorter or 
longer periods in various working committees organised either by the MSZMP 
(Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) or the government. These committees had 
the task of drafting proposals for the political decision-making administration and 
thus excluded the public from the process. This attachment to the administration 
is of course understandable, and perhaps it was necessary, given that reform initia­
tives usually started from, or at least had the approval o f the enlightened part o f the 
political elite. Thus, being excluded from this group practically also meant exclu­
sion from the opportunity to make proposals and an almost forced resignation from 
the shaping o f events. This situation survived until the mid-80’s in Hungary; then, 
the silent liberalisation o f the political system and the increased role o f publicity 
became perceptible (in Poland, although a strong and efficient secondary publicity 
had been functioning for a long time, the same process was not entirely identical).
In any event, it is a fact that reform literature became extremely widespread 
and in certain periods it became almost “fashionable” . It seized a number o f people 
and it cannot be denied now in retrospect, that the impact they had on public 
awareness o f issues related to economy was unprecedented. Writings on reform and 
analyses, proposals on the reasons and possible solutions for economic troubles in 
various fora of debate soon became the focus of attention4 and over a period of time 
achieved a breakthrough. What happened during this period gave me a sensation 
similar to that when I first read about the age o f enlightenment. I still consider 
this to be a great achievement o f reform economists and reform economics.
The tentative list o f players involved in reform publications clearly proves that 
one cannot talk about representatives of a certain school o f economics, nor about 
experts with the same values, the same understanding or the same style. Neither 
the convinced pragmatic and prophetic Liska, nor the strictly professional Tamás 
Sárközy with his professed cynicism (and who, by the way, does not consider himself 
to be a reformer, but this does not contradict the fact that some o f his writings 
can be deemed as organic parts o f the populous reform literature) (Sárközy 1990)
4Ivan T. Berend's book (1990) provides a thorough, factual and lively evaluation o f these 
debates during the 70’s.
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can in any respect be placed on a common platform; perhaps their only shared 
view is that they both regard the state as the cause of all trouble. (However, in 
my opinion, other, similar comparisons would also lead to approximately similar 
results.)
Change and reform5 is probably a piece o f reform literature which had one 
o f the largest impacts. Yet, the economic views, the economic and socio-political 
understanding, and the general thinking of its authors are far from identical. This 
fact was known at the time the study was born, but later the differences o f opinion 
on sometimes decisive issues— and which over time became deeper— were evident 
for readers.
Such fundamental differences in views were and remained present in the eval­
uation o f liberalisation and strict monetary policy, despite the fact that the paper 
took a clear position 011 these issues as well. Later on, disputes o f such nature also 
appeared in the press. Beyond the obviously opposing opinions, there was a differ­
ence in emphasis and in the judgment on the relative importance o f certain issues. 
There were also debates on how far it was possible to go in terms of compromises, 
and also in terms o f expanding the range of issues raised towards topics which point 
beyond economic topics. Nevertheless, the respective values of participants were 
not even common in some very general respect.
Yet, in retrospect this was not too serious a problem for the purposes of the 
product— i.e. it hindered common thinking only as an exception. This naturally 
demonstrated all the advantages and drawbacks of reform thinking at once, espe­
cially if compared with the „Társadalmi szerződés” (Social contract) which was 
born at almost the same time. Reform thinking in general— although it must be 
stressed, not all reformers— was lopsided and it sought to narrow the path where it 
was just possible to match the tolerance o f power at any time with the objectivity 
and strictness which was absolutely necessary for an “outsider” . With reference to 
András Kovács’s film, the unyielding reformer wanted to find and of course push 
out the Walls; the reformer wanted to be inside and informed of not only facts 
but, also the forces and interests which motivated decisions; at the same time, the 
reformer wanted to stand outside or, at least, keep his distance so that the inherent 
rules o f the system which would result in the reproduction of the system itself and 
the filtering out of innovation would not apply to him .6 Thus the reformer’s role 
was contradictory and although theoretically not a failure, in practice there were 
often failures and this brought disgrace, and in the worse cases, discord.
5See: Közgazdasági Szemle, June 1987 (short version) and a full version in the magazine 
Medvetánc (1987/4). The position o f the Theoretical Working Group of the Central Committee 
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and comments by some contributors were also published 
1,1 Közgazdasági Szetnle.
eThis description is appropriate in my case, but it certainly does not apply, for example, to 
Tamás Bauer who was much less ready to compromise than myself.
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One o f Aladár Madarász’s writings contains the statement that reform eco­
nomics does not have its own paradigm. He is right and it is perhaps clear by 
now that I do not consider reform economics to be a school o f economics, much 
less a scientific genre. However, I consider professionalism to be a real require­
ment (unfortunately, even this is not true of all representatives o f the trend) and 
the possibility o f significant work being produced in this area— that is, scientific 
work— was high on the agenda. It is a fact, however, that this cannot be an ade­
quate measure o f reform economics— rather, it should be measured by how much, 
in its time, it was able to exert influence on public awareness and through that, on 
decision-makers.7 There is no guarantee that this special role was fulfilled by the 
deepest, professionally most thorough and, mainly, the most original and innovative 
intellectual products: there is certainly an overlap, but it is equally certain that the 
two sets o f criteria were not completely congruent, not even in exceptional cases.
If we accept this approach, then
—  on the one hand, the competence o f reform economics cannot be defined 
clearly; it is difficult to give an answer to the question: o f the analytical and 
descriptive works in the fields o f economics, history, macroeconomics and sociology 
studies (a number o f which surfaced in this period and more than one o f which 
was discussed directly in the reform process or evaluated/re-evaluated during the 
period earmarked by reform) which can be deemed a part of reform economics and 
which cannot?
—  on the other hand, the measure for judging these works is not necessar­
ily the values o f universal science (or the trends and institutions which nowadays 
approximate to this rank). (All the more so because mature and “chiselled” work 
is sometimes in the form o f a self-motivated scientific performance, legitimised by 
participants o f international conference “tourism” . Such work is necessarily durable 
and its foundations are questionable and actually— and fortunately— come in for 
questioning from time to time.)
' There was a time when I believed vice versa— i.e. that others had to be influenced through 
decision-makers. Today— not a little due to the effect my close colleagues and sometimes friends 
had on me— I admit that the order, if not in reverse, certainly has one more step in between: 
communication with the intellectual group which is traditionally able to shape the opinion of 
others, simply because that is its mission (and o f course would not approve o f anyone disputing 
this privilege). I confess, however, that the reverse order— i.e. that power may be influenced 
primarily through public opinion— was not evident to me, and it has not been evident even in 
the period which has elapsed since the introduction o f the multi-party system. (Sometimes I feel 
the direct opposite to be true. After the undisciplined loosening of the 80’s, the final word is 
again pronounced by well-versed party bureaucrats, if we search for an authentic evaluation of 
the economy in various mass communication fora.)
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How can the efforts towards reform economics be evaluated?
Three points can be made with respect to the above question.
The first focuses upon the way in which the changes (initiated and partly 
achieved by the reforms) shifted the system of a traditional planned economy to 
another (reformed) system and how this affected the functioning of the economy. 
(It is clearly pointless, as well as impossible, to measure the efficiency o f individual 
reform proposals separately.)
If we try to compare the performance o f the Hungarian economy with that 
o f some non-reformed planned economies, the answer is more or less clear. Hun­
gary’s growth performance in the long run turned out to be no better after the 
reforms than that o f neighbouring Eastern European countries. Yet there can be 
no doubt that the equilibrium o f the consumer market improved suddenly and in a 
relatively short time: the domestic population felt this as much as tourists visiting 
from neighbouring Eastern European states.8 This improving market equilibrium 
was directly related to the substantial expansion of the role of market-type co­
ordination, the sometimes supported, sometimes only tolerated expansion o f the 
so-called second economy, and the less rigid regulation of imports from the West. 
All these changes were in some way related to the gradual, uneven, but after a 
while, irreversible series o f reform steps.9
It is also a fact that the reform process managed to produce a peculiar sym­
biosis between private activities and community property; this changed the moti­
vations and living strategies o f employees over a surprisingly broad range o f activ­
ities. (This sphere includes the household farms established prior to the reform, 
auxiliary businesses o f  co-operatives, later the company business units ( vállalati 
gazdasági munkaközösség) and various forms o f small entreprises, e.g. auction-type 
rental schemes.)
Based on all this, the negative evaluation o f growth performance mentioned 
above becomes doubtful. On the one hand, the highly unbalanced economy (es­
pecially being a shortage economy) was able to present faster growth— at least 
temporarily— in statistical terms. (This does not even require proof.) On the other 
hand, the gradual unfolding o f a secondary economy, which could not or could only
8In one o f his speeches as speaker at the Party congress, János Kádár summarised the success 
° f  the reforms in a single sentence: “ If there is meat, the butcher says hello, if there is no meat, 
the buyer says hello.” There could hardly have been a more tangible critique o f the shortage 
economy for the public than this statement. The otherwise well-founded analyses o f  theoretical 
economists on the distorting effects o f shortages were o f little interest to the public.
9Thus, people (e.g. Róbert Hoch) who attribute the improving consumer market situation 
simply to a change in econom ic policy priorities and an economic policy focused on living standards 
(*•*• independent from reforms) are not right. Once the significance o f the new type o f (meat- 
eating) socialist people was recognised, way had to be given to the development o f household 
farms and, to some extent, o f entreprises.
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partially be controlled, demonstrates that growth performance was better (and 
remained better after the political system change) than that measured statistically.
At the same time, it is also certain that particular aspects o f the reform 
programmes (which were often experiments— for example, the introduction o f the 
so-called competition price system in 1981) did not attain their perhaps most im­
portant goals— i.e. the fundamental transformation o f the attitudes and motives 
o f companies which continued to belong to the dominant public sector. Profit- 
orientation remained an empty abstraction or, at best, a distant goal. 10
Although the economic reforms proved to be effective, the actual results un­
doubtedly fell short o f the expectations o f those who initiated them. It is also a 
fact that economic policy practice came to rely much more than before on reform 
proposals but in most cases their implementation was half-hearted.
A possible second approach is to see whether the concepts and proposals had 
a direct effect and thus influenced public thinking on a broad basis. Did the process 
induce debates, intellectual activity or, at least, represent a turning point? If this 
is the starting point, then it is relevant and necessary to record a few works which 
were quite successful and effective in the later waves o f reform.
These may be the following:
—  Tibor Liska: Kritika és koncepció (Critique and concept) (1963)
—  Márton Tardos: A gazdasági verseny problémái hazánkban (Problems of 
economic competition in Hungary) (1972)
—  Tamás Bauer: A második gazdasági reform, és a tulajdonviszonyok (The 
second economic reform and ownership) (1982)
—  the HVG debate on the necessity o f the “reform o f the reform” (O ctober- 
December 1982) in which practically all reform economists involved in the issue 
participated
—  András Hegedűs: A nagyvállalatok és a szocializmus (Large entreprises 
and socialism) (1984)
—  László Antal, Lajos Bokros, István Csillag, László Lengyel and György 
Matolcsy: Fordulat és reform  (Change and reform) (1987)
Although this list is subjective, it would seem that in the quarter o f a decade 
which preceded the systemic change these were the most important works although 
from a professional point o f view they may not necessarily prove to be the most 
durable in the long term. (O f course, there are a number of other writings which 
could, at least, supplement this list and which were important a few years ago. 
However, these studies, which represented a turning point-type at the time, do not 
seem so special today.)
10This is proved by sociological analyses, corporate case studies, research dealing with the 
background o f corporate and co-operative mergers, analyses on the situation o f priority com pa­
nies and analyses showing the significant development o f  decisions (also on a sociological basis). 
Fortunately, all such studies became more numerous in the 70's.
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From what is being said here reform economics can be regarded as a loose 
stream composed o f elements which are strictly scientific but there are also reform 
writings o f a less scientific nature. Yet the factor uniting the participants was 
that they all wanted to surpass the traditional planned economy and this was an 
important goal for them (regardless of the fact that their respective views o f the 
world were different). Their agreement was that this aim (i.e. reform) was sensible 
and worthwhile— and could only be achieved by making some concessions to the 
structures o f a market economy.
For the purposes o f the development o f economic thinking, however, it is 
more important to point out that this period saw the evolution o f an “intellectual 
renewal task” or some sort o f belated economic enlightenment. The products of 
this can by no means be considered parts of a strictly reform literature but they 
certainly contributed to the advancement o f the reform spirit which started in the 
mid-60’s. A thorough economic history and re-evaluation o f the period has elapsed 
since the planned economy was established [in the book of Iván Pető  and Sándor 
Szakács (1985)]. Comprehensive macroeconomic— politico-economic works aiming 
to describe and compare Eastern European economic systems have been published 
[e.g. the major works by János Kornai (1980), Tamás Bauer (1981) and Károly 
Attila Soós (1986)]. The econo-sociology trend has gained strength, and it also 
describes the system from a microeconomic point of view. I consider these works to 
be outstanding even on an international scale and, at the same time, they represent 
something which is wider than reform economics.
Over the years, interested intellectuals and an even broader group o f the 
public has learnt to speak “economese” . Reform economics developed a language— 
furthermore, a communication form which does not always operate with a precise 
set of notions and uses analogies. It strives to make not only the issue raised under­
standable but also emphasizes its connection with the citizen what infringements o f 
interests it resolves and vice versa, and what it generates. This language and termi- 
nology, o f course, does not always comply with the strictest scientific requirements, 
nor is it exclusive and elitist: therefore, it is suitable for public consumption and 
this is its goal. A number o f neighbouring disciplines— e.g. sociology— involuntarily 
adopted this language later on, for the same reasons.
Thirdly, when considering whether reform economics has itself made an en­
suring contribution to economic science it is not so easy to give a direct answer. 
In his book on the socialist system Kornai states that the model o f a traditional 
planned economy forms a closed and coherent system. This is true. It is most prob- 
ably due to this fact that important comprehensive analyses, be it Kornai’s work 
(1980) or Tamás Bauer’s analyse basically the relations o f a traditional planned 
economy. Statements on the reformed system may only be considered as distrac­
tions, and are not really organic parts o f the aforementioned studies. [The only 
exception in this respect is Károly Attila Soós’ book (1986).]
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As the system of a traditional planned economy can be regarded as a closed 
logical model, the common feature o f systems which have evolved in the wake 
o f reforms is exactly that an economy based on the predominance o f bureaucratic 
coordination is made more viable and efficient precisely by changes which contradict 
the basic logic o f the system (and often acknowledged as a necessity). There are also 
differences between the formalised system set down in rules and the informal system, 
because the informal system gives way to adjustments which would be very hard to 
implement under a strictly implemented bureaucracy. Logically, there seems to be 
only one credible explanation for this, i.e. if the traditional planned economy cannot 
be reformed and the only course is its elimination. Reform economics, however, 
adopts arguments which start something like this: “It would still be better if...”
The results are thus contradictory and, after strict descriptive and thorough 
analysis, an economic system which was definitely confusing many respects ap­
peared to be quite viable as it gave way to the ingenuity o f the players. This 
hybrid system, however, is difficult to explain by the logic o f economics, to say 
the least: this is why the chapters of studies and documents which elaborate the 
proposals that analyse and criticise past events tend to be more convincing than 
the subsequent proposals. (The only exception to this rule in Hungary might be 
the last few years o f the 80’s, and only because this period could be considered 
as the beginnings to the collapse of the planned economy and the transition to a 
market economy.)
At the same time, some objections to this occur in the following form: “Re­
forms only extend the agony o f an unviable system, therefore they might even be 
harmful” . In retrospect, such arguments are also irrelevant because the centrally 
planned economy, whether traditional or reformed, definitely collapsed at the end 
o f the 80’s. The difference is only that, during the reform period, it was possible 
to buy meat here. That did make a difference.
Retliiiiking in retrospect
The issues raised by reform economics (which used to be sensitive) have be­
come irrelevant and unimportant today. There is a fraction of reform literature 
which will probably stand the test o f time, will certainly be interesting for eco­
nomic history just as Polanyi’s discussions on the agora or native barter trade are 
interesting. They will, however, certainly not be interesting for the future develop­
ment o f economic thinking.11
"M o r e  precisely, they remain interesting and relevant for those who still think that history 
will sooner or later arrive at the values searched for but never found by the ideals o f  socialism 
(and called “socialist” , although one might say they have never been looked for, simply because
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This is obviously not a tragedy for the profession. A similar fate must have 
befallen Kremlinologists. By now, the research topic which used to be interesting 
in the old days— i.e. that one o f the high-ranking Soviet leaders was moved from 
his room adjacent to Brezhnev’s to one floor below— has lost its significance. Simi­
larly, it has become irrelevant to conduct shrewd analyses of what messages certain 
communist functionaries sent through leading papers— not to the people, to whom 
they were addressed, but— to each other. This science has lost its significance just 
as the vegetarian reform research topic “How to make the artificial market more 
delicious” has become superfluous.
As far as Kremlinologists are concerned, this really means only the elimi­
nation o f a few research positions or a temporary unemployment problem among 
the researchers involved. As far as my own position is concerned, unfortunately I 
have to say that socialism (which has been reformed a number o f times) ceased to 
exist just when I was beginning to understand it. Thus, a part o f íny intellectual 
efforts no doubt went to waste and I had to start studying new things— but now 
with the certain knowledge that the market economy will not cease to exist before 
I understand it.
János Mátyás Kovács ’s most recent study (1997) discusses the issue o f what 
enduring values the science o f economics, developing on the basis o f socialism, 
has created. That is, has socialism made any relevant contributions to universal 
economics and if it has, why this has not been noticed in the West.
His conclusion is rather harsh. He thinks that there is a scientific contribution. 
The realisations “will be indispensable, but primarily as counter-examples which 
show (off the mainstream) what happens if the majority o f the usual assumptions 
of dominant schools o f economics does not apply. In order to become really indis­
pensable, however, first they have to be understandable for the ‘big white man’ . 
Less verbal, more formal analyses, more strict definitions, more precise proof rules, 
separation o f descriptive-explanatory and normative, deductive and inductive, and 
abstract theoretical and empirical procedures, pronouncing the premises, standard 
language use and the exhaustive reasons for any deviation from that standard, etc., 
etc.— the most excellent notions introduced by Eastern European scientists have 
to (should have) overcome these methodological obstacles in order to be compre­
hensible and consumable for the economics science o f the world.” (Kovács 1997)
° f  the monolithic power establishment); given this assertion the original questions should not 
be abandoned.
It is a strange twist o f fate that there are now a number o f platforms on the right, wing of 
the political spectrum which also declare support for capitalism, but are in fact looking for their 
own solutions from the perspective o f a long obsolete romantic anti-capitalism— i.e. some sort o f 
•'ghtist third way. The latter would be described— as far as it seems— by a large mass o f sweating 
s,T>all entrepreneurs. These would not only be entrepreneurs but would also work in their own 
workshops or plants; it would be a capitalism without cheats. From a cynical point o f view it 
w°uld be a capitalism which is not capitalism.
7* A cta  O economica SO, 1999
100 L. ANTAL: W H AT IS LEFT OF “REFORM  ECONOM ICS"?
After this, one should not be surprised at the question: “and the ideology histo­
rian who looks at the work o f this Eastern European economist, what should he 
do about a discipline the representatives o f which may boast that in their best 
moments they conduct scientific investigations o f some marginal cases, or realise 
which programmes they may not propose for improving the world? They started 
from ‘what to do ’ , but today they also know what not to do.”
Yet this picture seems to be rather despondent. The central, fashionable 
topic o f the day (which could fill a library o f professional literature) is centered 
around two topic words: “transition” and “privatisation” ; in other words, around 
the question of how to undo, in a historically minimum time, what has unfortunately 
been done; again not a typical (nor modem) question for economics. This task— i.e. 
the almost imperceptible dismantling of what is now sean as a dilapidated structure, 
will probably not become a part o f the main stream, either. There will probably be 
at least as many mistakes— though different ones this time— as there were in the 
previous period. (This is not sure of course, but experience so far would seem to 
confirm this supposition.)
This is not necessarily an indication o f failure, for the science o f economics 
(if not each economist) has to deal with what there is. It would have been strange 
for Eastern European economists o f the 60’s to focus on the same issues that have 
excited the theoretical experts o f the developed and sophisticated Western market 
economies over a period o f several centuries.
It is true that the majority o f Eastern European researchers are not really 
familiar with the language and habits o f the “big white man” — i.e. standard West­
ern economics (though there are exceptions). However, it is far from certain that 
scientific performance, considered to be mainstream over there, will indeed become 
a part o f universal science; yet this is, o f course, uncertain in the case o f all kinds 
o f scientific performance. On the other hand, I hope that issues which attempt to 
provide answers (or at least explanations) not to the questions arising in the most 
developed part o f the world but to the problems o f societies and economies which 
are considered relatively backward will sooner or later become an organic part of 
universal economics.
Although not easy to confirm, there seem to have been intellectual achieve­
ments in recent decades which will be o f lasting importance not only provincially 
but also on a universal scale (and not only in the research o f extremities, curiosities, 
economic Siamese twins but with a much more general scope). (The book by Peto 
and Szakács surpasses Alec Nove’s analysis on Soviet economy in all respects as 
far as general professional criteria are concerned. Sooner or later this will perhaps 
be recognised, perhaps even where the profile-competence and appointment lists 
o f universal science valid today are compiled.) In terms o f methodology they may
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not (or only rarely) contribute, but in approaching the issues, they may provide a 
substantial contribution to the accomplishments o f mature science.12
For the time being, what is apparent is that, after the intellectual effer­
vescence of the 70’s and 80’s, no really significant works have been authored in 
Hungary. Naturally, it is to hoped that this is just a brief interlude. My impression 
is, however, that economy is becoming political again and if Lenin once said: “pol­
itics is concentrated economy” , today we may say that economy is deconcentrated 
politics, and this is definitely not in favour o f scientific development.
References
Antal, L., Bokros, L., Csillag, I., Lengyel, L. and Matolcsy, Gy. „Fordulat és reform” (Change 
and reform) Közgazdasági Szemle, 1987. No. 6 (Extended version: Medvetánc, 1987/4) 
Bauer, T . 1981. Tervgazdaság, beruházás, ciklusok (Planned economy, investment, cycles). Bu­
dapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.
Bauer, T . „A  második gazdasági reform és a tulajdonviszonyok” (The second econom ic reform 
and ownership). Mozgó Világ, 1982. No. 9.
Berend, T . I. 1990. The Hungarian economic reform. Cambridge University Press.
Hegedűs, A. „A  nagy vállalatok és a szocializmus” (Large enterprises and socialism). Közgazda- 
sági Szemle 1984. No. 1.
Kornai, J. 1980. Economics of shortage. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co.
Kornai, J. 1986. “The Hungarian reform process: visions, hopes and reality” . Journal of Eco­
nomic Literature, December, 24(4), pp. 1687-1732.
Kornai, J. 1992. The socialist system — the political economy of communism. Oxford: University 
Press— Princeton: University Press.
Kovács, J. M. 1997. „A  kelet-európai közgazdasági gondolkodás (és története) hasznáról” [On the 
use o f Eastern European econom ic thinking (and history)]. Közgazdasági Szemle, April. 
Kuhn, T . S. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago Press.
Liska, T . „Kritika és koncepció” (Critique and concept— tehises for reform o f economic mecha­
nism) Közgazdasági Szemle 1963. No. 9.
Nove, A. 1969. An economic history of the USSR. London: Allen Lane.
Nove, A. 1983. The economics of feasible socialism. Georg Allen and Unwin Publishers Ltd.
Pető, I. and Szakács, S. 1985. A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története (The history o f four 
decades o f  Hungarian econom y). Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.
Sárközy, T . 1990. Egy szervezeti reform sodrában (In the wake of an organizational reform). Bu­
dapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.
Sík, Ota. 1985. Ein Wirtschaftssystem dér Zukunft. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springier Verlag.
Soós, K. A. 1986. Terv, kampány, pénz (Plan, campaign, m oney). Budapest: Közgazdasági és 
Jogi Könyvkiadó.
Szamuely, L. 1986. A magyar közgazdasági gondolat fejlődése  (Evolution o f the Hungarian eco­
nomic thought). Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.
Tardos, M. A gazdasági verseny problémái hazánkban (Problems o f economic com petition in 
Hungary) Közgazdasági Szemle 1972. Nos 7-8.
l2Thomas S. Kuhn’s work (1970) on the history o f science formulates a strong hypothesis that 
areas o f  science which have mature and sophisticated systems o f notions and analysis, which are 
generally accepted and therefore have seemingly unquestionable paradigms, may at a certain point 
become too  conservative; thus they become obstacles to the reconsideration o f issues or become 
self-mot.ivated in themselves. Impotence is but a step from here.
Acta Oeconomica 50, 1999

Acta Oeconomica, Vol. 50 (1 -2 ), pp. 103-117 (1999)
POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION AND THE LABOUR 
MARKET IN HUNGARY— 
THE QUEST FOR INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT*
I. R. GÁBOR
The severe transition-related recession o f the 1990s in Hungary was strongly felt in the 
labour market: employment declined at a rate greater than the fall o f production, and real wages 
declined substantially as well. However, with these socially painful adjustments over, it seems 
that Hungary’s labour market is now reluctant to accom modate the much-hoped-for economic 
upswing: even under the circumstances of two consecutive years o f impressive rates o f  econom ic 
growth and rising investment employment has not started to recover to any perceptible degree.
Preliminary results o f  our research into the causes of, and possible cures for this apparent 
closedness o f today ’s Hungarian labour market suggest that, parallel to the dismantling o f a 
large part o f earlier internal labour markets, a new institutional infrastructure fitting the logic o f 
operation o f occupational type labour markets has as yet failed to evolve. We will argue that it is 
primarily this uneven process o f institutional development (combined, perhaps, with factors widely 
held responsible for the persistence o f unemployment in some long-established market economies) 
that accounts for Hungary’s dismal employment record at the current stage o f econom ic recovery.
The main lesson we will draw from this assessment is that in the years to come a prereq­
uisite o f employment-enhancing and lasting econom ic growth in Hungary is the alignment o f the 
institutional infrastructure o f  the labour market with the advance o f occupational labour markets.
The Hungarian economy in the early 1990s was hit by a severe recession re­
lated to the economic transformation.1 In the course of this process employment 
declined by over 25 percent— greater than the fall in production— while real wages 
were being eroded and registered unemployment rose to a rate of over 10 percent.2 
Clearly, a fall in employment greater than the decline o f production (with a corre­
sponding improvement in productivity) would hardly have been possible if a good 
part o f the formerly established internal labour markets of large state-owned firms 
disintegrated and dissolved into occupational labour markets. As a matter o f fact,
*This study is a substantially shortened and somewhat, revised version of Gábor (1997a). It 
was presented at the Bamberg-Budapest. Inter-University Workshop on “Work in the European 
Context” (BUES, Budapest, April 7 -8 , 1999).
'T h e  arguments that follow take as a reference the views and ideas advanced by K ornai (1993), 
(1995) and (1996) on the causes of the transformationary recession and conditions o f recovery, 
but they are confined to aspects strictly related to the labour market.
2 János Timor was among the first who noticed that, compared to the dramatic decline of 
employment that was brought about by the transformationary recession (as a result o f which 
Hungary’s employment rate fell from a level higher by far to a level even lower than is typical 
among market economies), the magnitude of the increase o f unemployment was disproportionately 
s,nall in absolute terms. (Tim ár 1994).
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internal labour markets in recessionary periods act as employment buffers in that 
they reduce the output elasticity o f employment and, by so doing, tend to lower 
(or slow down the growth of) productivity. 3
The fact that internal labour markets did recede and give ground to occu­
pational labour markets in Hungary in the 1990s can be explained primarily by 
privatisation; this brought in its train the predominance o f firms too small and 
unstable to maintain internal labour markets.4 This is shown very obviously in 
the sudden proliferation o f self-employment. Obviously, given the natural desire of 
the overwhelming majority of workers for income and job  security, such an abrupt 
proliferation of self-employment could hardly have occurred had employment op­
portunities in internal labour markets not diminished drastically. Moreover, self- 
employment in Hungary today is in a large part only a mask that hides extremely 
precarious employment relations (representing the polar opposite o f the kind of 
employment relationship characteristic o f internal labour markets) through which 
separation costs as well as taxes and social security contributions can be saved. The 
excessive multiplication o f this kind o f compelled (pseudo-)self-employment should 
be seen not as a manifestation o f a working population highly entrepreneurial in 
spirit but rather an indication o f a temporary detour, or perhaps even worse: a 
low-equilibrium trap, o f small-business development.5
3These observations are typically traced to transition-costs econom ic interpretations o f the 
raison d ’être o f  internal labour market-type employment relations along the lines proposed in the 
seminal paper by Williamson et al. (1975); other econom ic interpretations view the employment 
relationship as a particular kind o f principal-agent relationship and stress problems o f asymmetric 
information and moral hazard; yet there are also others, following the footsteps o f Hirschman 
(1970); who point out the im portance o f “voice” as a political-institutional mechanism o f the 
adjustment characteristic o f internal labour markets, as against “exit” as a com petitive mechanism 
characteristic o f occupational labour markets— see, for example, Freeman (1980).
4 Smith (1988) found that only firms large enough (i.e. with a staff o f about 500 at least or, 
according to Oi (1983), 1000) establish internal labour markets. It is appropriate to note here, 
however, that this piece o f  indirect evidence and the ones that follow are only poor substitutes 
for the as yet lacking comprehensive body of relevant statistical evidence. For a systematic 
approach— whose adoption it is hoped might provide more substantive first-hand evidence before 
long— see Groshen and Levine (1998). See also Eyraud et al. (1990) and Gibbons and Waldman 
(1998), respectively, for alternative routes to the estimation o f the scope and impacts o f  internal 
labour markets.
5This is suggested by the apparent inconsistency o f the relatively low rate o f failure and that 
o f retreat o f Hungary’s overpopulated and overfragmented small-business sector: as many as two- 
thirds o f those small and mostly young undertakings which were surveyed in 1993 were still in 
business in 1996. ( Lengyel 1996) Moreover, the “death rate” o f those from among them which 
had been started under the pressure o f necessity was below that o f the total sample. Furthermore, 
although the size o f  the units (measured according to the number o f their staff) that had survived 
increased somewhat during that three-year period, this did not hold for the small-business sector 
as a whole— see figures in Footnote 9. For my view o f the state o f health of the Hungarian small- 
business sector and its developmental prospects see Gábor (1997b).
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Another piece o f indirect evidence o f the disintegration o f formerly established 
internal labour markets and their dissolution into occupational labour markets is 
the withdrawal o f firms from regular training: the role they used to play in regular 
training by establishing and operating apprentice workshops in their factories (i.e. 
as a device to gain access to a larger and selected pool o f skilled young workers) is 
now increasingly assumed partly by workshops run by the training schools them­
selves, and partly by micro-businesses which can thus benefit from tax relief (and 
also from informal fees that families o f apprentice candidates without a place o f 
practical training might be forced to pay) . 6 A similar conclusion can be drawn—• 
tentatively at least— from the marked devaluation in the 1990s o f labour market 
experience vis-à-vis, for example, formal education ; 1 it can also be seen from the 
observation that, other things being equal, those from among the unemployed who, 
prior to unemployment, were relatively low paid in their jobs— and can thus be 
assumed to constitute a sub-sample in which workers with shorter or no tenure in 
an internal labour market are overrepresented— , if they are re-employed, typically 
register a wage gain, on the other hand, the formerly better-paid reemployed will 
typically suffer a loss.8 As for waged employment in micro-businesses, registered 
employment is rare among these.9 However, where it exists, it does so mostly in 
the form o f casual/seasonal and part-time employment with practically no guaran­
tee o f job  and/or income security o f any kind. Furthermore, small-business owners 
prefer to rely on references obtainable from fellow-entrepreneurs when searching for 
new employees (Laki 1997)— again a practice that would clearly be foreign in an 
internal labour market context, where employers usually do better by relying on 
recommendations from their workers.
O f course, it would be a mistake to assume that internal labour markets 
in Hungary have been deprived entirely of their conditions o f existence. (Yet it
6While the number o f apprentices participating in regular vocational training dropped by 17 
percent between 1990-1991 and 1993-1994, those from among them who attended training shops 
run by schools even increased by 58 percent, while the number o f apprentices trained in groups 
at firms decreased by 49 percent. At the same time, participation in other (non-group) forms o f 
regular training grew by 12 percent. Source o f figures: Benedek (1994).
7See Kertesi and Költő (1999), who regard this finding o f their estimations o f Mincerian-type 
wage equations as an indication o f a general devaluation o f practical skills accumulated in the 
Pre-transformation era.
8This observation is reported (and given a hypothetical interpretation that— unlike the one I 
am proposing— relies on the theory o f statistical discrimination) in Köllő and Nagy (1995).
9 According to figures reported in Laky (1996), the average number o f employees in unincorpo­
rated small-undertakings o f single owners— typically own-account workers— did not change from 
1993 to 1995: it remained as low as 0.3. As for corporations, the ratio o f those with a staff o f  less 
than 20 even increased— from 72.5 to 87 percent— between 1991 and 1995. A particularly striking 
■»crease could be observed in the ratio o f the smallest corporations: the proportion o f those with 
a staff o f  10 or less grew from 47.6 to 74.8 percent in the two-year period from 1993 to 1995; it 
then continued to grow— and at the time o f writing had reached well over 90 percent (December 
1998).
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must be pointed out that it would be a mistake to ignore, when talking about 
the predominance of internal labour markets, the role occupational labour markets 
played in the 1970s through the 1980s as places o f employment for those large 
segments o f workers who were only loosely attached to the labour force and/or 
eager to accept less-remunerative and less-demanding jobs— or who were simply 
unskilled and untrainable.) Managers o f newly-established Hungarian subsidiaries 
o f multinational companies, particularly in the engineering industry, for instance, 
do their best to adopt Western-type internal labour markets. This is demonstrated 
by their efforts to build up their own systems o f training as a private source of 
supply o f skilled labour for themselves. In other cases involving the privatisation of 
existing firms, to the extent the privatisation was not followed by the introduction 
o f new technologies— the old-type, informal internal labour markets were left almost 
unaltered, in spite o f management efforts.10 What is being stressed here is that in 
Hungary today a much smaller proportion o f workers has chance to be employed 
in internal labour markets than was the case in the 1970s and 1980s; moreover, a 
much larger proportion has to be satisfied with the employment opportunities which 
occupational labour markets offer (for the most part including self-employment).
Meanwhile, however, the labour market in Hungary has become conspicu­
ously closed and inflexible. Notwithstanding the remarkable gaining o f ground by 
occupational labour markets, it has responded to economic recovery in ways which 
not even the predominance o f internal labour markets would imply. As a matter of 
fact, even under the conditions o f positive economic growth and rising investment, 
employment continued to decline up until 1997 and showed only an insignificant 
(i.e. a few decimal percentage) increase last year; in spite o f the fact that the ma­
jority o f those squeezed out of employment in recent years have withdrawn from 
the labour force— particularly those with little hope o f being rehired later— and 
are now economically inactive (therefore not counted as unemployed), long-term 
unemployment is not diminishing; what is more, wage inflationary pressure has not 
lessened. 11
This paradoxical behaviour o f the Hungarian labour market— namely, exces­
sive job-rationing12 and wage-inflationary pressure in the context of occupational
10This has been demonstrated by the case studies— e.g. Bodis (1996), (1997) and Janky (1996)— 
o f an ongoing research project (entitled “Econom ic sociological investigation o f hierarchical eco­
nomic organisations” ) inspired by the ideas o f Csontos (1994) and coordinated by him until his 
unfortunate early death in 1997.
" F o r  a solid and carefully documented general account of the labour market impacts o f the 
first half-decade o f the Hungarian econom ic transformation see Galasi and K ertesi (1996).
12 The phenomenon o f jo b  rationing as a regime in which otherwise apt outside applicants are 
widely denied jobs (despite their lower wage claims) is traced back, by efficiency wage theories, 
in part to workers’ unobserved heterogeneity. This being the case, and considering the fact that 
the existence o f internal labour markets is also traced back in part to this heterogeneity, it follows 
that efficiency wages and internal labour markets are in this respect conditional upon each other, 
(Cf. Weiss 1990.) Further, it should be noted that the role internal labour markets may play in
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labour markets— can be said to be intellectually embarrassing. More importantly, 
it involves the danger that the ongoing economic recovery will fuel wage inflation 
to a degree that calls for restrictive economic policies, with the consequence that 
the recovery may get stuck before growing demand for labour could bring forth 
any sizeable increase in employment. 13 Furthermore, overtly excluding character 
o f the Hungarian labour market, as a result o f which huge masses o f people devoid 
o f entrepreneurial spirit are notoriously deprived o f the possibility o f waged em­
ployment and are compelled to make their living as self-employed, may contribute 
to the perpetuance o f the current unfortunate state of affairs; in the latter, over- 
populated and overfragmented small-businesses are a medium for the acute danger 
of long-term economic dualisation— consequently they represent a threat to, rather 
than a catalyst for economic transformation. In order to escape these dangers it is 
essential to explore what it is that causes labour market inflexibility.
Obviously, differences in historical precedents and peculiarities o f the trans- 
formationary recession preclude the possibility o f extracting immediately adaptable 
lessons and direct guidance from treatments o f the labour market rigidities which 
market economies experienced following the oil-price explosions. At the same time, 
a special account o f their findings, and considering them in the light o f the pecu­
liarities o f the Hungarian case, may serve as a useful starting point o f exploration.
It is important to note first that, similar to the situation which the majority 
of the developed market economies faced following the oil price explosions, Hun­
gary in the 1990s got acquainted with high unemployment rates coupled with high 
rates o f inflation. This syndrome, commonly known as stagflation, was originally 
assumed to arise partly due to the anomalies o f adjustment ( “friction” ) accompa­
nying accelerated structural changes. It is assumed that the larger the structural 
(e.g. regional, occupational, etc.) disequilibria o f the labour market at a given point 
o f time, the higher the rate o f unemployment necessary to discipline inflationary 
pressure. 14
maintaining a regime o f  excessive jo b  rationing is also tacitly acknowledged in the so-called insider- 
outsider approach by Lindbeck and Snower (1988). In this approach insider workers, understood 
as “full-fledged employees” , are claimed to be able and willing to make underbidding by the 
outsiders expensive for the employers to accept and /or disagreeable for the outsiders themselves 
to engage in.
13In this discussion o f the role which the development o f wages and consumption have played in 
*he transformationally recession, and o f the kind o f income policy to be pursued in the recovery, 
Kornai repeatedly calls attention to this danger— see Kornai (1993; 1995; 1996).
'^Namely, the higher the natural rate o f unemployment in a com petitive economy and the 
higher the equilibrium rate o f unemployment (NIRU or NAIRU) in imperfect com petition the 
latter is understood as the rate at which workers’ real wage claims and firms’ real profit claims 
are consistent with each other. As a result, price-inflation expectations are fulfilled. Note that 
the theory o f  imperfect com petition is itself a product o f  the 1980s— see Blanchard (1986) and 
Blanchard and Summers (1986). Since the arguments below refer to the conditions o f imperfect 
competition, the concept o f equilibrium unemployment is adopted hereafter.
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An important implication o f this approach is that, with accelerated structural 
changes having been accomplished, stagflation is bound to disappear— an implica­
tion that was not entirely supported by later experience. It is true that equilibrium 
unemployment declined in the 1980s but not as far as its pre-stagflation level and 
with considerable variation among individual countries. This directed analysts’ at­
tention to the effects institutional factors such as: 1 . labour market corporativity,
2 . path-dependency o f equilibrium unemployment (usually labelled as hysteresis) or
3 . internal versus occupational labour markets may exert upon a country’s unem­
ployment performance. It is the responsibility o f these factors for the inflexibility 
of the Hungarian labour market that are now considered below .15
1. Initial attempts to find out why the unfavourable effects o f the oil-price 
explosions lasted longer than had been anticipated, and why they varied in de­
gree from country to country, yielded the assertion that there exists a theoretically 
well-arguable U-shape relationship between labour market corporativity (i.e. cen­
tralisation o f wage negotiations) and unemployment performance.16
Centralised (macro-level) collective bargaining is claimed to have the most 
favourable properties on the ground that unions negotiating in such setting are in a 
position which both allows and enables them to take full account o f the unfortunate 
effect excessive wage claims (ones that are inconsistent with the anticipated growth 
o f productivity) may exert on the rate o f price inflation. Thus, on the one hand, 
they will not easily fall victim to wage illusion. On the other hand, they are 
aware o f the danger an unanticipated acceleration o f price inflation entails— namely, 
that it normally invokes restrictive economic policies as counter-actions; in turn, 
these result in declining employment, which imposes involuntary unemployment 
upon a part o f their membership and increasing burdens of unemployment benefit 
contributions upon the rest.
Micro-level collective negotiations are claimed to have favourable properties 
as well; this explains the relatively good unemployment record o f those countries 
in which unions are engaged typically in firm-level bargaining. Here, trade unions 
will feel obliged to show self-restraint for they know that, with a firm facing highly 
price-elastic demand for its products, workers face highly wage-elastic employment 
opportunities. Consequently, unions will fear that higher wages (whether or not 
increasing production costs are passed on to buyers in the form o f higher prices) 
may lower the firm’s profits (either because o f falling revenues or as a consequence 
of lower profit margins) and induce decreases in staff numbers.
15 References to the literature on which the relevance o f these factors for Hungary is considered 
are placed in footnotes at the respective sections.
16See Calmfors and Driffil (1988). This view, which came to replace previous views o f a 
more linear, negative relationship between the level o f collective negotiations and m acroeconom ic 
performance (see, for example, Bruno and Sachs 1985), itself came under attack in the 1990s (see, 
for example, in Lindbeck and Snower 1997) and is widely regarded as outdated by now.
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Industry-level bargaining, in contrast, is clearly the worst alternative setting 
as far as equilibrium unemployment implications are concerned; this is because 
industry unions negotiating separately will act like non-cooperating players in a 
prisoners’ dilemma game. That is, they will know that none of them has to carry 
full responsibility for the impact excessive union wage claims in the aggregate make 
on the rate o f unemployment and inflation. Given that each of them will know that 
everybody else will think this way and act accordingly, they all are likely to end 
up showing minimum restraint. Also, with demand for an industry’s output being 
less price elastic than for a firm’s (as a consequence o f the lower substitutability 
o f an industry’s output), industry unions have less reason to bother about the 
industry-level employment impact o f their wage claims.
Now, in Hungary today, taking the as yet rudimentary state o f industrial 
relations into consideration ,17 one should be sceptical about the merits o f an ex­
planation of labour market inflexibility that draws too heavily 011 the above argu­
ments. If the differential equilibrium unemployment impacts o f different degrees 
o f corporativity are as claimed, the most one can extract as lessons relevant to 
the Hungarian case are “ifs” . One can only say that, had macro-level tripartite 
negotiations turned out to be more productive, and/or had the implementation of 
some kind o f Western-type income policy (that would have filled the gap the hasty 
elimination of central wage regulation in 1990 had left behind) been tried and found 
effective as a device for moderating wage inflation, etc., then Hungary might have 
tided over the economic transformation at lower costs— i.e. with less restrictive 
economic policies and thus lower job  losses. 18 Similarly, equilibrium unemploy­
ment in the years ahead could in principle be favourably affected by a macro-level 
collective agreement in which the parties would commit themselves to moderate 
wage inflation. Realistically, however, it is exactly the present rudimentary state of 
industrial relations that makes it hard to believe in the feasibility o f such an agree­
ment. Hungary’s strongly divided trade unions, keenly competing for a shrinking 
constituency base, can hardly be expected to enter into such an agreement. Should 
they eventually become resigned to doing it, it would be naive to assume that they 
would really be able to meet the negotiated terms in a consistent way.
2. Similar doubts can be cast on the merits of the oldest (but still quite 
recent) versions o f path dependency arguments (Blanchard and Summers 1986, 
1991) as far as their relevance to Hungary is concerned. True, they start out 
from the assumption that trade unions act as partial representatives o f insider 
Workers’ interests— a kind o f partiality which is clearly manifest in union behaviour 
m Hungary as well. This partiality, however, could produce hysteresis only in so
17For facts which substantiate this unfavourable general assessment see Lado and Toth (1996).
18In his assessment o f the results o f  the much discussed corrective measures o f the Bokros- 
Package, Kornai (1996) himself sees it as a fortunate accident, presumably the consequence o f a 
surprise inflation, that real wages declined considerably in 1995.
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far as our unions were massively involved in wage setting.
As against these early explanations, later interpretations o f this same phe­
nomenon are based on assumptions that do seem directly applicable to the Hun­
garian case. Namely, they assume that either employers are (for good reason or 
not) reluctant to hire from among the long-term unemployed or (if only for this 
reason) the long-term unemployed lack the confidence necessary to effectively com­
pete for jobs, or both. They argue that since increasing unemployment tends 
to increase the incidence o f long-term unemployment— i.e. the proportion o f long­
term unemployment— it causes an upward shift in equilibrium unemployment which 
means an increase in wage inflation at any given level o f total unemployment. 19
True, these latter interpretations also examine wage setting in a collective 
bargaining context. Nevertheless, they may serve as a suitable reference in find­
ing out the causes o f labour market rigidity in Hungary. This is because, in the 
first place, they allow, implicitly at least, for the possibility that, thanks to the 
high proportion o f long-term unemployed in total unemployment, large segments 
o f insider workers remain defended against the unfavourable impacts o f massive 
unemployment— even with the lack o f strong union support. Moreover, their rea­
soning would even account for the kind o f low-employment-equilibrium trap sit­
uation where the disciplinary (i.e. wage-inflation moderating) effect o f an initial 
increase in total unemployment has been more than offset by the sufficiently large 
increase in long-term unemployment it called forth. Yet, what would be essential in 
the adoption o f these interpretations to the Hungarian case is to address the issue 
o f what (presumably institutional) factors determine whether a given (increase in 
the) rate o f unemployment is likely to be associated with larger or smaller (growth 
o f the) incidence o f long-term unemployment.
Finally, according to a third characteristic explanation, the observed depen­
dency o f current rates o f equilibrium unemployment on past rates o f unemployment 
is primarily connected with the fluctuation o f capacity utilisation in the course o f a 
business cycle. (Soskice and Carlin 1989) Namely, with capacity utilisation having 
declined in the initial phase o f a recession, a fall o f investments and an increase 
in capital scrapping are bound to follow— with the result that capital stock will 
shrink. Granting this, when recovery comes it soon leads to an overutilisation of 
the undersized capital stock, with the consequence that price and wage inflation will 
start to accelerate at a relatively low rate of employment (and a correspondingly 
high unemployment rate).
19See Layard and Nickell (1996). Although this line of reasoning appears to differ fundamentally 
from the previous one in its departure, as Lever (1995) pinpoints: depending on how broadly or 
restrictively the notion o f “outsiders” are defined— whether it is meant to refer to the long-term 
(how long?) unemployed only or, more broadly, to the unemployed, or it should embrace non-union 
member employees a n d /or  workers in non-internal labour market jobs as well— can one regard 
the two lines o f  reasoning at theoretically more or less distinct from each other and attem pt to 
decide (possibly with the help o f econom etric analysis) which o f the two fits reality better?
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Given the enormous magnitude o f the reduction o f capital stock that accom­
panied the transformationary recession in Hungary, this argument deserves serious 
consideration. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that hysteresis o f such 
origin, unless the rise o f inflation thus induced is diagnosed incorrectly and sup­
pressed by hastily adopted restrictive economic policy measures, is transitory by 
nature. Moreover, the timely anticipation o f an imminent and fast recovery may 
give impetus to business investments early enough to simultaneously accelerate the 
upswing and prevent an undue transitory rise in inflation.
3. While traces o f the ideas reviewed and reflected upon in the foregoing 
appear incidentally in the study o f the ongoing transformation o f the Hungarian 
labour market, the marked and sudden contraction o f the domain o f internal labour 
markets and its bearing on the prospects o f economic transformation have some­
how remained beyond our range, leaving obvious parallels with market economy 
experience unrecognised and unexploited.
In order to amend this deficit, reference here is made to the marked cor­
respondence that cross-country comparative labour market studies usually reveal 
between the historically established patterns o f coexistence o f internal versus occu­
pational labour markets and certain aspects o f the institutional infrastructure that 
surrounds the labour market (e.g. vocational training, statutes of labour, industrial 
relations, employer and employee attitudes and norms o f behaviour, etc . ) . 20
The instrumentality o f this correspondence becomes obvious in the light o f the 
costs parties to an employment contract— i.e. workers and firms— incur if they ter­
minate their contract: the lower these transaction (separation/replacement) costs, 
the more viable occupational labour markets are.'’ 1 These separation/replacement 
costs are in turn lower, the closer substitute job  offers o f different employers are for 
a worker with a given qualification, and the closer substitute workers with a given
20See especially Eyraud et al. (1990). Also see Hashimoto and Raisian (1988). Schmid (1995) 
and Freeman (1998) are particularly persuasive in their pointing out the importance o f  the recog­
nition o f the way labour institutions fit together for an understanding of their outcomes.
21These costs include the so-called “quasi-fixed” costs o f employment born by employers (i.e. 
costs o f recruitment and selection, direct and indirect costs of training o f newly hired workers, sev­
erance payments, etc.) as well as those direct and indirect costs that workers incur if they change 
their place o f employment (e.g. search costs, reduction in one’s expected life-time earnings, etc.), 
which might be substantial in internal labour markets and negligible in occupational markets. (Oi 
1983.)
Note that equilibrium unemployment is also seen as a function of institutional factors— namely, 
° f  the existence o f severance payment, a characteristic of internal labour markets— in the multiple- 
equilibrium model set up by Saint-Paul (1995) in the spirit o f Blanchard and Summers (1988). In 
that model severance payment has an unfavourable impact on equilibrium unemployment part ly by 
discouraging separations and partly by strengthening the bargaining position o f (insider) workers. 
This gives rise to the conjecture that the first two o f those explanations o f high equilibrium 
unemployment that were discussed above (under the heading o f hysteresis unemployment) overlap 
with the ones that concentrate on the effects o f institutional factors related to the type o f labour 
market.
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qualification are for a firm— i.e. the more standardised the skill-requirements o f a 
given occupation and the actually acquired skills o f workers with a given qualifi­
cation are. The more standardised occupational skills and skill-requirements are, 
the more reasonable it is that occupational skills be acquired in specialised training 
institutions which are obliged to respect the established occupational standards in 
their subject-matters o f instruction, rather than in the form o f on-the-job training. 
Furthermore, under the conditions o f low separation/replacement costs involved 
with highly standardised occupational skills acquired in specialised training insti­
tutions, workers can best promote their interests collectively by forming or joining 
unions that are organised along the lines o f crafts and occupations; they can then 
press for collective agreements that include well-defined job  demarcation lines and 
formal qualification criteria o f admittance that are uniform throughout the econ­
omy.
In contrast, with an internal labour market, a two-pillàr system of voca­
tional training is compatible: basic occupational skills acquired at school are com­
plemented by a large number o f special skills, varying in contents from firm to 
firm, which can only be acquired while working. Given the long duration o f em­
ployment contracts and the strong bearing o f the length o f tenure and on-the- 
job  training on earnings and promotion, workers can best advance their interests 
collectively by forming or joining unions that are organised at the level o f the 
firm (or group of firms within the same branch o f the economy), and by pressing 
for collective agreements that include well-defined and enforceable rules o f hiring, 
firing, and promotion (possibly together with other kinds o f job  property rights 
provisions).
Whether the configuration of the labour market and its institutional infras­
tructure in a given country at a given time is more internal or occupational in its 
nature is the result o f a historic process of institutional evolution. In the course 
o f that process, tensions arising from the perception o f unexploited opportunities 
and/or unfulfilled expectations by workers and firms (e.g. dissatisfaction with each 
other’s attitudes and behaviour, with the performance o f training institutions, with 
the prevailing system o f collective bargaining, and so on) would call forth institu­
tional adjustments that gradually eliminate inappropriate institutional elements. 
Presumably, it is mainly these gradual adjustments that eventually produce a con­
stellation which is largely self-perpetuating (with compatible and mutually reinforc­
ing opportunities and expectations) even amidst extreme swings in the economic 
environment.
The particular equilibrium that such a stable, self-perpetuating institutional 
configuration represents should be respected by labour market policies as well 
(themselves coming within the institutional infrastructure o f the labour market); 
this is especially important given that it constrains the choice o f the effectively 
adaptable set o f policy instruments. Faced with a predominantly internal labour 
market configuration, for instance, active labour market policies should take into
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account the fact that participation in retraining programs cannot procure tenured 
jobs for the prime-aged unemployed, and to the extent this is known to them, they 
may be reluctant to undergo retraining. On the other hand, a configuration in 
which the typically occupational labour markets o f small firms dominate, granting 
wage subsidies to employers hiring from the unemployment pool will not be cost 
efficient either: non-renewable, short-term employment relations and high turnover 
rates will result.
As for the present situation of the Hungarian labour market, it is far from 
any kind of a self-reproducing institutional equilibrium. As a matter o f fact, the 
remarkable advance o f occupational labour markets has not been accommodated 
by the institutional environment. Namely, parallel with the liquidation o f an in­
creasing part o f firms’ apprentice workshops, the kinds o f skills and qualifications 
which can be acquired in vocational training have become ever less transparent 
and standardised— lack o f coordination and supervision has led to an enormous 
inflation o f certificates o f dubious credence and market value.22 Moreover, the fall 
in investments, caused by the recession, by hindering the process o f large-scale re­
placement o f obsolete capacities, has retarded the devaluation o f job-specific skills 
and thus the diminution o f separation costs. Trade union organisation along the 
lines o f crafts and occupations has not gathered momentum either. Finally, while 
the expectations o f the main army o f the unemployed bear the imprints o f their 
earlier internal labour market experience, too many o f the newly trained face, as 
job  applicants, the disheartening experience of distrust towards their qualification 
certificates on the part o f employers.23
Taking established market economies as a reference, the advance o f occupa­
tional labour markets in Hungary in the course o f transformation should thus be 
assessed as an irregular, uneven process. In the period o f transformationary reces­
sion the role o f internal labour markets as employment buffers has been reduced 
(perhaps, even beyond what one would regard as normal in a market economy); 
yet the conditions o f operation o f occupational labour markets have not been cre­
ated (i.e. low separation/replacement costs, that could have effectively moderated 
wage-inflationary pressure by intensifying competition between insider and outsider 
Workers, etc.). Such being the case, active labour market policies (like massive re­
22 To refer back to regular vocational training, what lies behind the category o f “ training not in 
groups” as a form o f  training currently being practised is in large part training in technologically 
obsolete a n d /or narrowly specialised shops in the small-business sector. For this reason alone, 
such training is not appropriate for introducing apprentices to the complexity o f an occupation.
23That those who enter the labour market after com pleting their studies in regular vocational 
Gaining have, nevertheless, relatively good chances to get a jo b  can partly be explained by their 
willingness to accept jobs  that were a n d /or could be filled with unskilled workers. (This explana- 
t'on is suggested in Chapter 5.3 o f  ILO  1997.) It is indeed reasonable to assume that, to the extent 
school a n d /or  qualification certificates are unsound signals of one’s acquired general knowledge 
ftnd/or occupational skills, employers are induced to hire formally overeducated an d /or  overskilled
Workers.
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training programs or generous wage subsidies) have, as a matter of course, not been 
particularly effective either.24
The main lesson to be drawn from our assessment o f the Hungarian situ­
ation is that, assuming occupational labour markets retain their prominence in 
the future, a prerequisite o f the degree o f labour market flexibility and policy 
efficiency necessary for sustainable economic growth is the formation o f an ap­
propriate institutional infrastructure— namely, one that fits and confirms the logic 
o f operation o f occupational labour markets. This could, perhaps, best be pro­
moted immediately in Hungary by redesigning the system of vocational training 
in a way that could yield transparency. The work could start with the specifi­
cation o f the skill-requirements o f occupations and then continue with the elab­
oration o f their standard cores of instruction— these are huge tasks, which can 
only be carried out successfully with government assistance or the involvement 
o f organisations representing workers’ and employers’ collective interests. One 
o f the most important points is that the credibility of qualification certificates 
issued by training institutions has to be reestablished so that the expectations 
o f workers and employers can gradually adjust to the principles o f operation of 
occupational labour markets and in this way the principles will be reinforced by 
fulfilment.
It is true that one could hold the assumption that, facing an institutional 
infrastructure seemingly inconsistent with the logic of operation o f occupational 
labour markets, employers will increasingly resort to building up their own inter­
nal labour markets. The result o f this would be that the present anomalies o f the 
disrupted institutional balance o f the Hungarian labour market would gradually be 
eliminated. Nevertheless, the confrontation between the indications in the equilib­
rium unemployment literature after the oil price shocks and the diagnosis o f the 
overtly excluding character and inflexibility o f the Hungarian labour market, sug­
gests the following: considering the urgency o f a marked reduction o f wage inflation 
as a condition for any sizeable expansion o f waged employment (this latter being in 
turn, as was pointed out, a necessary condition o f small-businesses embarking on 
the road to modernisation), it is the predominance o f occupational labour markets 
that promises a smoother way to economic development.
Yet even accepting the argument that infrastructural institutions (e.g. voca­
tional training, collective bargaining, statues o f labour, expectations o f employers 
and workers, active labour market policies, etc.) should be brought into conformity 
with the operation o f occupational labour markets, one must still pose the question
21 Based on a wide range o f unemployment literature, Falusne Szikra (1991) drew attention to
the important role active labour market policies would have to play in the initial stage o f economic
transformation, and attem pted to specify the main “strike directions” that she believed could be
appropriate under the constraints o f transformation. Yet, her expectations, although moderate 
compared to the views prevailing at that time, turned out to be too ambitious in the light o f later 
experience.
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of whether this would not result in a degree o f institutional homogeneity that, while 
promoting short-term flexibility, endangers long term efficiency.25
True, mutually reinforcing interactions taking place between a dominant type 
o f labour market and an institutional infrastructure that conforms to it are such 
that they have, as a matter o f course, unfavourable impacts on the costs o f operation 
o f the non-dominant type (i.e. they impose excess costs of training, search, collective 
bargaining, etc. on those who would rely on it), thus inhibiting the latter from ever 
becoming predominant. Nevertheless, it can subsist in its non-dominant position 
and thus contribute to the perpetuation o f institutional heterogeneity in so far as 
its comparative advantages are large enough to compensate for these excess costs. 
After all, a firm can benefit from an internal labour market even in an occupational 
type institutional environment inasmuch as certain individual characteristics of 
workers are o f vital importance but can only be learned and/or acquired after 
several years o f service, or as long as a low turnover rate is worth these excess costs 
for some other reasons.
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE IN HUNGARY 
IN THE NINETIES
K. LÂNYI
This study attempts to identify and describe the reasons and tendencies for contem porary 
developments in Hungarian agriculture and to demonstrate that the transformation o f  agricultural 
relations is not complete yet. Therefore, proposals to codify and institutionalise the status quo 
are ab ovo senseless and will do more harm than good. Agricultural programmes (or national 
programmes covering agriculture as well) and policies specifying their goals, instruments and 
schedules must reckon with the fact that they will take effect in an environment o f transformation.
The study includes the following sections: short historical overview with special regard to 
issues relating to economic structure and population; summary o f the m ajor symptom s o f  the 
current crisis in agriculture based on relevant domestic literature; short survey o f the beginnings 
of privatisation in the agricultural sector, a picture o f the present state of the land issue, a record 
o f the recent performance o f  agriculture and o f social and economic policy measures taken so far 
and a few- short and medium-term conclusions.
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Conceptual framework
In general, most international experts consider agricultural transformation 
to be complete once the bulk (e.g. 90 percent) of arable land (and occasionally 
of other farm property) has been transferred to private ownership. (Lukas 1997) 
Many Hungarian analysts already speak o f what they call “consolidation” after the 
initial crisis brought about by the transformation. 1
Hungarian policy-makers have drawn up medium- and longer term moderni­
sation programmes (Magyarország... 1995); the previous government published 
the main principles o f the National Agricultural Programme (NAP  1997) in 1997 
and, at the end o f the same year, Parliament passed an act o f the development of 
agriculture.2 EU accession negotiations are beginning in the near future, and tech­
nical and organisational requirements concerning legal harmonisation and many 
other issues, need to be resolved if progress is to be made at the negotiations. 
Moreover, the rules o f international trade in agricultural produce approved by the
*This study was prepared as a background paper for KOPINT-DATORG C o.’s medium-term 
forecast, with preliminary research being supported by KOPIN T-D ATO RG ’s Econom ic Research 
Foundation. The author would like to thank Imre Fertő for having called her attention, after 
having read the first version o f  the manuscript, to seven essential sources. Any omissions are, o f 
course, the responsibility o f  the author.
! The relevant programme referred to in the next is Földművelésügyi... (1997)
21997. évi CXIV. törvény az agrárgazdaság fejlesztéséről (A ct CXIV o f  1997 on the development 
agrarian econom y). Magyar K özlöny , No. 102., 1997, pp. 7273-7275.
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World Trade Organisation o f the United Nations— W TO — (on customs, and ac­
ceptable instruments o f market protection and subsidies) are also known; this is 
also true o f the ways and means used by OECD Member States to abide to them; 
finally, we also know that the world and the international financial institutions ex­
pect the transition economies to show growth (by around 5 percent of the GDP 
annually) in the next few years. Numerically, these would allow the current Hun­
garian agricultural output to be doubled. Since no external constraints implying 
serious hindrances are in sight, we could, in principle, draw up a forecast on the 
basis o f the above.
The main reason why this has not been done is that, as has happened several 
times in the 20th century, (and in the 19th, too) domestic relations in agriculture 
have turned into a battleground for acute and intensifying social tensions. The 
present problems have been going on now for almost 15 years. This tension is 
rather extensive in the sense that it affects a substantial part— i.e. almost half— of 
the population o f the country; since these tensions do not have their origins in 
agriculture alone, no reassuring solution can be found within a solely agricultural 
framework. So strong are the tensions that they deprive any specific agricultural 
programme o f meaning and they can even be regarded as obstacles to Hungary’s 
accession to the European Union. This issue will be returned to later on, but it 
should be noted in advance that the crucial problem is that social groups who 
are opposed to each other cannot or will not participate in these programmes (or, 
at best, would only like to use individual elements included in them, and only 
in mutually exclusive ways). Therefore the present agricultural structure, while 
reflecting actual power relations despite the ongoing process o f transition, would 
be difficult to reconcile with that o f the European Union. (Fertő 1997)
Historical overview
In Hungary, the same set o f development symptoms affecting economy and 
society in quasi-identical ways has recurred time and again over the last hundred- 
and-fifty years. The main structural elements o f this complex situation are land 
shortage and rural over-population; underlying this problem, at the level o f eco­
nomic structure, there is insufficient demand for industrial activities and services 
on the input side, and on the output side a low demand for the processing and sales 
o f agricultural products. Typical concomitants o f the above are shortage o f capital 
in agriculture and contraction and swelling o f poverty in villages. All these are on 
such a scale that they prevent the rapid progress o f overall economic development. 
Moreover, surplus labour originating in agriculture cannot be absorbed (which is 
also a problem for villages in general).
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In the first half o f the 19th century Hungary could still be qualified as a 
purely agricultural country (with 75 to 80 percent o f the total population working 
in agriculture); furthermore, its economy was characterised mainly by bounded 
labour (corvee) and other compulsory services for peasants with respect to the 
estates o f the nobility. The abolition o f feudal charges (proclaimed in 1848) was 
finally codified in the imperial edicts o f 1853, on the basis o f the more-than-a- 
hundred-year-old socage settlement of 1760. The latter had been designed for a 
completely different population and different economic relations (and even at that 
time it had certain intentional distortions). The surveying of land only began in 
1856, the end o f the process left approximately half o f the former estates’ labourers 
without land o f their own. The last legal hope related to the status o f former 
manor cotters was blocked by an act of 1896. However, legal disputes concerning 
land distribution were still going on as late as 1912; the last procedural order was 
completed in the summer o f 1914 (although its announcement was prevented by 
the break-out o f World War I).
After a lost war, revolutions and the Trianon Peace Treaty, approximately 
one quarter of the Hungarian population consisted of farm servants (resident estate 
workers), landless villagers and their family members, and another 10 to 12 percent 
of owners (tenants) with plots of under 5 “hold” (i.e. 2.9 hectares). Such plots were 
not sufficient for subsistence. The land reform o f 1920 allocated land to some 300 
thousand landless workers and dwarf holders (with another 110 thousand cases 
affecting other categories). With this reform, the 35 percent o f the population 
living from agricultural subsistence remained almost unchanged until World War II. 
(The Upper House approved a seriously trimmed version of Pal Teleki’s extremely 
moderate 1939 Bill concerning the redemption or leasehold of a total o f 1.4 million 
cadastral “hold” (about 0 .8  million hectares) over a period of ten years, but this 
was not implemented.)
Land reform in 1945 brought about three major changes: it gave land to ap­
proximately half o f the farm servants (i.e. approximately 110 thousand individuals) 
and more than half o f the landless agricultural labourers (approximately 261 thou­
sand), and also to another 247 thousand dwarf and smallholders (whose average 
family plots were already 2.9 ha). The reform created around about 400 thousand 
new farms. (Farm servants received the biggest plots.) Even so, the reform failed 
to satisfy at least some 90 thousand claimants and their families.
In spite o f the above state o f affairs, the stubborn hunger for land, and rural 
over-population, major social conflicts were rare. There was always some external 
circumstance— related to economic or other trends— to conceal the signs o f under­
lying tensions.
From the 1850s to the 1880s unskilled village labour was absorbed by the 
'exceptional boom  brought about by infrastructural development (e.g. railway and 
road construction, and regulation o f riverways; here they worked as navvies). Once 
this process was over (and under the impact o f other circumstances such as the en­
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try of cheap American grain and the decline in wages in agriculture), agricultural 
movements immediately gathered strength and occasionally their actions resulted 
in serious clashes; yet even these were cushioned by the possibility o f emigration 
to America. It was only after the war, when that escape route had also closed 
down, that the 1920 land reform— much more modest in scale than correspond­
ing ones in neighbouring countries— was implemented. Visible poverty began to 
disappear. (One million landless people— labourers and their families— were left in 
villages and on their outskirts. The 600 thousand servant population living in semi- 
feudal manorial settlements and in estate-administered communities disappeared 
completely.)
After the second land reform, a “class struggle” was artificially generated 
in the villages; there were allocations and re-allocations o f farm plots, as well as 
repeated entries to and exits from co-operatives. These shorter or longer periods of 
flight from the villages nevertheless gave the landless and the very poor some means 
o f existence until the consolidation o f large-scale farming (which took place after 
1958-60). The large-scale farming system covered (as a “historical maximum” ) 6 
million hectares at the peak o f its existence. Some 860 thousand people (and partly 
their family members) found permanent or almost permanent working possibilities 
(although, in most cases, the plots were insufficient for subsistence).
Another method also evolved to alleviate the damaging impacts o f land- 
hunger and rural overpopulation. Paradoxically, this consisted o f the allotment 
and, later on, under the socialist regime, the leaving behind, o f land o f a mini­
mum size; under the 1920 land reform and the 1936 Settlement Act approximately 
300 thousand families received a building plot (i.e. sufficient exclusively for build­
ing). However, the plot usually included a piece o f land sufficient in size to use as 
farmyard or kitchen garden. Hence by the time the war broke out, some 2 million 
families had landed property o f some sort, although the number of registered farms 
hardly exceeded 1.5 million.
The same scenario recurred at the time o f the land reform o f 1945-46: 347 
thousand people were allotted a building-plot (150 thousand exclusively for build­
ing). The plots were around 1,700 m 2 on average.
Finally, at the time o f the last phase o f collectivisation (1958-60) there were 
again plots o f land that did not have to be brought into the cooperative. Firstly, 
there were the remaining private farms. Although these had contracted to less than 
one quarter o f their original size over a period o f years, new owners o f lost private 
land were already operating under the title: “complementary farm plots o f workers 
and employees” , or as “area taken out of cultivation” . This category included some 
0.5 million hectares. The major segment o f land owned by so-called “specialised 
co-operatives” (these were stable, each with around 70 to 80 thousand ha since 
the end o f the seventies) also remained in private ownership. Thus they were in 
the same category as minor plots o f land (e.g. vineyards, orchards, small isolated 
plots) not claimed by the co-operatives (and registered statistically as “household
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plots” ); o f course, land going with the building plot came into this category. The 
number o f building plots must have increased (by hundreds of thousands by the 
end o f the eighties) owing to the intensive parcellisation efforts o f state enterprises 
(farms) and co-operatives in the seventies and eighties.
As a paradoxical result o f nationalisation/collectivisation, about two-third 
o f households (some 2.3 to 2.5 million consisting o f persons representing all cate­
gories by place o f residence, occupation and social status) acquired/retained what 
was mostly land of a minimum size. This fact made it impossible to predict by 
standard economic and sociologic reasoning which group(s) in which region would 
suddenly feel an urge to add a bigger or indeed very big piece of land to their small 
plots.3 Reality has demonstrated exactly that: loud predictions have been dis­
proved, without exception, during the actual course o f the privatisation o f landed 
property.
Crisis of the Hungarian agricultural system
The opinions o f experts concerning the crisis o f the agricultural system in 
Hungary are polarised by two factors. The first is a chronological one: did the crisis 
precede the change of the political and economic system, or was it triggered by the 
latter. In other words, did the former system arrive at a crisis on its own, or was 
its disintegration due to transition politics? In the latter case, was it the policies of 
the first government which led to crisis, or did the second exacerbate the situation? 
The second factor is methodological in nature and relates to whether the causes and 
consequences o f the crisis can be described in purely economic (market economic) 
terms, or whether social movements are equally important (perhaps essential) for 
understanding them.
Those experts who claim that the symptoms of—economic— crisis were ev­
ident in agriculture in the eighties draw attention to certain phenomena. Given 
the escalation o f their cost and sales problems on both the internal and external 
markets, large-scale producers (i.e. state farms cultivating thousands o f hectares 
and production co-operatives working the fields o f several villages) could only sur­
vive by expanding production. Relying mainly on wage labour, and constituting 
the base o f the agricultural system these units had to reduce their product mix 
and produce an ever smaller range o f mass products (thus they had produce only 
one type o f corn, or fodder, or livestock). The other land became the basis for 
Private farms (mainly dwarf holdings). As a result, however, they became ever 
more prone to fluctuations in economic trends. In the eighties, business relations
3 According to Pál Juhász’s observation: “With the general spread of the dual system of large- 
scale farming and household or complementary farms, the scope for family enterprise narrowed, 
' ,ut this narrower scope became accessible to practically all” . ( Juhász 1987, p. 15)
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between big and small farms— which could have reduced the exposure of the big 
ones— also started to disintegrate. Big farms intensified their industrial activities 
and services— i.e. non-agricultural complementary activities. However, this has not 
provided a lasting solution.
The agricultural product structure and the technology o f big farms was ex­
tremely capital-intensive and their revenues did not ensure appropriate returns on 
capital invested. Machinery and equipment purchased originally with state subsi­
dies could no longer be renewed/upgraded in the eighties. Price revenues lagged 
more and more behind expenditures and the maintenance of technologies selected 
earlier (e.g. sowing seed, fertilisers, plant protection, pedigree stock, irrigation) 
were increasingly difficult to maintain. Monetary restriction from the eighties on­
wards also hit agriculture: subsidies declined while requirements increased. With 
the introduction o f the two-tier banking system in 1987 and the brutal credit pol­
icy implemented by banks with respect to food industrial companies, the chronic 
current asset shortage o f big plants was made obvious. Also obvious was their total 
exposition— given the absence o f state intervention (i.e. co-ordination, as in every 
plan economy)— to the (at that time, still state-owned) procurement, processing 
and exporter monopolies. Their fixed and current assets both started to decline in 
the last years o f the decade. After a few years’ stagnation (only prevented from 
turning into decline due to the performance o f complementary branches) during
1989 and 1990, both their gross output and sales decreased.
Quasi-unanimous agreement, however, ignored the presence o f the above phe­
nomena, and gave way to debates as to whether they were rooted in the system 
itself (implying, potentially, the aggravation o f crisis phenomena and open crisis); 
or, could the gradual reforms implemented on established bases (meaning, first of 
all, units o f large-scale farming) be expected to lead to a market-type, adaptable 
system o f agriculture. Advocates o f the latter standpoint demanded an actual raise 
in the level o f central— cash— subsidies.
Those who considered the unfolding crisis to be systemic referred to the fol­
lowing decisive traits o f the agricultural system: extremely polarised farm structure4 
with capital-wasting big farms monopolising land use at one extreme, and labour- 
wasting small farms unsuited for modern vertical co-ordination at the other; yet 
both cases were characterised by a lack o f direct access to mechanisms for coordi­
nating the activity o f farms with that o f the monopolies supplying the inputs o f the 
latter and procuring, processing and selling their output while, at the same time,
4 Named “dual” by, am ong others, the author o f a World Bank study, although this was not 
the case in reality. Despite the mediation o f a multitude o f different artificial transmissions, 
procurements by both farm types originated from the same sources and their products travelled 
through identical or similar sales channels to markets o f identical or quasi-identical types. In a dual 
economy, the two farm types are disjunct with respect to their procurements and sales markets as 
well, or one is characterised by pure subsistence or natural farming and product exchange without 
cash. These variants are now starting to emerge in Hungary.
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operating separately; they had defective and often distorted market contacts, with 
little or no information at all). There were no procedures for tracking and moni­
toring the progress o f their products through market channels. Activity-financing 
and price-setting issues were beyond their decision-making competence or indeed 
their bargaining power. Interest representation was not properly established and 
at best only powerful groups among them could lobby.
The above-listed components of the agricultural system were organised and 
interlinked in such a way that the system was simple, transparent and easy to man­
age for those on top o f the decision-making pyramid. In other words, Hungarian 
agriculture like that o f the other former socialist countries, operated with an East 
European, instead o f an American or West European, version o f vertical coordi­
nation (or, to use a more common phrase, vertical integration). In the socialist 
version, the prime integrator was the state.
It follows directly from the above that products manufactured in the frame­
work o f integration had to be made, preferably, at farms identical in type and size, 
using the same technology and producing in similar quantities the smallest number 
o f product types possible. The other main consequence was that products had to 
go through a process which was inevitably disintegrated in an economic sense thus 
could only be coordinated by the state. In such circumstances, the most appropri­
ate, and often only buyer’s market was the market o f the socialist countries, with 
the Soviet Union in the first place. This organisational and institutional system 
has been chronically unable to respond to signals emitted by the western markets 
(or by domestic market, for that matter), and to communicate them effectively and 
efficiently to the primary producer.
Inevitably, even small fluctuations in the buying capacity o f socialist markets 
shook the very foundations o f the domestic agricultural system. In the end (well 
before the disintegration o f COMECON), after the 1984 COMECON Summit, Hun­
gary was obliged to deliver much larger quantities o f foodstuffs, especially grains 
and meat, to the Soviet Union than before (and at extremely low rouble prices). Ex­
port subsidies for grains and meat exports bought with the rouble reached between 
150-375 percent. Moreover, the Soviet Union simultaneously reduced its earlier 
free-currency purchases; yet, satisfying escalating Soviet demand also meant that 
Hungary’s exports to the West were reduced. As a result, the respective deficits of 
the trade balance and the budget increased, and the revenues o f large-scale farms 
decreased. The latter could no longer expand their output, but neither did they 
have the funds required change over to a new production structure.
Another interesting, but hardly foreseeable, feature of the given agricultural 
structure was that, at the enterprise level, it could simply not adapt at all to the 
gradual reforms taking place in its economic environment (especially if the latter 
implied a weakening o f state coordination). The gradual liberalisation o f trade and 
Prices in the second half o f the eighties, and the elimination and dismembering 
° f  monopolies (trusts) was concurrent in every case either with the disruption of
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familiar partnership relations, or the unilateral (and unremediable) exposition o f 
big farms to new or unknown market actors. All this occurred well before the big 
wave o f transformations, liquidations and bankruptcies had cleared the way for 
finding new partners.
When the crisis became open, big farms (co-operatives) either liquidated their 
complementary branches or the latter simply broke away from them. Other circum­
stances, perceptible from the mid-eighties on, included a decline in employment and 
a reduction in the cooperation with small farms (or at least the disappearance of 
previous forms of co-operation). Land tenancy instead of household plots (or wage 
supplementing plots) became the order o f the day; many cooperatives liquidated 
their trading branches based on micro-producers; instead they subcontracted part 
o f their producing activities to their members (KSH  1990; Molnár and Szabóné 
Medgyesi 1991) The presence of subcontractors obviously modified social relations 
within big farms: between those remaining with the farm and those leaving it ei­
ther voluntarily or under some constraint, and also the interrelationship between 
the afore-mentioned groups and the rest o f the village population. The study pre­
pared for the Presidium of the Hungarian Academy o f Sciences (Sipos and Halmai 
1993) mentions as potential sources o f social conflict the embryonic state o f interest 
representation for different groups and other parties; regardless o f the state o f the 
former, there were no interest reconciliation institutions anyway; the legitimacy of 
big-farm leaders was weak and this created a lack of confidence among the manag­
ing groups. At other places there was evidence o f the increasingly rigid managerial 
hierarchy o f co-operatives, the shameful living and working conditions of those liv­
ing at settlements in certain state farms, and the miserable situation o f those forced 
to be free labour but unable to find employment in co-operatives and state farms 
alike.
The above developments mainly occurred prior to the maturing o f the open 
crisis o f the agrarian system, o f agricultural production and employment. Open 
crisis actually brought a single new element to the surface and this is referred to 
as the land issue below. This soon became the crucial issue o f transformation in 
provincial Hungary. The overall economic environment also began its descent into 
depression and this accelerated the process o f agricultural decline: the nadir (as it 
stands today) shows that agricultural output has declined by 45 percent— compared 
to the first half o f the eighties— and more than half a million jobs have been lost 
in agriculture.
Beginnings of privatisation in agriculture
Initial privatisation measures relied on the conceptual/theoretical model of 
the “two-level co-operative” ; this was realised in practice somewhat imperfectly in
Acta Oeconomica 50, 1999
K. LÁNYI: THE TRANSFORM ATION OF AGRICULTURE 127
the form o f co-operatives or state farms operating as holdings (or something called 
a holding) for some time after the systemic change.5
Judging from various sources, however, mainstream privatisation ought to 
have meant the transformation o f big farms, with all their landed and other prop­
erty, into joint stock or limited liability companies. This would have left the way 
open for members o f the (old or new) management to become independent.6
By 1988-89, bigger co-operatives had already shed their former territory 
and/or their branch-based, two-level labour management system, and also their 
policy o f incentives originating in basically undifferentiated wages (by branches). 
As a result, 8 to 15 organisational units emerged from each co-operative (employing 
an average staff o f 20 to 30); these were organised mainly according to branches.7 
Many o f the smaller units became semi-independent, (i.e. self-accounting), and by
1990 the majority (albeit few among those pursuing agriculture as a core activity) 
had a bank account o f their own. New organisational units hence quickly turned 
into independent small enterprises contributing some 30 percent of the price rev­
enues o f co-operatives, and accounting for a similar share of employment there.
In the eighties so-called in-company partnerships, specialized groups, “lump­
sum” accounting sections and other, lease- or contract-based organisations mush­
roomed in agricultural co-operatives, the same as in industry. From 1988 on, in 
accordance with the Companies Act, these could be considered autonomous com­
panies, and it also occurred in numerous cases that the co-operative itself formed 
a company on part o f its property. Moreover, co-operatives were entitled, already 
prior to 1988, to take part in so-called associations with other co-operatives or state 
farms (e.g. “gestor” farms— that is, farms responsible for the introduction and run­
ning of specific production systems), other state enterprises, banks or private com­
panies. From 1989 on, the associations in question were allowed to transform into 
companies with co-operatives as potential members. These entities became popu­
5The two-level co-operative model was designed by the economists o f the Research Institute 
for Co-operatives in the eighties. ( Gaál 1990) It was one or another variant o f the same that was 
quoted, most frequently by economists, at the 1988 Kiskunmajsa Conference as well. According 
to Pál Juhász’s initial debate lecture, “ co-operative and state farm centres are gradually trans­
forming into financial institutions for  enterprise management— instead of the dismembering of 
co-operatives.” (Italics in the original K. L.) ( Halász 1989, p. 5)
6The conceptions in question were based on Act XIII o f 1989 (the so-called Transformation 
Act), at least as far as co-operatives were concerned. A subsequent amendment imposed a mora­
torium on the sales o f real property and suspended the transformation of co-operatives into com ­
panies. A ct II (the so-called Transition Act) attached to Act 1 of 1992 (the Association Act) 
obliged co-operatives to begin transformation anew (to prevent them becoming companies in the 
nieantime). An amendment dating from spring 1994 prohibited cultivated land, apported by land 
owners, from being turned into a company form as an asset.
'Source o f facts and data hereafter: Molnár and Szabóné Medgyesi (1991). The authors 
Investigated 128 co-operatives, 66 o f which had switched (up to 1989) to the so-called advanced 
lr,centive system.
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lar capital investment targets for co-operatives, which invested 9 percent o f their 
assets in this way (while no capital replacement took place at co-operative farms). 
Half o f the capital so placed went to join stock and limited liability companies, the 
other half to limited ( “deposit” ) partnerships. It seems likely that part (perhaps a 
major part) o f the capital invested in this way was lost in the early nineties.
Land statistics also provide evidence showing the extent o f gradual and ac­
celerating privatisation. In the first half o f the eighties, land acquisition by private 
individuals essentially took the form o f re-qualification and parcellisation o f the 
landed property o f co-operatives.
Land purchase (up to the 3 ha limit) and sales (by co-operatives) was liber­
alised in 1988 only, and sales and subcontracting by lease affected, annually, only 
3 to 4 percent o f the total co-operative land area. In 1989, however, some co­
operatives were already selling lots o f 50 to 100 hectares, at an astonishingly low 
price of HUF 1,300 to 1,800 per hectare, while the lease was HUF 1,500 for grass 
and around 10 ,00 0  for plantation, and the price o f smaller pieces of land amounted 
10 to 30 times the lease. Prices o f subcontracted areas approximated farm rents. 
According to several sources land taken out by co-operative members withdrawing 
in early 1990 did not exceed 105 thousand hectares, and the total area o f individual 
farms grew very slightly, by a total o f 34 thousand hectares only. Thus it can be 
presumed that part o f the 170 thousand hectares growth registered under the head­
ing o f “complementary farm plots” in 1989 to 1990 also originated from sales or 
subcontracting. Moreover, land leased out by co-operatives to individuals totalled 
26 thousand hectares in 1981, 134 thousand in 1986, 232 thousand in 1989 and 349 
thousand in 1990. (KSH 1990)
Parallel with the above, the membership o f agricultural production co-opera­
tives, especially the number of active members, underwent a drastic decline. At 
the beginning, the main reason for this was not the high number o f exits, but the 
exodus to the (semi-)private economy motivated by the higher incomes to be gained 
there or due to the lack o f work at the original work place.
State farms also made attempts to lease or subcontract land in the eighties, 
and the signs are that their total land area also diminished. The method o f their 
privatisation was more akin to that o f state enterprises: the original plan was to 
leave the most important parts of 28 farms (the original number o f 20  was first 
raised to 25 and then to 28) in state ownership to allow them to fulfil their current 
role in education, research, improvement and the propagation o f new technologies, 
or their prospective role in vertical integration. It was mandatory for all o f them 
to transform into companies and laggards could only do so without landed prop­
erty. Half, or somewhat more o f their former landed property remained in state 
ownership and it is only now that it is being leased. In the first round, units— 
e.g. industrial plants, service providers— detachable from the farm, and machinery, 
equipment and real estate superfluous for future operation had to be offered for 
sale at estimated asset value according to the relevant regulations o f the State
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Property Agency. Proceeds went toward paying off debts accumulated over the 
previous years. The items in question were sold at a loss and with partial success 
only. Then came agricultural production plants and units thereof unclaimed by the 
state. (To that effect, companies had to be taken to pieces: this is what was called 
“decentralised privatisation” .) The least is known about the new owners o f these 
units (apart from occasional cases of ESOP and management buy-out). However, 
the press has frequently dealt with cases of livestock farms cut off from fodder cul­
tivation areas by landed area marked off for compensation or by persons eligible 
for compensation but prevented from acquiring land by privatisation (or long-term 
lease contracts). Large-scale privatisation (including the transfer to minority own­
ers o f the property o f companies market out for permanent state ownership) began 
in the next round only. 44 o f the 97 companies put up for sale were sold, and 36 
were under liquidation/final settlement at the end o f 1995. (Fertő and Mohácsi 
1993; Czárlné Ivanics, Szabó and Tassy 1996; Papócsi 1993)
In summary, since 1988, options for so-called spontaneous privatisation (and 
later on self-privatisation at state farms), identical in nature to those in commerce 
and industry, have opened in agriculture as well. There have been a few extreme and 
unrealistic efforts for instance, to limit agricultural entrepreneurs operating other 
than large-scale production from conducting business on rented farms only, or to 
limit co-operatives to the leasing activity of manager-proprietors. Apart from these 
examples by 1992 it had become obvious that if trends inherited from the eighties 
persisted, it would be impossible to restore the predominance o f private ownership 
in agriculture by a land reform similar to those implemented in the neighbouring 
countries. Therefore it was essential to avoid depriving of their property rights 
peasants who formally retained title to land that had earlier passed into a co­
operative. (Such members o f co-operatives would have received stocks/shares in 
exchange for land if such land was transferred to a joint-stock or limited liability 
company and their names as landowners would have been cancelled from the land 
register.) This, no doubt, was done due to political considerations, rather than 
economic or social ones. However, its consequences have brought to the surface 
conflicts o f interest originating basically from the fact that Parliament and the new 
government (i.e. the Antall-Boross government) postponed the passing o f several 
acts and regulations. As a result, parallel with the delay (and procrastination) of 
the other politically motivated reforms, compensation (Fertő and Mohácsi 1996a) 
and privatisation proceeded for two years in a direction incompatible with a real 
Political (ownership) caesura,8
8Taking Gyula Teller's precisely developed ownership theory as a basis, a few years after 
the uniform proprietary class—-i.e. the party-state hierarchy— had managed to swallow different 
types o f co-operative property completely, under the acts o f 1967 and 1970, and with the regime 
° f  the new econom ic mechanism, it delegated part o f the proprietary decisions to co-operative 
leaders. Compromise with co-operative memberships striving for a middle-class type o f existence 
also made it possible for skilled and independence-oriented management to operate a big part of
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Act I o f 1992 (the Association Act) nevertheless signified a compromise in 
that it did not include, and did not intend to support, any time-tested histori­
cal variant o f co-operation based on family enterprise or any association o f small 
producers (nor, indeed, any working co-operative o f members possessing landed 
property). Such forms would have made it easier to adjust to the forms of produc­
ers’ associations found in the European Union .9
Act II o f 1992, the Transition Act, on the other hand, tried to give a time 
preference to long-term land users, to registered owners o f co-operative landed 
property still in private ownership (nearly 2 million hectares) and to those eligible 
for compensation. This time enabled them to assert their lawful claims relating 
to landed, and to a smaller extent other, property against other claimants. It also 
attempted to persuade them to think their decision over in case they wanted to 
join a corporation. Furthermore, it wanted to give priority to small proprietors 
by providing an opportunity for those exiting with landed property to acquire 
other property shares for a short period o f time. All this, however, had its price— 
namely, the division into two (for a long time and at the procedural level as well) 
o f the privatisation o f landed, and other types o f property at co-operatives. Such a 
division obviously hindered the realisation o f the plans o f managers hoping to set 
up bigger private farms; it was also an obstruction to those intending to attract 
foreign capital, either in the form o f capital investment companies or large-scale 
agricultural production based on wage labour. In fact, for some time, the last 
option was the only available one (apart from a few cases o f renting and service 
provision as a side activity), although this went on without the entry o f foreign 
capital. (This is what state capital allocation and other forms o f subsidies have 
been meant to replace ever since.) The method o f privatisation o f co-operative 
lands clearly signifies a diversion for managers, compared to their original plans.
co-operative property as capital, and in due time to transform it into its private property (in an 
individual or corporate form ). In the eighties, assets and decision-making competences which had 
been centralised earlier were re-distributed by the absolute owner to the county, town or village 
level. As a result, co-operative managers, whether in industry or agriculture, did not have to share 
with former members o f the party-state hierarchy when the political and econom ic transformation 
began. Expropriation was easiest if the co-operative form itself was liquidated, and this, in turn, 
was easiest if the m ajority o f members could be “shaken o ff” . In spite o f that, co-operatives 
continued to exist in many places. This was especially due to the will o f the members themselves 
who believed that they had a better chance to fight for their property from within and in the 
framework o f  the co-operative. (Teller 1994)
9In holdings or holding-type co-operatives, production activities and material services are or­
ganised under companies/partnerships where employees and managers qualify as active members 
(i.e. if they are members they have a property share or some other property quota/business share 
in the co-operative). Members pursuing independent production on their own land by founding 
a farming co-operative, or one based on the shared use o f machinery but relying on the services 
o f the co-operative with respect to sales or other functions, do not qualify as active m em bers 
(Phare 1995, p. 12)
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The land and those who cultivate it
Since 1990, every country in the region has implemented or launched a land 
reform o f some sort (although in Hungary, for instance, the phrase itself has not 
been uttered once). ( Csáki 1994; Fertő 1994a) The trend and prospective final 
results o f the respective land reforms show many parallels with those in East Asia 
or Latin America, (de Janvry 1981; Yujiro Hay ami 1991) That is to say, that 
their final goal is the establishment of a— capitalist— large-scale export sector (to 
be integrated, if possible, into international agri-business). The policy-makers of 
most countries regard a village middle stratum with peasant- or entrepreneurial- 
type farms as desirable, but not indispensable. They would also accept the survival 
of a large number o f what are, effectively, part-time farms (whether producing for 
the market or satisfying subsistence needs only).
By way o f illustration, it is worth quoting a few paragraphs o f the agricul­
tural programme which supplements the 1991-1994 economic programme o f the 
Hungarian government: 10
“The Government intends that larger-scale co-operative, private and state 
enterprises should produce the bulk o f agricultural output in the emerging new 
agricultural structure. Therefore, it will take action against the unjustified fragmen­
tation o f holdings, and provide active support to the emergence o f landed property 
of a sufficient size to make competitive agricultural production feasible.” (pp. 8-9.)
“The process includes the formation o f family farms based on private property 
or leasehold... Individual units operating within the co-operative framework will 
be transformed into companies... Activities that can be performed individually or 
*n a small-farm framework will break away from co-operatives... The future fate o f 
what will emerge as large-scale production branches will be defined by real owners 
according to criteria o f economic efficiency and profitability.” (p. 1 0 .)
“We expect the number o f first-job-holder entrepreneurs to undergo signif­
ian t growth ... the economic background o f the enterprise boom ... will be en­
sured by providing support to new agricultural enterprises starting operation now” 
(p. 23.).
In reality, however, no real plans were made to promote the development 
° f  the above-mentioned middle stratum, nor to provide interest representation to 
dwarf farms and deploy the procurement, sales and other infrastructures needed 
by them. Furthermore, no facilities have been created to provide vocational and 
business training for their staff. Pledges concerning the factors just mentioned soon 
disappeared from consecutive general economic and agricultural programmes; only 
recently have suggestions started to re-appear and these only indicate prospects
10 1'he relevant econom ic programme was the so-called Kupa Programme (1991 ) The agricultural 
g r a m m e  in question is “Government agricultural policy and programme” , (Földművelésügyi... 
1991)
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for very small steps. The raison d ’être and survival o f so-called part-time farms 
(i.e. farm units operated by second job  holders) was only codified under the Act 
on Agriculture o f 1997. The combination of half-hearted land reform, digression 
from announced programmes and delay in the perception o f the resulting situation 
is not just a Hungarian speciality: it is typical o f the whole East Central European 
region. 11
Except for part o f Church property, in Hungary no privatisation took the 
form of restitution, and the majority o f land was distributed in the framework of 
property compensation .12
There are at least two practical reasons for this situation. Firstly, both state 
farms and co-operatives cultivated land owned by the state and were acquired, ac­
cording to the nullity acts, unlawfully or under some constraint imposed on previous 
owners. Secondly: land-owner entrants to co-operatives established in 1958-1960 
(and earlier as well) retained cadastral ownership o f their landed property and re­
ceived a minimum amount o f land rent from it. From 1968 on, co-operatives began 
gradually to redeem (at token payments) half o f the total o f approximately 4 mil­
lion hectares o f members’ land (although they have still not got round to the other 
half) . 13 The Compensation Act ensured the restoration o f the proprietary status 
(not the property itself) o f the two groups o f former owners.
Given the mushrooming o f private and semi-private enterprises based on 
landed property (owned by co-operatives among other things), land allocation to 
private operators preceded the satisfaction of similar claims by those eligible for 
compensation.
Accordingly, a pre-emptive right was granted to members o f specialised co­
operative groups with respect to co-operative land used permanently, to leasehold­
ers and to persons using their redeemed land on a long-term basis (provided that 
the legal title in question had existed for at least five years).
It was only after the above process that co-operatives had to mark off dif­
ferent land funds— first that of members/pensioner members (occasionally former 
members and their heirs) who still had land in their own names (the so-called 
quota owners). Landless members and employees were to receive land worth 30
11 For a detailed panorama cf.: Csáki and Lerman (1997)
12Compensation for lost property and land acquisition within it was inseparably intertwined 
with political com pensation and, at the same time, became subject to every conceivable form of 
business manipulation, to the detriment o f those having suffered political or ethnic prosecution. 
(Fertő and Mohácsi 1996a).
13Redemption was still going on in 1989. Redeemed land (including part o f land in state 
ownership) constituted the so-called undivided land property o f  co-operatives. (In 1967 only one 
thousandth— i.e. some 5000 hectares o f the land they used— was their own property.) Landed 
property o f persons in retirement, o f those who had left the co-operative or who had died was 
subject to redemption; this was the same as land owned by every member o f a co-operative 
terminated by liquidation or merger.
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and 20 gold crowns (G C ) 14 to compensate them for the loss o f household or wages- 
supplementing plots. Then came the demarcation o f compensation land to be put 
up for auction, under the Transition Act. If land offered for compensation was not 
sufficient, a part equivalent to one quarter o f the compensation land fund had t.o 
be marked off from landed property owned by state farms. (The Compensation 
Act preceded the Transition Act, so in practice co-operatives were the first to be 
involved in identifying compensation land areas.)
State-owned landed property held by co-operatives was either transferred to 
the compensation land fund or had to be handed over to the municipality. At the 
same time, no private-owned (privately used) landed property could be marked off 
for auction.
Even if the above takes place in an orderly fashion, if the land issuer and 
reconciliation committees do not dissolve without completing their task (some of 
them did this), if auctions actually take place (not all o f them did) and if complaint 
cases are settled (there are still unsettled cases), the future owner is still only at 
the point o f having a certain GC value registered under his/her name in connection 
with a given part o f the fields. Should the owner wish so, he or she can, in principle, 
have the plot in question surveyed and staked off, and take it out. (Surveys have 
been made on preferential terms up to a certain deadline.)
Co-operatives marked off 814 thousand hectares o f land for their members and 
employees, 764 thousand hectares for quota holders and 1,806 thousand hectares for 
those eligible for compensation. (Ferto 1994b) To these were added 475 thousand 
hectares o f land marked off by state farms for compensation purposes. ( Takdcs 
1995) That is to say, the aggregate land area to be distributed was around 3.86 
million hectares in 1991-1992. The quantity o f land marked off for members and 
employees corresponded approximately to their number, but that designated for 
quota holders was surprisingly small compared to their almost 2 million hectares 
° f  landed property in co-operatives according to the relevant 1989 statistics.
Consequently, real ownership relations were to take shape only later on, 
through the acquisition o f the right of disposal and/or through property concen­
tration; these processes usually involve several steps.
In order to obtain a realistic picture of the initial situation one should know 
that, o f a total o f 8 .2  million hectares o f cultivated land (including forests), and of 
6-4 million hectares (1991) o f land under agricultural cultivation, approximately 70 
Percent and more than 80 percent, respectively, was assigned to (or to a smaller
4GC: traditional value unit o f  land. 20-30 GC corresponds to 1 to 1.5 hectares o f good quality
and (i.e. corresponding to the Hungarian average), and since it was ordered by Act X XV  o f  1991
(the Compensation A ct), it may be considered as “compensation for compensation” . At places
"'here members a n d /or  external owners had left land for common use, in principle they could
a8ree to revive household plots.
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extent distributed among) some 2 million or more individual proprietors. 10 Among 
the latter, however, the number o f new owners was negligible: according to the 1994 
census, there were only 7 thousand new owners compared to the 1991 status among 
individual farmers. 16 In this sense, non-residents who have received compensation 
certainly qualify as new owners, the same as the few thousands o f families who have 
received landed property under the social land allocation schemes o f the previous 
(1990-1994) government and the municipalities. As for the rest, reference can be 
made once again to what was said in the historical section: one cannot expect 
masses o f new landowners in a country where two-third of households have landed 
property of some size.
The land issue for the period from 1992 to the present day is not defined by 
the number o f landowners, but by the possibilities they have had to integrate as 
proprietors or managers into the holding or business form categories defined by size 
o f landed or other property about to emerge now. The categories in question corre­
late with social categories: there are wealthy manager-entrepreneurs and individual 
big entrepreneurs with or without landed property; medium entrepreneurs related 
to co-operatives or operating on a family basis with less property; small and dwarf 
farms producing for the market (according to information provided by the cham­
bers o f commerce, some 700 thousand took out the original producer’s certificate); 
the unemployed and temporary workers trying to survive on dwarf farms and at 
the most only satisfying their own food requirements (this category covers some 
1 million persons, many o f whom were entitled to some land but who sold their 
newly acquired plot at once); the pauperised village population invading denuded 
state farm settlements, uninhabited dwarf villages, and deserted farmsteads. Some 
o f the people in the last category have put all locally available land area under 
cultivation. (O f course, as in Western Europe, the number of middle and upper 
middle class families setting up a second home in a village or on a farmstead or in 
a vineyard, and cultivating the land that goes with them (or having it cultivated 
by someone else), is on the rise in Hungary as well.)
As for the first category, we know most, in terms o f statistics, o f co-operative 
members. In 1989, co-operatives had 5.5 million hectares o f land and 686.5 thou­
sand members; they cultivated 4.5 million hectares themselves, employing 453 thou­
sand full-time staff for that purpose, and had 327 thousand active members. By 
1996, their total land area had shrunk to 1.9 million hectares, and the number of 
full-time employees to 94 thousand (and the steady decline is still evident today) 
and that o f active members to 60 thousand. (All other members are “externals” in
15Source for statistical data hereafter, unless otherwise specified: relevant volumes o f CSO ’s 
Pocket-book o] agricultural and food industrial statistics.
16According to the estimate o f  Gyula Varga, the number o f  those receiving land compensation 
could be around 700 thousand; some <100 thousand landless members/employees were allotted 
pieces o f  land from the so-called members’ land fund; and there were some 250 thousand old (i-e- 
registered) proprietors whose landed property was still in the co-operative. ( Varga 1993)
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comparison.) In other words, while the 1989 average was 14 hectares per member, 
by 1996 the corresponding ratio had increased to 30 hectares (in all probability 
this remains an insufficient area). However, active members today are authorised 
to have some landed property not only within the co-operative, but also without 
it; what is more, they can act as managers o f enterprises operating on co-operative 
land. Co-operative managers suggesting (or even demanding) the buy-out o f quotas 
o f external proprietors (a total o f 1 million hectares according to certain computa­
tions) and the gradual alienation o f compensation and members’ land areas leased 
out by proprietors to the co-operative (1994: 880 thousand hectares) actually only 
wish to end as soon as possible the process in which they still have to compete with 
the remaining active members for exclusive ownership. Subcontracted assets are not 
necessarily returned; some o f the beneficiaries o f compensation and of quota holders 
may have their piece o f land surveyed and use it themselves or exchange or sell it. 
Moreover, in the meantime, managers have to contest with big entrepreneurs and 
leaseholders (although small in number) operating outside the co-operative, and 
apparently also with family farms and farm enterprises one step lower in the rank 
order. Statistics indicate the existence o f 60 thousand o f the latter (other sources 
speak o f 51 or 66  thousand) and, according to several experts, approximately half 
o f these do business with co-operative assets while the other half inherited part of 
their initial resources; also their contacts and know-how (especially skills relating 
to machinery, for it was not the average unskilled co-operative member who became 
an entrepreneur) from co-operatives.1'
This extremely thin and vulnerable middle stratum (kept alive, in the absence 
o f institutional support and an appropriate infrastructure, by their own wits and 
good fortune) hence qualifies as a rival, not an ally for the upper stratum undergoing 
the selection process now. Nevertheless, there exists one pillar which could seal 
their alliance (the likelihood o f such an alliance only be o f a potential character at 
present): both groups often protest against small and dwarf holders and also those 
withdrawing to subsistence farms because o f their confused market channels and 
incapacity to generate demand in the near future for the products and services of 
the big ones.
Censuses o f different kinds put the number o f independent farms producing 
for the market— 95 percent among them small farms— at 1.2 to 1.6 million. Some 
600 to 800 thousand raise pigs, a few hundreds of thousands produce vegetable
17From among private producers figuring in the CSO’s survey, in 1995 45.1 percent had earlier 
been independent; the proportion o f non-manual workers was 11.4 percent, that o f skilled workers 
13.4 percent (with those com ing from within and from without agriculture represented almost 
equally), and that o f  independent craftsmen, tradesmen and those pursuing other occupations was 
*L7 percent. (Harcsa 1996) This recruitment distribution does not seem to be disproportional, 
considering the fact that already in the seventies less than half o f the village population had an 
agricultural occupation, and less than half o f those employed by big agricultural plants doing 
Manual jobs actually worked directly in land cultivation or animal husbandry.
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and fruit and some 150 to 200 thousand have vineyards. The majority are what 
the professional literature calls “part-time farms” , although many family heads 
and members today have no other job . (Inclusive farms even smaller in size, their 
number totals around 1.8 million, some 3 million people are cultivating them, whose 
land or rather produce contribute to the living o f some 4.8 million, corresponding 
to 46 percent o f the Hungarian population. (Takács 1995; Gyimesi 1995)
Representatives o f old, new and prospective big farms call attention to two, in 
their opinion anomalous, phenomena. The first one is that land is being squandered 
among a mass o f new owners who have neither the money, nor the experience 
required to use it well. As mentioned already, however, the owners in question are 
not new; in fact, patchy as the relevant statistics may be, they make it evident that 
the average area o f small and dwarf holdings keeps rising year on year, the same 
as both the number and total area of medium-size and larger holdings, albeit at a 
slow pace.18 (The latter cultivated by big agricultural companies and co-operatives 
totalled 2.3 million ha. The harvested area o f the major arable crops, on the other 
hand, amounted to a total o f 3.9 million ha. A major part of the difference was 
obviously produced on the 557 thousand ha arable land o f big and medium-size 
individual farms. In other words, the monopoly o f the former socialist big farms 
with respect to the cultivation o f major arable crops is a thing o f the past.19
The other anomaly referred to is the divergence of land ownership and land 
use. However, there is no theory or experience to suggest that, in an ideal case, the 
two should coincide (i.e. that land monopoly will paralyse the farm structure and 
create an opportunity for land usury); this arrangement is not typical in Western 
Europe either. As we have seen, farm and land use patterns are in statu nascendi, 
and they endanger the operation o f neither the export sector, nor domestic supply, 
despite altering ownership relations in both. One ö f the main arguments for putting 
things in order is security, the other is that, by pressuring co-operatives to lease 
land from former members, capital is withdrawn from agriculture. The experience, 
however, is that leasing o f this kind has been very cheap so far (it is often free 
and sometimes it is the proprietor leasing land out who pays), and land rented 
so is often sub-let out by the co-operative to companies or private individuals. In 
the latter case the lease is rather expensive (in Hungarian comparison). (Burgerné
I847.2 percent o f individual agricultural entrepreneurs at least doubled their landed property 
from 1992 to 1995, another 22.9 percent increased it by a smaller extent and only 27.7 percent did 
not enjoy any increase at all. Those cultivating more than 20 hectares leased half or two-thirds 
o f the area. (Harcsa 1996) The May 1996 statistics show that 3,346 hectares were being used by 
individual farms as opposed to 1,382 hectares two years earlier. Within that, small farms occupied 
1,972 thousand ha instead of the earlier 841 thousand, medium-size ones 67 thousand instead o f 62 
thousand and big ones 630 thousand instead o f 479 thousand. ( KSH  1996) As can be seen, dwarf 
farms underwent the most spectacular increase— more than two-fold, by 1.1 million ha. Part of 
the difference is due to unregistered changes in previous years.
19 The crops taken into account are as follows: grains, sugar beet, sunflower, potato, maize for 
silage, alfalfa.
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Gimes 1996) One wonders if capital is withdrawn from agriculture in this case at 
all, and if so, whose capital that might be.
The same could be said o f those demanding the accelerated consolidation of 
holdings. As long as the permanent location and size o f holdings is not established 
on a more sound basis, and real ownership relations (which are starting to take 
shape now through the unification o f family plots, land exchange between friends, 
land use based on personal favour, and so-called pocket contracts etc.) are not 
certified by land register or other documents, forced consolidation would give enor­
mous privileges to some and do blatant injustice to others; what is more it would 
fragment many o f the farms about to emerge and drive smallholders to poor quality 
or inaccessible land or simply swallow their existing piece o f land.
A closer look reveals that the processes taking place are still those envisaged 
by the 1991 agricultural administration under the influence of contemporary inter­
est representation organisation, bureaucracy and international trends rather than 
political parties. At least such processes bring closer the envisaged objective o f 
modern land reforms. It is true that this transformation has confronted resistance 
in every country (Csáki and Lerman 1997), but it seems that in Hungary those 
showing most resistance have been the winners of the process. The main reason for 
this is the enduring absence o f set criteria which would allow individuals or families 
to know for sure that they are going to be among the winners (perhaps even be 
topmost among them).
O f course, in the meantime, the historical problem o f the combination o f land 
shortage and rural over-population has returned. Some are of the opinion that 
the new distribution o f holdings is worse and more polarised than that o f 1935."° 
However, if land use data released recently carry a real meaning— according to CSO, 
land in private use increased by 2 million hectares over two years— the situation is 
certainly better than it was prior to the war.21
20 If we consider those farms whose size exceeds 100 cadastral “hold” (57.6 hectares) to have 
been “big ones” in 1935, and accept the categorization o f the CSO which differentiates between 
companies (i.e. co-operatives) and individual farms (the average size o f the latter being 57 hectares 
if considered as “ big” in 1994), we receive the result that in 1935 big farms covered 48.2 percent 
° f  agricultural land area, but in 1995 about 45 percent (and surely less than that in 1997). (I<SH 
1990; Fazekas 1995; KSH 1995; KSH 1996)
21 From 1989 to 1991, the CSO data for land used by private individuals showed a reduction 
from 1.5 million hectares to 889 thousand. No data are available for 1992. As for 1993, statistics 
wdicates 1,620 hectares as the average agricultural area held by individual owners. Subsequent 
data are as follows: 1994: 1,719 thousand ha, 1995: 2,789 thousand ha, 1996: 3,345.7 thousand 
ha. No. 6 o f the CSO Reports for 1997 says that “in 1997, 56 percent o f the agricultural area 
(3.5 million ha) was used by individual farmers, 26 percent by co-operatives and 17 percent by 
companies” (p. 11.).
The change is, understandably, the result o f rather com plex shifts and transactions. Business 
Partnerships started with 936 thousand ha in 1989 and in principle lost 475 thousand through 
compensation; but in 1996 they had 1,090 thousand, so they must have acquired 630 thousand ha 
'*> the meantime. The increment consisted o f land owned (used) by co-operatives and individuals.
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Performance of Hungarian agriculture, 1990-1996
Publications in recent years have estimated the contribution o f agriculture 
to the GDP and to employment to have fallen from 14 to 6 to 7 percent and from 
16 to around 8 percent, respectively. Most analysts expect these ratios to remain 
unchanged in the future.
Gross average annual agricultural output growth already started to slow down 
in the eighties and turned negative, as mentioned already, in the second half of 
the decade. Plant cultivation underwent a more marked decline than livestock 
farming.22 The poor harvest o f 1990 had its effect on livestock farming as well (with 
the exception o f pig rearing). From that time on, however, output fell irresistibly in 
both main branches (and in the garden and plantation sectors as well within plant 
cultivation itself) until 1993-1994. Gross output volume (productive absorption 
in agriculture included) reached its lowest point in plant cultivation in 1993 at 62 
percent o f the 1989 volume, and in animal husbandry in 1994 with about the same 
proportion. The aggregate minimum was 63.4 percent in 1993, signifying a much 
more marked decrease than that registered in industry, and it was especially low 
in the food industry where, its lowest point in 1993, monthly average gross output 
corresponded to 83.7 percent o f that in 1985. Volume indices for procurement had 
dropped to less than half o f those for 1990 by 1994.
Marked recession preceded the substantial decline in exports o f agriculture 
and the food industry (the latter occurred in 1993 only, simultaneously with the 
general and very substantial loss of exports); in contrast, exports grew very fast 
in 1991 and to some extent even in 1992. (The increase, however, was not due to 
volume growth, but to the fact that accounts in convertible currency had become
(Takàcs 1997) Land marked off by co-operatives for distribution totalled 3.4 million ha— i.e. 2 
million ha less than that registered by statistics in 1989. 1.2 million ha o f the nearly 2 million 
hectares o f quota-holders were conspicuously missing from the area marked off in this way. In 
reality, co-operatives must already have had less land than the registered quantity in 1989, and 
since then it has continued to decrease. The contraction of co-operative land areas prior to com ­
pensation must have been due to previous parcellisation, sales, exit o f members, or the transfer 
o f certain pieces of land to the municipality. This, together with land transferred to permanent 
use later on appeared in statistics as individual and com pany land areas. Apart from land leased 
permanently, co-operatives did not have to mark off for distribution plots necessary for the ex­
pedient operation o f their equipment, nor those plots under mortgage. Presumably, therefore, 
co-operatives do not rent all the 1.75 to 1.9 million ha o f land they use, from their members (or 
others), but they use (or utilise) land unsold at the auctions or over which there is a dispute 
(or occasionally not marked off at all). Sources o f land used by individuals or co-operatives or 
companies today should, therefore, be examined one by one; also unidentified is the 2 million ha 
that turned up missing at the beginning o f the distribution process, but they all have a share of 
that as well. Land utilisation ratios, on the other hand, have not been consolidated yet.
2" Source o f data unless otherwise specified: CSO Pocket-book of agricultural and food industrial 
statistics, Vols. 1989 to 1996. Soui-ce o f foreign trade data: KOPIN T-DATORG database.
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exclusive. The volume of exported foodstuffs is still not more than 70 percent o f 
the 1989 level.)
Three factors can be emphasized as having determined agricultural perfor­
mance, and these factors also affected the general economic environment, including 
foreign and domestic demand and the transformation o f related branches; all three 
are in connection with the trade and the banking system .23 The first was the pri­
vatisation o f the individual element o f the production, processing and sales chains, 
in diverse ways and independently of one another at a strikingly high loss in their 
value and o f mutual linkages. This method o f privatisation could, in itself, have 
led to total collapse o f the whole food system. The second factor has been that 
state regulation has been asserted most forcefully in two areas. Firstly, the export 
and import authorisation and tender system has acted, at least for a few years, 
against the stabilisation o f production and sales; secondly, the situation o f the so- 
called agricultural market arrangements. The system has two poles, one o f them 
being the government’s central administration system and the other the product 
councils (similar to commodity boards) organised according to the main com m od­
ity/com m odity group. The latter, theoretically, represents every important actor o f 
the given market segment. Standard prices (i.e. guiding prices, guaranteed prices) 
are set centrally, and occasional market intervention (i.e. subsidised procurement, 
exports, imports), in case there is surplus production or shortage, is decided upon 
through bargaining between the two. Specification of the distribution o f actual 
prices and price margins is assigned to the competence o f the respective product 
councils or decided upon by bargain between their members, provided that the ma­
jor actors o f the given market segment actually participate in such bargaining. The 
representation o f small producers, for instance, is unresolved. The bargains in ques­
tion are not public, and their results promote the consolidation o f the given market 
segment only in the presence o f an extensive contractual system or some other type 
of horizontal or vertical integration. The system cannot act as a substitute for a 
relatively uniform and well-informed market. The third influencing factor involves 
state subsidies. Central subsidies had disappeared or been cut drastically by the 
end o f 1992 (export subsidies included). Under the impact of a drop in exports by 
30 percent in 1993, subsidies started to increase again and new forms also appeared. 
From 1994-1995 on, they became the most effective market-organizing force, not so 
much owing to their consistence but rather due to the concentration of their poten­
tial advantages (in combination with the relevant regulations) to bigger companies. 
Furthermore, from 1995 on, they also carried the possibility of advantages to the
23Sources o f the following summary o f agricultural performance in addition to statistical pub­
lications referred to already, include especially the following: Czárlné Ivanics, Szabó and Tassy 
1996; Gyöngyösi 1996; KSH 1997; Németh and Vati 1995; Fertő and Mohácsi 1996b; Takács 1996a 
and 1996b; Mohácsi 199'); Orbánné Nagy and Szabd 1996; Alvinci 1997; Szabó 1995; Mohácsi 
1995a and 1995b; Mohácsi 1997; Fertő and Mohácsi 1997; KOPINT-DATORG Econom ic trend 
reports.
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successor organisations o f the former state farms and those co-operatives that have 
remained relatively large.
State support includes, in addition to subsidies in cash, some organizing ac­
tivities, like the organisation for vertical co-operation/integration (consisting o f 
state farms which have remained in state ownership) which is under development 
now; there is also assistance from the agricultural marketing agency, which is a 
state organ.
Budgetary subsidies mostly take the form o f credit interest support for the 
purpose o f financing procurement or the costs o f livestock breeding; occasionally 
this goes with a state guarantee, as in the case o f credits drawn to reduce damage 
caused by drought. The so-called reconstruction credits have been accompanied by 
state assistance (to establish stock farms, or purchase or modernise buildings, for 
example). Investment credits with interest subsidies are also available, although 
that option depends to a large extent on whether banks have funds (which they can 
place for more than twelve months) available for that purpose. After 1990, small 
producers, normally not rated as creditworthy, could also be granted re-organisation 
credit at the time of the sales o f the superfluous equipment o f big farms.
The subsidy system is about to be transformed again: direct export subsidies 
show a marked decline; the agricultural administration is introducing a system of 
cost-reducing subsidies under different titles, to be put in the so-called “green box” 
in the spirit o f EU harmonisation, especially for large producer plants; they would 
prefer to allocate a bigger proportion o f meat subsidies to primary producers instead 
of the food industry and food exporters, and would like to involve agricultural 
plants and their partners to a larger extent in subsidised regional development 
programmes. The importance o f this last option is increasing. Co-operatives have 
been granted a few billion forints annually to buy out the share o f so-called “external 
owners” .
While, in 1990-1993, investments to the economy overall halved, the share 
o f agriculture in national economic investments fell to about 1 or 2 percent, and it 
was only in 1994 that it started to rise again. Despite growth by 35 percent over 
one year, the share o f investment in agriculture had only attained 3.6 percent by 
the end o f 1997, and even that was primarily due to subsidies.
The degree o f assistance to Hungarian agriculture (measured in producer 
subsidy equivalent, PSE) was estimated by the OECD at 23 percent in 1989-1991, 
16 percent in 1995 and 11 percent in 1996. The 1996 subsidy ratio is among the 
lowest in the OECD. (OECD  1997) The level o f subsidies calculated by OECD 
totalled around 1 percent o f the GDP in 1996; consequently, the corresponding 
figure for 1997 must have been around 1.25 percent. In the past two years, leading 
interest representation organisations serving agriculture have demanded subsidies 
corresponding to 2.5 percent o f the GDP, as guaranteed by law. This ratio is 
higher than the corresponding OECD or even the EU average, but the GDPs of 
the member states o f those organisations are much bigger. Calculations based on
Acta Oeconomica 50, 1999
K. LÁNYI: THE TRANSFORM ATION OF AGRICULTURE 141
unit (i.e. one ha) agricultural area project a different picture altogether: some 
USD 180 for 1998— i.e. less (although not much less) than the OECD average and 
approximately one-fifth/sixth o f that of the European Union (in 1992).
The new production, investment and market structure o f Hungarian agricul­
ture which has emerged, has up until now partly preserved the more or less sponta­
neous tendencies which manifested themselves in 1985 and after 1989, respectively. 
This is partly the result o f the above three influencing factors (i.e. privatisation, 
regulation and budget subsidy).
The essential structural characteristics o f the system are as follows:
The share o f grains within the total sowing area grew from 58-59 percent 
to 62 percent; however, the total grain output (maize included) fell, as a result 
o f the deterioration o f cultivation technology and/or the selection o f permanently 
more extensive methods, from 13-14 million tonnes to between 11 and 12 million .24 
Some 30 to 40 percent o f the latter total and the other arable crops cultivated in 
large quantity (25 percent o f that quantity comprising grain) was produced, as 
indicated earlier, by individual farms. Medium-size farms also produce sowing 
seed, maize for human consumption, sugar beet, sunflower and potatoes among the 
crops regularly for sale. Small and micro-enterprises, and the medium-size ones 
also, only sell fodder in exceptional circumstances (for instance, if they discontinue 
livestock-breeding).
It should be noted that within both the big and medium-size farm sectors 
companies (joint stock and limited liability companies) produce the best results 
with respect to both yield and quality.
85 to 90 percent o f the potato, other vegetable and vine output has shifted to 
individual farms and almost exclusively to small ones among them. In recent years, 
approximately 70 percent o f the total fruit output has originated from independent 
farms (and not forgetting that this output has contracted by nearly half its earlier 
figure).
Livestock breeding was characterised by the slow decline in stock all through 
the eighties (with the exception of poultry, which showed marked fluctuations), 
giving way to a fast decrease in 1989-1990; thus, by 1993-1994 only 57 percent of 
the initial cattle, 54 percent o f the initial pig and 50 percent o f the initial sheep 
stock remained.
The drastic fall in livestock farming (and milk production) seemed to have 
come to a halt in 1993-1994. In 1994-1995 the stock increased somewhat, followed 
by a decline which has carried on to the present day. Animal husbandry shrank to 
a minimum level or was stopped completely at most o f the former co-operatives, 
while at bigger and very large farms, this activity was taken over by companies.
24It would be premature to draw conclusions from the 14 million tonnes output figure released 
for 1997. It is possible that the production systems are working efficiently once again, in which 
case a solution will have to be found for the market problem.
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In the first half o f the nineties, it was large-scale animal husbandry that showed 
the faster decline, although many small producers and individual farmers (mostly 
“forced” entrepreneurs) also gave up this line o f activity. Nevertheless, one quarter 
o f the cattle total, half o f the pig and three-quarter o f the poultry remained with 
the individual producers. In 1995, the stocks o f all three grew. Over the past 
two years, on the other hand, it has been the stock o f individual farmers that has 
contracted faster, with the majority o f the small ones having given up production 
for the market and keeping animals only to satisfy the demand o f the household 
(or occasionally o f relatives). This situation has been brought about by the impact 
o f the exceptional increase o f fodder prices and the chaos reigning on the livestock 
market.
As for the purchasing and sales organisations, the first to revive have been 
relatively small new companies, former units o f foreign trade companies o f the 
previous era and industry-type production systems. The majority have preserved 
their creditworthiness and command a relatively secure share o f the price margin 
and o f export and other subsidies. Gestor farms have managed to have the grains 
produced and foreign trading companies have exported the produce; moreover, they 
have gradually ousted entrepreneurs appearing from here and there and rallying in 
an attempt to obtain subsidies. Surviving grain procurement companies have also 
acquired a certain amount o f working capital. An “old-new” system o f public 
warehousing has been established.
Livestock-breeders were in a more difficult situation. At one time, even meat 
processing factories modernised on World Bank loans were facing liquidation; big 
slaughter houses were working at half capacity and benefited from only a minor 
segment of the price margin; furthermore, over the past two years a certain propor­
tion o f their subsidies has also been revoked. The majority o f companies involved 
in large-scale livestock-breeding and processing have not created their own efficient 
trading organisations. The companies in question suffer considerably due to the 
competition they face from the mushrooming small slaughter houses and proces­
sors. However, at the same time, if they wish to purchase from the small producers 
(who keep most of the animal stock) they are often forced to rely on the services 
o f purchasing agents who are o f rather dubious competence. The prices o f small 
producers regularly lag behind those o f their big rivals.
Sheep farming shrank more markedly than other branches o f livestock breed­
ing— to less than half— but even 70 percent o f that has fallen into the hands of 
independent farms (of course, primarily to bigger ones). (Reports and rumours 
indicate that working conditions are the worst in this branch.) Typical features 
o f this market include marked fluctuations in sales and prices, common with other 
branches as well.
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The privatisation o f the food industry is almost complete .25 Nevertheless, 
plan which envisaged the integration o f big producers and manufacturers by trans­
ferring processing plants to the ownership o f the biggest producers (according to a 
later version, producers could buy them for compensation vouchers) has not been 
realised. Half o f the food industry has been bought by foreign companies: the 
entire vegetable oil industry, almost all the breweries, the liqueur and champagne 
industry, almost the entire confectionary, sugar and refrigerating industries, a ma­
jor part o f soft drinks production, a much smaller part o f the dairy industry, a 
few modern processing plants in the meat industry, very little in the manufacture 
o f pasta, not much in the wine-bottling and canning industries, and practically 
nothing in milling. The entire tobacco industry is now in foreign hands.
Interestingly enough, foreign companies have organised raw material produc­
tion and have become reliable partners for farms, especially in places where they 
have acquired a monopoly position. Yet recently they also seem to have become 
more negligent and peremptory. As far as their production, export and import pro­
grammes are concerned, they are not much different from other multinationals. As 
for the others, sharp changes in quantity, product mix and prices and a penchant 
for easy solutions— above all in the meat and dairy industries but to some extent 
in the tobacco industry as well— threaten to promote the complete downgrading of 
certain regions. Domestic suppliers of soft drinks companies, canning factories and 
of the refrigerating industry— almost exclusively small plants— have fared better: 
whatever raw material manufacturers purchase in Hungary (although this some­
times seems relatively little), they do so under a satisfactory contractual system. 
For example, half o f vegetable production has been contract-based since 1995.
The spread o f contract-based systems is especially marked at places where 
power is organised mainly through state subsidy or a big foreign company— such 
places enjoy many preferences and forms o f assistance. Such systems affect big 
farms (or mediuin-size ones at the most) only. Due to the security which goes along 
with working with larger quantities o f goods, these organisations are more capable 
of asserting their own interests, and more willing to observe contract discipline than 
small ones.
It is highly typical o f this, the best-organised segment o f the market, that 
food processing companies occupy strong positions and deliver directly (often on 
the basis o f contracts which can be renewed regularly) to retail networks; even 
•nore among their number export (occasionally also import) independently. Many 
have their own outlet network as well. Conflicts concerning the sharing o f the price 
margin between the food industry and major store chains have quietened down in 
many places.
25In 1995, there were 152 big plants in the food industry, 20 to 22 among them really big ones; 
'220 small and medium-size enterprises; and 9,09(3 micro-enterprises (Czárlné Ivanics, Szabó and 
Tassy 1996).
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Plants protection and veterinary health care services, provided by the state 
to agricultural producers earlier, have partly broken up and partly been incapable 
o f adjusting to the new relations o f ownership. Although in 1996 53 percent of 
the agricultural output originated from individual producers, so far no government 
organ or public body has undertaken to provide them with general technological, 
plant management, market, business and accounting training or to deliver useful 
market information to them on a regular basis. The farmers’ own initiatives such 
as farmers’ circles or co-operative-like informal associations, proposed partly by 
agricultural entrepreneur-intellectuals were relegated to the background owing to 
the lack o f institutional, legal and political support.26
The wholesale system involving purchasing, distribution and delivery to the 
processor (i.e. the bulk o f agricultural produce) has recovered exceptionally fast 
from almost total collapse. This is probably due to easily available high profits. 
Today we no longer hear and read about its absence, only about conflicts on the 
partitioning o f the food margin. The former producers’ and farmers’ co-operatives 
that used to purchase the output of individual farms (i.e. household plots) and small 
enterprises, have terminated this line o f activity (and renewed it at a few places 
only); wholesale markets typical o f the pre-collectivization era have not opened 
anew and there is no demand for auction markets operated by co-operatives or 
markets which have adjusted to them in the absence of incentives to co-operation. 
Hence small farms, if they are the almost exclusive suppliers o f a product, are 
exposed to purchasers or agents, or monopolists o f the given sub-region. As for 
other products o f which they are not the sole producers, they are often considered 
to be annoying rivals and obstacles on the market and they are treated accordingly.
The production and market organisation system which primarily integrates 
big farms has emerged from the above-mentioned gestor farms. They constitute 
the majority of the 28 companies which have remained in state ownership. Their 
primary role is to place preferential loans in kind— in the form o f sowing seeds for 
instance— to the farms, and to contribute to maintaining and improving techno­
logical standards. Their function as purchasers o f the produce o f the given farm, 
or contributors to the sales thereof, has evolved gradually. In the first half o f 1997 
there was already at least one (specialised) integrator in every one o f the 18 Hun­
26It is mainly agricultural chambers that have com mitted themselves to taking care o f small 
producers. Now, they do not demand thousands o f forints for the membership alone and thus the 
main obstacle to contact has been eliminated. The other institution is the network o f farmers’ 
notaries; there is one o f the latter for every three or four villages, although they are overburdened 
with formal administrative tasks (e.g. the issuance o f certificates). In some regions the agricul­
tural marketing organisation is willing to establish contact with them, and there are regional 
development centres where a few companies try to lure them. Some integrators also consider it 
worth cooperating with them; the so-called “mountain communities" are, in principle, and often 
in reality as well, the individual vine-growers’ own organisations. Young farmers have also been 
eligible for a few preferences (albeit difficult to acquire) since 1997.
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garian counties, and credit amounting to approximately HUF 100 billion had been 
extended to farms through their auspices. The integrator also constitutes the main 
base for the maintenance and development o f the export sector.
Within Hungarian food exports (that is, until the relatively early boom  o f 
privatisation in the food industry), the share o f unprocessed products increased; 
however, parallel with privatisation and with supplementary investments by for­
eign owners, processed goods took the lead again, with the exception o f grains. In 
the meantime, these investments were completed, but the steady shrinking o f the 
domestic food market continued, and hence the food industry has had little oppor­
tunity for further growth (preliminary data for 1997 showed a decline). Moreover, it 
has been unable to provide any impetus, via its demand, to raw material producers.
Imports o f agricultural and food products underwent alarming growth in the 
first transition years, but the process has been reversed significantly since then, 
and today food imports only represent 4-5 percent o f all imports. (Higher customs 
duties and the import surcharge— which has been eliminated in the meantime—  
certainly played a role in bringing about the reverse.) Given the contraction o f the 
retail trade, it has been impossible to increase the sales o f import goods, which any­
way are usually rather expensive in domestic comparison; furthermore, to a certain 
extent export subsidies motivate exporters to produce domestic raw materials.27
Exports o f agricultural and food products, although they have attained USD 
2.4 to 2.7 billion in good years, since 1994 have represented a smaller part o f total 
exports than they used to earlier: some 18 percent instead o f 20  to 22 percent 
(or occasionally more than that). (As a result o f the alteration o f the system of 
statistical accounting— which now covers the turnover of duty-free zones as well—  
this ratio is currently around 13 to 15 percent.) The figures match the tendency that 
agriculture now contributes a smaller part to the GDP and, after its predominance 
for a period o f a hundred years or so, the food industry is no longer the first and 
foremost manufacturing branch in the economy. It is worth noting that, despite 
an “intermission” o f a few years, Hungarian food exporters now sell half o f their 
exports to the former socialist countries (30 percent to the successor states o f the 
Soviet Union) once again; they are still unable to make complete use of the duty-free 
quotas offered by the association agreement concluded with the European Union 
(although today the main reason for this is the lack of exportable goods) and they 
yield customs preferences to the importer at all times, the same as before.
27 rt> •The sugar, meat and milling industries are least the import-intensive, while vegetable and
‘ «it processing and “other” industries (including the confectionery and soft drinks branches)
'^'Present the other pole.
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Some possible conclusions for the future
For a country in Hungary’s position, there is probably no fool-proof recipe 
against the emergence of a Latin American-type dual agricultural system and the 
concomitant final and massive pauperisation o f the village population. A great 
majority o f the village population have no job  and even the distant hope for reg­
ular work has receded further. Although (for the time being at least) they seem 
to be surviving, there is no room here for complacency. A few decades ago, every­
where (including Southern Europe) programmes were implemented with the aim 
o f achieving economic and social progress at the village level. These programmes 
enjoyed some results, but today they are no longer effective; this is because they 
cannot reckon either upon generous financial support or on adequate product, ser­
vices and labour demands coming from the overall economy. What is more, an 
acknowledged need for security is also absent; earlier there was a system of security 
which adjusted the co-ordination o f the food system to the demands o f agricultural 
production and o f those working in it.
In the absence o f long-term prospects, and without appropriate theoretical 
foundations, the analyses of the state of affairs presented here only permit the 
offering o f short-term or at the most medium-term recommendations.
The initial hypothesis presented here is for a rational, moderate social and 
economic policy devoid o f extremes and too sharp changes; it should be a consistent 
policy and not a mere acknowledgement o f spontaneous tendencies. Also, it is also 
assumed that a certain degree o f consensus can be reached with respect to relevant 
social and economic goals.
Social goals requiring consensus include those aiming to:
—  prevent the pauperisation o f village families/groups/strata capable of 
earning a living;
—  make basic production, business (household), administration and elemen­
tary market skills available to everyone without exception (in the rural regions);
—  promote the development o f industrial, services and intellectual activities 
in rural areas;
—  sustain and promote the development, if possible, o f a village middle 
stratum who opt for farming as a main or secondary line o f activity and who 
actually live in the rural district (i.e. village, county town, farmstead). Members of 
this stratum have the potential to serve as a reference group for others in farming) 
especially with respect to the way o f life associated with it;
—  pay attention to ensure that politics should not harm the property or 
social self-esteem o f groups involved in agriculture and to prevent the institution­
alisation o f existing abuses which negatively effect on the latter.
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Economic goals requiring consensus include those aiming to:
—  stop the further substantial decline o f agricultural production (i.e. its out­
put value) and exports (the value of exports), without insisting on the maintenance 
o f the current structure;
—  eliminate or at least make flexible the institutions which could make the 
structure of activities, o f production or farm structure rigid at a certain point in 
the transition process;
—  promote (support) the emergence (construction) o f commodity markets 
for every stratum of producers and the horizontal and vertical cooperation o f market 
actors;
—  offer and support cooperation (association) opportunities for every group 
o f farmers, micro-enterprises and subsistence farms included;
—  allow village families to use subsistence farms as a last resort (and satisfy 
at least the food demands o f the household) in the future as well, but prevent a 
situation in which they are confined to this form o f living— i.e. not to hinder in an 
institutionalised way their integration into the market economy.
Consensus on issues similar to the above may be based on the recognition 
o f two facts: first, the transformation of agriculture is in process and cannot be 
terminated arbitrarily— it can only be diverted in a desirable or an undesirable 
direction; secondly, the relative absence o f serious conflicts and the avoidance of 
permanent social damage during the process o f transformation so far should be 
seen as an advantage, not a drawback o f Hungarian development.
The identification o f the prospects for further development (i.e. expedient 
tendencies) would certainly be promoted if important groups and influential per­
sonalities in Hungarian agriculture were able to familiarize themselves with the 
agricultural system o f the European Union and the social, cultural and economic ob­
jectives underlying it. This would make it possible to eliminate many uncertainties 
from domestic programmes and avoid the rather undecided character o f economic 
policy (subsidy policy included). It would put an end to the sort of unhealthy com­
petition among certain groups (i.e. the actors of different farm/enterprise/business 
forms) which is aimed exclusively at forcing events forward too quickly so that the 
government and its negotiating partners confront accomplished facts by the time 
of the Union negotiations.
If, on the other hand, a sufficient number of supporters can be rallied for the 
Union philosophy and practice among producers, agricultural experts and mem­
bers o f the state administration, this would almost automatically (and with little 
expenditure) imply two types o f advantages. Firstly, it would be easier to convince 
foreign agri-business companies established in Hungary to act in conformity with 
Union practice and to realise and propagate a corresponding culture o f cooperation 
among their local partners. Secondly, it would be easier (and would have been 
so earlier) to open the way to Union and national (i.e. regional, professional, in­
terest representation, chamber o f commerce, etc.) levels o f assistance and support
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(mediated by contacts) for familiarisation with, and the propagation o f local organi­
sations, institutions and forms of cooperation (e.g. co-operatives, simpler marketing 
organisations and procedures) at present still absent from Hungarian agriculture.
If a sufficient number o f producers offering marketable products and new, 
young generations are to emerge, it is an elementary interest o f society to provide 
them with training and information adequate to their situation and needs, as well 
as access to market organisations, market channels and options for co-operation. 
This is the best way to prepare for accession to the European Union. Countries 
which take accession seriously (and which aim to acquire a certain advantage, not 
disadvantage in this respect) will allocate most efforts to these forms o f assistance.
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RESTRUCTURING OF THE HUNGARIAN 
AGRI-FOOD SECTOR
I. FERTÔ
Towards the end o f  the 1980s agriculture in Hungary began to fall into an increasingly deep 
crisis. After the political reforms o f 1990 this process accelerated. The evaluation o f agricultural 
policy reform and its effect on agriculture is a subject o f debate among agricultural policy-makers 
and agricultural economists. The purpose of this study * is to summarise agricultural policy 
reforms and their effect on the Hungarian agri-food sector.
The first section o f the study briefly reviews pre-reform conditions in agriculture. This is 
followed by a short account o f the main elements o f agricultural policy reform. The third section 
deals with the impacts o f  agricultural reforms on agri-food-sectors (especially on structures), and 
in the fourth, focus is upon barriers to adjustment. Finally, we summarise the most important 
lessons o f the transition in agriculture.
Pre-reform conditions in agriculture
Before 1989, agriculture in Hungary, like other Eastern European countries, 
was characterised by various types of distortions (Brooks et al. 1991). The structure 
o f agricultural production exhibited extreme duality. One part consisted of large 
scale farms: agricultural production co-operatives and state farms. In 1989 in 
Hungary there were about 1500 large-scale farms, which used 85 percent o f the 
arable land. The average size o f the area o f large-scale farms was about 5000 
hectares. These each employed on average, 540 persons. At the other extreme were 
the small-scale private farms. The average o f the 1.4 million private farms was 0.62 
of a hectare. The efficiency o f this agricultural system, as mentioned above, was 
poor relative to developed industrial countries. The food processing, distribution 
and input supply were highly concentrated and characterised by pervasive state 
monopolies.
The main price distortions were the following (Marrese 1993): agricultural 
inputs were generally purchased by state farms and co-operatives at prices below 
Prevailing domestic or world market prices; the provision o f agricultural credit was 
meant to encourage government priorities irrespective o f the enterprises’ ability to 
repay; and the consumer prices of foodstuffs were kept low through subsidies. After
1989, the deepening economic crisis in Hungary made it impossible to maintain this 
supported system o f agricultural prices and production.
'T h is  study is based on the research on “The redistribution of property rights, corporate 
governance and com pany restructuring after privatization” supported by the Research Support 
Scheme o f the Soros Foundation.
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Agricultural policy reform in Hungary
Simultaneously with the political and economic changes in Hungary, the 
transformation o f agriculture also began. The agricultural policy reforms repre­
sented one part o f a stabilisation programme. The agricultural policy reforms 
contained three main elements: price liberalisation and the cutting o f agricultural 
subsidies; liberalisation of foreign trade; and land reforms. The period from 1989 
to 1997 can be divided into two phases: the first was the time o f transformation 
(1989-1993) and the second, one o f consolidation and solid recovery (1994-1997). 
The experience o f agricultural policy during the transformation phase centred on 
building up the legal and institutional framework for the market economy. The 
second, consolidation phase o f agricultural reform has focused on three main prob­
lems. First, the incumbent governments have tried to accelerate or to complete land 
reforms, and have attempted to consolidate land ownership relations, by amend­
ing land reforms, and have attempted to consolidate land ownership relations, by 
amending land laws and co-operation laws. Second, they have stabilised the do­
mestic agricultural market by establishing a market regulation office, improving 
the activity o f such institutions, and increasing production support. Finally, steps 
have begun to harmonise the legal environment o f agriculture with that o f the EU.
In Hungary, prices have been gradually liberalised since 1968. By 1985, some 
40 percent o f all prices were no longer controlled. But the breakthrough came about 
in 1989 when 90 percent o f all producer and consumer prices were liberalised. In 
1990 the respective prices o f bread grain and milk were also liberalised.
The reduction o f agricultural subsidies had already begun in the second half 
o f the eighties and, by 1992, they had dropped even more, to 40 percent o f the 
1989 level. However, it must be noted that one reason was the changeover to dollar 
accounting in trade with the former Soviet Union. The previous rouble accounting 
involved substantial financial support. Thus, since 1993 agricultural subsidies have 
grown continuously but have not yet reached the level o f 1989. The structure of 
subsidies also underwent significant changes. Consumer subsidies were abolished. 
Production and investment subsidies were greatly reduced at first, but since 1993 
have begun to grow. A new type was created: namely, internal market intervention 
to counteract the frequent problems arising on the domestic agricultural market. 
Between 1989-1995 export subsidies represented the biggest share, being in general 
above 50 percent o f total support. In 1996, agricultural support policy was changed 
due to G ATT commitments, and the share o f export subsidies was reduced to below
40 percent.
In 1990, the government decided to adopt a system o f institutions similar to 
that of the developed countries for the regulation of agricultural markets. After a 
long gestation, the law on agricultural market order was passed in 1993. According 
to this law, domestic regulation operates on two levels. The first is the Office of 
Agricultural Regulation, which works out the market intervention programme and
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rules o f operation. At the second level o f regulation are marketing boards. They 
negotiate about the regulation of a given product, and are responsible for ensuring 
their members abide by agreements (i.e. determination of target price, distribution 
o f quota, voluntary reduction of production, etc.). In reality, however, this sys­
tem does not work. For instance, by the end o f 1996 there were no interventions 
due to low intervention prices. The Office’s work has been characterised by a lack 
o f systematic thinking (for example, exports and imports were restricted simul­
taneously). Since agricultural markets are underdeveloped, the measures— based 
frequently on vague and incomplete information— often have done more damage 
than if no intervention had been made at all.
In Hungary, the decision to begin liberalising foreign trade was made in 1988. 
Instead o f four years, as originally planned, the liberalisation o f non-rouble account­
ing trade was completed in three years. In 1991, the liberalisation was extended to 
the former COMECON. During the following year, 90 percent o f all imports were 
liberalised. However, an import licence is required for nearly a hundred agricultural 
and food industry products. The licence is linked to import quotas if the products 
falls under a global quota. Exports were also liberalised and in 1991 licensing rules 
were greatly relaxed. After 1993, however, some of the new restrictions began to 
apply to foreign trade—for instance, customs duties. The honeymoon years for lib­
eralisation had ended. The most recent increase in customs duties was introduced 
as part o f the so-called stabilisation programme o f 1995.
In Hungary, the change o f land ownership was regulated by the compensa­
tion law passed in 1991. The goal was reparation for damages unlawfully caused by 
the state after 1 May 1939. At the beginning of 1992, the co-operative transition 
law and the law on co-operatives were passed. The aim was to put formerly indi­
visible co-operative property into private ownership, and thereby to give the new 
owners the right to decide about the use of their property. Another goal was the 
establishment o f new types o f co-operatives, corporations and private farms. The 
laws contained elements o f compensation pertaining to arable land as well as to 
co-operative assets.
The transformation and privatisation o f state farms also began, but at a much 
slower pace than foreseen by government. The many uncertainties about privati­
sation, and the frequently changing concepts and deadlines in the period between 
1990-1992, illustrated the hesitation o f decision-makers and also changing political 
reactions. Government adopted the concept o f decentralised privatisation. Due 
to the uncertainties in connection with the land issue and poor earning prospects, 
the process cannot be expected to accelerate. Investors show very little interest in 
Purchasing equipment piece by piece and investing in small farms. The final result 
° f  the privatisation o f state farms by the end of 1996 was as follows: o f the 120 
state farms, 39 were liquidated; 47 had been privatised and 27 were in the process 
of privatisation and the rest remained in state ownership with a strategic purpose 
(■•e. aims o f education, research and development).
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Two phases can be distinguished in the privatisation of the food industry. In 
the first phase (1990-1992) it was dominated by direct foreign investment. More 
than 50 percent o f privatisation revenue stemmed from privatisation o f the food 
industry. In the second period (1993-1997) the pace o f privatisation slowed. The 
government adopted the concept o f decentralised privatisation (similar to the case 
o f state farms) in order to accelerate privatisation. This idea was helped by com­
plementary techniques— e.g. privatisation leasing, management buy-out, and em­
ployees’ co-ownership programmes. As a result o f the process, at the end of 1995 
private ownership already exceeded 50 percent in the sphere of the food industry.
The effects of agricultural reform 
Table 1
Share of agriculture and food industry in the national economy
(percentage at current prices) 1990- 1996
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Agricultural G D P /G D P 12.5 8.6 7.2 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.6
Food industry G D P /G D P 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.0
Agri-food sector G D P /G D P 17.2 13.6 11.9 11.1 11.0 10.9 10.6
Agricultural export/export n.a. n.a. 10.0 6.8 6.8 8.2 6.0
Food industry export/export n.a. n.a. 16.0 16.6 15.9 15.4 15.6
Agri-food export/export 24.3 26.6 26.0 23.4 22.7 23.6 21.6
Agricul tural employment/employment 14.3 15.2 11.3 9.1 8.7 8.0 8.3
Food industry employm ent/employment 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.4* 3.8 3.5 3.3
*from 1993 data about organizations employing more than 20 persons
Source: Agricultural statistical pocket-books 1990-1996. Central Statistical Office o f Hungary 
(1990-1996).
Hungarian agriculture is still significant in the national economy, though its 
role has gradually been decreasing since 1986. The performance o f agriculture has 
declined, as shown by various economic indicators. Table 1 shows that the share 
of agriculture in GDP sharply declined between 1990-1993, then stabilised at the 
level 6.7 percent. On the other hand, the proportion o f food industry as a part of 
GDP fell only slightly. At the end o f the period analysed more than 10 percent of 
GDP still came from the food sector.
It is paradoxical that the proportion of agri-food exports in total exports 
was able to remain above 20 percent during this period and, moreover, actually 
improved in the critical years (1991-1992). In 1993 a smaller share o f agricultural 
production went towards exports, and since then the performance o f agricultural
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exports have gradually declined. However, the share o f food industry products in 
agri-food exports has increased.
The proportion o f agricultural and food industry employment in total em­
ployment during this period also declined. The fall in the share o f employment 
was much greater in agriculture than in the food industry. The reduction of the 
share o f agriculture in employment was dramatic between 1990-1993; after that 
its proportion in overall employment has remained relatively stable. The share of 
the food industry in total employment went down only after 1994. The decrease, 
however, can be explained partly by changes in the methods o f recording.
Table 2
Development of main indicators 1990-1997 (previous years=100 percent)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GDP 96.7 88.1 95.7 97.7 102.9 101.5 101.3 104.6
Agricultural GDP 95.4 93.8 80.0 90.3 103.2 102.7 104.1 99.5
Share o f  crop production 51.9 56.6 52.6 52.9 56.3 54.3 59.6 55.9
Share o f  animal production 48.1 43.4 47.4 47.1 43.7 45.7 40.4 44.1
Food industry GDP 99.1 93.2 96.0 95.8 105.5 101.6 99.6 92.8
Sources: Hungarian statistical pocket-books 1990-1997. Central Statistical Office o f Hungary 
(1990-1997).
Behind the process described above, a similar change in agricultural produc­
tion can be found. Agricultural GDP between 1990-1993 continuously declined by 
about '28 percent. The reduction o f agricultural production exceeded the decrease 
of GDP. From 1994 to 1996, however, there was a larger increase in agricultural 
production than in the increase in the total economy. Since 1996 the growth o f agri­
cultural GDP has stopped, whereas the GDP has continued to grow. Moreover, 
some preliminary estimations for 1998 suggested similar trends. Despite the drastic 
fall in agricultural production, the GDP of the food industry declined only slightly 
between 1990-1993. This is very interesting because some subsectors in the food 
industry were oriented to former Soviet markets, and the collapse o f COMECON 
caused serious difficulties in these subsectors. On the other hand, the data suggest 
that the food industry was able to adjust more easily to market conditions than 
were agricultural producers.
In two major sectors (plant cultivation and animal husbandry), however, 
Production developed differently. After 1988 the proportion of livestock raising 
strongly diminished, while the performance o f plant cultivation fluctuated depend- 
lng on weather conditions, and within the total output it increased from 46 percent 
in 1989 to 56 percent in 1997.
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The numbers in agricultural employment also declined dramatically. In 1997 
there were 310 thousand people working in agriculture (which amounts to about 
36 percent o f the 1990 level). The reduction o f the number of active earners in 
the food industry was not so drastic. In 1997 the level of employment in the food 
industry was 50 percent, compared to the figure in 1990.
Development o f prices
The planned economy was characterised by different types o f price distor­
tions. The prices o f industrial inputs for agriculture were below the market prices 
due to production support. Simultaneously, food prices were cheap because o f con­
sumer subsidies. Within agriculture, crop prices were relatively low compared with 
livestock prices due to the poor efficiency o f animal breeding on large-scale farms.
Table 3
Agricultural terms of trade (1990=100)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industrial prices 132.6 143.2 171.8 202.9 250.9 351.7 404.8
Agricultural prices 99.1 107.6 127.5 159.3 202.4 260.0 294.8
Agricultural terms o f trade 133.8 133.0 134.7 127.4 123.9 135.3 137.3
Source: Agricultural statistical yearbook 1997. Central Statistical Office o f Hungary (1998).
Table 3 shows that, despite price liberalisation, in the first years o f transfor­
mation the agricultural price conditions (i.e. agricultural terms o f trade) became 
less favourable for farmers. Between 1986-1989 state purchasing prices for agricul­
tural products moved parallel with the prices o f industrial inputs. However, after
1990, the gap between the prices o f agricultural and industrial products suddenly 
increased. The changes in the agricultural terms o f trade eliminated the earlier 
price distortions between agriculture and industry on the one hand, and within 
agriculture, between crops and livestock prices on the other. After 1992 real mar­
ket price conditions developed between agricultural products and industrial inputs. 
In general, it can be stated that farm prices have moved more or less parallel with 
input prices, but some fluctuations have occurred.
Transformation of agriculture
The agricultural policy reforms have had considerable effects on the distribu­
tion o f property rights, especially on land ownership, land use, and on agricultural
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structure (including the number o f enterprises and the size o f  agricultural com pa­
nies).
Transformation o f  land ownership
The most im portant change has been the termination o f  the co-operatives as 
a form o f property and the recovery o f  private land ownership. Precise data about 
the distribution o f  land ownership are not yet available due to a lack o f  exact details 
about the registration o f land. Therefore we can show data only about the change 
o f land utilisation.
Table 4
Distribution o f agricultural land use according to organisation form s 1990-1997
(percent o f area)
1990* 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
com panies and corporations 12.6 14.9 16.0 20.2 19.0 16.5 17.6 15.6
cooperatives 67.7 62.8 58.3 53.3 37.7 33.0 28.3 26.0
private farmers 19.7 22.3 25.7 26.5 43.3 50.5 54.1 58.4
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* 1990s data refer to ownership relations, and com panies equal state farms
Source: Agricultural statistical yearbook 1997. Central Statistical Office o f  Hungary (1998).
Table 4 shows some interesting findings with regard to the change o f  distribu­
tion o f agricultural land use according to organisation forms. The most important 
changes are the considerable decrease in the number o f co-operatives, and the off­
setting rise o f private farms in agricultural land use. But these results need to 
be interpreted with care. Iiovdcs et al. (1998) point out that the real land use o f 
private farms is probably shown as less by 10-15 percent o f the true figure, owing 
to registration difficulties and tax avoidance. Furthermore, some co-operatives be­
came joint-stock companies during this period, hence increasing the share o f land 
use by corporations.
In 1989 the average area o f state farms was 7138 hectares, while the average 
area o f a co-operative was 4179 hectares. The average area o f large-scale farms was 
below 2000 hectares in 1994. In the background o f the process, the decrease in the 
number o f large-scale farms above 3000 hectares and the increase in the number 
° f  farms between 500-3000 hectares can be found. It is interesting that large-scale 
farms above 10000 hectares have remained as state farms, as they were earlier.
Surprisingly, since 1996 the land use by firm size has more or less been stable. 
The most interesting results are that the land use o f large- and medium-size private
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Table 5
Agricultural land use by firm size 1996-1998 
(thousand hectares f
1996 1997 1998
Total 6184.5 6194.6 6192.7
econom ic organisation: 2838.8 2578.9 2470.8
o.w. large 2613.1 2497.3 2369.3
medium 53.9 63.6 80.3
small 39.3 18.0 21.1
private farms: 3345.7 3615.8 3721.9
o.w. large 66.8 62.5 69.9
medium 630.1 622.2 665.2
small 1972.2 1940.7 1981.4
Sources: Statistical monthly bulletin 1996-1998. Central Statistical Office o f Hungary.
farms has not grown markedly. In the case o f economic organisations the land use 
o f medium-scale companies has increased, whereas the land use o f large- and small- 
size corporations has fallen. The share o f land use in small-scale companies and 
large-size private farms— compared to total agricultural land use— can be neglected. 
This suggests that the concentration process in land use has stopped during this 
time (due mainly to the Land Law).
The change of agricultural structure
The number and distribution o f registered corporations in agriculture changed 
radically in the period under scrutiny. Until 1989 the agricultural company system 
was characterised by a predominance o f state farms and co-operatives. From 1990 
to 1998, the total number of registered corporations grew by more than five-fold. 
The number o f corporations increased at different rates in the various company 
categories.
The category o f (state) enterprise disappeared in 1996 due to privatisation. 
The most dynamic growth was shown by business association forms— absent from 
agriculture before— such as limited liability and join stock companies, which make 
up about 40 percent o f all agricultural corporations. The number o f co-operatives
2In 1994 the Central Statistical Office introduced a new typology to identify agricultural or­
ganizations. Small-size farms operate on less than 30 hectares and have less than 2.5 standard 
animal units; the corresponding values for medium-size farms are less than 300 hectares and less 
than 30 animal units; large-scale farms have more than 300 hectares land and more than 30 animal 
units.
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Table 6
Development of the number o f registered corporations in agriculture 1990-199¿P
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 2112 2994 3308 4639 5547 9409 9639 10722 11210
o.w. enterprise 171 150 122 91 36 33 - - -
company 535 1309 1581 2575 3342 4263 4008 4729 4921
o.w. ltd. 451 1212 1511 2434 3140 3636 3805 4516 4724
join-stock company 39 40 41 109 171 186 191 204 197
co-operative 1405 1485 1605 1971 2048 2117 1930 1915 1715
non-legal entity company - - - - - 2996 3009 3154 3382
Sources: Statistical monthly bulletin 1990-1996. The number of economic organisations 1997- 
1998. Central Statistical Office o f Hungary.
increased continuously until 1995, but over the last three years their number has 
fallen by about 20 percent. Owing to changes in the statistical accounting system 
the data referring to non-legal entity companies are available only from 1995. Over 
the last four years the number o f non-legal entity companies has increased by about 
10 percent. At the end o f the period analysed the share of limited liability and non- 
legal entity companies had reached about 75 percent o f all the registered companies. 
Probably, these types o f company are mainly small- or medium scale farms.
The rapid growth of the number o f agricultural companies and the radical 
decline o f the number o f agricultural workers led to a fundamental transformation 
in the size structure o f agricultural companies. At the end of the eighties, approx­
imately one-half o f the agricultural organisations had more than 300 employees. 
This was mainly due to the fact that co-operatives performed many activities over 
and above their basic ones. More than 90 percent o f the agricultural companies 
had a staff more than 50.
By 1998, these proportions had changed. The largest group consists o f cor­
porations with a staff below 20, whose relative proportion was about 85 percent 
in 1998 as a result o f the more than 230-fold increase o f registrations in this cate­
gory. The number o f 21 to 50 employee-corporations also grew, with a share o f 7 
percent by 1998. The number o f large-scale firms with more than 300 employees 
declined drastically; consequently, their proportion became minimal. The share of 
companies above 50 workers had not reached the level o f 10 percent in 1998.
3Registered corporation: legally existing unit with tax number, figuring in the administrative 
register. In 1996 the statistical nomenclature changed; since this time the data have shown the 
•'Umber o f active corporations. Active corporation: those enterprises which had tax reports in 
the subject year or in the preceding year (corporate tax, value added tax, etc.), or which were 
established in the reference year, and then registered as a budgetary, social security, non-profit 
a,ld Employees’ Co-ownership Programme organization.
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As a consequence o f transformation, the former extreme duality o f the Hun­
garian agricultural system has been moderated considerably. One can distinguish 
three main types o f farms. The first are what we might call industrial farms and co­
operatives. They stem from former state farms (currently join-stock companies), 
co-operatives and newly established agricultural firms. They have their origins 
mainly in the break-up of co-operatives into smaller units. Most corporations with 
above 50 employees belong to this category. The important characteristics o f these 
farms are based on hired labour and a hierarchical organisational structure. Despite 
transformation, these corporations have remained predominant in the Hungarian 
agricultural structure. They use about 40 percent of agricultural land and they 
have more than 100 thousand employees. The average area of these corporations 
was 1332 hectares in 1996.
Table 7
Distribution of agricultural organisations, according to number of employees 1990-1998?
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
-  10 1669 2420 3834 7256 8435 8958
11 -  20 413 1031 1471 991 1012 624 605 576 607
21 -  50 106 297 437 730 761 799 743 738 747
51 -  300 860 1060 1200 1188 1209 1061 963 906 817*
301 - 722 666 378 129 126 95 72 67 81**
Total 2101 3054 3486 4707 5528 6413 9639 10722 11210
*51-250
**251-
Sources: Statistical monthly bulletins 1990-1996. The number of economic organisations 1997- 
1998. Central Statistical Office of Hungary.
The second type is the private or family farm . They arise from: (1) the lands 
from former co-operative members and state-farm employees; (2) beneficiaries by 
compensation; (3) members seceding from co-operatives with their land; and (4) a 
combination o f the above. These farms are based on family labour (farmers and 
their family members) and some o f them also employ full-time and seasonal hired 
labour. However, it is difficult to determine the exact number of family farms. 
According to the last Agricultural Census (1994) there were 51 thousand full-time 
private farmers. They employ 10.9 thousand full-time and 20.6 thousand seasonal 
workers. The number o f private farms has increased probably over the last four 
years by about 10-20 percent (Kovács et. al. 1998). However, the number o f farmers
1The main sources o f the significant data difference for 1995, com pared to previous table, is 
that Table 7 does not contain non-legal entity companies.
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and farms do not necessarily coincide. In 1994 there were 1044 large-scale and 64.9 
thousand medium-size farms, exceeding the number o f registered full-time farmers 
by approximately 15 thousand.
On the other hand, the number of registered private farmers is markedly less. 
In 1998 the number of registered agricultural entrepreneurs was 27.9 thousand, out 
o f which full-time farms represent 15.1 thousand, part-time farms 7.7 thousand, 
and retired farms 5.1 thousand. Moreover, one can assume that non-legal entity 
companies are also family farms. Similarly, most o f the active corporations with 
less than 10 employees can be private farms as well. The number o f registered 
private farms is about 30-32 thousand. The large- and medium-size private farms 
were using about 12 percent o f the agricultural land in 1998 ( Table 5).
The third group is made up of the part-time farms, which play a traditionally 
significant role in the Hungarian agricultural structure. According to the Micro­
census (1994), 732 thousand active earners worked on their own land part-time. If 
one takes into account the inactive earners, the unemployed who work on their own 
land, pensioners and young people below 14 years of age, the number of people 
who are involved in agriculture was 1875 thousand. The number o f agricultural 
households was less, at 1069 thousand.
There are two main types of part-time farms. First, the agricultural house­
holds which produce basically for the markets. Some of them have specialised in 
particular commodities— e.g. pigs, fruits and vegetables. In 1997, 800 thousand 
people registered as primary producers. Most o f them produce a marketable sur­
plus. The results o f the survey by Szijjarto (1996) demonstrated that 40 percent of 
part-time farms produce for the market; this proportion was two-thirds in the case 
of retired part-time farmers. The second group can be called subsistence part-time 
farms. They number about 1 million. Their main production goal is to reduce 
household expenditure. However, some o f the subsistence part-time farms sell their 
products— depending on their surplus— seasonally on the local market. The data 
of the Hungarian Households Panel show that between 1992-1994 the share of sub­
sistence households increased from 34.4 percent to 44.4 percent (Spéder 1994). The 
growing role o f subsistence farming is confirmed by some regional studies (Spéder 
1997). However, recent research by Laki (1996) has shown that, in particular re­
gions, surprisingly, agricultural production is not a part o f a survival strategy to 
cope with rural unemployment.
The change in the structure of the food industry
Before 1989 the food industry was characterised by state-owned firms, but 
some companies worked as co-operatives. Privatisation has had a lundamental 
effect on the structure o f the food industry. First, the number o f corporations in
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the food industry grew from 1990 to 1997: more than 16-fold. The increase came 
mostly from newly established private enterprises and partly from privatisation. 
However, this development had stopped by 1998 ( Tables 9 -10). It can be seen from 
Table 8 that, between 1994-1998, the number o f partnerships and unincorporated 
enterprises and co-operatives decreased after 1995.
Table 8
Development o f the number o f active corporations in food industry
1994 1995 1997 1998
Total 3934 4353 4600 4442
o.w. limited liability company 2415 2731 2903 2775
join-stock company 226 235 247 245
partnerships and unincorporated enterprises 1168 1268 1255 1245
co-operatives 97 92 69 69
Sources: Oszoli (1998) The number of economic organisations 1997-1998, Central Statistical 
Office o f Hungary.
Table 9
Size distribution o f companies in the food industry, by number of employees 1989-19915
1989 1990 1991
1 -1 0 0 80 373 983
101-500 49 70 100
5 0 1 - 150 144 139
Total 279 587 1222
Sources: Statistical monthly bulletin 1989-1992. Central Statistical Office o f Hungary.
The most popular legal business form was the limited liability company in 
the food industry: its share reached 60 percent in 1998. The proportion o f joint- 
stock companies is below 6 percent, but they play a very important role in the food 
industry. The sharp increase in the number o f companies in the food industry has 
had significant effects on the size o f the industry. Table 9 shows that in 1989 about 
54 percent o f companies in the food industry had more than 500 employees. The 
share o f corporations with less than 100 employees represented only 28 percent of 
the total number o f companies. From 1992 to 1998 the corporations with a staff 
below 50 grew nearly threefold. The number o f corporations with 50 to 300 em­
ployees grew less, whereas the number of companies with more than 300 employees
JThe basic source o f the data difference for 1995 compared with Table 8, is that Table 10 does 
not contain companies with less than '20 employees.
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Table 10
Size distribution of companies in the food industry, by number of employees 1992-19985
1992 1993 1995 1997 1998
1 - 5 0 1376 1929 2662 4208 4038
51 -3 0 0 177 243 281 271 278*
3 0 1 - 201 179 148 121 126**
Total 1714 2351 3091 4600 4442
*50-250
**250-
Sources: Statistical monthly bulletin 1992-1996. The number of economic organisations 1997- 
1998. Central Statistical Office o f Hungary.
fell steadily. As a result o f these processes the share of different categories has 
changed. In 1998 the proportion of companies with less than 50 employees was 
about 90 percent, the category o f 51 to 250 employees was 6 percent and that with 
above 251 employees was 4 percent. The companies in the last group probably 
operate as join-stock companies. The data of the last two years suggest that a 
slow concentration process has started and this is confirmed by the decrease of 
small-scale companies.
As a result o f the transformation (including privatisation) there are three 
groups in the Hungarian food industry (Mohácsi 1996). First, there exist foreign- 
owned companies (mainly multinational firms). Foreign investors have played a 
very important role in privatisation, especially compared to other post-socialist 
countries.6 The proportion o f FDI is significant in the following sub-sectors: veg­
etable oil, sugar, tobacco, soft-drinks, brewing, distilling, wine, confectionary, poul­
try, and starch-biotechnology. These respective sub-sectors can be described by one 
° f  the following characteristics: stable domestic markets, monopolistic-oligopolistic 
market structure, or relatively simple production technology (Lakner and Somo- 
9yi 1997). These companies produce for the Hungarian domestic market and the 
export market. They have good information on international market trends, devel­
oped marketing strategies and techniques.
Second, there are medium- and small-scale companies (in accordance with in­
ternational measurements) most o f which are owned by Hungarian investors. These 
firms are mainly domestic market-oriented with strong links to Hungarian and 
Multinational food retailing companies.
Finally, there are small-scale corporations which are owned by agricultural 
Producers, local governments and other entrepreneurs. The activities of these firms 
f°cus primarily on regional markets. They sell their products mainly via regional
â5d local retail companies.______
°A  study by Josling et al (1997) shows that the share o f FDI in agri-food sectors in the 
llansitional countries was most significant in Poland and Hungary between 1990-1996.
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The obstacles facing adjustments in agri-food sectors
The production in agri-food sectors decreased significantly between 1990 and 
1993. It is generally agreed among agricultural economists that the causes are a 
combination o f particular factors: (1) decrease o f support for agriculture; (2) de­
clining agricultural terms o f trade; (3) imperfections of agricultural credit markets; 
(4) fall o f domestic food consumption; (5) collapse of COMECON markets; (6) 
disruption caused by land reform and privatisation; (7) weather in particular years;
(8) disruption o f the traditional exchange system within the agri-food system; and
(9) slow establishing o f new market institutions. The differences in the respective 
evaluations o f agricultural policy reform are based upon which factor is considered 
to have had the most significant effect in transition.
Despite a sharp decline in agricultural production, signs o f a recovery still 
looked only slight at the end o f 1998. A cross-country study by Macours and 
Swinnen (1997) has shown that between 1989 and 1994, in the case o f Hungary, 
positive effects due to increased productivity offset negative impacts caused by 
disruption o f former production structures.7 Most of the economic conditions for 
agri-food sectors have improved over the last four years. The agricultural terms of 
trade began to stabilise after 1992. Support for agriculture has grown continuously 
since 1993. The agricultural credit constructions have become more favourable. 
Food consumption has started to increase. Given these details, why does the output 
o f the agri-food sectors not increase much faster? The one possible key factor in 
explaining this phenomena is the slow restructuring o f the exchange system in the 
agri-food chain and the lack o f efficient and transparent agricultural markets.
It can be seen from Figure 1 that particular groups of agricultural produc­
ers use different market arrangements or pricing mechanisms to connect with the 
food industry. Industrial farms and co-operatives usually have a production con­
tract, sometimes long-term, with the food industry. They are rarely involved in 
the vertical integration offered by food industry companies. These farms can also 
sell their products on the organised markets. The products o f private farms are 
purchased mainly via organised markets, but they sometimes have production con­
tracts. Market-oriented part-time farmers sell their commodities basically through 
individual negotiations and organised markets. Subsistence part-time farmers do 
not sell their products, therefore they are not in Figure 1.
The choice among different pricing mechanisms depends mainly on the char­
acteristics of particular products (e.g. storable or non-storable). Vertical in t e g r a t io n  
is important in the poultry industry. The importance o f production contracts is 
considerable for milk, beef, pork, and some fruit and vegetables. The com m odity 
exchange market plays a significant role for grain. However, all types o f pricing
7It must be noted that results by Gow and Swinnen (1998) are from a study that covers only 
the grain sector.
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Fig. I Exchange systems within Hungarian agri-food system
mechanisms have special difficulties in current Hungarian agri-food systems. These 
failures cause inefficiencies within the agri-food chain.
In those sub-sectors where no type o f production contract exists, agricultural 
producers face the problems of delay8 (e.g. delayed payment for delivered products). 
These problems are stressed strongly by Gow and Swinnen (1998, 1998a).
Empirical evidence suggests that FDI in food industries encourages a solution 
of hold-up problems mainly via long-term contracts, especially in the cases o f to­
bacco, sugar brewing, vegetable oil, poultry, milk and confectionery (Kacsirek and 
Kóczián 1997, Lehota and Szűcs 1998). However, it must be noted that in some 
cases, where multinational firms have dominant market positions, they create a new 
type o f hold-up problem— for example, ex-post reduction o f the contract price.
The use o f organised markets causes some difficulties. Despite the growing 
importance o f the commodity exchange market, it is not suitable for reasonable 
risk-sharing strategies for farmers. The grain exchange market reacts very slowly 
°r irregularly to changes in the world markets. For example, it occurs often that 
World prices increase and domestic prices decline on the commodity exchange mar­
kets and vice versa (see, for example, Cochrane 1996). Furthermore, there is no 
sUch government intervention system which is able to secure efficiently the rea- 
s°nable floor price on the grain market. Also, no crop insurance system works in 
Hungary. Hence the grain producers face considerable market uncertainties every
8 “Hold-up problems occur when one o f the parties has incentives to initiate ex post renegotia- 
*•'0118 o f  contractual terms in an attempt to extract a greater proportion of the quasi-rents accruing 
to the relationship-specific investment.” (Gow and Swinnen 1998, p. 4.)
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year. Consequently they cannot share production risks due to the lack o f efficient 
market institutions.
Auction markets are not transparent and are often isolated. Sometime signif­
icant price differences and fluctuations can be found which can only be explained 
by transport costs or other local characteristics. However, the private farms and 
market oriented part-time farmers react very responsively to the price changes. It 
should be remembered that the share o f private farmers and part-time farmers is 
estimated at 57 percent in total agricultural production.
It can be seen that only a low proportion o f agricultural producers have 
table linkages with the food industry. Furthermore, a majority o f farmers face 
significant market uncertainties in dominant sub-sectors, yet without having the 
benefit o f reasonable risk-sharing techniques. It follows from this that the situation 
of many farmers has not yet stabilised after nine years of transformation; therefore 
their output fluctuates considerably. Hence, total agricultural production is not 
able to exhibit a sustainable increase. Nevertheless, in some sub-sectors strong 
development can be found.
Conclusions
The first years o f agricultural policy reforms in Hungary have been charac­
terised by a large decrease in agri-food output. Despite desirable structural changes 
in both agriculture and the food industry and the growth in productivity, and more 
favourable economic conditions, production has risen only slightly over the last four 
years. This phenomena can be interpreted as part o f the process o f development of 
a smaller and more efficient agri-food sector.
The key factor is the underdeveloped pricing mechanisms within the agri-food 
chain. Empirical evidence suggests that multinational firms and other large-scale 
companies in the food industry can solve some inefficiencies, including hold-up 
problems. However, their activities can cover only a small proportion o f the Hun­
garian agri-food sectors. The majority o f farmers are not able to adjust efficiently 
to the continuously changing economic environment. Their problems cannot be 
solved simply by government support. Consequently, without establishing and de­
veloping efficient and transparent market institutions, it cannot be assumed that 
sustainable growth in agri-food sectors is guaranteed. The main conclusion o f this 
analysis reinforces the conclusions o f Cow and Swinnen (1998)— that is, the focus 
of government activities should move from predatory-type subsidies to productive- 
type support; that latter would decrease the transaction costs o f exchange systems 
within agri-food sectors.
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REGIONAL EFFECTS OF FDI-INFLOWS IN HUNGARY
J. HAMAE
This article summarises the research results o f a study (Hamar 1998a) which began in 1998; 
the study aims to measure the real and changing effects o f  foreign direct investment (FDI)-infiows 
in Hungary according to the respective Hungarian regions, and to identify the main factors of 
differences in the FDI-attractiveness of those regions. Looking for the answer whether FDI-inflows 
have increased the “splitting o f the country into two parts” or, on the contrary, have contributed 
to a narrowing o f the gap in the development ability o f the respective regions, our research 
results do not suggest that there are growing differences between the regions. However, some 
border areas have obvious disadvantages in FDI-attractiveness, and our analyses underlined the 
overwhelming dominance o f Budapest in the respective cases of almost every factor.1 Nevertheless, 
our analyses show that the FDI-inflows outside the capital, even if they seemed to be almost 
negligible compared to the amount invested in Budapest, have contributed significantly to county 
development, lessened the unemployment level in nearly every county, increased export-ability and 
-orientation and improved com pany performance. At the same time, the foreign capital owners 
have gained a determinant role almost in each economic activity.
The regional characteristics o f the FDI-inflows are summarised in Hungary as research 
results showing each double accounting firm's (legal and non-legal entity’s) balance sheets as 
presented to the Tax Office.
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Tlie distribution and changes ill the number of joint ventures (JVs), FDI-stock 
and company assets by comities"’
FDI-inflows have focused on Budapest since the beginning o f the transition: 
up to the end o f 1992 more than 57 percent o f total FDI-stock was invested in firms 
with headquarters located in Budapest. Out o f the total number o f partially or to­
tally foreign-owned (12,363) firms 7,069 (57 percent) were registered in Budapest. 
Distribution o f the statuary capital o f the JVs (partially and totally foreign-owned 
firms together) was also concentrated in Budapest in the same proportion (58 per­
cent). While, as a country average, every fifth company had FDI at that time, 
*n Budapest this share was more than 28 percent. The FDI-value had already 
reached almost 11 percent o f the statuary capital o f all (more than 25,000) firms 
•n Budapest. With this share o f FDI the foreign capital owners could control more
'T h is  is, however, also exaggerated by technical facts. (The only possible statistical base for 
the analyses is the double accounting firms' tax reports, these are based on the location of the 
headquarters o f  the firms, and not on that o f the activities, or plants.)
2Since the formation o f  the new regions (in line with EU) is under discussion, this article uses 
the terms “regions" and “counties" as synonyms.
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than double this amount o f capital (the share o f the total capital o f the JVs as a 
proportion o f the total amount o f the statuary capital o f all firms was 19 percent).
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Fig. 1 FDI-inflows by regions, 1992
Fig. 2 FDI-inflows by regions, 1996
These outstanding shares, however, did not indicate any special behaviour 
on the part o f foreign investors. Budapest had a dominant role in almost every 
respect. The share o f the capital in the FDI-inflows in 1992 was only 3 percent 
greater than the share o f the total capital o f all Budapest firms; the FDI share in 
all statuary capital (SC) was only 0.5 percent higher than the national average.
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While these differences in the West Hungary (in Vas county) were +14 percentage 
points, in Fejér county they were near to +5, and in Nógrád and Pest counties there 
were also more than +3 percentage points.
It is worth mentioning— and it was different from what we expected— that 
the largest investments did not happen in Budapest even up to the end o f 1992. 
While the aggregated capital strength o f all Budapest firms surpassed the national 
average by 25 percent, in the case of the JVs, this gap was only 1 percent, and 
the average amount o f FDI invested in Budapest firms (30 million HUF, as a firm 
average) was similar to the national one. In contrast to Budapest, in Borsod-Abaúj 
county (Northeast), where relatively few companies (9 percent o f all firms) had 
received any FDI up to the end o f 1992, the average level o f FDI per firms— 80 
million HUF— was more than 2.5 times higher than the national or the Budapest 
average. This amount was more than 50 million HUF also in Fejér, Heves, and 
Békés counties, but Nógrád, Jász-Nagykun, and Vas counties also reached near to 
50 million HUF.
The picture had changed significantly by 1996, however, with FDI-inflows 
concentrated further on Budapest (59 percent). The largest number o f the JVs 
had also been established in Budapest (out of the 105,717 double accounting firms 
20,278 already had FDI in 1996, and out of these, 11,282 were registered in Bu­
dapest). The value o f the total FDI-stock also increased by four times (by 442 
percent, while the national growth rate was an average o f 430 percent). The out­
standing role o f Budapest, however, was mainly due to the multiplication o f the 
capital strength o f the Budapest companies (both the respective average values 
o f the total statuary capital and the FDI invested in a firm), mainly as a conse­
quence o f the increasing capital accumulation in the financial sector (predominantly 
focused on Budapest) and as a result o f its opening up process for foreign investors.
The average capital o f firms in Budapest increased 75 times in four years; 
firms with foreign capital raised their average capital amount by 87 times, and the 
average value o f FDI increased more than 100 times, from 30 million to 3.1 billion 
HUF between 1992-1996; the national average was only 79 million HUF in 1996.
In Budapest, as with the national tendencies, more companies were formed 
without foreign capital between 1992-1996 (the number of indigenous firms in­
creased from 18 thousand to almost 34 thousand), while the number of companies 
with FDI increased by “only” 60 percent (from 7,069 to 11,282). Therefore, the 
share o f Budapest in the number o f all JVs slightly decreased (to 56 percent), while 
according to the value o f the FDI its share increased further (to 59 percent).
Considering the growth rate o f the number o f firms with foreign capital, 
some counties— such as Heves (213 percent), Somogy (200 percent), Győr-Sopron 
and Zala counties (199 percent)— produced much higher increases than the capital,
°i' the national average during 1992-1996. In Vas- and Győr-Sopron counties more 
than one-quarter o f the firms (26-27 percent) were already operating with foreign 
capital in 1996.
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The rate o f FDI to firms’ total assets in 1996 reached the highest proportion in 
Vas county (47 percent), but the national average (32 percent) (or the 33 percent 
share in Budapest) also was significantly surpassed in Borsod-Abaúj, Pest and 
Győr-Sopron counties (39 percent), and also in Heves, Komárom and Fejér counties 
(35 percent). The foreign capital owners could control more than half o f the total 
company assets in several counties (such as: Győr, Heves, Borsod, Csongrád, and 
Vas counties), and the capital strength of the JVs in Zala, Baranya, Pest and 
Hajdú-Bihar counties was quite similar to the Budapest share o f 46 percent.
Employment and the unemployment rate
The double accounting firms employed altogether 2,250 thousand persons in 
1992. Out o f this total 39 percent (887 thousand) were employed in Budapest. 
The number o f people (345 thousand) employed by the JVs (firms with foreign 
capital) accounted for 15 percent o f the total employment at the national level; 
out o f this figure 49 percent— almost every second person— worked in Budapest. 
Out o f the total employment o f Budapest almost every fifth person (19 percent) 
worked for a foreign-owned firm. The share o f the employment o f the JVs to the 
total by counties was higher than Budapest only in Borsod county, where every 
fourth person belonged to a foreign or partially foreign-owned firm already in 1992. 
The JVs also had a larger role in employment than the national average in Vas, 
Baranya and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok counties (17-16 percent), and it reached almost 
the national rate (15 percent) in Győr-Moson-Sopron county. In contrast to this, 
less than 6 percent o f the total respective workforces could find employment at the 
JVs in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Békés counties; this proportion in Tolna was 8 
percent, in Somogy 9 percent, and Veszprém, Pest, and Hajdú-Bihar counties also 
had a rate o f only around 10 percent.
By the end o f 1996, the differences in firm size by counties had significantly 
decreased. The indigenous and the foreign-owned firms showed definite and sig­
nificant tendency alterations: while the average size o f all companies country-wide 
decreased almost by a half (from 39 persons to 18 per firm) by 1996, the JVs’ 
average size remained the same as in 1992 (28 capita as a national average).
In some counties the size o f the JVs increased: in Fejér, Békés, Hajdú, and 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties the increases were significant; in Vas, Komárom, 
Pest, Veszprém, and Zala counties (similarly to Budapest) the expansion in size 
of the JVs was modest (about 10 percent or less). The opposite tendency was 
registered in Borsod and Jász-Nagykun counties, where it decreased by a half; a 
decrease in size also characterised the JVs in Baranya, Bács-Kiskun, Győr-Sopron, 
Nógrád and Tolna counties.
A cta  O economica 50, 1999
J. H AM AR: REGIONAL EFFECTS OF FDI-INFLOWS IN HUNGARY 173
The smaller size o f the JVs in Budapest was mainly due to the fact that the 
FDI flowed to the service sectors rather than to industry, while in the counties men­
tioned above it was invested into industrial sectors, with mainly labour-intensive 
activities.
It is important to mention that while the total number employed by all (dou­
ble accounting) firms further decreased in the period 1992-1996 (by almost 14 per­
cent as a national average), the partially or totally foreign-owned firms increased 
their employment one and half times by 1996, compared to the employment level 
o f 1992 (the growth rate o f employment in the JVs was 162 percent). The to­
tal number o f employees in Budapest decreased by 15 percent, while the average 
employment level o f the JVs increased by 169 percent.
The tendencies in the total employment level and that o f the JVs showed 
quite strong links. Fejér county was the only one where there was no decline in 
the total level o f employment during the four year period— in fact, an increase 
o f 6 percent was registered. This is certainly connected with the fact that the 
JVs expanded here at the most dynamic rate (255 percent). The lowest falls (less 
than ten percent) in the employment level were generally found in those counties 
where the JVs had at least doubled their number of workers (such as in Somogy, 
Vas, Veszprém and Győr-Moson-Sopron counties). The increasing role o f the JVs 
in employment certainly reduced the deterioration of the labour market situation 
to a significant extent in Zala, Heves and Pest counties, too. The largest fall in 
employment (30 percent) happened in Borsod. However, here the JVs also reduced 
the total number empoyed by them by a similar degree (28 percent).
These general tendencies brought about a situation in which, out o f a total 
number o f persons (1,947 thousand) employed by all (double accounting) firms in 
1996, more than 749 thousand worked in Budapest; out o f this figure 283 thousand 
were working in firms operating with foreign capital (38 percent, compared to the 
national average o f 29 percent).
In 1996 more than half o f the persons employed by all JVs worked for firms 
located in Budapest. Nevertheless, Nógrád and Tolna counties could not reach even 
a one percent share, and the largest share of Győr-Sopron county remained under 
five percent. However, the role o f the JVs in the counties’ employment increased 
almost everywhere in the period in question. 29 percent o f the total labour force 
Worked for foreign-owned firms (as a national average). In 1996 JVs reached an 
exceptionally high share in Vas county (39 percent) and in Budapest (38 percent), 
but, in Győr and Heves counties every third person was employed by a JV, in Zala 
and Komárom counties JVs accounted for 28 percent o f the total employment, and 
>n Baranya, Borsod, Csongrád counties every fourth person was employed by a 
Partially or totally foreign-owned firm.
The FDI-infiows had, significantly, the most modest role in reducing employ­
ment problems in Tolna (12 percent), Békés, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (16 percent), 
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and Somogy counties (19 percent).
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By comparing the share o f the JVs in employment to the data o f unemploy­
ment rates (for 1997) by counties, the positive effects o f FDI-inflows on employment 
levels are clearly proved; however, the regional distribution and labour-market ef­
fects o f FDI have also been determined by other factors (such as the structural 
differences and changes according to the labour-intensity and productivity, as will 
be mentioned below).
The unemployment rate, even in 1997, was highest in Borsod county (7.2 
percent o f the population o f 15-74 year olds). Here, as was mentioned above, even 
JVs laid off employees at a rapid rate (28 percent of the total) during the four years. 
However, the role o f the JVs in employment also increased here. Every fourth per­
son in the total employment o f the county worked for a foreign-owned firm in 1996. 
Those counties where the JVs’ share in employment remained relatively modest 
(less than 20 percent) even in 1996, the unemployment rate surpassed 5 percent 
(with the exception o f Bács county, where the rate o f unemployment was only 4 
percent). Whereas in Vas county, where the JVs reached an exceptionally high pro­
portion in employment, the unemployment rate was significantly the lowest, only
2.5 percent. Similar links could be registered in Győr-Sopron and Pest counties, 
and in Budapest (in the first two cases the respective unemployment rates were 3.5 
percent, while in Budapest it was 3.9 percent in 1997). Heves, Fejér, and Komárom 
counties showed an opposite tendency; despite the high proportion of JVs account­
ing for employment, the rate of unemployment remained relatively high (more than 
4 percent).
FDI-inflows and salaries
The foreign-owned firms generally pay more as wages and salaries to their 
workers than the indigenous firms. This was characteristic for the whole country: 
the JVs contributed by a much higher proportion (41 percent) to the wage- and 
salary payments than to the total employment figures (29 percent). A similar ten­
dency could be measured in their health, social security and pension contributions, 
too. In 1992 the average payment o f a JV, as total wage- and salary expenses per 
capita, was more than 25 percent o f the total average (0.5 million HUF per capita), 
and more than the average for all firms (0.4 million HUF per capita).
This gap in Budapest was even larger: even the all-Budapest companies 
paid more in wages and salaries altogether than the national average (0.5 million 
HUF per capita), and the JVs’ “human expenses” were much higher (by almost 30 
percent, at 0.7 million HUF per capita).
Despite the higher per capita wage-expenses the JVs (across the whole coun­
try and in Budapest also) paid out relatively less as wages and salaries (relative to 
their net income on sales) than their indigenous counterparts (13 percent, whereas
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the national average was 16 percent). By 1996, this gap had increased further. The 
JVs tended to specialise on less labour-intensive activities; however, they (nation­
wide and in Budapest) paid out twice as much on wages and salaries than all firms, 
and more in Budapest than in other parts o f the country.
In 1996, the JVs in Budapest paid 1.5 million HUF per capita as average 
salary expenses, and 1.3 million HUF per capita nationwide, whereas the figure for 
all firms was 0.9 million HUF/capita (as a national average salary payment), and 
1.1 million HUF/capita in Budapest. However, these higher per capita expenses 
represent an even smaller part o f their net income on sales (only 10 percent) in 
1996, than in 1992.
The distribution o f wages and that o f social security contributions depended 
heavily not only on the different role o f the JVs by counties but on the structural dif­
ferences according to economic activities (sectors). Budapest’s outstanding share in 
wage and salary expenses and in social contributions (besides the distorting effects 
of the methods o f the registration o f a firm and the location o f its headquarters) 
can partly be explained by the fact that financial intermediation and other better 
paid activities are dominantly focused on the capital city.
It is worth mentioning that the wage-increase in Budapest was nowhere near 
the highest during the four year period: the national average growth rate was 
82 percent, while in Budapest it was “only” 80 percent. (The health and pension 
contributions increased, like the national average, by 81 percent.) There were much 
higher increases in wage levels in almost half o f the counties than was the case in 
Budapest, or compared to the national average (especially in Fejér, Vas, Veszprém, 
Heves, Győr-Sopron, and Borsod counties). The “negative record” in this field was 
“produced” again in this respect by Szabolcs-Szatmár, Hajdú-Bihar, Komárom and 
Somogy counties.
The expenses o f the JVs (with respect to contributions to healthcare and 
Pension funds) increased much faster almost everywhere: they paid twice, three 
°r four times more in 1996 than their contributions in 1992 (the national average 
increase was 386 percent), and their average was more than that for all firms. This 
means that the firms with foreign capital contributed significantly to the increase 
•n personal incomes and to social security, health and pensions everywhere. The 
rankings o f the counties were quite similar to the rankings for all firms.
At the same time, there were some interesting and important differences 
between the tendencies in wage and salary expenses and that of the health and 
social security payments: in the case o f all firms these two items increased at 
the same rate and in parallel; while the dynamics o f the health-care and social 
security contributions o f JVs (403 percent) greatly surpassed their wage and salary 
Payment increase (386 percent). This was characteristic for all counties (with the 
e*ception o f Zala). This gap between the dynamics o f health and social security 
c°ntributions and that o f salary increases was largest in Heves (+48 percent), Fejér 
(+45 percent), Baranya and Pest (+25 percent), Somogy and Vas counties (+20
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percent). Budapest showed a similar gap, with respect to the national average (+18 
percentage points), between the growth rate of these two items.
The share o f JVs in the wage- and salary income for the whole country reached
41 percent in 1996, while in Budapest it was 51 percent, and in Vas and Heves 
counties it was 46 percent and 43 percent respectively. One-third o f the total 
personal income originated from foreign-owned firms in half of the counties, and 
their proportion in the other counties was at least one-fifth (with the exception of 
Tolna).
Net income on sales (NIS) and exports
The deepest point o f the transitional crises was 1992. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the net income on sales (NIS) had increased across the country two 
and half times by 1996, and at least doubled in each county (with the exception 
o f Tolna, where the NIS was “only” higher by 197 percent in 1996 than in 1992.) 
The value o f the NIS increased most dynamically in Vas county (3.5 times), and in 
Pest and Fejér counties it tripled.
The expansion o f the JVs characterised the whole country: the value o f the 
NIS produced by the JVs increased almost five times as a national average. The 
JVs in each county produced several times higher NIS in 1996 than in 1992 (again, 
with the exception o f Tolna) and the increase was much higher than that for all 
companies.
The NIS o f JVs in Vas, Fejér and Baranya counties increased more than eight 
times, in Borsod seven times, in Győr-Sopron, Pest and Zala counties it was six 
times higher in 1996 than in 1992, and in Hajdu-Bihar this was almost the same; 
but in Veszprém, Somogy, Komárom and Csongrád counties, the contribution of 
JVs to sales development was more than the average for all firms. The increase 
o f the Budapest JVs, however, was less dynamic than the national average, but it 
still reached a more than 4.5 times higher value in 1996 than in 1992. The dynamic 
effect o f the JVs even in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county was not negligible; here 
the NIS also increased four times, as in Heves and Baranya. In Békés county the 
growth o f the NIS was also 3.5 times. The JVs o f Nógrád, Bács-Kiskun and Jász- 
Nagykun-Szolnok counties expanded at a more modest rate. However, there was 
only one county (Tolna) where the indigenous firms developed their sales faster 
than the JVs (197 percent in contrast to 181 percent).
The share o f JVs in sales increased at a high rate in all counties (with the 
exception o f Tolna). (The national average increased from 24 percent to 47 percent, 
and respective figures for Budapest were 32 percent to 57 percent.)
The differences according to counties decreased significantly over the four 
years. However, Budapest kept its dominant share in sales for all companies. (1" 
1996 half o f the total income on sales o f all companies was produced by firms reg is­
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tered in Budapest, one point higher than in 1992.) In contrast, the JVs registered 
in Budapest had noticeably lost their positions (by almost four percentage points), 
but they still had 60 percent of the NIS produced by all JVs. This proportion was 
still much higher than their share according to the number of JVs, or that o f wages 
or employment.
By comparing the development in NIS and in exports by counties and ac­
cording to the different company groups, it turned out that, the income on sales in­
creased rapidly in those counties where the exports— and mainly the JVs’exports—  
expanded at a significant rate.
In Fejér and Borsod counties export-expansion grew more than 20 times; 
Pest, Győr-Sopron and Komárom counties produced ten times higher exports than 
four years earlier, but even in the other regions the export-growth reached a value 
at least four-five times higher in 1996 than in 1992. In Tolna and Békés exports 
grew “only” 3.5 times, and the most modest (3 times) expansion was registered in 
Nógrád and Jász-Nagykun counties, respectively.
As a result o f the spectacular export-expansion, the JVs gained dominant 
positions in nearly all counties: their share in the total national exports reached 
71 percent in 1996, but in several counties they dominated almost all the export 
markets (such as in Vas county at 94 percent, and in Fejér, Komárom, and Pest 
counties all with more than an 80 percent share).
The earlier dominant position o f Budapest (both in total exports and in 
exports made by JVs) declined significantly between 1992 and 1996 (by 13 and 19 
Percentage points respectively). This change was certainly due to the new export- 
capacity o f “green-field investments” made outside Budapest by foreign investors, 
and also to the rapid development o f the Free Trade Zones.
The spectacular export-expansion over the last few years is frequently con­
sidered as a result o f the activities o f some (few) large multinationals. However, 
the standard deviation o f the NIS and the exports per company indicates a much 
more sophisticated picture. The concentration o f the NIS and especially that of the 
exports in Budapest decreased significantly between 1992-1996. In Jász-Nagykun 
county, also, where in 1992 the average export-value o f the JVs (per firm) was al­
most three times higher than the national average, this figure had declined to 151 
Percent by 1996. (Hajdú-Bihar, Heves, Nógrád, Csongrád, Bács-Kiskun, Veszprém, 
Zala counties showed the same tendencies, albeit by a smaller degree.) On the other 
hand, in Fejér county the average export-value per firm compared to the national 
Average increased from 124 percent to almost five times higher than that average 
('191.1 percent). The same tendency o f the increasing concentration of exports in a 
smaller number o f companies could also be measured in some counties (such as in 
county— from 175 percent to 387 percent, in Borsod— from 68 percent to 311 
Percent, and in Komárom county— from 97 percent to 166 percent).
Considering our calculations on the degree o f the “openness” of the counties,
^ e  export-orientation (i.e. export share compared to NIS) was in 1992 only 14
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percent of the country average (and in the case o f JVs it-was only ‘21 percent). 
The same proportions in Budapest were 15 percent and 20 percent respectively. In 
certain counties, however, where the JVs already had an extra role in exports (for 
instance in Vas, Békés, Fejér, and Nogrâd counties), the dependence on export- 
markets was already much higher than it was for the whole economy. By 1996 the 
export-orientation had grown rapidly everywhere (except Budapest), but especially 
in those counties where the JVs had acted as a catalyst in export-expansion.
In Vas county, for instance, more than half o f the NIS was earned through 
export-markets and the JVs exported three-quarters o f their production. The 
export-orientation in Fejér county also reached one-third of the total NIS, and in the 
case o f the JVs the export-share in relation to their NIS was 59 percent. In Somogy 
county it was also the JVs which were the “engine” of export-development: the av­
erage degree o f the openness in this county increased by ten percentage point during 
the four years, but it was still a modest level (less than 20 percent) compared to the 
national average; the JVs, on the other hand, had an average export-orientation 
higher than 50 percent. It is also interesting that the export-orientation in Zala, 
Csongrâd, Hajdu-Bihar, and Veszprém counties increased (albeit at a modest rate), 
while the export/NIS in the JVs declined. In other words, the indigenous firms were 
able to increase their export-orientation more than the JVs.
Budapest showed a different tendency in the development o f export-ability: 
here, all companies, including the JVs, became relatively less export-oriented in 
1996 than in 1992, and the level o f export-orientation was also the lowest in the 
country. This was especially remarkable in the case o f the JVs. This indicates that 
the focus o f the development o f export and total sales seemed to move away from 
Budapest (for instance, to the Free Trade Zones).
Performance and profit-taxes
The more efficient company performance of firms with foreign capital (as in 
the national economy) could be measured by each county, too. At the deepest 
point o f the crises, in 1992, however, the majority o f the JVs— as with all double 
accounting firms— in general, produced losses.
As a result o f the character o f Budapest, as a “centraliser” for firms, the 
majority o f the losses were also produced in the capital (47 percent o f the total 
value o f all losses, and 56 percent o f the losses for all JVs). The second “ loss- 
maker” county was Borsod, where the few JVs accumulated one-quarter o f all losses 
produced in the whole economy. At the same time, Gyor-Moson-Sopron county was 
the only county where all firms, including JVs, reached results which on average 
were positive in 1992.
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Table 1
Export-orientation by counties between 1992-1996 
(export-income to the net. income on sales, percentage)
Export-orientation 1992 1996
percentage All companies Joint ventures All companies Joint ventures
Total 13.9 21.3 17.3 26.0
Budapest capital 15.2 19.8 14.1 17.4
Baranya 8.3 17.9 12.8 24.3
Bcs-Kiskun 13.4 30.5 15.8 43.4
Bks 17.2 38.7 18.3 38.9
Borsod-Abaj-Zempln 13.8 9.6 17.3 30.9
Csongrd 9.5 27.3 12.6 22.9
Fejr 17.8 19.8 34.2 59.4
Gyr-Moson-Sopron 16.3 20.8 28.8 39.6
Hajd-Bihar 10.1 27.6 11.2 19.5
Heves 11.8 17.8 14.1 22.2
Komrom-Esztergom 10.8 16.6 20.4 33.3
Ngrd 17.6 30.8 17.5 33.4
Pest 9.1 16.3 18.6 37.4
Somogy 9.9 28.5 19.8 52.0
Szabolcs-Szatmr-Bereg 13.8 26.3 18.2 36.2
Jsz-Nagykun-Szolnok 12.7 30.9 16.8 34.7
Tolna 8.8 19.7 10.9 37.1
Vas 18.2 42.1 51.6 73.9
Veszprm 14.4 35.7 17.5 27.1
Zala 12.8 36.4 15.0 25.0
Source: Tax Office, and KOPIN T-DATORG, double accounting firms balance sheets, and own 
calculations
The average size o f losses for all firms before taxes was highest in Borsod 
in 1992 (8 million HUF); this was two and half times greater than the national 
average (3 million HUF), and two times larger than the average losses in Budapest 
(4 million HUF).
The JVs’ performances varied by counties on an even larger scale. While out 
° f  the total negative results o f the double accounting firms in the whole country 
before taxes only 10 percent was made by the JVs, this share of the JVs’ losses 
reached one-fifth in Budapest, Békés and Heves counties, and almost one-third in 
Jász-Nagykun, Zala and Komárom counties. The JVs were “responsible” for almost 
half o f the total losses in Fejér and Borsod (42 percent, and 45 percent respectively). 
On the other hand, in Győr-Moson-Sopron county the JVs had positive results be­
fore taxes— one and half time higher than the average for all firms in the county, 
h  Tolna, the JVs reached almost the same positive results as the negative value
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for all other firms. In several JVs counties lessened significantly the overall size of 
the losses.
Company results strongly improved in the average o f each company group 
between 1992-1996. Both the JVs and all other firms on average had positive 
results (before taxation) in all counties in 1996. The national average for all other 
firms produced two times higher positive results in 1996 than the value o f the 
average losses for 1992 in the case o f their group, whereas in the case of the JVs 
the positive results were nine times higher than the 1992 average for the JVs, and 
ten times higher in Budapest. Out o f the total profit for all firms, 46 percent was 
produced by the firms registered in Budapest, and out o f the total profit of the JVs 
64 percent originated in the capital city.
The most significant development was registered in Borsod, where the average 
losses o f the JVs in 1992 was 15 times higher than the national average, while the 
average profit per firm in 1996 was twice the size o f the national average.
The better performance o f the JVs over their national counterparts was 
clearly recognisable in the whole economy: the main economic indicators per firm 
proved that the average positive results (before taxation) per firm reached 3.5 mil­
lion HUF in 1996, while in the case of the JVs the figure was 14.5 million HUF. The 
difference in Budapest was even more striking: the all Budapest firms also reached 
better results than the national average (3.8 million HUF), and the results o f the 
JVs in Budapest were really outstanding (16.6 million HUF) compared with the 
national average and that o f all other Budapest firms.
By comparing the company results before and after taxation, we can form a 
picture about the distribution of the tax burden by counties. It turned out that 
the rank order o f the counties according to company results (in 1992 losses, and 
profits in 1996) was quite similar after taxation with respect to the situation before 
it. However, some counties illustrated rather interesting deviations in this field: for 
instance in Budapest, all Budapest firms produced 41 percent o f the total profit 
after taxation (4 percent less than before taxation), and the JVs in Budapest had 
62 percent o f the total profit produced by all JVs after taxation (this represents
1.5 percent less than before taxation). Thus the tax burden in general was higher 
in Budapest than the average for the whole country. On the other hand, in some 
counties— such as Vas, Pest, Fejér, Győr-Sopron, Somogy, Jász-Nagykun— the firms 
could keep a larger part o f the profit after taxation. (And the indigenous firms 
generally enjoyed a larger rate o f tax-deduction than that o f the JVs, while in 
Budapest the case was the opposite.)
In 1992, the negative results of the firms after taxation were much higher than 
before it. In 1996, in general the paid taxes significantly reduced the d isp o sa b le  
profit-income o f firms (with a large standard deviation by counties). Due to the 
balance of tax holidays and extra taxes, all firms received profit-income which 
was in general less by 32 percent; this figure for the JVs was 18 percent. The 
JVs’ contribution to the profit-income was significant everywhere, even determinant
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in some counties (such as in Vas and Pest counties). The JVs in Budapest and 
Komárom produced positive results after taxation and these were much greater 
than the national average for all firms. Nógrád was the only county where the JVs 
produced negative results as an aggregated average even in 1996, and the value of 
losses was almost four times larger (before taxation, and twice as much after it) 
than the total losses produced by all firms in this county.
The JVs’contribution to the county profit-tax-income was negligible in 1992 
in several counties.3 However, in Budapest, out o f the modest profit-tax-income 
89 percent came from the JVs’ profit-tax-payments. By 1996, the JVs’contribution 
had become determinant everywhere in the country despite the fact that several 
among them were still enjoying generous tax-holidays. Out of total tax-payments, 
57 percent was paid by Budapest firms, and in the case o f JVs this proportion 
increased from around 33 percent to 71 percent in four years.
The average tax-payment for all firms— similar to the rates per firm— was 1.1 
million HUF, and it reached 1.5 million HUF in the case o f the JVs. In Budapest, 
the same rates were 2.6 and 3.3 million HUF, respectively.
By 1996, the JVs’contribution to the county tax-income had become signif­
icant in each o f the counties. For instance, in Borsod, the JVs paid 61 percent of 
all tax-income collected in the county, much higher than the nation average o f 45 
percent, or that o f 56 percent in Budapest; in Veszprém 48 percent, in Vas county
42 percent, in Heves 37 percent, and in Győr-Sopron more than 30 percent o f total 
taxes in these respective counties were paid by JVs. A modest tax-contribution 
from JVs was recorded in Békés, Bács-Iviskun, Fejér, Szabolcs, Jász-Nagykun and 
Tolna counties, respectively.
FDI-inflows and structural changes by sectors
The outstanding role o f Budapest in FDI-attractiveness also determined the 
national trend o f the FDI-inflows and its sectoral structure. Budapest was and is 
characterised by a much lower level o f “material” activities (such as agriculture, 
fishing, mining, manufacturing, construction, and even public utilities) than in the 
whole economy. However, in the capital city a much greater proportion o f firms 
specialise in services (with the exception o f hotels, restaurants, postal services and 
transportation) than the national average. These differences, both in the number of 
all firms and that o f JVs, can be clearly measured; the activities of firms operating 
with foreign capital showed almost the same structure as all Budapest firms.
3In this, the fact that the registration offices for firms in the counties were formed first only
10 1992 certainly had an important role, too. Therefore, at that time the majority o f  JVs were 
°bviously formed and paid taxes in Budapest.
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Table 2
The role of FDI in tctx-payrnents between 1992-1996 
(distribution ancl shares, percentage)
Paid taxes, Distribution Shares
percentage 1992 1996 JV /A ll
all JV all JV 1992 1996
companies companies
Totál 100 100 100 100 4.4 44.7
Budapest 1.5 30.5 56.7 70.9 88.6 56.0
Baranya 6.9 3.9 1.8 0.9 2.5 21.0
Bcs-Kiskun 8.2 53.9 2.3 0.8 28.9 15.8
Bks 1.9 0.8 1.7 0.5 1.9 13.3
Borsod-Abaj 3.9 0.7 5.3 7.2 0.8 60.8
Csongrd 5.5 0.0 2.3 1.1 0.0 21.3
Fejr 5.7 0.0 2.6 1.0 0.0 17.4
Gyr-M oson-Sopron 11.0 4.8 3.6 2.6 1.9 31.9
Hajd-Bihar 0.4 0.0 2.7 1.2 0.0 20.4
Heves 1.1 0.0 1.2 1.0 0.0 37.1
Komrom 3.1 5.2 1.9 1.1 7.2 27.5
Ngrd 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 28.1
Pest 3.9 0.0 5.3 3.4 0.0 28.8
Somogy 4.2 0.0 1.2 0.6 0.0 20.7
Szabolcs-Szatmr 2.2 0.0 1.6 0.7 0.0 18.5
Jsz-Nagykun 0.1 0.0 1.7 0.7 0.0 18.2
Tolna 35.8 0.0 1.6 0.7 0.0 19.4
Vas 0.4 0.0 1.8 1.7 0.0 42.1
Veszprm 1.6 0.0 2.6 2.8 0.0 48.3
Zala 2.3 0.0 1.7 0.9 0.0 24.0
Sources are the same as those cited in the previous table.
The greatest number o f JVs were formed in Budapest (about the same as 
the national average) in trade (53 percent according to the number o f JVs) and in 
real estate, renting and business activities (18.3 percent). A much lower proportion 
of JVs (only 12 percent of all Budapest firms) could be found in manufacturing 
industry (relative to the share o f all firms in Budapest), almost as low as in the 
construction industry (4.4 percent, in contrast to the total share o f 8 percent for all 
other Budapest firms.) However, according to the value o f invested FDI by sectors, 
the highest share was in the manufacturing sector: 31 percent. (However, this share 
was modest relative to the national average o f 40 percent, the share o f the value 
o f invested foreign capital in manufacturing by 1990.) Similarly to the national 
average, one out o f every five o f Budapest firms in manufacturing had already 
attracted FDI. FDI comprised 53 percent o f the total assets o f JVs (the national 
average was 51 percent); with this proportion they could control 75 percent of the
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assets o f firms in Budapest (the national average share of the JVs’ assets relative 
to all other firms was 68 percent). A relatively smaller number o f JVs was formed 
in the construction industry in Budapest (14 percent), but the capital-strength of 
these firms was much higher than their indigenous counterparts. (The ratio o f the 
FDI to all assets was 62 percent in the Budapest construction industry and, in this 
way, the JVs controlled 66 percent o f the total assets of the Budapest construction 
industry.) FDI invested in the financial services in Budapest had the same features: 
the foreigners invested into relatively few firms, but with a significant value o f FDI, 
and in this way foreign investors could gain control of almost 70 percent o f this 
sector.
Therefore, the FDI-inflow in Budapest raised the sources available for firms 
to a higher level than for the whole economy (with the exception o f some activities, 
such as mining, electricity, transportation, logistic activities, education, and the 
public and private services). The share o f FDI in the total assets o f these latter- 
nientioned sectors was lower in Budapest than outside the capital city, but the 
control foreigners could exercise over other sectors was much higher in Budapest 
than the national average: 75 percent in manufacturing, 75 percent in health care, 
69 percent in financial intermediation, 66 percent in the construction industry, and 
also 60 percent in hotel and restaurants, according to the assets o f those sectors. 
They controlled more than half o f the total assets in trade, too.
However, the FDI invested in Budapest had a much higher role in the whole 
economy and in each o f the sectors, if the number o f Budapest firms and their 
capital-strength are compared to the national characteristics of each sector. Due 
to this it turned out, that the distribution o f the FDI-stock in Budapest followed 
almost totally the feature o f the structure o f the activities o f all Budapest firms. 
The share o f Budapest in each respective service sector (by number of all firms, by 
all assets and mostly by the FDI in the sector) was significantly higher (and mod­
estly higher in construction) than Budapest’s general share in the whole economy. 
Parallel with this, the capital city had a relatively lower role in agriculture, fishing, 
lin in g , and manufacturing, in electricity and generally in the public services. The 
capital-strength o f the Budapest firms (i.e. the general size o f the assets per firm, 
"'¡th the exception o f agriculture, fishing and mining) significantly surpassed, in 
each sector, that o f those firms which operated outside Budapest (in the case o f the 
Public services the assets were four times greater, but even the lowest difference, in 
h^e manufacturing, was +19 percent).
The FDI in certain sectors (such as financial services, health care, but in all 
service sectors except education and public services) flowed almost exclusively, or at 
ieast predominantly into the firms registered in Budapest. This also characterised 
the construction industry (89 percent o f the total FDI invested into the construction 
‘udustry increased the assets o f Budapest firms.) In contrast to this, out o f the total 
I-in flows in manufacturing, only 45 percent was invested in Budapest (however, 
the average size o f the FDI-value per firm was much higher in Budapest than the
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national one). In the case o f power stations, mining, fishing and agricultural firms, 
even the average value of the FDI per firm was less in Budapest than outside it. This 
indicates that the foreign capital owners, by investing in a Budapest firm, could 
gain almost total control over the whole country in the case o f several activities.
FDI-inflows and “industrial density”
The majority o f the FDI invested in Hungary by the end o f 1996 (in the first 
years half o f it and since the respective bank- and the energy sector-privatisations 
its lowest proportion, altogether 40 percent), had gone to the manufacturing sec­
tor. The delocation of certain industrial segments (especially the labour-intensive 
activities with continuous or three-shift requirements) outside Budapest had hap­
pened long before FDI-infiow was liberalised. However, this process gained speed 
clearly due to FDI-inflows. This was already apparent from the high and increasing 
presence o f Budapest in services, and its lower and decreasing share in industrial 
activities and in exports o f goods. Despite this (as mentioned above) manufactur­
ing is still focused on Budapest (similar to other economic activities but at a lower 
level). Therefore, it is not surprising that Budapest had an outstanding role in 
attracting foreign investment, even into the manufacturing industry: 45 percent of 
total FDI in manufacturing was invested in Budapest.
Outside the capital, even the most attractive areas for the foreign investors 
(such as Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom, and Vas counties) could get, hardly 6 percent 
FDI out o f the total invested in manufacturing industry. The rank order o f the 
counties according to their shares in FDl-inflow showed a high similarity with their 
general shares in the manufacturing industry. Some deviations from this general 
link were due to the higher average size of the FDI per firm; in some counties this 
was due to the smaller amount of FDI per firm, but invested into a greater number 
o f JVs. In the three counties mentioned above (and in Borsod) the average amount 
o f FDI per firm was one and half times or twice as large as the national average. 
In Vas county a relatively greater proportion of JVs were established than in other 
parts of the country (40 percent o f all manufacturing firms in the county already 
had FDI by 1996). The manufacturing JVs in Győr-Sopron county were formed 
with relatively less FDI, but in a relatively large number (according to the number 
of firms, the JVs accounted for 37 percent o f the total in 1996). The firms with 
foreign capital also represent a higher proportion than the national average in Zala, 
Komárom, Baranya, Veszprém and Somogy counties.
The FDI-inflows everywhere increased the capital o f the firms: the FDI as » 
proportion o f total assets for all firms in Vas and Komárom had already reached 
more than 75 percent o f the total assets in manufacturing in 1996, and 58 percent in 
l'ejér county. Even in Tolna county, where the amount o f the FDI in manufacturing
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did not reach one percent of the total FDI invested in the Hungarian manufacturing 
industry, out o f the total assets o f the manufacturing industry in the county more 
than one quarter was o f foreign origin in 1996, and the foreign owners thus controlled 
more than half o f the total manufacturing assets. The JVs dominated at least one- 
half o f the total manufacturing assets o f the counties almost everywhere (except in 
Veszprém, Csongrâd, and Tolna counties).
The development potential by regions is obviously determined to a great ex­
tent by the structure and characteristics o f the industrial activities. (The firms 
have specialised rather on simple, low wage-, labour-intensive activities or inno­
vative, high-tech-, knowledge-, and/or capital-intensive activities; these structural 
changes are determined on the bases o f the existing labour-force in the county, etc.) 
These kinds o f linkage would need further research.
Summary
The disposable data-sets (i.e. the tax reports o f the double accounting firms 
in 1992-1996 and the regional statistics o f the Central Statistical Office) did not 
make possible systematic (model-type) analyses of the main factors of the distribu­
tion and sectoral features by counties. However, simple statistical analyses of the 
existing data resulted in important information about the real effects o f FDI-inflows 
by counties and also the main explanatory factors behind them. It turned out that 
there is a clear positive correlation between the intensity of the FDI-inflows, com­
pany performance, export-ability, value-added, wage- and salary levels, and social 
security-contributions (i.e. health care and tax-payments)— similar to the whole 
economy— at the county level, too. The FDI-inflows significantly reduced employ­
ment problems, and the unemployment level; however, the dimension o f this effect 
certainly depended also on the industrial structure, its labour-intensity and pro­
ductivity changes by the counties.
Our research results did not prove that the country had been divided into 
two parts. The disadvantageous positions of some counties (mainly near to the 
south, east and north borders, respectively) with regard to FDI-attractiveness are 
doubtless. In this, the “industrial density” (which we could not measure exactly) 
and the actual level and quality o f the existing labour-force had determining roles. 
The analyses underlined an “overconcentrated character” o f Budapest with regard 
to nearly all factors, even if there has been some change from the capital to out­
side Budapest in recent years. As a result o f the effects o f the Free Trade Zones 
and the intention to help regional development (e.g. the SME project launched by 
f’HARE, special industrial zone program, etc.) the focuses o f export-growth and 
trade seem to have moved away from Budapest. Budapest was not the leader in the 
growth rate o f the FDI-stock in the period under analysis. The outstanding share
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o f the capital in services explained the fact that the FDI-inflows directed towards 
some sectors (such as financial services, other public and social services, postal and 
telecommunications, business services, restaurants, etc.) mainly or almost exclu­
sively went into firms registered in Budapest. Therefore, the foreign capital owners, 
by investing into firms in Budapest, have been able to gain control over whole sec­
tors in Hungary. In contrast to this, in manufacturing Budapest absorbed only 45 
percent o f the total FDI invested in this sector (however, the average amount o f the 
FDI per firm in Budapest was generally much higher than in the countryside.) It is 
worth repeating that the overcentralised character o f Budapest is exaggerated by 
the distortive effects o f the existing data-sets (i.e. the way that the firms presented 
tax-reports according to the location o f their headquarters). (The lack o f other 
type o f data-sets, however, does not yet allow for the correction o f this distortion.)
The results o f the study underlined the expectations: namely, that the “in­
dustrial density” and, parallel with this, the professional structure o f the existing 
labour-force had important respective roles in altering the sectoral direction and 
volume o f FDI-inflows. (For instance, in the region o f Székesfehérvár the accu­
mulated knowledge based on the earlier development o f weapons and engineering 
industries.) The links between the FDI-inflows and the unemployment level proved 
that intensive FDI significantly reduced the employment problems in several coun­
ties. In 1996, out o f total employment, in Vas county and Budapest almost 40 
percent already worked for firms operating with foreign capital, every third worker 
belonged to a JV in Győr, Heves, Zala and Komárom counties, and every fourth in 
Baranya, Borsod, Csongrád counties. The improving effects o f FDI on employment 
were clearly most modest in Tolna, Békés, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Jász-Nagykun- 
Szolnok and Somogy counties.
The generally better company performance and the higher productivity in­
crease o f the JVs let them pay more to their employees than the indigenous com ­
panies. In 1996 the firms with foreign capital were already “giving” 41 percent 
o f all wages and salaries— that is, in relation to the national average. The JVs 
paid the 1/3 o f all salary- (and sala.ry-t.ype) incomes in half o f the counties, and 
at least 1/5 in the other counties (except Tolna). The distribution o f wages and 
salaries by counties depended not only on the role o f the JVs, but also on the dif­
ferent professional structures according to the particular county. The higher share 
(51 percent) o f Budapest in the salary and social security-payments can partly be 
explained by the fact that financial services and other better paid activities are fo­
cused mainly on the capital (as well as the registration o f firms due to the location 
o f their headquarters). It is worth noting that salary-increases were not the most 
dynamic in Budapest between 1992-1996. Almost half o f the counties (especially 
Fejér, Vas, Veszprém, Heves, Győr-Sopron, and Borsod counties) produced much 
higher increases in salary levels, while the “negative record” happened again in 
Szabolcs, Hajdú, Komárom and Somogy counties. It is also an important fact, 
considering social security contributions, that the JVs increased their payments at
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a much higher rate than the county average almost everywhere (with the exception 
of Zala). (Social security payments generally grew faster than salary-payments 
and the largest gap could be measured in Heves, Fejér, Baranya, Pest, Somogy 
and Vas counties.) Company performance improved significantly in each company 
group during 1992-1996. The respective averages of both the JVs and the indige­
nous firms produced positive results (before taxation) in all (except one) counties 
in 1996. The advantages o f the JVs over the indigenous firms could be clearly 
recognised in this field, too: according to the economic indicators per firm all other 
companies produced (before taxation) 3.5 million HUF positive results on average 
in 1996, while the JVs’ average positive result reached the value o f 14.5 million 
HUF. Out o f the total profit, 46 percent, and in the case o f the JVs 64 percent, 
was produced respectively by firms registered in Budapest. However, in general 
the Budapest firms had relatively higher tax-burdens than firms in other counties 
(such as, for instance, in Vas, Pest, Fejér, Győr-Sopron, or Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 
counties.) Despite the higher tax-burden, the Budapest firms paid a higher propor­
tion o f tax-payments (57 percent) in 1996, and in the case of JVs (despite their still 
high level o f tax-holidays) this proportion increased from 32 percent to 71 percent 
between 1992-1996.
The JV ’s tax- and social security contributions had reached a determinant 
size by 1996, even considering the whole state budget income. But in some coun­
ties, such as Borsod for instance, the JVs increased the county tax-income at a 
much higher rate (their tax-payment readied 61 percent), than the national aver­
s e  (where the JV ’s proportion was 45 percent) or than the rate in Budapest (56 
Percent). However, in Veszprém and Vas counties respecively more than 40 per­
cent, and in Heves and Győr-Sopron counties respectively more than 30 percent of 
the county’s tax income originated from the JVs. The JVs’contribution to the tax- 
income in Békés, Bács-Kiskun, Fejér, Szabolcs, Jász-Nagykun and Tolna counties 
was the most modest.
One o f the most important outcomes o f our analyses was that the FDI-inflows 
°utside Budapest— even if they seemed to be negligible in comparison with the value 
■nvested in the capital— significantly contributed to the development at the county 
*evel; they reduced the unemployment level almost everywhere, and improved con- 
siderably the export-orientation and efficiency of company performance. At the 
Same time foreign owners gained dominant or determinant roles in almost all activ­
ities. This must call the attention o f policy-makers at local and governmental level 
*'° the fact that the intention to attract more foreign capital must be harmonised 
*ith the intention o f helping local entrepreneurs to accumulate and to develop, 
even to the point o f using positive discrimination.
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Some conclusions
The experiences o f other countries in closing the gap between regional de­
velopment also underline certain basic linkages (well-known, but in the Hungarian 
economic policy frequently neglected). For example, a country’s development (and 
in it, that o f its regions) is basically determined in the long-term by the level of 
education, labour-force mobility, professions and locations. Therefore, for instance, 
in France at the end o f the sixties, or in Belgium at the same time, the answer to 
the crises o f the declining areas (i.e. those specialised in mining, shipbuilding, or 
low-wage labour-intensive industries), caused by the increasing delocation o f these 
activities to the low wage countries, was that universities (university cities with the 
necessary infrastructure) and research centres were built-up as bases for knowledge- 
intensive activities. (For example, Louven La Neuve, as a university city next to 
Bruxelles, or the university city with a hyper-modern metro line in the surround­
ings o f Lille in North-France.4) Similar developments happened in England (for 
instance, in the “cradle” o f the textile industry, Bradford, the newly-established 
computer industry absorbed some o f the unemployed textile workers, and the old 
textile machines were exhibited in a museum o f industrial history formed for fos­
tering tourism5). At another level, in Spain and in Portugal, accession to the EU 
revealed the adjustment barriers raised by structural and territorial inflexibility and 
the insufficient educational level o f the labour-force. The answer, here, was also 
education, and re-education (with the support of the EU, the government, and the 
regional funds), and the development o f universities, and industrial and research 
centres— in the developed areas as well as the underdeveloped ones. (Hamar 1995a; 
1995b; 1998b) The main lesson o f these examples is that the most efficient tools 
for closing the gap in development between areas and regions is the development 
o f the existing education and research, and establishing new bases for knowledge 
in the underdeveloped areas. Without this even the existing possibilities cannot be 
fully utilised.
The future FDI-attractiveness of Hungary will further depend on the FDI- 
absorbing ability o f Budapest, and the attractiveness o f the capital will also depend 
on the investment worthiness o f the national economy. In certain activities— such 
as logistics, even in research— the multinationals focusing on the whole Central- 
European area have already chosen Budapest as a central location. In the case of 
advantageous development, the idea that Budapest could become a regional centre 
for FDI is not without good grounds. However, this would need further development 
in several respects (such as improvement in public security, and in infrastructure 
and solving the parking problems, and also reducing air-pollution and promoting 
tidiness o f the city. The administration (in ministries, chambers o f commerce, and
4 According to the author’s personal experiences and interviews in 1993.
5Interviews in London, Cambridge, Leeds, and Bradford, in 1985.
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other authorities) has to become more efficient, less corrupt, more transparent, and 
produce information and services. Further improvement in financial and banking 
services, and especially in the legal sphere would also be needed, and they would 
need to be controlled more efficiently.
The study has been able to provide more information about the effects of 
FDI on regional development. The special industrial and free trade zones have 
already influenced and helped to narrow the gap between Budapest and the coun­
ties, especially in export-ability and industrial development. Further improvement 
in this field, however, also requires several conditions (e.g. building new airports 
and highways in the country areas with a parallel and horizontal line o f roads and 
transportation in a territorial network; also, developments in education are vital, as 
well as raising the general cultural level, especially in the underdeveloped areas and 
in Budapest, by improving the ability to answer the new challenges o f the future).
One o f the most important results of our analyses— that the FDI-inflows even 
in the counties where the invested amount of foreign capital seemed to be almost 
negligible— has now become so determinant that the simple presence o f these firms 
hinders the development o f indigenous companies and hardly allows newcomers to 
enter the markets. Therefore, to attract further FDI into the underdeveloped areas 
needs special care. It is obvious that local FDI-attractiveness would and should be 
increased by giving tax- and other preferences in order to improve the prospects 
of further development, to help in the establishment of new kinds of activities and 
to promote the diffusion of marketing and management knowledge. Nevertheless, 
to reduce the already recognisable signals o f the dual type economy, and mainly to 
avoid its growing social and political tensions and the concomitant and specifically 
distorting effects at local level— in small villages, for instance— it is necessary to 
Put. extra importance on the responsibility o f the local decision-makers. (It is well- 
known for instance, that the multinational companies are easily willing to close 
down their production units if they are no longer efficient. Consequently, the prob­
lems raised by this behaviour in a region, where this unit is the main employer (and 
gives the main source of tax-income and social security contributions) demonstrate 
tile harm o f dependence on one or a few foreign investors. It means that education 
and information also have a special importance in the improvement of the abilities 
° f local decision-makers.
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PORTUGAL’S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON HER FOREIGN TRADE
A. NAGY 
Introduction
The many-sided economic integration, accommodation to community regula­
tions, the breakdown o f internal customs borders, and transformation of the level 
and structure o f  im port duties for outsiders, naturally have a great effect on the 
volume and dynamics o f exports and imports, and on their commodity structure 
and market shares. Research carried out on the static and dynamic influence of 
econom ic integration, and first o f all the analysis of processes in the European 
Union, have many references and settled methodology. Their conclusions helped 
a lot in our research, and also the fact that the formation o f the European Union 
lias been gradual, and differently developed economies joined the West-European 
uitegration at different periods.
In our research project we investigated the integration experiences of three 
South-European countries: Spain, Portugal and Greece. We chose them because 
their levels o f  econom ic development were similar to Hungary’s when they joined the 
EEC, and because sufficient time has passed since then to enable the measurement 
and analysis o f  the influences o f integration. As its results have been unlike in 
many respects, we expected to draw different conclusions and lessons about the 
effectiveness o f  divergent integration processes.
The present study looks closely at Portugal’s accession to the European Com- 
•nunity, how it happened, its motivations, and especially the influence it has had 
on foreign trade. It was very a great help that I could visit Portugal to collect 
literature and data, and also to have consultations with Portuguese experts.1
11 am thankful to  Paula Fontoura and Joao Dias, professors of the Department of Economics 
the L isbon  Technical University; to Teresa Moura, General Secretary o f  European Affairs; 
a,,d Katalin M uharay, correspondent in Portugal, for their assistance. In data collection and 
Processing Dr. V itor  R am os, Zoltán Ákos Kovács  and Gergely Fazekas helped me very much.
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The present situation: tlie results of participating in European integration
Twelve years have passed since Portugal’s accession to the European Eco­
nomic Community. Before following the precedents o f this process and its influence 
on foreign trade, it is worth surveying— at least, looking at the general outlines 
of—the results o f integration, and what the present situation is. Naturally, it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to separate the changes caused by accession from 
those reached by Portuguese economic and reform policy independently of Euro­
pean integration.
The most important result is that Portugal’s income per capita at purchasing 
power parity in 1986, was slightly over one half o f the EEC’s average, and in 1997 
it reached nearly 70 percent o f the fifteen member countries’ average. (Fontoura 
1998; OECD 1998) Economic analysts evaluate the development o f Portugal and 
the present situation very positively (OECD 1998). The Portuguese economy has 
been characterised by an unusually balanced growth for the last four years, and 
this has caused significant improvement in all basic economic indices. The stability 
of the exchange rate and the fall o f the budget deficit have raised the confidence in 
economic policy. Portugal is apparently going to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, and 
is likely to be a founding member o f the European Monetary Union. According 
to the OECD’s forecast, in the next two years in Portugal there will be dynamic 
economic growth and a fall in unemployment without higher inflation.
The GDP increased by 3.5 percent in 1997, and it has a growing tendency. 
The main driving force for this comes mainly from investments. Industry’s utilisa­
tion of productive capacity grew to 80 percent from 73 percent in 1993. Economic 
activity was stimulated by both domestic demand and by the increase o f export 
capacities. Falling inflation rates, growing employment, and an increase in foreign 
transfers are the causes in the growth o f personal consumption. Further prospects 
for an increase in demand should also stimulate investments.
In the years following the accession inflation rates in Portugal significantly 
exceeded the rates o f EC countries: between 1987 and 1992 it fluctuated between 
10 and 15 percent. Since then, over the past seven years, it has shown a smooth 
pattern o f reduction. Last year it was only a little over two percent— that is, it 
approached the average o f the EU countries and the terms o f the common currency 
criteria. The price rise o f tradable products has been scarcely one percent despite 
the escudo’s devaluation (which was the result o f the dollar’s strengthening); the 
price rises o f real estate, construction and services have remained relatively high 
(4 percent) despite their falling tendency. The increase in unit labour costs has 
been kept on a low level according to exchange-rate stability, the restraining of 
wage rises, and a significant growth in productivity. The “Strategic Social Pact’ , 
concluded at the end o f 1996, fixed nominal wage rises at 3.5 percent, inflation at
2.5 percent, and the rise in productivity at 2.2 percent. It seems that this goal has 
been achieved. The return on capital has increased smoothly, partly because of
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the relative reduction o f unit labour costs, and partly because o f better utilisation 
o f productive capacities. One should not forget, o f course, that despite the rapid 
rise in income per capita, the wage levels o f Portuguese workers are considerably 
below those o f their main European partners. This is partly the reason for the 
competitiveness o f Portuguese products, and it also makes possible a relatively 
high return on capital despite the productivity differences. All this attracts foreign 
direct investments and encourages the privatisation o f state-owned companies.
Parallel with fast economic improvement, Portugal’s participation in the in­
ternational division o f labour has grown and its quality has got better. Its export 
volume and market share have also risen considerably. According to the OECD 
report Portugal’s export performance since 1990 has increased approximately 20 
percent— i.e. the rise in its export volume has surpassed the increase of the de­
mand growth o f the importing markets. Import penetration has also risen on the 
Portuguese market: since 1990 its import volume has been increasing approximately 
30 percent more than the gross domestic demand.
Exports have been rising faster than imports for the last five years and the 
terms o f trade have been favourable for Portugal during this period. The rising 
share o f the means of production in imports can be regarded as very favourable, 
as this contributes to productivity rises and further improvements in quality (More 
details in Pereira 1996). The trade deficit has consistently made up 9-10 percent of 
■ the GDP since the beginning of the 1990s, but it is balanced by the surplus coming 
from tourism and transfers.2 As a consequence, the deficit o f the current account 
around 2-3 percent o f the GDP.
Both foreign investments in Portugal and Portuguese investments abroad 
have shown a rapid increase. In the first case the assumed level o f capital income 
has motivated the rise o f portfolio investments, while the capital exports have been 
the consequence o f a gradual liberalisation o f the financial markets. Privatisation 
has been an important factor in capital inflow: since 1990 around forty state-owned 
companies have been privatised, and the income from these made up 14 percent 
° f  the GDP. The state-owned energy sector was— eventually— also privatised. Par­
allel with privatisation in certain areas— for example, telecommunications and the 
energy industry— control commissions have been created to defend consumer’s in­
terests and develop state regulations.
Four basic goals were set o f privatisation: to improve competitiveness, to 
w>den and deepen the capital market, to reduce state debt, and to maximise rev­
enues from selling state assets. While in 1988 the companies which were majority- 
0vvned by the state produced 20 percent o f the GDP; after fulfilling privatisation 
Plans, by the end o f 1999 this share is expected to fall to 5 percent. Among the sig- 
n<ficant successful privatisation cases some earlier protected branches can be found.
The foreign transfers are divided 50-50 percent between the European Union and that o f the 
°rtuguese workers’ transfère from abroad.
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111 the respective cases o f the latter the dismantling of state monopolies has led not 
just to productivity growth and technical improvement but to the creation o f many 
new jobs through increased competitiveness.
Catching up and European integration
At the beginning of the 1980s the openness o f the Portuguese economy was 
similar to that o f the Western European countries; this was partly a follow-up of 
EFTA membership and partly the long tradition o f trading with colonies. When 
Portugal joined the European Community its average tariff level was 5 percent, 
and this suited the Community’s average3 (although quotas and a licensing sys­
tem restricted imports). Portugal’s backward agriculture differed greatly from the 
developed European countries. In 1980 agricultural production was 10.3 percent 
o f GDP, and 27.3 percent o f the labour force worked in agriculture; these shares 
were on average 4.8 percent and 14.3 percent in the OECD countries.4 Portu­
gal’s agricultural productivity was scarcely one-fourth o f the EEC’s average as a 
consequence o f strongly subsidised prices, the low qualifications o f agricultural em­
ployees, backward production technologies, an underdeveloped infrastructure and 
poor marketing practice.
Another source of the difficulties o f economic development was the enormous 
size o f the state sector where price controls and state interference restricted con­
siderably the functioning o f market forces. The share of the state sector was 17 
percent in gross value added and in investments, while budget subsidies reached 
4.3 percent o f the Portuguese GDP in 1985 (CEEP  1987). Most o f state-owned 
companies worked with low productivity levels and, cushioned by subsidies, they 
produced deficits. The subsidies were a burden to savings and made the resource 
allocation irrational and rigid.
Financial markets were underdeveloped, there was no competition among the 
banks, the capital market was tight, opportunities to save were few and consisted 
mainly o f state securities, the credit market and interest rates were controlled 
by the state, and subsidised credits were widespread. The different regulations 
distorted the allocation o f resources and increased transaction costs. The social 
infrastructures (i.e. education and health care) and economic infrastructures (i-e’ 
transport and communication) caused many problems as they were much moi'e 
backward in Portugal than in other West-European countries. This made catching 
up all the more difficult. In 1987, for example, 81 percent o f the 25-34 age group 
and 89 percent o f the 45-54 age group had completed only primary school (sorne
3There was an important difference between Portugal and Spain in this respect. In Spain 
average tariff level was 17 percent before accession to EEC.
4See: Larre and Torres (1991), using OECD and IMF National Accounts statistics.
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have not even achieved this) ( OECD 1989), and only five percent o f young people 
had attended a technical or other qualification-oriented school. According to the 
data o f Eurosat, infant mortality was 64 percent higher than in the EEC countries, 
and at the same time Portugal had one-third o f telephones and two-fifths of cars 
per thousand capita, compared to the EEC countries.
When joining the European Community significant reforms were introduced 
and, despite the delay, Portugal managed to apply community rules. Import li­
censing, extra-tariff taxes, and many quantity restrictions were repealed; other 
quotas were scheduled for repeal over the following three years. The value-added- 
tax system introduced in place o f the previously very differentiated tax system 
automatically reduced the hidden export subsidies and import restrictions, while 
many allowances for exporting companies were preserved.
The reduction o f trade barriers increased the demand for the products o f the 
countries joining the EEC, which changed the volume and structure o f their trade 
flows. In Portugal’s case the trade-creation effects surpassed trade-diversion effects 
significantly and, as a result, the export share in the GDP started to rise after some 
time lag. This increased the average productivity o f the economy because there 
Were increases in the productivity and exports o f those branches which were com­
petitive internationally (or would become competitive following new investments) 
and which benefited from the dismantling of trade restrictions and subsidies. The 
growth and changes in the production structure o f the industry corresponded to the 
country’s revealed comparative advantages. This underpins the theory according 
to which catching up with the level o f the developed countries is basically an en­
dogenous process (Abramovitz 1986). In other words, although it depends greatly 
°n external conditions, it is basically the consequence of the improvement o f the 
formerly underdeveloped country’s internal economic and institutional structure, 
allocation o f resources, and the development o f the resources themselves.
As a result o f structural reforms the structure of Portugal’s export supply and 
market shares changed, and this was the result of the extension o f those products for 
which demand rose rapidly, the concentration o f exports on those markets on which 
the products were or could become competitive, and appropriate improvements in 
^ e  quality, competitiveness and marketing o f the products. Following these changes 
d significant improvement in the Portuguese terms o f trade could be observed. 
Comparing it with other countries, it can be stated that the influence o f accession 
to the EEC due to structural changes had more positive effects the higher was the 
Pre-joining tariff level, and the more quantitative restrictions there were.
The only exception from these positive influences mentioned by the experts 
Is agriculture, where structural changes were less successful than in industry. One 
°f the reasons for this could be that the agricultural tariffs o f the Community were 
Uglier than those in Portugal before accession to the EEC.
Another obstacle to further modernisation was the unsatisfactory flexibility 
the Portuguese workforce. The deregulation of the labour market attracted
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foreign investments, but the lack o f qualifications and insufficient retraining schemes 
created a further serious obstacle to the catching up process. Both the development 
o f the infrastructure and improvement in labour adaptability required increases in 
public expenditure; thus the state’s tasks did not decrease but became greater in 
these areas. Solving these problems without raising the budget deficit was a very 
difficult problem for the government. The only possible answer seemed to be the 
stricter control o f state expenditures in other spheres, and improvement of the 
efficiency o f public services.
Winning the trust o f foreign investors played a very important role in accel­
erating economic development. It influenced strongly both direct investments and 
the success o f the privatisation process. Confidence in the economic development 
o f a country depends mostly on how successful the balancing o f the macroecon­
omy is, how far state debt, budget deficit and inflation are reduced, and how much 
the government seems to be determined to accomplish the structural and market- 
conforming institutional reforms, including the necessary but unpopular steps.
Precedents of accession to the EEC
In the opinion o f Macedo (1990) the necessity o f European integration became 
evident only four years after Portugal joined the European Community. Up until 
that time this question had been dealt with ambiguously by governments, in fact 
somewhat similarly to the British attitude. Although the idea of integration started 
to mature in Portugal before 1975, the revolution had taken an opposite turn: the 
regime opposed Western-type development and tried to introduce East-European 
type nationalisation and central planning. The idea o f the “Portuguese fortress 
remained after the revolution too, but the image o f the besieged colonial empii'e 
was changed for the socialist fortress. (Krugman and Macedo)
Although this experiment did not last for a long time, it did result in an 
increase in the state sector’s share in the Portuguese economy very much, and this 
situation remained frozen up to 1989. After the revolution o f 1974 banks and insur­
ance companies, public utilities and transport companies, petrochemical, a r t if ic ia l  
fertiliser and paper factories, cement and steel-works, ship-building and tobacco 
industries were nationalised (Balassa 1981). The 100 percent state-owned com' 
panies made up 10 percent o f industrial production, while the partly state-own^ 
companies made up another 5 percent. However, in reality the state controlled or 
managed a much higher proportion o f production through the nationalised banks 
and an elaborate system o f industrial regulations.5
5Some o f the companies occupied by different worker’s self-managing organisations could be 
listed here too.
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The other important outcome o f the revolution, considering its economic and 
social significance, was the agrarian reform and the spontaneous land-seizures. This 
virtually abolished the system o f large estates typical for the Southern part o f the 
country. Although the fundamental change in property relations created the long­
term conditions in Portuguese agriculture for enabling the establishment of modern 
farms and for significant productivity rises, (thus improving the living standards 
of the peasants population), in the short-term it caused serious difficulties in agri­
culture. Since the new small and medium-size farms did not get enough support, 
the level o f their production and productivity decreased, and the trade balance of 
agricultural products became strongly negative despite Portugal’s favourable geo­
graphical conditions.
Portugal’s ambiguous and long integration policy was related to the dual 
structure o f her economy. The complex administrative regulations o f her economy 
preserved a dual structure, in which a competitive sector existed alongside a non­
competitive, non-adaptable state sector. The latter had the effect o f substantially 
decreasing the productivity o f the whole economy. Gradual trade liberalisation—  
which started in the 1960s— revealed the existence o f an unrecognised competitive 
and export-capable industrial sector in the Portuguese economy; alongside this 
sector, industrial and financial regulations created conglomerates which could be 
successful only in the privileged trade with African colonies. After the liberation 
° f  those colonies the failures o f the conglomerates came to light and this was one 
of the reasons why they were nationalised.
From this point o f view the revolutionary “achievements” have been subject 
to a new interpretation: it was not the most profitable enterprises that were taken 
over by the “people” during the nationalisation process, but the bankrupt, or almost 
bankrupt, big non-competitive firms. Thus the extreme “left-wing” demands coin­
cided with the interests o f some o f the big monopolies. This explains why resistance 
to the nationalisation was not stronger. An article of the Portuguese constitution 
Passed in 1976 froze the large and extensive state sector, according to which nation­
alisations were seen as “irreversible conquests o f the working class” . Consequently 
state interference and bureaucratic regulations were extremely widespread and the 
Private sector had great difficulties in dealing with such obstructions.
The accession
The rigidity o f the large public sector6 underlay the ambiguity that charac­
terised Portugal’s intention to join the process o f European integration. Politically, 
't meant balancing the consequences o f joining the European Community and the
C According to the data o f the Hungarian Institute for World Economics the share o f the public 
Sector in G D P rose from 22 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 1982. ( VKI 1994/b  p. 63)
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socialist principles laid down in the constitution. In the opinion o f some analysts 
(e.g. Macedo 1990), during the seven years o f negotiations on the accession this 
contradiction hindered the progress, and it often appeared as the conflict between 
Prime Minister Soares and President Eanes. The prime minister represented those 
interests which supported accession to the European Community, while the mili­
tary commanders o f the African wars insisted on maintaining the “achievements” 
and institutions o f the revolution during the sessions o f the Revolutionary Commit­
tee, presided over by the president o f the Republic. However, other experts held 
the view that linking up with the capitalist West was opposed by only some of 
the military commanders. Until the Revolutionary Committee was wound up with 
a constitutional amendment in 1982, the president’s loyalty was divided between 
the citizens, who voted for him, and the army, represented by the Revolutionary 
Committee. This conflict, and the indecision associated with the social and po­
litical problems hidden behind it, probably had something to do with the sixteen 
governments which Portugal had in the decade following the revolution.
The ambition to join the process of European integration was an important 
and necessary step for the presidency o f Soares, and this is partly the reason why 
the government forced the pace o f the negotiations. Business circles criticised the 
government, arguing that domestic industry would not have enough time to get 
prepared for the competition with more developed member EEC member states. 
When Soares became president o f Portugal in 1985, the mainly presidential system 
was changed for a parliamentary system; furthermore, the socialist government was 
replaced by a rightist government. It remained in power for another two election 
cycles. Accession to the European Community in 1986 coincided with the change 
and stabilisation o f the political system, and obviously contributed to it. (Kovács 
1994)
For Portugal, joining the European Community meant a policy o f opening and 
a commitment to the European integration, in contrast to its earlier economic and 
trade policy. It also meant striving for the stabilisation o f parliamentary democracy 
and observation o f human rights in domestic policy. Parallel with this, it offered 
several economic advantages: the extension of export markets and the prospect 
o f considerable financial transfers from community funds. Despite the benefits 
to be expected, there was doubt about the extent to which EEC member states 
would increase imports compared to the advantages which had been secured in 
earlier free trade agreements; moreover, how would EEC membership compensate 
for a further strengthening o f import competition? At the same time, they had to 
take into account the considerable disadvantages o f staying outside the European 
integration, especially, as it became evident that orientation towards the CMEA 
and the “Third World” was neither desirable nor possible.
Politicians in the European Community emphasised that the respective acces­
sions o f the South-European countries had served primarily political aims, and thus 
the indication was that only moderate economic advantages could be expected. Tli*s
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was especially true in the case o f Portugal, where the Community, being well aware 
o f the country’s ambiguous integration policy, wanted to strengthen and stabilise 
the démocratisation process with full membership, after fifty years o f right-wing 
dictatorship. An important part o f this plan was that it was expected that acces­
sion to the EEC would drive the Communist Party out of power; the presence of 
the latter in the government was regarded as ominous for European security from 
NATO’s point o f view.7
The member countries o f the European Community did not expect, especially 
not in the short-term, considerable advantages from the growing markets o f the 
new South-European countries, given that the latter were much less developed 
than themselves. However, they had to calculate for a considerable increase in the 
common expenditures. Yet in Portugal’s case there were long-standing privileged 
trade relations with its earlier African and Brazilian colonies— this situation held 
out the prospect o f advantages for the Community countries as well. In the event, 
reality considerably surpassed these expectations, especially in the medium-term. 
The transfer o f production to Portugal through foreign investments proved to be 
advantageous in many cases.
Public opinion polls showed that the majority of the population was not 
particularly interested in joining the EEC, and many Portuguese citizens did not 
even know what it really meant. (Éltető 1997) It was neither put on the agenda in 
the Portuguese National Assembly, nor was it much discussed by the media. This 
was not just the result o f the country’s long-standing relative isolation, but also 
the chaos o f domestic crises and other problems that eclipsed the importance and 
likely effects o f accession.
Changes in the dynamics and structure of foreign trade in Portugal 
between 1988 and 1995
In the following Portugal’s trade structure is analysed: that is, its commodity 
composition and market share are considered from the viewpoint o f the medium- 
range influence which accession to the EEC has had. On the one hand, how did 
integration and removal o f trade impediments influence the dynamics o f its trade 
flows, and how did it strengthen and change trade relations with the member states? 
Furthermore, to what extent did it substitute domestic production with imports? 
On the other hand, how far did participation in the common external tariff system 
change the dynamics and structure o f trade with other areas to the advantage of 
internal trade with member countries? Our analysis was carried out using different
7Kramer (1983, p. 254) quotes a European Parliament MP: “No one knows what the outcome 
the accession will be but we should want it for political reasons.”
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disaggregations: first, according to the two main commodity groups o f primary 
goods and manufactures, and then using a one- and two-digit SITC breakdown of 
the UN statistics. Nine commodity groups belong to the first and 72 to the second 
disaggregation.8
The regional breakdown used by the OECD has been altered at many points 
because it contained several strange groupings— for example, it included the Soviet 
Union, not as part o f Europe but o f Asia and, in contrast to that, it mentioned 
Turkey as belonging to the European region. We categorised the Soviet Union (or, 
after 1992, the European CIS countries) and the three Baltic States as part o f the 
European region, while the other former Soviet republics were left in the Asian area. 
Japan is dealt with independently, separate from the East-Asian region. Oceania 
has been merged with the East-Asian countries.
Table 1
The growth of Portuguese trade between 1988 and 1995 (in percentage) 1988=100
Regions Exports Imports
Primary
goods
Manufactures Total Primary
goods
Manufactures Total
Total world 143 223 206 173 189 184
Europe 151 227 213 229 189 194
European Union 15 154 230 216 235 190 196
Eastern Europe 54 270 187 520 124 199
North America 63 167 141 100 169 126
Japan 151 336 217 100 114 114
Africa 214 163 176 148 170 150
South America 437 523 494 176 117 154
Asia-Oceania 199 252 239 152 217 187
Source: OECD Trade by Com m odity Statistics, CD-ROM , 1997 March. This source is used in 
the other tables and figures, if no other source is mentioned.
Between 1988 and 1995 Portugal’s exports and imports grew faster than world 
trade or the European Union’s trade and this was obviously a consequence o f the 
trade-creation effect o f accession to the EEC. While world trade rose by 80 per­
cent, and the EU’s exports rose by 73 percent and its imports rose by 67 percent in 
this period, Portugal’s total exports increased by 106 percent and its total imports 
by 84 percent ( Table 1). Its turnover with the member countries o f the European
8The source o f these data is the O E C D ’s International Trade by Com m odity Statistics CD- 
ROM issued in March 1997; this contains the trade flows o f the 1988-1995 period in current US 
dollars.
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Community rose faster than the average: its exports to the Community rose by 116 
percent and its imports by 96 percent.
It can be seen that the rapid rise in Portugal’s exports was primarily due to 
the export o f manufactures; the rise in the latter was much higher, while exports 
o f primary goods was much lower than the average.9 Manufacture’s exports to the 
European Union rose faster than total exports, whereas the total o f Portuguese 
exports to Eastern Europe, North America and Africa increased slower than the 
average; however, there was a remarkably large export rise to South America (394 
percent).
Despite the fact that imports grew at a slower rate than before, Portugal’s 
trade balance showed a remarkable deficit during this whole period. It was 6.8 
billion dollars in 1988, and it rose to over 10 billion dollars in 1995 (Table S). 
Imports from the European Union countries also rose faster than total imports; even 
so, it is remarkable that Portuguese primary goods imports rose much quicker (135 
percent) than imports o f manufactures (90 percent). The increase o f Portuguese 
imports originating from Eastern Europe— as opposed to its exports there-—was 
comparatively fast, especially in primary goods (420 percent). The rise o f Japanese 
imports was remarkably low (14 percent), and it is surprising how much the increase 
o f imports from South America and Asia lagged behind exports there.
Table 2
The shares of Portuguese trade in 1988 and 1995 (in percentage)
Regions
Exports Imports
Primary goods Manufactures Primary goods Manufactures
1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
Total world 20.62 14.29 79.38 85.71 26.18 24.54 73.82 75.46
Europe 18.32 13.00 81.68 87.00 14.08 16.63 85.92 83.37
European Union 15 18.38 13.14 81.62 86.86 12.66 15.17 87.34 84.83
Eastern Europe 38.50 11.19 61.50 88.81 19.02 49.63 80.98 50.37
North America 25.32 11.33 74.68 88.67 62.13 49.10 37.87 50.90
Japan 64.41 44.85 35.59 55.15 0.35 0.31 99.65 99.69
Africa 25.00 30.50 75.00 69.50 92.23 91.22 7.77 8.78
South America 33.36 29.50 66.64 70.50 62.64 71.58 37.36 28.42
Asia-Oceania 24.09 20.04 75.91 79.96 45.46 36.82 54.54 63.18
9 III this classification the SITC com m odity groups from 0 to 4 belong to primary goods and 
those o f  5 to 9 belong to manufactures. There are many inaccuracies in this o f course— forexample, 
food industry products belong to the first group and metallurgical products belong to the second. 
However, the m ajor shares and tendencies are not altered by these distortions.
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Changes o f Portuguese trade shares with respect to the main commodity 
groups by regions between 1988 and 1995 are shown in Table 2. The share of 
manufactures was growing and that o f primary goods declining on both sides of 
the trade turnover, but it was more marked on the export side. It can be observed 
that in the exports to the European Union the share of manufactures grew (from 
82 percent to 87 percent) and, in contrast to this, in the Portuguese imports from 
the Union the share o f manufactures dropped surprisingly (from 87 to 85 percent). 
As a consequence, the share of primary goods increased. There has been a sim­
ilar but much stronger change in the commodity structure of Portuguese— East 
European trade. While the share o f primary goods declined and that of manufac­
tures increased in Portuguese exports, the share o f primary goods in Portuguese 
imports rose from 19 percent to 50 percent, and in accordance with it, the share of 
manufactures was reduced.
Table 3
The shares o f Portuguese trade bij regions and commodities in 1988 and 1995
(in percentage)
Regions Primary goods Manufactures Total
1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
Exports
Total world 100 100 100 100 100 100
Europe 74 78 86 87 83 86
European Union 70 75 80 83 78 82
Eastern Europe 2 1 1 1 1 1
North Am erica 8 4 6 5 7 5
Japan 2 2 0 1 1 1
Africa 5 8 4 3 4 4
South America 1 3 1 1 1 2
Asia-Oceania 3 4 3 3 3 3
Imports
Total world 100 100 100 100 100 100
Europe 41 54 88 88 75 79
European Union 34 46 83 84 70 75
Eastern Europe 1 2 1 1 1 1
North America 14 8 3 3 6 4
Japan 0 0 5 3 4 2
Africa 21 18 1 1 6 5
South Am erica 9 9 2 1 4 3
Asia-Oceania 17 15 7 8 10 10
The share o f primary goods in the Portuguese imports from North and South 
Africa and Asia in 1988 was remarkably high. There has been a significant re­
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duction in the imports from North America and Asia, the share o f manufactures 
has risen from 38 to 51 percent in the case o f North America, and from 55 to 63 
percent in the case o f Asia. In the case o f Africa and South America the dominance 
o f primary goods has remained or even grown. As it can be seen in Table 3 the 
majority o f Portugal’s foreign trade is with Europe, and within it, with the Euro­
pean Union countries. 86 and 82 percent respectively of its exports are directed 
there, and 79 and 75 percent respectively o f its imports originate from there. This 
was its characteristic even in 1988, and stronger integration brought another 3 or 4 
percent growth in these shares in the following seven years. Trade in manufactures 
was even more concentrated on the European markets in both directions than trade 
in primary goods. It is conspicuous that the European Union’s share in Portugal’s 
primary goods imports rose (from 34 to 46 percent), and in contrast to this, the re­
spective shares o f Africa, Asia and North America decreased, even if they remained 
high.
In the opinion o f some Portuguese experts,10 as a consequence of integration 
Portugal’s foreign trade has been concentrated excessively on Europe, primarily on 
the European Union. The country has lost a remarkable proportion of its earlier ex­
port and import markets and this has engendered several disadvantages. Previously, 
Portugal purchased a remarkable proportion o f its agricultural imports from the 
United States and Canada, but it became apparent that substituting these with im­
ports from Western Europe was more expensive. The concentration of Portuguese 
light industry exports on the European Union countries has made vulnerable those 
traditionally important branches which employ many people. Such opinions are 
of the view that it is disadvantageous to have very limited imports from Japan 
and the Asian countries. It is pointed out that Portugal could purchase machinery 
products much cheaper from those countries than from EU member countries.
If Portugal’s exports are analysed in more detail— that is, by SITC one-digit 
breakdown in nine commodity groups ( Table 4 )—'it is clear that the fastest devel­
oping commodity group is machinery exports, which increased by 239 percent over 
a period o f seven years; furthermore its share rose the most— by 11 percent— in 
the total o f exports (from 17 percent in 1988 to 28 percent in 1995). Consequently, 
machinery exports became the second largest commodity group after clothing in­
dustry products in the share o f Portuguese exports. This unusual dynamics caused 
a reduction o f the shares o f other commodity groups because their growth was less 
than the average o f 106 percent. Only the growth o f food exports followed the 
average pace and thus its share remained almost the same.
The changes in the values and shares o f the four main commodity groups in 
Portuguese exports can be seen in Figures I and 2 where one and two-digit SITC 
groups have been aggregated. In Figure 1 the changes of the export values can be 
followed between 1988 and 1995. It is clear from this that the largest export group
10Personal communication o f  Teresa Mouran, Under-Secretary o f State of European Affairs.
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Table 4
The shares and growth of Portuguese exports between 1988 and 1995 (in percentage)
S iT c  C om m odity groups 
numb.
Total world European Union 15 Other regions
1988 1995 Growth 1988 1995 Growth 1988 1995 Growth
0 F ood and live animals 4.16 4.14 205 3.08 3.90 273 8.07 5.25 112
1 Beverages and tobacco 3.48 2.58 153 3.4.3 2.31 146 3.69 3.75 175
2 Inedible crude materials 9.62 6.48 139 10.35 6.27 131 6.97 7.42 183
3 Mineral fuels 2.92 0.42 30 1.25 0.50 86 8.95 0.06 1
4 Animal and vegetable oils and fats 0.43 0.67 322 0.27 0.15 122 1.00 3.01 518
Prim ary products 20.62 14.29 143 18.38 13.14 154 28.67 19.48 117
5 Chemicals and related products 5.98 5.00 172 5.28 4.87 199 8.53 5.61 113
6 Manufactured goods 24.46 23.44 198 23.48 22.22 204 27.99 28.96 178
7 M achinery and transport equipment 16.81 27.61 339 18.05 28.55 341 12.36 23.36 325
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 32.02 29.56 190 34.76 31.22 194 22.14 22.07 171
9 Other com m odities and transactions 0.11 0.10 189 0.05 0.01 37 0.32 0.52 276
Manufactures 79.38 85.71 223 81.62 86.86 230 71.33 80.52 194
Total exports 100.00 100.00 206 100.00 100.00 216 100.00 100.00 172
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Food and beverages (0+1) —Cl— Electric machinery and road vehicles (77+78)
Raw materials (2+3+4) —O— Textile, clothing and footwear (65+84+85)
Fig. 1 Main commodity groups of Portuguese exports
is still that o f textile, clothing and shoe exports; this illustrates a rising tendency 
despite the recession o f 1993. The sudden 80 percent leap in the increase of elec­
trical machinery and vehicle exports in 1994 is remarkable, given their previously 
consistently smooth rise. The export values of the other two commodity groups— 
i e. food and drink and other primary goods— changed little until 1993 when the 
first, group started to rise and the latter started to decrease. It can be seen that 
primary goods exports (excluding food) surpassed the value of exports of the two 
main machinery groups up to 1991, but later the latter rose much higher.
In Figure 2 we can see the variations of the export shares of the same four 
commodity groups. In contrast to Figure 1 this reflects that, since the beginning 
of the 1990, the proportion of textile and clothing exports has had a consistently 
falling tendency. This is in spite o f the fact that their values have increased signif­
icantly. This decline is mainly a consequence o f the growth of the export shares of 
other manufactures— the diagrammatic representation of the increase in the export 
Proportions o f the two machinery groups show this clearly.
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0
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Years
-Food and beverages (0+1)
I— Electric machinery and road vehicles (77+78) 
—A— Raw materials (2+3+4)
—O— Textile, clothing and footwear (65+84+85)
Fig. 2  Export shares of the main commodity groups in Portuguese trade
The European Union, as the largest buying market, has determined the make­
up o f Portugal’s exports— with respect to composition of the goods, and the dy­
namics o f the commodity groups; on this plain we can see similar variations to 
those found among total exports (Table 4)- The single significant difference is that 
food exports to the EU countries have been above average and that is why their 
share has grown within exports.
On the basis of two-digit SITC groups we have examined Portugal’s exports 
developments in more detail (see Table 5 , which includes export commodity groups 
o f more than 100 million US dollars). It is apparent that exports o f instruments 
have increased more than sevenfold, while exports o f telecommunications and elec­
trical equipment and road vehicles have grown fourfold over the seven years under 
consideration here. In the latter a few newly established large car-assembly plants 
(e.g. Ford, Renault) have played a significant role. It can be seen that machine 
exports increased not only on the EU markets, because the growth of exports to 
other countries was sixfold.
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In the exports o f agricultural and food products, attention should be paid 
to the fact that the effects o f integration have meant that exports to EU countries 
have grown very strongly. For instance, dairy products, fruits and vegetables have 
experienced a threefold growth in exports, while exports to other countries have 
fallen. The traditional Portuguese export— cork— has increased slower than the 
average. This is partly because o f the lack o f new plantations and partly due to the 
slow producing time. In contrast to this, products from the paper industry have 
enjoyed increased exports, growing more than fourfold.
Among Portugal’s traditional export items, one of the largest comprises light 
industrial products. As can be seen, products from the textile and clothing indus­
tries have respective export increases, which have been slower than the average. 
Shoes, however, have just about kept up with average exports. The rapid rise in 
machine exports and the stagnation o f light industrial products have brought about 
a re-structuring o f Portugal’s exports: the share of machinery exports has grown 
significantly and surpassed clothing and leather export items.
On the basis o f Table 6 we can examine the dynamic changes which have 
taken place in Portugal’s imports. If we compare it to Table 5 we can see that 
exports are highly concentrated while imports are more diversified: there are more 
commodity groups which have a value above 100 million US dollars in Portugal’s 
imports. In contrast to exports, the growth in machinery imports is below the 
average, and only the so-called “other vehicles” have seen slightly faster import 
growth. Road vehicles, however, only grew by 49 percent— namely, at about half 
the rate o f exports. In contrast to this, the respective import figures for clothing 
items, shoes, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, vegetable oil, meat and dairy products 
have grown between three-fourfold. All these dynamically growing imports are a 
consequence o f the growth o f imports originating in the EU. It should be noted 
that all those commodity groups, which are imported from other non-EU countries 
and which have grown comparatively fast, have not been significant in their value.
From Table 7 the results o f those calculations can be seen. These show, 
according to the SITC one-digit detail, the extent o f the trade increment over the 
period o f the seven examined years. It should be noted that Portuguese exports 
increments were significant: out o f a growth o f more than 11 billion US dollars, a 
value o f nearly 10 billion was absorbed by EU countries; namely, (with the exception 
o f raw materials, fuels) 85 percent o f export increments were directed towards the 
member countries. The situation is different, with imports: total increments were 
much greater, reaching more than 15 billion US dollars; but out o f this “only ’
80 percent originated from EU countries. It is striking that in the sphere o f food 
imports the increment from EU countries was higher (90 percent), and their share 
m the increment o f machine imports was lower.
In Table 8 and Figure 3 the values o f the trade balances are shown with 
respect to a breakdown o f the main commodity groups. Portugal’s trade balance 
(as has been mentioned) shows a significant deficit for the whole period examined;
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Table 5
The changes in Portuguese exports by commodities in 1988 and 1995
Total world European Union 15 Other regions
SITC
numb
C om m odity groups 1988 
M . USD
1995 1988 
M. USD
1995 1988 
M. USD
1995
M. USD 1988=100
percent
M . USD 1988=100
percent
M. USD 1988=100
percent
02 Dairy products and eggs 43.51 125.52 289 33.46 111.50 333 10.04 14.03 140
03 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs 177.62 301.24 170 112.99 241.00 213 64.63 60.24 93
05 Vegetables and fruits 153.38 272.61 178 67.08 212.99 318 86.30 59.62 69
24 Cork and wood 205.79 203.39 99 174.77 171.96 98 31.02 31.43 101
25 Pulp and waste paper 671.11 739.18 110 592.25 644.12 109 78.86 95.06 121
28 Metalliferous ores and m etals+A32 58.34 324.27 556 48.42 229.27 474 9.93 95.00 957
33 Petroleum , petroleum  products 320.35 56.77 18 106.57 55.13 52 213.78 1.65 1
42 Fixed vegetable oils and fats 44.16 142.75 323 21.97 26.16 119 22.19 116.58 525
51 Organic chemicals 148.70 316.12 213 108.11 264.52 245 40.59 51.60 127
57 Plastics in prim ary forms 154.36 195.78 127 88.83 153.77 173 65.53 42.02 64
58 Plastics in non-prim ary forms 39.37 110.55 281 28.97 94.56 326 10.40 15.99 154
59 Chemical materials and products 147.47 179.88 122 136.88 165.46 121 10.59 14.43 136
63 Cork and w ood manufactures 557.91 923.01 165 424.45 646.00 152 133.46 277.01 208
64 Paper and paper manufactures 156.34 680.06 435 134.55 606.19 451 21.79 73.87 339
65 Textile yarn and related products 1056.42 1626.82 154 831.31 1264.22 152 225.11 362.59 161
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a .
Total world European Union 15 Other regions
Com m odity groups 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
SITC M. USD M. USD 1988=100 M . USD M . USD 1988=100 M. USD M. USD 1988=100
Table 5 (continued)
The changes in Portuguese exports by commodities in 1988 and 1995
numb percent percent percent
66 N on-m etallic mineral manufactures 471.59 1010.36 214 318.79 767.39 241 152.80 242.97 159
67 Iron and steel 65.68 185.02 282 41.18 156.04 379 24.49 28.98 118
69 Manufactures o f metal n.e.s.* 242.02 653.60 270 161.54 504.95 313 80.48 148.65 185
71 Power generating machinery 187.78 399.09 213 170.86 336.85 197 16.91 62.24 368
72 Specialised machinery 79.16 184.92 234 49.23 106.25 216 29.93 78.67 263
74 Other industrial machinery A7 177.81 490.80 276 108.78 332.71 306 69.03 158.10 229
76 Telecommunication equipment 188.81 727.99 386 174.95 680.57 389 13.86 47.41 342
77 Electrical machinery 489.52 2135.40 436 440.21 1844.40 419 49.31 291.00 590
78 R oad vehicles 570.36 2084.02 365 543.99 1899.06 349 26.37 184.96 701
79 Other transport equipment 76.34 176.54 231 14.72 65.94 448 61.62 110.60 180
82 Furniture and parts thereof 72.49 284.02 392 62.37 252.03 404 10.12 31.98 316
84 Articles o f apparel &; clothing 2296.36 3805.12 166 1972.44 3400.64 172 323.92 404.49 125
85 Footwear 877.95 1846.82 210 776.63 1554.66 200 101.32 292.16 288
87 Professional instruments 27.87 205.49 737 19.60 174.99 893 8.27 30.50 369
89 Miscellaneous manufactures 188.95 406.05 215 115.01 283.51 247 73.93 122.55 166
N ote: Com m odity groups with more that USD 100 million export values
*n.e.s.— not elsewhere specified
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Table 6
The changes in Portuguese imports by commodities in 1988 and 1995
Total world European Union 15 Other regions
C om m odity groups 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
SITC M . USD M . USD 1988=100 M . USD M . USD 1988=100 M. USD M. USD 1988=100
numb. percent percent percent
00 Live animals 29.04 102.96 355 28.49 95.72 336 0.55 7.24 1316
01 M eat and meat preparations 164.65 490.08 298 151.30 468.18 309 13.35 21.91 164
02 Dairy products and eggs 36.29 165.19 455 30.78 162.37 528 5.51 2.83 51
03 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs 459.95 806.55 175 123.77 364.78 295 336.18 441.77 131
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 259.71 693.81 267 83.10 561.37 676 176.60 132.44 75
05 Vegetables and fruits 291.16 591.04 203 121.37 378.81 312 169.79 212.23 125
06 Sugar preparations and honey 142.42 199.92 140 33.74 40.67 121 108.68 159.24 147
07 Coffee, tea, co coa  and spices 111.84 254.62 228 47.74 131.90 276 64.10 122.72 191
08 Feedstuff o f animals 221.04 257.11 116 44.88 98.44 219 176.16 158.67 90
09 Other edible products 29.07 116.97 402 26.83 112.76 420 2.24 4.21 188
22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 391.97 319.86 82 124.98 31.05 25 266.99 288.82 108
24 Cork and wood 186.81 382.25 205 58.50 113.42 194 128.30 268.82 210
26 Textiles fibres and their wastes 435.23 500.53 115 92.24 149.58 162 342.99 350.95 102
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials 45.94 106.83 233 35.61 78.46 220 10.33 28.37 275
32 Coal, coke and briquettes 152.48 260.02 171 16.86 4.12 24 135.63 255.91 189
33 Petroleum  and petroleum products 1246.91 1757.49 141 257.13 75.24 29 989.78 1682.25 170
34 Gas, natural and manufactured 65.23 162.70 249 63.76 140.55 220 1.47 22.15 1504
42 F ixed vegetable oils and fats 23.12 215.67 933 9.39 178.66 1903 13.73 37.00 270
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Table 6 (continued)
The changes in Portuguese imports by commodities in 1988 and 1995
Total world European Union 15 Other regions
Com m odity groups 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
SITC M . USD M. USD 1988=100 M . USD M . USD 1988=100 M. USD M. USD 1988=100
numb percent percent percent
51 Organic chemicals 478.09 651.54 136 351.99 499.75 142 126.10 151.79 120
52 Inorganic chemicals 127.37 172.75 136 114.13 150.27 132 13.25 22.48 170
53 Dyeing and colouring materials 184.21 356.31 193 152.07 334.62 220 32.14 21.69 67
54 Pharm aceutical products 219.29 630.02 287 166.52 505.34 303 52.78 124.68 236
55 Essential oils for perfume materials 110.80 388.15 350 99.61 369.21 371 11.19 18.94 169
57 Plastics in primary forms 249.87 550.34 220 235.32 513.17 218 14.55 37.17 255
58 Plastics in non-prim ary forms 119.46 253.59 212 115.05 240.69 209 4.41 12.89 292
59 Chemical materials and products 244.16 403.07 165 218.94 362.60 166 25.22 40.47 160
61 Leather and leather manufactures 266.76 467.90 175 153.99 283.29 - 184 112.77 184.60 164
62 R ubber manufactures, n.e.s.* 158.59 349.99 221 146.07 289.85 198 12.53 60.14 480
63 Cork and wood manufactures 26.83 116.89 436 22.35 91.48 409 4.49 25.41 566
64 Paper and paper manufactures 266.73 691.13 259 247.22 652.10 264 19.51 39.03 200
65 Textile yarn and related products 1103.35 1953.82 177 924.96 1628.38 176 178.39 325.44 182
66 N on-m etallic mineral manufactures 293.23 452.48 154 235.63 416.90 177 57.59 35.59 62
67 Iron and steel 587.67 1264.53 215 544.73 1164.36 214 42.95 100.17 233
68 Non-ferrous metals 379.93 583.03 153 233.13 475.24 204 146.80 107.78 73
69 Manufactures o f metal, n.e.s.* 294.23 700.46 238 266.95 636.06 238 27.28 64.40 236
*n.e.s.— not elsewhere specified
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Table 6 (continued)
The changes in Portuguese imports by commodities in 1988 and 1995
Total world European Union 15 Other regions
C om m odity groups 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
SITC
numb
M. USD M. USD 1988=100 
percent
M. USD M. USD 1988=100 
percent
M . USD M. USD 1988=100 
percent
71 Power generating machinery 269.76 638.31 237 203.81 548.06 269 65.95 90.25 137
72 Specialised machinery 1196.86 1056.81 88 983.54 898.08 91 213.32 158.74 74
73 M etal working machinery 132.54 142.61 108 108.58 107.02 99 23.96 35.59 148
74 Other industrial machinery 754.59 1079.17 143 668.96 943.05 141 85.63 136.12 159
75 Office machines and data processing 488.70 802.85 164 368.10 684.45 186 120.60 118.39 98
76 Telecom m unication equipment 565.65 931.89 165 438.82 693.98 158 126.83 237.91 188
77 Electrical machinery 791.99 2314.54 292 656.36 1663.43 253 135.63 651.11 480
78 R oad vehicles 2593.04 3868.97 149 2290.86 3402.15 149 302.18 466.82 154
79 Other transport equipment 71.53 500.68 700 51.70 369.77 715 19.83 130.91 660
81 Sanitary, heating and lighting fixtures 39.71 113.95 287 38.07 107.92 284 1.64 6.03 367
82 Furniture and parts thereof 62.17 196.94 317 60.39 187.81 311 1.78 9.13 513
84 Articles o f  apparel & clothing 
accessories 201.92 851.40 422 190.52 781.36 410 11.40 70.04 614
85 Footwear 83.19 292.15 351 79.74 213.56 268 3.44 78.59 2282
87 Professional instruments 206.79 401.08 194 152.19 308.22 203 54.60 92.86 170
88 Photo and optical goods, watches 169.76 290.44 171 119.67 199.28 167 50.09 91.16 182
89 M iscellaneous manufactured articles 423.82 1169.04 276 344.78 993.99 288 79.04 175.06 221
94 G old, non-m onetary 4.25 176.73 4157 1.98 170.52 8595 2.27 6.21 274
Note: C om m odity groups with more that USD 100 million im port values
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Table 7
Increment of Portuguese trade between 1988 and 1995 
(in million USD and percentage)
Com m odity
groups
World EU 15 Other
leg.
EU/W orld 
(percent)
Exports
0+1 683,927 594,934 88,993 87
2+4 517,774 279,284 238,490 54
3 -227,262 -15 ,370 -211,892 7
5 + 6 + 8 + 9 6,309,975 5,369,645 940,330 85
7 4,423,067 3,757,244 665,823 85
Total 11,707,481 9,985,737 1,721,744 85
Imports
0+1 2,168,828 1,961,837 206,992 90
2+4 518,183 292,191 225,992 56
3 730,525 -102,905 833,430 -1 4
5 + 6 + 8 + 9 7,236,627 6,399,148 837,479 88
7 4,471,158 3,539,267 931,891 79
Total 15,125,321 12,089,537 3,035,784 80
The titles o f the com m odity groups can be seen in Table 4-
in 1988 the deficit was 6.9 billion US dollars, but by 1995 it had grown to above 10 
billion US dollars. The import surplus was characteristic of most commodity-groups 
with the exception o f two: beverages and textile/clothing items. The greatest deficit 
could be witnessed— in each year— in machinery trade; however, its significance has 
decreased: in 1988 the total deficit amounted to 73 percent while in 1995 it was 
only 49 percent. It is worth mentioning that trade in food products also had an 
import surplus, its value doubling over seven years.
As a consequence o f  participation in European integration— as was expected— 
the respective proportions o f intra-industry and inter-industry trade have changed 
greatly in Portugal.11 According to the theory o f Hekscher-Ohlin and neo-classical 
concepts, the international division o f labour and especially the development o f inte­
gration, by increased specialisation lead towards a decrease o f competitive branches 
and activities in the individual countries; and the share o f inter-industry trade 
grows. The exports o f competitive activities are extended, while their position on 
the domestic market is not endangered by import competition. In contrast to this, 
those branches that cannot stand up to the competition are unable to overcome 
the rivalry from imported goods and are gradually squeezed out o f the market.
11 The results o f  the computations for “inter-industry” and “ intra-industry” trade are based 
°n the findings o f Fontoura (1998). See also Balassa (1963; 1974); Grubel and Lloyd (1975); 
Greenway and Miller (1983); Halpern, K örösi and Richter (1985); Nagy (1995); Éltető (1998).
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Table 8
Portuguese balance o f trade by main commodity groups (1988-1995)
SITC Com m odity groups 
numb.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
0 Food and live animals -1 2 8 6 -1 1 9 3 -1 6 6 9 -2 0 4 3 -24 1 7 -2 1 8 8 -24 6 5 -2 7 3 7
1 Beverages and tobacco 290 209 299 301 355 269 201 255
2 Inedible crude 
materials -2 8 8 85 -3 4 -1 4 9 -1 1 3 -1 0 7 -1 7 0 -1 9 6
3 Mineral fuels -1 1 4 2 -15 7 5 -2 1 3 6 -1 9 4 9 -1 8 9 7 -1 6 2 0 -1 5 7 6 -2 1 0 0
4 Animal and vegetable 
oils and fats 10 -3 0 14 - 4 2 -7 7 -7 6 - 8 2
5 Chemicals and related 
products -1 1 1 6 -10 4 2 -1 4 4 6 -1 6 3 9 -1 9 7 7 -1 6 6 3 -1 8 3 5 -2 3 3 8
6 Manufactured goods -6 8 1 -7 6 1 -1 1 4 6 -1 2 1 3 -1461 -6 1 2 -7 2 8 -1 2 5 2
7 Machinery and trans­
port equipment -5011 -4562 -6 1 3 3 -6395 -76 2 6 -5 3 5 8 -5 4 2 4 -5 0 5 9
8 Miscellaneous manu­
factured articles 2330 2636 3352 3092 3200 2642 3104 3359
9 Other com modities 
and transactions 7 - 8 -5 6 -6 5 -1 0 6 -1 1 2 -1 1 9 -1 5 5
Total exports -6 8 8 7 -6241 -8 9 5 5 -10064 -12040 -8 8 2 6 -9 0 8 8 -10305
In contrast to this appealing and logical conception, it is already nearly 20 
years since observation o f the facts has led to the drawing of strongly divergent con­
clusions. It has turned out that it is in the trade o f the most developed countries 
that the turnover has grown fastest within the same commodity groups. Also, trade 
among different groups has not shown consistent or unambiguous increases. The 
differentiation o f products, the demand for the increase in varieties available, the 
exploitation o f economies o f scale and the significant spread o f product ranges with 
imperfect competition: these are the main factors which have refuted the expec­
tations of greatly simplified neo-classical theory. Balassa (1974) pointed out that 
most o f the fast development of intra-industry trade is a result o f the spontaneous 
operational effects o f market forces. However, in this, trade liberalisation and eco­
nomic deregulation— i.e. the trade policies o f the states— have had vital roles to 
play.
Tables 9 and 10 include the results o f investigations carried out by Fontoura 
(1988). The development o f inter-industry trade over a period o f 30 years shows 
that in the main commodity groups protectionist measures brought about an ex­
traordinarily strong isolation. In other words, domestic needs were satisfied by 
home production, independent o f efficiency considerations and consumer demands. 
Imports were only present where domestic production was unprotected. It can be 
seen that in most o f the commodity groups (e.g. paper, textiles, clothing and shoes)
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Years
■  Food (0)
GBeverages (1)
■  Other crude materials (2+4)
Mineral fuels
Q Chemical products (5)
Miscellaneous manufactures (6+8+9)
M Machinery and transport equipment (7)
: iTOTALTRADE
Fig. 3  Trade balance o f Portugal by main commodity groups
the effect o f inter-industry specialisation was not only very high but also signifi­
cantly increased, right up to the beginning o f the 1980s. However, due to the effects 
o f integration in all commodity groups the index o f inter-industry trade decreased 
strongly (although in some areas, even in 1995, it remained comparatively high).
The examination o f intra-industry trade in Table 10 reveals that, in Portu­
gal’s case, it was at an extraordinary low level up to the beginning o f the 1980s, 
when it began to rise strongly. In the 1960s the parallel imports and exports of prod­
ucts belonging to identical commodity groups were negligible. The Grubel-Lloyd 
index was only 0.14 in 1977 and it gradually rose to 0.44 in 1996. Compared with 
the average o f the EU countries this is still at a comparatively low level. However, 
taking into account the tendency towards growth, it is to be expected that Portugal 
will soon have similar intra-industry trade indices to the other countries partici-
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Table 9
The changes in Portuguese inter-industry trade
Com modities 1960-65 1970 1983 1986 1992 1995
Agricultural goods 0.44 0.42 0.14 0.20 0.28 0.24
Food industry products 2.49 3.28 4.21 3.58 1.16 0.86
Beverages 107.62 22.49 46.76 12.38 3.47 3.05
Cork products 20.76 12.00 11.41 10.20 6.48 3.25
W ood pulp 4.08 19.81 36.09 24.03 24.30 13.34
Paper products 0.11 0.87 1.95 1.06 0.98 1.39
Textiles 1.34 1.84 2.42 2.01 0.62 0.57
Clothing 15.41 19.71 93.79 41.13 9.80 7.63
Footwear 21.77 14.24 76.67 28.90 13.55 9.07
Machines 0.13 0.20 0.51 0.36 0.36 0.51
Electric machinery 0.25 0.96 1.17 0.91 1.02 1.30
Road vehicles 0.05 0.08 0.38 0.32 0.41 0.70
Note: Computations made following the formula of Balassa (1963): (X i/ M i)/ (X / M ). 
Source: Fontoura (1998)
Table 10
Intra-industry trade between Portugal and EU
1961 1967 1972 1977 1985 1990 1994 1995 1996
Portugal
European Union*
0.04
0.48
0.10
0.56
0.13
0.57
0.14
0.59
0.24
0.58
0.30
0.59
0.36 0.38 0.44
‘ Average o f eleven EU countries, weighted by values o f intra-EU manufactured trade. 
Note: Unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd indices o f manufactures in four digit com m odity groups. 
Source-. Eurostat-Comext, quoted by Fontoura (1998)
pating in European integration.12 On the basis o f Elteto’s (1998) calculations, at 
the two-digit commodity breakdown level she was able to make the statement: “In 
trade with France, Germany and Great Britain, Portuguese intra-industry trade 
visibly grew in the 1990s. In this, growth was primarily trade in ‘non-railway ve­
hicles’ (almost 25 percent o f the total), secondly, the trade in electrical machines 
and equipment had a growing turnover; these increases can also be attributed to 
the effects o f foreign capital” (p. 50).
12Portuguese intra-industry trade indices during the 1970s and 1980s were comparatively low, 
even com pared to the more developed members o f CM EA countries. See: Halpern, Körösi and 
Richter (1985); Nagy (1995).
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Some conclusions
After reviewing Portugal’s joining the European integration and examining 
the effects o f this on foreign trade, in this closing section an attempt will be made to 
summarise concisely those lessons, which, on the basis o f our investigations, could 
be useful for other countries wishing to join the European Union. Conclusions will 
be drawn on the basis o f the negotiations of accession, on the process o f accession 
itself, and finally on the likely effects of EU membership on foreign trade.
Association and negotiations preceding membership o f the EEC
1. Portugal has several economic and social similarities with those East Cen­
tral European countries wishing to join the EU. Among these, one is the develop­
ment o f agricultural property relations and their confused state. The revolution re­
sulted in a radical land reform (and parallel with it, spontaneous seizures o f land), 
which brought about the abolition o f the system o f large estates. However, the 
new small- and medium-size farms did not receive sufficient support; consequently, 
agricultural production and productivity fell. Thus, with respect to competition in 
agriculture with the EU member states, Portugal— despite its favourable geograph­
ical conditions— found itself rather defenceless.
2. The second similarity is that a significant proportion of Portugal’s labour 
force was backward, uneducated and of low flexibility. This is regarded as an im­
portant obstacle to the dissemination o f modern technical methods. Deregulation 
o f the labour market improved the situation somewhat but the lack o f profes­
sional skills and insufficient efforts at retraining are still causing serious hindrances 
to catching up with the developed countries. Following accession, it seems that 
structural transformation and economic advance largely depend on the type o f in­
stitutional instruments available and the degree o f success in improving the skills 
and employability o f the labour force.
3. Another similarity is the comparatively backward state o f the infrastruc­
ture; development o f the latter is one of the most urgent tasks to be dealt with in 
order to join the EU. The EU can be counted upon to provide significant support for 
this but— as with the case o f improving the quality o f the labour force— public ex­
penditure will have to grow: namely, the tasks of the state will not decrease but will 
increase in these areas. One o f the keys to Portugal’s successes is that it was able 
to increase such expenditures without pushing up the budget deficit. This required 
stricter supervision and greater efficiency in other areas o f state expenditure—  
especially with respect to the abolition of subsidies to large state-owned companies 
and banks.
4. One o f the factors that had a great role in speeding up Portugal’s eco­
nomic development was the degree o f confidence o f foreign investors in Portugal’s
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economic and political stability. This had an important role both in foreign direct 
investments and in the process o f privatisation. Confidence in Portugal’s economic 
progress depended largely on the success in establishing macro-economic stability. 
This involved reduction o f the national debt, the budget deficit and inflation. An­
other vital role was played by the ostensible determination of the government to 
implement structural and market-conforming institutional reforms, including un­
popular but indispensable measures.
5. In the negotiations on accession to the EU it soon became apparent there 
could be no question o f refusing the terms of the community, or transforming these. 
Rather, the discussions focussed on the sustainability o f the circumstances for, and 
the time in which Portugal would be able to comply with the terms o f the EU. 
In other words, in which cases would Portugal need help (and what kind o f help) 
in order to gradually fall in line with the acquis communautaire? Moreover, how 
much time could be allowed for this process to take place?
6. After the accession negotiations, the opinion o f some experts was that it 
would be more advantageous for Portugal if it was to negotiate alone in Brussels—  
i.e. without its much larger and more protectionist neighbour, Spain. During the 
course o f negotiations, some o f the experts in Brussels were against certain con­
cessions to Portugal because they feared a precedent would be set up for Spain. 
This could be an important lesson in the preparations for the negotiations over the 
accession o f the three East Central European countries. According to the experi­
ences of the South European countries, parallel negotiations with other countries 
not only make the process more difficult but also slow it down.
7. The accession negotiations were many-sided and the level o f difficulty in 
the problematic themes to be resolved differed greatly. According to Portuguese 
experiences, due to the complexity of the problems and their connection with each 
other, discussions can drag on for some time. The success o f this process (and its 
speeding up) can be better ensured if themes for debate are divided up according 
to their respective degrees o f complexity, with easier ones being dealt with first 
and then moving on to more difficult issues. Once an item has been discussed and 
agreed upon there should be no return to that particular issue; yet thought must 
be given to the way in which the solution o f individual questions can be brought 
into harmony with other issues.
8. At first, Portugal’s efforts to join the European Community were charac­
terised by a considerable degree o f ambiguity. They tried to politically balance the 
requirements for accession with the principles o f socialism that had been laid down 
in the post-revolutionary constitution. However, behind the latter— with regard 
to economic interests— there were inherent tendencies towards protectionism and 
inflexibility in the state sector, which had also increased in size. This ambiguity 
was particularly responsible for the long-drawn out discussions; the solution was 
to develop unequivocally a democratic and Europe-friendly political system (which 
meant squeezing the communist party out from positions of power). The European
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Community wanted to bring about this political settlement mainly from a security 
point of view, in order to allow accession to go ahead. It can be presumed that this 
goal o f political settlement is valid for East Central European countries in order to 
prevent the return o f the former communist dictatorship and the renewal of Rus­
sian influence in the region. This is an important factor for EU accession, even if 
it does not actually play such a determinant role in the course o f discussions and 
agreements.
9. Portugal’s accession was also hindered by frequent political changes, gov­
ernment crises and, within these, inconsistencies related to the frequent changes in 
officials responsible for negotiations. In order for new officials to become acquainted 
with the on-going procedures, time was needed; the concomitant uncertainty nega­
tively affected the credibility and reliability o f the country. It was at such times that 
Portugal’s negotiating position was weakened. The success of negotiations depends 
largely on the expertise and mindfulness of the delegations o f the countries seek­
ing accession. The maintenance o f continuity— regardless o f political changes— is 
highly important.
10. Portuguese experts have emphasised that, in the course o f seeking in­
tegration, the liberalisation of the trade and financial systems should take place 
alongside one another; the way in which this takes place and the timing o f the 
changes are important. Moreover, the deregulation o f rules influencing production 
also needs to be connected with the above processes. Thus it is not enough to 
decrease the role o f the state in the economy, to liberalise and deregulate the nu­
merous types o f restrictions. This is because success mainly depends on details— i.e. 
how, with what methods, and in which order the changes take place. One aspect 
mentioned, as an example, concerned Portugal’s large external and internal debts 
(which were a consequence of preference being given to state borrowing). This 
significantly narrowed, and made more expensive the opportunities for acquiring 
resources for the competitive sphere, which retarded structural changes and held 
back competitiveness.
Integration effects on foreign trade
a) European integration has had a strong trade-creating effect for Portugal: 
both exports and imports grew rapidly in the wake o f EEC accession; in fact, 
growth was faster than world trade and average EU trade. The rapid growth in 
exports was primarily due to trade in manufactures. Imports originating in EU 
countries also grew comparatively quickly. However, it is striking that Portuguese 
imports o f agricultural goods and raw materials from EU countries grew faster than 
the importation o f industrial goods. This phenomenon contradicts the supposition 
that integration with developed European economies leads to “colonial-type” con­
nections with the weaker economies— i.e. raw material exports from the weaker
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economies increase while their exports o f industrial goods are restricted, and op­
posite tendencies can be expected on the import side.
b) The overwhelming share o f Portugal’s trade is transacted with EU count­
ries— in 1995 the EU accounted for 82 percent o f Portugal’s exports and 72 percent 
of its imports. The turnover o f industrial goods is more strongly concentrated in 
the EU countries than the turnover of raw materials. Because the participation 
o f EU countries in Portugal’s raw material imports has grown, the volume o f such 
imports from Africa, Asia and North America have fallen. In the opinion o f some 
experts the effect o f integration on Portuguese foreign trade has turned too much 
towards the EU, and thus it has lost some o f its earlier advantageous export and 
acquisition markets. On the one hand, because o f this agricultural imports have 
become more expensive and, on the other hand, the market concentration o f light 
industry exports has increased their vulnerability. For those East Central European 
countries aiming to join the EU an important objective o f trade policy should be, 
alongside the attraction o f integration, to find out how existing and advantageous 
export and raw material import markets can be preserved. In other words, how to 
profit from integration through trade-creation, without losing existing advantages 
by trade-diversion.
c) Following accession it was Portugal’s machine exports which grew most 
dynamically. For example, the export o f instruments grew sevenfold; the respec­
tive export figures for telecommunications products, electrical equipment and road 
vehicles grew almost fourfold between 1988 and 1995. The successful growth of 
machinery exports was not only due to trade with the EU but with other parts of 
the world as well. These came second to textiles and clothing— traditionally the 
main exports. The value o f the latter increased significantly, although their share in 
total exports has had a consistently decreasing tendency since the beginning of the 
1990s. Thus European integration has not led to a decline in Portugal’s traditional 
exports but, rather, has resulted in significant growth alongside the production of 
new, up-to-date goods. The latter have markedly surpassed the traditional ones in 
export growth.
d) Exports o f agricultural and food products have grown strongly, e.g. dairy 
products, vegetables and fruits. Exports o f these grew threefold in under seven 
years, mainly to the EU markets; however, exports to other regions o f the world 
declined. It can be presumed that the reason for this was that the EU’s protected 
agricultural market offered better prices and more favourable conditions for exports 
than elsewhere.
e) In the case of Portugal one fear about integration has proved to be ground­
less— namely, that machinery imports from the developed European countries would 
flood Portugal’s market and damage the machine industry and its export capacity. 
The growth o f machine imports has remained around the average, and the import 
o f road vehicles has increased only half as rapidly as exports. In contrast to this, 
there have been notable increases in imports— primarily from the EU countries— in
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the spheres o f clothing, shoes, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, meat and dairy prod­
ucts. Thus industrial competition within West European integration has spread 
virtually to every branch o f production; nevertheless, the competitive productive 
activities have not only been able to maintain their position but have also been 
able to increase their exports significantly.
f) The increase o f Portugal's industrial production and its structural transfor­
mation owe much to integration in the EU. Investigations indicate that the changes 
have actually proceeded according to Portugal’s revealed comparative advantages. 
Although the effects o f external markets have had a big role in this, it can be stated 
that Portugal’s catching up with developed countries has mainly been due to en­
dogenous changes— namely, to transformations in the formerly backward economic 
and institutional structures, in the allocation o f resources, and in the restructuring 
o f those resources themselves.
g) As a consequence o f the opening up o f the world economy and of the results 
o f European integration policy— in contrast to the earlier period o f protection—  
inter-industry trade specialisation has declined and the importance of intra-industry 
trade has significantly increased. Similar developments can be hoped for in the 
respective cases o f the East Central European countries seeking EU membership. 
Nevertheless, this is not a rapid process and its success depends on a decisive 
transformation of a country’s internal institutional structure, and also the removal 
o f obstacles to international co-operation between enterprises.
h) The positive development o f the commodity structure o f Portugal’s foreign 
trade corresponding to its comparative advantages can be put down to the extension 
o f those products which have experienced a comparatively fast growth of demand 
on the world market; and also on those markets where exports were, or became 
competitive. The effect o f all this has been a remarkable improvement in product 
competitiveness, quality and marketing. Compared with other countries it can be 
seen that the positive effects accession to the EU were the stronger, the higher the 
pre-accession tariff level was, and the more quotas impeded the free flow o f trade.
i) Before Portugal’s accession, and during the long process of negotiations, 
there were strong doubts about what advantages could be expected. The Por­
tuguese knew that they could count on a certain increase of their export markets as 
well as generous funds from EU transfers. Yet, alongside the expected advantages, 
there was great doubt as to whether EU membership would produce more advan­
tages than the guarantees o f earlier trade agreements. Given the latter concern, it 
was asked whether it was worth getting involved in stronger import competition, 
with all the risks and disadvantages which could arise from it. However, the very 
serious long-term disadvantages o f staying away from West European integration 
had to be carefully considered also. Experiences have proved that these doubts and 
a certain unsteadiness o f Portuguese economic policy were without foundation. The 
advantages o f accession, in parallel with processes o f structural and institutional
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modernisation have led to developments that have surpassed the expectations of 
nearly all the experts. 
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Well, is there any difference? A few 
months ago the hostess o f the press presenta­
tion o f Varga’s book and my colleague at BUES, 
Katalin Szabó, replied in such a way to the re­
sponses to my attempt to catch the audi­
ence’s attention with the following, seemingly 
absurd question. “W hat do university stud­
ies and pigsties have in com m on?” All this 
might seem curious and I will try to increase cu­
riosity by first saying a few words about why I 
like my colleague Júlia Varga’s book.
Psychologists say that one o f the rea­
sons for explaining psychological phenomena is 
that there is no reason. Yet here I do have more 
than one.
Firstly, I like this book because it is 
by no means a boring compilation o f literature 
thrown together in the spirit o f “ (s)he who can­
not practice it, teaches” ; rather, it is an excit­
ing intellectual venture o f an author who knows 
and practices the economics o f education. Or 
as another maxim says: I have heard and for­
gotten, I have read and remember, I have prac­
tised it and I understand it. Those who may not 
know Varga's research work will certainly re­
alize from her book that she has not simply 
“ read and remembers” but “practised and un­
derstands it” .
A second reason is that Varga is the 
sort o f teacher who is able to pass on knowl­
edge without giving up accessibility to com ­
petence. Presumably this is not simply be­
cause she happens to be an economist o f ed­
ucation, just as a physician’s degree is no guar­
antee for a healthy way o f life. Upon reading 
her book, I do understand the economics o f ed­
ucation.
A third reason is the deliberately discus- 
sion-like treatment o f the topic. O f course, this 
is not in the sense o f the old-fashioned style o f 
the peripatetic school but, as a rare strength of 
some textbook authors, with regard to a clear, 
authentic and proportional treatment o f  con­
flicting views.
Finally, I like this book for its ele­
gant and friendly style, while maintaing a high 
level o f academic seriousness.
So, what do university studies have to do 
with pigsties ?
The Nobel prize winner Theodore Schultz 
appeared suddenly on the economics scene with 
his 1961 article on human capital investment. 
Shortly after W .W .II Schultz spent a semester 
at Alabama University as an agrarian economist 
interviewing farmers in the neighborhood. Ac­
cording to his memoirs (Schultz 1988) it was 
then that he met an elderly couple who, though 
visibly in dire straits, were surprisingly con­
tent with their fate. He was at a loss to under­
stand the case until the couple explained that 
they were by no means poor. They had ex­
changed their riches for the academic educa­
tion of their children. It was true that they used 
to have chicken coops and stockyards, pigs and 
mules; now all these properties were, in the form 
o f intellectual capital, in the brains o f their chil­
dren. “How on earth could we feel poor?” 
the couple asked. Schultz’s article came be­
fore basic works by renowned authors like Gary 
Becker, another Nobel laureate. His book, pub­
lished in 1964, was the first systematic treat­
ment o f  human capital theory; Schultz also pre­
ceded Jacob Mincer who, in his article in 1962, 
drew attention to the importance o f knowl­
edge and skills acquired through on the jo b  ex­
perience and whose human capital theory in­
spired the earnings function, proposed in a 
study o f 1974, and which is widely applied in 
labour economics even now.
Does the reader still need an explana­
tion for my question mentioned earlier in this re­
view? It would be unfair to Adam Smith if we 
were to leave unmentioned his early explana­
tion in 1776 o f the basic principle o f the the­
ory o f human capital: the impact o f the ef­
forts, money and time people invest in learn­
ing a trade on the difference between the wage 
o f  skilled and unskilled work.
Let me now quote Julia Varga’s words 
from the introduction to demonstrate the the­
matic structure and approach o f her book: 
“We are looking into three theories: the the­
ory of human capital, which asserts that ed-
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ucation increases the productivity of partici­
pants; the filter theory o f education, which 
claims that education simply provides informa­
tion on the performance capacity o f individ­
uals; and the approach based on labour de­
mand which says that economic growth re­
quires a given number o f  employees with a cer­
tain degree of knowledge and skills. Thus 
the main task o f educational policy is to pro­
vide the supply thus required. A most de­
tailed account will be given o f the theory of hu­
man capital since this is the most influential ap­
proach, so much so that even those who do not 
adhere to it cannot com pletely avoid its inspi­
ration.
Hence we will first have a closer look at 
the theory o f  human capital. We will exam­
ine the characteristics o f individual and cor­
porate investment decisions and how individ­
ual and social costs and benefits justify the role 
of the state. This will be followed by the treat­
ment o f the cost-benefit analysis o f educa­
tion (also based on the theory o f human cap­
ital) and a review o f the research into the im­
pact o f education on econom ic growth. A sep­
arate chapter will be devoted to the filter the­
ory and then another to the labour demand ap­
proach. Finally, problems associated with the 
financing o f education and methods of assess­
ing the efficiency o f education will be dis­
cussed. Each chapter, beside dealing with the­
oretical issues, will also summarize the rele­
vant results o f the most important empirical in­
vestigations.” (p. 8)
O f the above seven chapters, this re­
view is confined to comments upon the first 
five, o f  which Chapter I deals with the the­
ory o f  human capital and Chapters II-V  are 
partly based on the theory of human capi­
tal, and partly are reflections on it.
W ith regard to Chapter V, this coun­
terpoises the two basic versions o f educational 
planning— i.e. planning based on labour de­
mand versus rate o f return calculations. I have 
to remark at this point that this is where the au­
thor ought to have gone beyond the stan­
dard textbook requirement o f presenting a par­
ticular school o f thought and those (and this is 
a sort o f reproach) o f the m ajor Hungarian play­
ers in the field; she refers to János Timár’s 1989 
book, but fails to mention János K ovács 's from 
1968. W ith respect to Chapters VI and VII, it is
enough to note that they offer up-to-date theo­
retical, methodological and factual fixed points 
(largely in accordance with conclusions drawn 
in 1997 from an examination o f American pub­
lic education by an internationally reknown ex­
pert in the field, Henry M. Levin , whose two 
earlier works are included in the list o f ref­
erences in Varga’s book). These points pro­
vide orientation in delicate and highly practi­
cal questions like:
—  on the one hand, the desirable mag­
nitudes and methods o f state subsidies for pub­
lic and higher education (e.g. should they be 
sector-dependent or sector-neutral, based on 
per capita institution financing or on vouch­
ers given to those entitled to educational ser­
vices, or should there be a tuition fee in non­
private higher education?)
—  on the other hand, the effectiveness, 
economies o f scale and cost-efficiency o f educa­
tional institutions.
I begin my comments with the con­
fession that I did not refer to Schultz’s Al­
abama experience simply as an anecdotal ex­
ample o f scientific perception born o f a propi­
tious encounter, or to Smith’s disquisition solely 
as a homage to the achievement o f a scien­
tist who was far ahead of his time. I did so 
mainly to illuminate reservations that should 
hardly have been forced into the framework of 
a textbook-like treatment of the theory o f hu­
man capital (although it might be excusable to 
raise such issues in the context o f a book re­
view).
The analogous treatment o f human and 
physical capital investments as part o f the hard 
core o f the theory of human capital— discussed 
in Chapter I— raises some concern. This is 
mainly because it puts into brackets the piv­
otal difference that, in normal cases, physi­
cal investment for the investor is tod ay ’s sacri­
fice for a future profit (i.e. immediate pleasures 
are forgone for higher future pleasures, or as El- 
ster (1997) puts it when criticizing Becker’s lat­
est (1996) book: first one step back, then
two steps forward)— but learning is, in normal 
cases, a basically positive, self-rewarding expe­
rience (namely, one step forward, then more 
steps forward). Had I not believed so, I would 
surely feel frustrated as a professor, and as a 
reviewer— without such belief I would have to 
feed prospective readers o f Julia Varga’s book
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not so much with the promise o f intellectual ex­
citement but with the prospect o f sizable mon­
etary returns.
Should we still presume that education 
is, for the individual, an investment (sacri­
fice) but one that yields positive external ef­
fects (benefits for others); if the latter is the 
case, then the state should indeed co-finance ed­
ucation to the extent o f such positive exter­
nalities; otherwise people’s willingness to learn 
would be suboptim al— i.e. less than socially de­
sirable. (There should not be any misunder­
standing here: the net individual profit from 
higher education will thus increase only tem­
porarily since, according to the theory o f hu­
man capital, individuals keep on getting higher 
wages and other pleasantries in proportion to 
the extra educational expenditures borne by 
themselves. In other words, as a consequence 
o f  education getting cheaper, more people will 
wish to participate in higher education, which 
will then result in a fall in the gross individ­
ual returns o f higher education later on. This 
is an implication o f the theory o f  human capi­
tal that seems to be supported by differences in 
the individual costs and returns o f higher edu­
cation between Great-Britain and the US.) At 
the same time, from the fact that the part 
o f  the costs o f education which is not cov­
ered with public money is borne not so much by 
those participating in education but their— in 
this regard altruist— rather profit-minded par­
ents. The parents are happy to make a sac­
rifice for the education o f their children, as is 
clearly the case with Schultz’s couple; the even­
tuality o f supra-optimal human capital invest­
ment follows, even without state subsidies, to 
education. Note, however, that the very term 
(sub/supra)-optim ality makes sense only to the 
extent that we think o f learning in the spirit 
o f the theory o f human capital: as a “one step 
back” sacrifice which increases future produc­
tivity and not as “one step forward” consump­
tion.
Reservations with regard to a treatment 
o f education which is analogous to physical cap­
ital investment proliferate if one reads rate o f re­
turn calculation principles, techniques and re­
sults in Chapter II. As it is, these calcula­
tions select from cost and return factors mostly 
on the basis o f technical difficulties with re­
spect to their measurability in monetary terms.
One could thus hardly play the Karl Popper- 
ian game: to reach an agreement in how much, 
say, a university degree against a high school 
diploma should be worth to justify the the­
ory o f human capital. The truth is that what­
ever it is worth, it is a question o f taste whether 
we make conclusions from the result about 
the validity o f the theory or, taken its valid­
ity for granted, focus on the specific prefer­
ences o f individuals: i.e. their attitudes towards 
various elements o f costs and returns. Fol­
lowing from all these, educational policy con­
clusions that may be implied by rate o f re­
turn calculations for the desirable amount and 
composition o f human capital investments are, 
in my view, to be treated with more seri­
ous reservations than in the case in Chap­
ter V. This chapter deals with such conclu­
sions with regard to assessing the capacity o f ed­
ucational planning using these conclusions (cf. 
Freeman 1976b).
In spite o f the above objections we might 
consider education in terms o f its effect on eco­
nomic growth at the national economy level—  
that is, as an investment similar to the re­
newal or increase o f physical capital stock, 
provided that a clear dependence o f an ef­
fect upon a cause between educational expen­
ditures and economic growth could be proven. 
(A rigorous critic may still find fault, say­
ing that this might represent a dependence o f ef­
fect upon a cause whereas consumption, in­
cluding education, is the powerhouse o f eco­
nomic growth.) Yet the methodological difficul­
ties and calculation results presented in Chap­
ter III suggest doubts again, notwithstand­
ing the results o f recent attempts to explain 
the huge international disparities o f productiv­
ity (for instance Hall and Jones 1996, and es­
pecially Barro 1997).
Investigation results reviewed in Chap­
ter IV seem to tip the scales in favour o f earn­
ings functions induced by the theory o f hu­
man capital in order to explain earnings differ­
entials across groups with various levels of edu­
cation. This is in contrast to the explanation of 
the filter theory which has been a challenge ever 
since the later Nobel prize winner Kenneth Ar­
row published his famous article in 1962. This 
claims that the positive association o f earn­
ings and education does not confirm the pos­
itive impact o f schooling on productivity; it
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might be that inherently more intelligent and 
more ingenious, and consequently more produc­
tive individuals have better chances o f reach­
ing a higher education level. Since employ­
ers tend to judge their productivity by their 
qualifications— that is, discriminate on the ba­
sis o f educational level— such people get more 
lucrative jobs. At the same time, we learn 
from this chapter that results are far from be­
ing in line with each other and that, partly be­
cause o f  methodological difficulties and partly 
due to gaps in data sources, there is no re­
alistic hope for certainty regarding the rela­
tive validity o f the two— possibly sociological—  
explanations. The terms used are telling any­
way: Why is the exclusive validity— i.e. the
“strong version” — of the filter theory being re­
jected in the face o f empirical evidence? Why 
not that o f the theory o f human capital?
To add to the confusion, let me re­
fer to the return o f  education which is posi­
tively dependent on the size o f  the company, 
an observation that may be explained in a bet­
ter way on the basis o f the filter theory— i.e. 
that smaller companies do rely on formal ed­
ucation so much when judging the individ­
ual productivity of their employees (cf. Green, 
Machin and Manning 1996). Also there is the 
well-known experience, seemingly in contradic­
tion with both theories, that employers do not 
care about their junior jo b  applicants’ school re­
ports. Finally, there is the phenomena, com­
patible with both theories, that they do pay at­
tention to the reputation o f the institution is­
suing the school report. (For more informa­
tion on this subject see, for instance, Rosen­
baum and Binder 1994, and Rosenbaum and 
Kariya 1991; for the Hungarian experience see 
the as yet unpublished results o f a follow-up 
survey conducted by Péter Galasi and Janos 
Tim âr with reference to recently graduated co­
horts.)
W ith all these doubts and objections, 
why is there such a huge scientific aura around 
the theory o f human capital?
The so far unmentioned Nobel prize win­
ner Milton Friedman was one o f the early pro­
ponents o f the concept o f  human capital and 
the first (in 1955, six years before Schultz, and 
then later in Chapter VI o f  his epoch-making 
book o f 1962) to urge a switch from the di­
rect financing o f education to the more market-
conforming voucher system. Anyone famil­
iar with economics must know that this disci­
pline is not too  particular with regard to the va­
lidity o f its presuppositions. According to 
the methodological approach especially popular 
among members— like Friedman and Becker—  
o f  the so-called Chicago School, it is suffi­
cient if conclusions drawn logically from presup­
positions prove to be true. The theory o f hu­
man capital has proved to be apt for explain­
ing otherwise unaccountable phenomena.
The cobweb phenomena cited in Chapter 
I o f the book (beside the aforementioned pos­
itive external effect) can be given as an ex­
ample of a possible reason for state interven­
tion in education. The essence o f this phe­
nomenon is that—just like in the case o f the so- 
called “ pig cycle” , literally conceived— if (1) re­
turns from investment accrue with consider­
able delay, and (2) investors react frantically 
to changes in expected returns and (3) are ir­
reparably naive in their adjusting their expecta­
tions of future returns to current returns, then 
unexpected rises or plunges o f returns will be 
followed by wild swings o f investments and re­
turns. The presumption that this cobweb phe­
nomenon may in fact occur, and not only in 
pig production but in higher education (and 
not only in the US as analyzed by Freeman 
(1976a) but in Hungary as well) has been ren­
dered probable by conclusions drawn in Kertesi 
and Kollo's recent (1999) study o f  the return of 
higher education and the proportion o f  contin­
uing studies in post-socialist Hungary.
On the other hand, consumption theory 
seems to be suitable enough to explain the secu­
lar rise in demand for education: like other nor­
mal “consumer goods” , demand for school as 
a consumption service grows in line with ris­
ing real incomes. For an interpretation o f this 
kind it is paradoxically Becker’s path-breaking 
work (1960) on demographical economics that 
may offer an example: for the purposes o f m od­
elling the family planning decisions o f house­
holds in industrialized countries he considers 
offspring (although the decision to have chil­
dren may be influenced by fear o f  deprivation 
and poverty in old age) as consumption goods 
and not as investment goods. (By contrast, in a 
recent econom ic explanation o f over-population 
in the Third W orld, Dasgupta (1993) regards 
households’ decision to have children as an in­
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vestment dictated by the sheer need to sub­
sist, which is in turn maintained by the result­
ing over-fertility itself.) In the case o f other phe­
nomena, such as when human capital invest­
ment happens in the form o f short courses com ­
pleted in order to change jobs, the deploy­
ment o f the theory of human capital is like 
breaking a butterfly on the wheel; the no 
less elegant but perhaps less sophisticated the­
ory o f compensating wage differentials, also di­
rectly originated from the economics o f Smith 
(1776), will do perfectly; moreover, the the­
ory o f consumption demand is at least as con­
vincing as an explanation o f the negative re­
lationship o f university tuition fees and the de­
mand for higher education as is the human cap­
ital theory. There is one thing, however, 
that must be avoided: the obviously indefensi­
ble implication that the theory o f human capi­
tal promises a theoretical assessment of the eco­
nomically optimal amount o f education in a 
given country at a given time— in a way sim­
ilar to an assessment o f the optimal amount 
o f investment in pigs and pigsties— ignoring 
the non-investment, personal consumption as­
pect o f education— i.e. its resemblance to pork 
eating or keeping pigs as pets. By confess­
ing my reservations with the theory o f hu­
man capital my main aim has been to call at­
tention to such abuses o f theoretical orthodoxy 
more emphatically than Julia. Varga’s The eco­
nomics o f education does.
Attention, pig farmers, pig lovers and 
pork eaters! Studying Julia Varga’s The eco­
nomics o f education may turn into a prof­
itable human capital investment for those work­
ing in the education branch. It is certainly a 
good read for anyone who (I quote from the au­
thor’s Introduction to the book ): “ ...are sim­
ply interested in what economics may con­
tribute to education policy disputes” .
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I. R. G Á B O R
HALPERN, L.— W Y PL O SZ, C. (eds): Hun­
gary: Towards a market economy. Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998. xx+  
390 p.
The editors o f  this volume, who are 
both economists o f international standing, have 
put together an excellent collection of essays 
on the second phase o f econom ic transforma­
tion in Hungary. The “Hungarian problema- 
tique" has always featured prominently in pro­
fessional literature, as was the case even be­
fore the start o f econom ic and political trans­
formation; both Hungarian and international 
economists have followed closely the transi­
tion process in Hungary. This notwithstand­
ing, the present volume stands out with its valu­
able insights into the specific features o f  the 
Hungarian econom y in the 1990s and thus it 
is an im portant contribution to the literature 
on the transition from plan to market in gen­
eral.
I must confess that I opened the vol­
ume with some apprehension, given that the al­
lusion to the well-known book Hungary: An  
economy in transition (I. P. Székely and D. 
M. G. Newbery, Eds., Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) is inevitable. However— to the 
full credit o f the editors and of the contribut­
ing authors o f the new volume— with every 
page o f the book it became increasingly ob­
vious that here was a book with im pecca­
ble and genuine merits o f its own. In fact, 
Halpern and W yplosz have not tried to es­
cape the allusion— in fact, they are not afraid 
of it; rather, they have wisely and innova- 
tively built on the success of the previous vol­
ume.
The list o f Hungarian authors (all chap­
ters were written by Hungarian economists) 
represents a carefully matched balance between 
established and familiar names and some rel­
atively less well-known but very promising, 
younger Hungarian economists. The list o f in­
ternational authors (who have contributed dis­
cussion notes to each “Hungarian chapter” ) is 
even more impressive: it includes acclaimed in­
ternational economists who specialize in the 
economics of transition.
There is nothing particular about the 
way the volume is structured (it contains more 
or less the traditional cocktail o f macro- and 
micro-econom ic topics, mixed for more flavour 
with a policy-cum-inst.itutional polem ic). Nev­
ertheless, the topics o f the chapters are well se­
lected and balanced and they do provide a 
broad overview o f some o f the most impor­
tant and interesting features o f  the Hungar­
ian economy, which has now been approach­
ing a market economy for several years. In­
deed, both the topics and contents o f prac­
tically all the chapters reflect fairly precisely 
the title o f the volume: they present convinc­
ing evidence that the first phase o f transi­
tion in Hungary is over; however, it is shown 
that there is still a long way to go befoi'e it 
reaches the state o f a developed market econ­
omy.
W hat is perhaps most impressive is the 
very high quality o f all the selected studies— 
this has resulted in the volume being of out­
standing quality. In this respect the book is 
a rare exception among the growing body of 
edited volumes on transitional topics (m any
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of which have, unfortunately, became infa­
mous for the uneven quality of individual con­
tributions). In this volume I cannot men­
tion even a single study that could be re­
garded as being weak or, for that matter, that 
would not merit publication in a respected jour­
nal.
Furthermore, the volume is indicative 
o f the progress which econom ic research has 
made in the course o f transition— both in terms 
o f the methodological approach and in terms 
o f the depth o f the analysis; in general, the 
book presents a mature and sophisticated in­
sight into the range o f topics selected. Some of 
the chapters, on macroeconomic themes, espe­
cially Chapter 3 by B. Világi and J. Vincze (on 
monetary transmission mechanisms) and Chap­
ter 4 by I. Hamecz, J. Vincze and I. Zsol­
dos (on the nature o f  inflation in Hungary), are 
really innovative within the stream o f transi­
tion literature.
Am ong the other studies I am tempted 
to single out (not at the expense o f the rest 
o f the volume and probably due to my sub­
jective preference!) the respective chapters of:
L. Halpern and G. K örösi (which presents a 
rare analytical perspective on Hungarian cor­
porate performance, pre- and post-transition); 
that by J. Koltay (containing a rather uncon­
ventional view on the nature and function of 
the minimum wage in Hungary); and also the 
study o f A. Ábrahám and G. Kertest (which fo­
cuses, in unusual detail, on some specific de­
mographic aspects o f Hungarian unemployment 
which are sometimes not mentioned in pub­
lic discussion).
This is not to say that there is nothing in 
the volume which deserves discussion. In fact, 
reading a number o f  the chapters (including 
some o f those that I found most interesting) I re­
alised there are many questions to be answered 
and actually they could serve as a good start­
ing point for lively debates; not all the conclu­
sions drawn by the various authors are convinc­
ing. However, what is indisputable is the pro­
fessional approach and the impressive depth of 
the analytical insights that most o f the au­
thors o f  the volume offer to the reader.
Hungarian economists, who are famous 
for their scepticism with regard to the Hun­
garian economy, have been caught by sur­
prise by the unexpectedly solid economic per-
formance o f Hungary in the late 1990s. Indeed, 
most o f the studies in the volume were writ­
ten in 1995, when Hungary was in the midst of a 
painful macroeconomic adjustment and success 
was still beyond the horizon. Hence (and re­
grettably!) the volume stops short of reveal­
ing the driving forces o f the economic revival 
that followed. In fact, Halpern and W yplosz 
have tried partly to make up for this by writ­
ing an extensive and more up-to-date introduc­
tory chapter. The latter is titled “The hid­
den Hungarian miracle” and it tries to go be­
yond the usual summary o f conclusions o f the 
chapters in the volume. However, in its origi­
nal section, this chapter only outlines some hy­
potheses about the key factors o f the (un­
expected) subsequent economic success; how­
ever, these factors are not substantiated by in- 
depth analytical justification in the main body 
o f the book. Obviously, the story o f the “Hun­
garian miracle" is yet to be written.
On a more critical note, a number of 
studies in the volume could have omitted some 
unnecessary factual and time-specific details, 
whose irrelevance only increases with time. 
(One example is the rather lengthy discus­
sion on the Hungarian pension system, viewed 
against the actual reform of the Hungarian 
pension system that followed; arguably, this 
part o f the otherwise excellent paper on wel­
fare reform by /. Csaba and A. Semjen might 
have been shortened in the editorial phase.) 
Also, some papers contain very detailed digres­
sions with reference to the past. Such unnec­
essarily long accounts of pre-transition experi­
ence have little relevance to the main topics of 
the book (and which now only belong to eco­
nomic history). Furthermore, as Chapter 1 was 
obviously written last, it could have been kept 
more up-to-date (for example I did not under­
stand why only some, and not all tables in this 
chapter were updated, given that the most re­
cent data is available).
Notwithstanding these critical remarks,
I would like to conclude that I consider the book 
as a big success and I think that it is essen­
tial for anyone who follows Hungary’s most in­
teresting road towards a market economy, as 
well as for those trying to understand some o f 
the caveats and traps along this bumpy road.
R. DOBRINSKY
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FERBER, K.: A siker ára — Japán (The price 
o f success: Japan). Budapest: László és Társa.
1998. 132 p.
It was with keen anticipation that I 
picked up this book by Ferber. This was be­
cause I felt it was high time that someone—  
eventually a European woman— having spent 
several years in Japan, should reveal that the 
way of life in Japan is far from being a joyride 
and that the miracle does have its shadowy 
sides. My excitement grew even greater since I 
very well remember an excellent book I had read 
in the early 1980s (Jared Taylor: Shadows oj the 
rising Sun, Morrow et Co., New York, 1983). 
The latter provided an insight into the darker 
sides o f the so-called “Japanese miracle” . Hence 
it seemed to me that it was a brave and praise­
worthy venture for a new approach towards 
the topic, by a Hungarian. Moreover, the lat­
est bad news on the Japanese economy, slightly 
overdramatized by a sensation-hungry press, 
has created a receptive atmosphere for a crit­
ical opinion for two reasons. However, the last­
ing and exemplary values o f the Japanese model 
should be recognized and they can be fol­
lowed by other nations and economies. As 
I see it, the model contained a lot o f gen­
uinely good  values (like diligence, thrift, en­
durance, the priority given to group— e.g. fam­
ily, company, country— as opposed to those 
of the individual, and also their long-term 
approach). Secondly, someone should have 
pointed out that, by m odifying the mixed pro­
portions o f tradition and change, the Japanese 
were certain to be able to overcome their dif­
ficulties. By using the time-honoured trick of 
“ let’s break out from tight corners by mak­
ing the best o f it” , the Japanese have been suc­
cessful in such a way that they have gradu­
ally adopted the norms o f  the global com m u­
nity and preserved their own identity. At least, 
I myself regard this scenario as the most proba­
ble, and also the most desirable both for Japan 
and the world.
This book is quite a disappointment 
from a number o f points o f view. The ti­
tle is vaguely worded and it does not live 
up to its promise— i.e. that it is going to ac­
count for the successes of the Japanese econ­
omy. The chapters o f the first half o f the book
deal with Japan’s “ unfinished” past, its nation 
statehood, its relation to war and peace, its ed­
ucation system and the emergence of its bureau­
cratic administration. Having done this the au­
thor then indicates that “ it is high time to 
find the answer to the question in the ti­
tle; (sic!) what has been the price o f suc­
cess in the Japanese econom y and society to­
day?” (p. 73). She then states, (almost like 
some form o f self-criticism perhaps?): “The an­
swer can obviously not be found in this book 
only.” Even after all this I still hoped that, 
at a later point, the book might say some­
thing about positive and negative experiences 
which could serve as lessons for Hungary. This 
hope was raised by the fact that Ferber poses 
a question with almost econom ic philosophi­
cal profundity: “Knowing the successful m od­
ernisation of Eastern Asian economies as well 
as the painful, socially irreversible damage and 
loss o f the decade-long ‘ transition’ o f many a 
Central-European country, the question is un­
avoidable (sic); namely, what is the social price 
o f market rationality and is there any guaran­
tee for the players o f the economy to act as mar­
ket rationality actually dictates?” (p. 74). I 
must confess that, even later in the book, I did 
not find the answer to this question.
The other reason for my disappoint­
ment was that the text is full o f vague word­
ing, with linguistic and orthographic inaccura­
cies. The incorrect (and often unnecessary) use 
of semi-colons (see the above citation) and ques­
tion marks at the end o f indirect questions are 
frustrating. Furthermore, the unmatched sen­
tence elements become annoying. [What did the 
editor do? Did the author reread the proof be­
fore printing? W hat shall we do with sen­
tences like “ Japan is an archipelago in East­
ern Asia but (sic!) historically it is an Asian 
country” (p. 20), or “ class-teacher relation­
ships are arranged by the rules o f  sub- and su­
perordination” (p. 45), “ the technological op ­
eration o f the com pany ...had been ensured by 
N T T ’s experts” (p. 66), or “parliamentary com ­
mittee hearings o f ministerial employees have 
no sanctioning consequences at all, this comes 
up with arrest by the police (?) only” (a foot­
note on page 92), and “except for the agrar­
ian reform, all other econom ic organisations 
banned by the American occupation forces had 
been restored" (p. 107). How could the fol-
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lowing two subsequent “stammering” sentences 
been put into print: “As for Asia, China was 
the first to introduce entrance exams for bu­
reaucrats had been introduced by the Ming em­
perors in the 16th century. Japan, too, took 
over the basic principles o f Japanese bureau­
cratic selection from China” (footnote No. 80 
on p. 88). Has no one noticed that “social mo­
bilisation" is not identical with social mobil­
ity (p. 89)?]
These inaccuracies are all the more con­
spicuous since (the author herself must have ex­
perienced it during her stay there) the topic she 
has chosen evokes a priori the notions of qual­
ity and preciseness. The multiple and mu­
tual control o f  Japanese bureaucrats that re­
sults in faultless work, or the zero-defect pro­
duction declared by quality leagues of Japanese 
processing industries, are all integrated com po­
nents o f the Japanese success; thus these fea­
tures remain in the minds o f  foreigners who 
spend a longer period o f time in the coun­
try. As for me, I will always remember how 
minutely my host— a Japanese professor stand­
ing much higher in the university hierarchy 
than me— worked on the Japanese translation 
o f an English-language paper o f mine, and 
how much care he took to ensure the exact­
ness o f  the words he used.
The inconsequential use o f  Japanese and 
other foreign names and words is embarrass­
ing. At one moment the transcription and or­
der are Hungarian and then English in their 
form; then they are mixed in a unique manner. 
W ith regard to names, it is amazing how, cate­
gorically, Ferber pronounces the authors o f  cer­
tain sources as being the best in the field she 
has chosen for her research. At the same time, 
she has mentioned only one Hungarian name in 
the book: that o f Papp István, a com poser liv­
ing in Sweden who also spent some time at a 
Japanese university (N. B. not at the Hitotsub- 
ashi as Ferber thinks but at the Chuo...).
Ferber, who spent four years in Japan, 
knowingly avoided the trap that awaits many.
As she writes: “According to a Japanese pro­
verb, after a week in Japan, one writes a book, 
after a month a study, and those who spend 
more than a year here, are unable to write any­
thing on this very different world." (p. 19). She 
has undoubtedly contributed a few highly valu­
able analyses to Hungarian— Japanese research.
One o f them is the chapter with the title “State- 
owned or private" (pp. 65-74), where the au­
thor demonstrates “how profoundly the dimen­
sions of private or non-private, i.e. state-run in­
stitutions (corporations) o f the Japanese econ­
omy, differ from the concept prevailing in Eu­
rope and even more in Anglo-Saxon territo­
ries” and that “all state or authority-run com ­
panies in Japan are flexible with regard to their 
property relations, scope of activity and condi­
tions (price, wages). Any private company may 
be transformed into an official one, just as well 
as state-run corporations may function as pri­
vate ones” . “These companies ...are not o f a 
public nature since there is no kind o f pub­
lic control over them.” “The whole o f the sec­
tor which gives work to over one million em­
ployees is a highly important link functioning 
both economically and socially between the pri­
vate sector and the bureaucratic state appara­
tus."
The March 1997 issue o f Külgazdaság 
rightly published an abbreviated version o f the 
chapter on “heavenly missionaries” from the 
state administration landing like parachutists 
in the private sector (pp. 79-101), given that it 
contains novel ideas. In it, Ferber makes an im­
portant statement: “Japan’s political elite, in­
cluding the economic one, has over the past 
half century preserved its elitist position on 
the basis o f status, not property. As a mat­
ter o f fact, the nouveau riche in Japan can­
not become members o f the elite even today.” 
(Let me add that the egalitarian attitude of 
Japanese society is well reflected by recent sur­
veys showing that over 90 percent o f the popu­
lation thinks o f itself as a member o f the mid­
dle class.)
Ferber deserves credit for drawing atten­
tion to Japan’s Fiscal Investment and Loan Pro­
gramme (FILP for short, or with a Japanese 
acronym ZTK ). Traditionally, the FILP al­
most rounds off the central budget and I would 
liken it to a permanent supplementary bud­
get (pp. 105-126). A discussion about the role 
o f Marxism in Japan is a little bit out o f  place 
here, but the author borrows a thought from 
Brian McVeigh when she states that ” ... the ef­
ficiency o f the Japanese state cannot be mea­
sured with its system o f institutions or the num­
ber o f people employed by them. The bureau­
cracy is small just because its rules and the in-
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stitutional and traditional expectations they 
embody make the expectations in connection 
with the state clear and easy to  oversee. The 
functioning o f the Japanese state is efficient be­
cause it is not the visible institutions and rules 
that enforce the will o f power groups. This is, 
however, nothing else in my view but a recogni­
tion of the fact that the principles o f Confucian­
ism still impregnate the society or, as the au­
thor remarks: the functioning o f state in­
stitutions is efficient since, in the eye o f in­
dividuals, it seems to be a ‘natural endow­
ment’ .” This is exactly why I cannot share the 
view which Ferber expounds in an earlier chap­
ter, namely, “an image o f Japan as ‘harmonic’ 
or ‘conflict-avoiding’ would be overly schematic. 
Another question concerns the sort o f ‘ new’ hu­
man features that might emerge in a Japan 
that is now in the process o f the deepest trans­
formation in its history, once creativity be­
comes more im portant and individual aspects 
are given priority over group interests. The ex­
planation for the system o f so-called ‘indirect fi­
nancing’ in the context o f the second bud­
get is also useful for a better understand­
ing o f the mechanism o f the Japanese econ­
omy. The chart on the last page o f the 
book, though its source is not revealed, gives 
a vivid picture o f  the change in spending (and 
not resource-side, as it is indicated) priori­
ties. It ’s a pity the book ends with the situ­
ation as it stood in Japan in 1981...”
It was not only the reviewer who felt 
that Ferber’s book ended abruptly— she re­
ally should have given some sort o f summary. 
The final note o f the less than two-page long 
prologue— based on a vague citation without re­
ferring to its source— only adds to the reader’s 
feeling o f want. If anything, she could have 
mentioned the pledge o j  further success— i.e. 
that the much-heralded administrative reforms, 
such as deregulation or Big Bang, will have an 
effect only if introduced swiftly and not over a 
period of, say, five years.*
A. HERNÁDI
‘ T h is  b o o k  review  appeared incom pletely  for  
technical reasons in the previous issue o f  A cta  Oe- 
con om ica . N ow the com p le te  text is published once  
m ore. (E d itor 's  n ote)
W AGENER, H .-J. (ed.): Economic thought in 
communist and post-communist- Europe. Rout- 
ledge Studies in the History o f Economics. 
London-N ew York: Routledge. 1998. 388 p.
A grand theme and an ambitious ti­
tle. As we learn from the b ook ’s preface, 
the issues which prompted the research fo­
cus upon the role o f econom ics as a science 
in post-war Central and Eastern Europe, re­
cent changes o f  the respective econom ic sys­
tems o f  the countries o f the region, and the re­
forms which took place between the two changes 
o f the regime. In fact, the theme is nar­
rower than the title would indicate. To cite just 
a few Hungarian examples: it has not been able 
to take into account János K ornai’s promis­
ing but discontinued anti-equilibrium initia­
tives, András Nagy’s equally disrupted sur­
vey o f the international flow o f  products, the 
metrological studies o f András Bródy, and Fe­
renc J inossy's schemes for reconstruction pe­
riods or of the origins o f European capital­
ism. These economists did not have much to do 
with regime changes or reforms, but they were 
deeply involved with econom ic science and with 
econom ic thought. Another reference to a less 
broad perspective can be read in the author's in­
troductory study, where he considers renowned 
economists o f the region and their works in ac­
cordance with Mark Blaug's history o f theo­
ries. Blaug made a school by ranking eco­
nomic theories and their creators according to 
the extent they are considered to have con­
tributed to the emergence o f the mainstream 
econom ics o f  our age (i.e. the ’70s and the 
’80s). According to Blaug, the rest can be for­
gotten. It is easy to see that the method 
lets older ideas, or ones born on the periph­
ery, seem as mere rivulets or dry river beds of in­
tellectual landscapes avoided by the rain o f No­
bel prizes. Given such a point o f view, the fol­
lowing conclusion seems only logical: “On the 
whole, it seems that the contribution of So­
viet socialism to econom ics was, above all, nega­
tive in establishing the counter-example o f  more 
successful market capitalism” (p. 25). Com ­
parativeness perhaps? No, because the au­
thor writes: “A similar fate has befallen the hu­
man capital o f the Western specialists in com ­
parative econom ics.” (p. 25) In other words: its
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repositories learned to read between the lines, 
and this is no longer needed. Of course, it 
was necessary at one time, and may still be 
needed— not merely for reading between the 
lines, but also to find out what economists, so­
ciologists and other social scientists in Novosi­
birsk or Budapest discovered with painstaking 
research about the functioning o f their respec­
tive economies (som e o f them are still explor­
ing). Yet this collection o f material has not cov­
ered the efforts o f such researchers. Neverthe­
less, we will see that some o f the authors have 
been unable to tell their part o f the story with­
out mentioning them.
The research which underpinned the book 
was organized and guided by the European 
University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, Branden­
burg, Germany, with generous funding from the 
federal government and the state’s ministry o f 
education. Teams were formed to compile mate­
rial for chapters on ex-Soviet (i.e. Russian), Pol­
ish, Hungarian, Czechoslovak (Czech) and East- 
German economics, and (at the last moment) 
on the Yugoslavian experience. The first con­
ference was held in J994 and the preface o f the 
book is dated March 1997. Hence research was 
conducted within a relatively short period. The 
authors were asked to write about the “cogni­
tive pre-history o f transformation” and to de­
scribe the latest theoretical trends. In his pre­
liminary study, Wagener presents the relevant 
periodization, themes and theses; the latter fo­
cus on the question which considers why the so­
cialist system could not be reformed. The au­
thors of the subsequent chapters were, how­
ever, unable to follow these guidelines all the 
way; the material they worked with had seem­
ingly resisted the attem pt (and so did their ex­
tremely diverse approaches). As a result, the 
book is not boring: it is readable.
In the following, I will not deal with ev­
ery chapter but the reader’s attention will be 
drawn to less known, or completely unknown 
episodes and interrelations and wherever it ap­
plies, to conspicuous deficiencies.
R u ssian s (Pekka Sutela and Vladimir Man)
The first country study is quite a dis­
appointment. The authors have failed to for­
mulate the essence o f the theories under sur­
vey, and they have also been unable to throw 
light on the political, economic and manage­
ment situation that launched the theoretical 
work (or which caused it to be launched by 
higher ranking institutions and individuals). 
After Stalin’s death— as a response to schol­
ars dealing with theory— the situation was man­
aged in a mainly voluntaristic way. It is, 
for instance, a nonsense to dispose o f Viktor 
Novozhilov and Vasili Nemchinov so quickly, 
when in the '60s the former (together with Kan­
torovich) opened the way for the elimination 
of plan instructions by suggesting interest rates 
and allowances based on the shadow price of re­
sources; the latter wanted to achieve a utopian 
unity of plan, statistics and management using 
a single system of multilevel computerized pro­
grammes. A similar misconception (shared by 
many a Kremlinologist) is the legend of Kosy­
gin ’s reform in 1965. This was in fact a counter­
reform, preceded by press debates, activities 
on the respective regional and company lev­
els and high-sounding policy speeches. Yet, over 
a period of ten years the “reform” strictly di­
vided the economy (i.e. branches and com pa­
nies) into segments under federal, provincial 
and local control; it reorganized existing units 
o f the economy with giant mergers and it cre­
ated agrarian-industrial complexes (often do­
ing away with the independent accounting de­
partments o f the former); finally, by wind­
ing up wholesale companies (bases) it created a 
uniform system of material and technical sup­
plies and forbade companies (i.e. merged com­
panies) to have direct (contractual) commer­
cial contacts. No doubt this resulted in a signif­
icant. drop in the number of central plan indexes 
and instructions. One does not know whether 
to laugh or cry when, at the same time, the au­
thors call to account economists, o f all peo­
ple, for the absence o f arbitrage and a capi­
tal market.
Weaknesses aside, the chapter has strengths 
as well. From subtle details and references 
there is a picture of Abalkin-—perhaps the only 
clear-headed economist and economic politi­
cian of the ’80s. He had a quite fixed con­
cept of how the monster described in the afore­
said could, in ten or fifteen years, be turned into 
a more or less normally functioning market of 
goods and services (and in a restricted man­
ner, o f capital); this would have been some-
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thing like the situation in Hungary in the early 
and mid-1980. Another important part o f 
the chapter is where Sergei Glaziev and Pyotr 
Avert, two highly knowledgeable actors, reveal 
what the purpose o f  the Gaidar programme had 
been. The sterile programme, that had hardly 
anything to do with local realities, was con­
ceived in the autumn o f 1991 by a team of 
Russian and foreign experts working in isola­
tion: “ ...since the governability o f the econ­
omy had already been lost, the task at hand 
was the destruction o f as much o f existing in­
stitutions as possible, thus both securing irre­
versibility and clearing the road for a new insti­
tutional revolution.” (p. 69). We do not learn 
from the authors if there was (or is) such a pro­
gramme. The last part o f  the chapter deals 
with the renewal o f  econom ic science in edu­
cation.
The chapter on Russia was at the front of 
the book presumably because the Soviet Union 
was not simply a world power o f the post­
war era but also the absolute leading force of 
the CM EA; the latter, in its heyday, united 
as many as ten countries. It was an exam­
ple followed by most o f the 25 to 30 countries 
that called themselves “socialist” and the Soviet 
Union was their econom ic ally. It is strange that 
this situation, and the relevant theoretical prob­
lems, are not referred to in the chapter; they are 
not even listed, although it was a highly im­
portant domain o f  Soviet econom ic thinking. 
W hat could have been considered by the au­
thors are: the theory o f communism (its schol­
ars were pulled down to the earth by Stalin’s 
1952 study but it reemerged later as the tran­
sition to communism ); the (econom ic) com peti­
tion o f the two global systems and, within it, 
the theory o f two world markets; in connec­
tion with the CM EA, first the so-called inter­
national socialist division o f  labour (i.e. special­
ization and co-operation within branches, co­
ordination o f  plans), and later socialist integra­
tion and its phases (i.e. long-term co-operation 
programmes and target programmes, joint plan­
ning).
P o les  (K rzysztof Porvit)
We know from the preface that the Pol­
ish team was the biggest. The choice o f  Por-
wit to write the chapter was an excellent one: 
he is a contem porary o f all protagonists from 
the prewar period to our days and also he 
is an author who is able to handle his ma­
terial correctly. It is a pity that the chap­
ter is rather long, (almost twice as long as the 
one about the Russian). It is true that, by East­
ern European standards, Polish econom ic sci­
ence had all along been producing “big names” . 
Think o f Kalecki, Lange, Drewnowski, Bo- 
browski, or Edward Lipinski— who, from the 
very beginnings o f their long careers addressed 
the problems o f socialism ’s possible econom ic 
system (many o f them held the planned econ­
omy to be the most viable one). Moreover, 
they had been able to word their original con­
structions in the scholarly language of their 
age. Those who had emigrated and later re­
turned with an international reputation, com ­
bined forces with their colleagues who had re­
mained at home. They then irritated Commu­
nist governments which made the mistake o f al­
lowing them to head reform com mittees (as 
happened to Oskar Lange and Michal Kalecki 
in 1956-57) or to teach and carry out re­
search. This resulted in two things. There ap­
peared a young and restless generation (e.g. 
Brus , Laski) who were still left-wing and social­
ist but who relentlessly demonstrated the faults 
o f the economy and the way in which existing 
socialism functioned. This often ended in con­
flicts and emigration. Then there was a next 
generation that elegantly, and with specific—  
very Polish— terminology, dealt with insignif­
icant little reforms by taking them most se­
riously (like realistic raw material prices, and 
pseudo-reforms like border rates and other “pa­
rameters” , which were mainly for the purpose 
o f incentives and efficiency estimates). How­
ever, waves o f crises in the economy and in so­
ciety prom pted some economists and sociolo­
gists to look deeper into the micro-environment 
o f social conflicts and econom ic decay. Por- 
wit deserves credit for introducing the reader 
to this fact-finding literature which, until now, 
had been unknown to the world but is cer­
tainly o f scientific value.
In the light o f the above it is no won­
der that the 1981 reform proposals o f Polish 
mainstream economists (e.g. Pajestka, Mujzel) 
hardly differed from the ones which had been 
made in 1956. The most important counter-
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proposal came from a young team led by Balce- 
rowicz; it called fox- the liberation o f prices, 
the control o f  the state’s regulating function 
and for other dem ocratic (parliamentary) pro­
cedures and guarantees. The government (Por- 
wit does not mention Jaruzelski by name) in­
troduced the first phase o f the reform dur­
ing the state o f emergency; the second phase 
was to be implemented in 1987 and, accord­
ing to Porwit, it would have been not far from 
the Balcerowicz proposal with regard to sup­
port for private initiative, company indepen­
dence and the development o f  banking insti­
tutions. The author o f  the chapter goes into 
(too many) details when dwelling on the de­
bates during the system ’s last years, or on why 
there was a crisis and who was to blame. Yet, 
in years to come, researchers may be grate­
ful for his thoroughness.
A sub-chapter is devoted to the liter­
ature and debates o f the 1990-1996 period. 
This may be justified by the fact that the 
Balcerowicz programme adopted in late 1989 
by the Sejm, was quite ambiguous with re­
gard to the nature o f the econom ic system it 
was meant to create. In the beginning, how­
ever, debates-centred on the causes o f the eco­
nomic slump which was accompanied by a steep 
inflation rate, and also on the sequence and 
speed o f  reform steps; Polish economists liv­
ing abroad, understandably, took an active part 
in the discussion. The chapter ends with a re­
view o f  the “Strategy for Poland” (theses) at­
tributed to K olodko and with some excellent 
econom ic and sociological surveys o f  com pa­
nies.
H u n ga ria n s  (László Szamuely, László Csaba)
O f all the studies, this seems to be the 
most balanced and the best to read. This praise 
is considerable given that the authors had rel­
atively few sources on the subject at hand; 
the m ajority o f the few sources that are avail­
able cover short periods and even these have 
gaps. (As a matter o f fact, this chapter has been 
expanded and published by the Közgazdasági 
Szemle Foundation in book form under the ti­
tle Rendszerváltozás a közgazdaságtanban — 
közgazdaságtan a rendszerváltozásban (Trans­
formation in economics— economics in transfor­
m ation).
Szamuely’s short retrospection at the 
head o f the chapter on the position o f Hungar­
ian economic science before and during World 
War II deserves praise (even if it is inevitably 
limited in its scope). He also mentions some 
outstanding statisticians who were involved in 
the so-called “academic” science. He describes 
for whom and for what was the absolute caesura 
in the study o f economic science— unpreceden­
ted even in the Eastern European region—  
which began as early as 1945/46 and took hold 
after 1948. Of possible causes, he mentions 
in the first place the role Hungary played in 
the war and the possible collaboration of lead­
ing economists, but this can hardly be be­
lieved.
A Hungarian reader is obviously more 
sensitive to the wording of a chapter on Hun­
gary, which is not always fortunate. For in­
stance, the “biggest civic party, the Small­
holders' Party, which won the absolute major­
ity o f seats in Parliament at the general elec­
tion of November 1945” . (p. 24 in the Hungar­
ian version) translates into “the biggest bour­
geois party” (p. 162). This and some other ad­
jectives throw a somewhat misleading light on 
the figures o f István Varga and Jenő Rácz. Oth­
erwise, this chapter which deals with the 1945- 
1978 period is concise and well-written. There 
are only two protagonists o f the period miss­
ing: the influential István Friss who, in the de­
bate ‘reform o f mechanism versus a proper eco­
nomic policy’ , stood out. for the latter; and 
Sándor Ausch, who attempted to draft out­
lines for a CMEA which could accommodate 
economic units (companies) o f member coun­
tries experimenting with market reforms.
Both authors o f the chapter are consis­
tent in the sense that, in describing the back­
ground o f economic debates, reform propos­
als and theory-making from 1968 onwards, they 
do not try to present some sort o f “market- 
less” economy. Moreover, they have man­
aged to provide a clear and focused picture of 
the various forms o f “neither-plan-nor-market” 
in full awareness o f the actual institutional 
backdrop (and its movements). This particu­
lar approach which they have adopted is espe­
cially handy in the sub-chapters “From the mar­
ket under socialism to market or socialism” 
(pp. 181-191) and “Reforms beyond socialism” 
(pp. 191-200) written by László Csaba. At the
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same time both authors, referring to the dom­
inance o f bureaucratic co-ordination, still re­
gard the post-1968 Hungarian system as one of 
the versions o f a “ third m odel" o f central plan­
ning, or in other words, o f a com mand econ­
omy.
It is worth mentioning that the chapter, 
apart from dealing with the period before 1948, 
also gives a fair treatment to the most original 
Hungarian research— i.e. m icroeconomic (com ­
pany) surveys which include sociological as­
pects o f the theme; it also praises János Kor- 
nai’s oeuvre. The enjoyment o f the pages de­
voted to recent years is several times disturbed 
by unexpected, and sometimes vague asser­
tion o f a political hue; furthermore, the clas­
sification o f contem porary researchers accord­
ing to particular econom ic schools (is there 
at all a living neo-liberal econom ic theory?) 
is something which could have been left out 
o f the study. The list o f references and lit­
erature at the end o f the chapter is excel­
lent but it needs pointing out that the book by 
Tamás Sárközy published by Közgazdasági és 
Jogi Könyvkiadó and the one published in Ger­
man by Akadémiai Kiadó are not the same.
C ze ch s  a n d  C zech os lov a k s  
(Jiri Havel, Jan Klacek, Jiri Kosta, 
Zdislav Sulc)
The chapter covers the years from 1945 
to 1992. First we learn that here, just like in 
several other countries, the Communist party 
produced workers versed in Stalinist science 
through “crash courses” , while long-time left­
wingers or scholars who wanted to study plan­
ning theory, like Josef Goldmann, were sim­
ply imprisoned or, in some cases, executed. The 
profession began to recover in 1956, but not for 
long: the turning point was the 1964/65 cri­
sis when works by Josef Goldmann and Karel 
Kouba on planning, growth cycles and on the re­
wording o f Kalecki’s growth theory were pub­
lished. It was in 1968 that young Václav Klaus, 
as the enfant terrible o f  the Czech econom ic sci­
ence, appeared on the scene. He avoided any 
contact with Marxist theory in his very first 
study. In 1964 the Communist rulers ap­
pointed Ota Sik as head o f their reform com ­
mittee.
The authors try to mention all the trends 
and debates o f any significance and still place 
the Czechoslovakian reform programme among 
the reform tendencies o f the period. The re­
sult is that distinctive characteristics o f the 
original programme— like wages calculated on 
the basis o f the residue principle, unemploy­
ment as an important instrument o f market con­
trol, accumulation centralized by the state as 
a factor to be increased from above— all get 
somewhat lost in the process. The chap­
ter does not mention that the very first com ­
pany experiment had been preceded by an ex­
tensive concentration, and the implementation 
of the system had been accompanied by strikes 
and demonstrations; thus, early in 1968, signif­
icant changes had to be introduced. All these 
facts are somehow compressed, or hidden, in 
one sentence; yet, following the com ing into 
power o f the democratic-minded Dubcek gov­
ernment. “a growing number o f economists were 
now searching for a solution that would take 
into account both the demand for dem ocratiza­
tion in decision-making at the enterprise level 
on the one hand and the requirement for effi­
ciency on the other.” (p. 227). At this point it 
is worth mentioning that in his Sankt Gallen ex­
ile, Ota Sik worked out a third way for Social­
ist countries.
As a matter o f fact, the chapter on the 
Czechs gives a detailed account o f  economists 
who emigrated after 1968 and it duly describes 
foreign— Eastern and Western— influences as 
well.
The authors are of the opinion that, de­
spite the repression following 1968 and the resti­
tution o f party bigotry, econom ic science sur­
vived in Czechoslovakia because there was still 
some room left for research: one could write 
studies for a closed— institutional— circle; oth­
ers were confined to write “ for their shelves” 
only, although their works were here and there 
discussed by professional bodies; again, oth­
ers could take refuge in harmless professional 
jobs. This is the only chapter that mentions 
the contacts maintained with Western (Am eri­
can) colleagues and study trips abroad. There­
fore the vague reform attempts, albeit weak as 
they seemed (there is a list o f  them in the chap­
ter), and the upcom ing generation were not to­
tally unprepared for the turn; we have seen 
many a proof o f these facts ever since.
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E a st-G erm a n s  (Gunther Krause)
This story runs from 1945 till 1990. 
The approach o f the chapter differs radically 
from the guideline for the whole book, as de­
vised by the organizers; this is because Krause 
sets out from the premise that “interpreting the 
phenomena in the G D R  exclusively as a pre­
lude to its collapse not only leads too easily to 
one-sidedness, but also <  introduces the dan­
ger o f  grossly ignoring the question o f pos­
sible alternative courses within the historical 
con ste lla tion»." (p. 264). A few pages later, 
however, we are told that GDR-econom ists “in­
creasingly became convinced that economics in 
the G D R  had no m ajor im pact on econom ic pol­
icy or the development o f the economic sys­
tem ." (p. 266). Given these two theses, the au­
thor necessarily finds himself on a road where he 
gathers together considerable amounts o f data 
to explain events that were less and less in­
teresting, even for those who were protago­
nists in the overall process. It was their way of 
life. W hat was actually going on in their heads, 
if anything particular at all, we are not in­
formed about. The lengthy story told by 
Krause implies that the scholars o f socialist po­
litical economics in East Germany occasion­
ally might or might not say or write some­
thing; these desultory efforts were then fol­
lowed invariably by harsh reproach and, of 
course, self-criticism.
However, we know from the results—  
that is, from the time o f the implementation of 
the Neues Ökonomisches System  in 1962/63— 
that these economists had to scrutinize and dis­
semble the Soviet plan instruction system, along 
with its dual subordination and hozrastschot, 
in order to create a simpler and more clear- 
cut one, The “charm” in this was that the sta­
tistical data for the “ revised” system ’s produc­
tion associations (V V B s) corresponded with­
out a hitch to the lines and columns o f  the na­
tional econom y’s input-output tables. Never­
theless, we are not told anything o f this, nor do 
we learn how, around about 1970, the reorgani­
zation o f the same associations into giant com ­
bines (that functioned along largely different co­
ordination principles) was carried out. Given 
that none o f these achievements could be at­
tributed to this or that member o f  the Commu­
nist Party’s politburo, it would have been in­
teresting to have been enlightened on the sub­
ject o f policy implementation.
While showering us with lots o f data and 
bits o f facts, the author keeps quiet about some­
thing which occurred in the 1980s: namely, 
policy-makers in the G D R suddenly found that 
under the latest development trends o f the 
CMEA, their processing and machine industrial 
combines— as possible integrators of the joint 
development programmes— might help their 
country acquire extra benefits. Also, they 
thought that their own planning methods and 
control system could, after a little rewriting and 
simplification, become the practice o f plan co­
ordination (joint planning).
Since Gunther Krause does not have 
anything to say about the above, there is not 
much left for him to write about other than Hel­
mut Koziolek et alia who published, and ruled, 
under the name Autorenkollektiv, he mentions 
Gunther Kohlmey, who started out as a sort 
o f hero from the Freiburg school and who, by 
G D R  standards, stumbled from one revisionism 
to the other. Nevertheless, the long list o f liter­
ature may one day be useful for historians o f sci­
ence or ideology.
Y u gosla vs  (Vladimir Gligorov)
This last chapter should enable the read­
er to become acquainted with the development 
o f economic thought in Yugoslavia. Alas, the 
author declares in the very first note that this is 
not his intention. In fact, there is not a word on 
the following pages on the biggest achievement 
o f this country’s social scientists: that is, the 
system o f self-management ( “organizations of 
associated labour"), along with market contacts 
(which were a specific form of dominant collec­
tive ownership). We never learn who developed 
it nor how it operated. As for the “ father o f de­
nationalization” , Edvard Kardelj, the first o f 
his works referred to dates from as late as 1978. 
Where the short study begins— that is, “ the sec­
ond model o f socialism” — suggests that an ear­
lier system had long been in existence since the 
first sentence states: “The main subject o f Yu­
goslav economics after World War II was sys­
temic reform.” (p. 329). It is true that the sys­
tem was being reformed practically all the time, 
but scholars never actually questioned the foun­
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dations o f  the system . T he ones who at­
tem pted to  d o  this becam e fam ous abroad. 
Those w ho stayed at hom e becam e hapless on­
lookers o f  econom ic processes right up un­
til both  the federation and system  fell apart. 
This is where G ligorov ’s study starts to  be­
com e inform ative (bu t not before he lists a full 
page o f  reform s from  1952 till 1988, and on a few 
m ore pages he reviews the main issues concern­
ing the debates around them ). T he author fi­
nally arrives, in the second half o f  the chap­
ter, at the key issue: i.e. the intellectual ten­
dencies o f  the protracted period o f  decay, be­
ginning with the so-called humanist Marxists 
rallying around the one-tim e Praxis in Za­
greb, and continued with the expanding na­
tionalist and leftist (or rather centrist) Social­
ist group. W e learn that, over a period o f  time, 
trade had becom e m ore professional and prac­
tical, m ainly under Western influence. Never­
theless, the liberal approach which prevails to­
day did not em erge until the collapse o f  the fed­
eration. In this part we are presented with in­
teresting details about how som e economists
worked together in order to justify the désin­
tégration (eventually, every part o f the coun­
try felt that it was them and only them who 
was being exploited by the rest). Thus, fol­
lowing the collapse, not untalented individu­
als set out to implement the tasks o f  the day; 
former m ajor figures like Branko Horvat, tried 
to carry on with business as usual. The chap­
ter is closed by an excellent list o f literature; 
those interested can find the titles o f the very 
works on the development o f theory, the subject 
o f which they might have missed in the study it­
self.
At the end o f the book there are short bi­
ographies o f nineteen outstanding economists 
who have been referred to. The most excit­
ing o f these is Miroslav Toms o f  Prague; at the 
time o f  his premature death at the age o f 44 
in 1988, he had created a school without hav­
ing made a name abroad. O f the Hungari­
ans, the biographies o f János Kornai, György 
P éter  and István Varga are included.
K. LÁNYI
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Corrigeuduni
In the previous issue o f  Acta Oeconomica (Vol. 49, Nos 3-4) on p. 380 in the study by I. J. Toth entitled “Inter- 
enterprise ownership links in Hungary instead o f Table 3 a wrong table has appeared. Here is the correct table.
Table 3
Distribution o f firms according to the number o f their own enterprise (percent)0
Distribution o f medium-size 
enterprises (FIRM 96) with given
and large 
amount shares
Distribution o f the largest manufacturing 
com panies (E XP O R T96) with given amount o f  shares
Number o f 
enterprises
T hey have 
ownership 
shares
Their share 
is over 
25 percent
Their share 
is over 
50 percent
T h ey have 
ownership 
shares
Their share 
is over 
25 percent
Their share 
is over 
50 percent
None - 27.0 43.0 - 28.4 40.0
One 36.6 34.0 25.0 42.1 30.2 35.1
Tw o 21.8 13.0 13.0 16.6 15.6 12.4
Three 13.9 6.0 4.0 13.7 11.3 6.1
Four 4.0 6.0 5.0 6.2 5.7 0.9
Five 6.9 3.0 2.0 5.8 0.8 0.0
Six o f more 13.9 11.0 8.0 15.7 8.0 5.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 101.0 100.0 100.0 102.0 95.0 96.0
Average num ber 
o f  firms 3.38 2.1 1.6 3.62 2.1 1.2
Standard deviation 3.71 2.7 2.2 4.52 3.3 1.6
“ Am ong firms which had investments in other companies and answered the questions regarding their ownership shares.
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